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ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES

BY

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UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

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PREFACE.

THE essays and addresses contained in this volume are selected from a large mass of material left by Sir Richard Jebb. I publish them in the desire to save from oblivion some portion of his minor literary work, which occupied the spare moments of a busy life. Of the papers thus brought together, some were contributed to reviews and magazines, while others were written in response to the many requests that came to him from various schools and societies; requests it was a pleasure to him to grant, if they could be fitted in with his other duties. It was always his desire to give what aid he could in the cause of letters or education. Most of these writings were struck off under pressure of many engagements. Systematic they are not, yet neither are they mere fragments. Each is, in a sense, complete in itself, and all seem to bear the mark of his distinctive handling.

I am greatly indebted to Mr S. H. Butcher, M.P., for his assistance in making this selection;

to Dr Verrall for consenting to correct the proofs and see the book through the Press; and to Mr R. T. Wright for much valuable counsel.

That I am allowed to republish *Humanism in Education* is due to the kind offices of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford, who obtained this permission for me from the Trustees of the Romanes Fund.

My sincere thanks are also due to Messrs Macmillan & Co., to Messrs Longman & Co., to the Editor of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, and to the Editor of *Hellenica*, for permitting me to include in this volume articles published in the first instance by them.

CAROLINE JEBB.

CAMBRIDGE,
April, 1907.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
The Genius of Sophocles	1
Pindar	41
The Age of Pericles	104
Ancient Organs of Public Opinion	127
Lucian	164
Delos	193
Cæsar: a Sketch. By J. A. Froude, M.A.	279
Erasmus	323
The Speeches of Thucydides	359
Suidas on the Change ascribed to Sophocles in regard to Trilogies	446
Samuel Johnson	479
Humanism in Education	506
On Present Tendencies in Classical Studies	545
The Influence of the Greek Mind on Modern Life	560
The Work of the Universities for the Nation, Past and Present	581
An Address delivered at the Mason College	609
University Education and National Life	624

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THE GENIUS OF SOPHOCLES[1].

THE most brilliantly joyous of all comedies were brought out in a city vexed during the years that gave them birth by every kind of misery in turn; by want and pestilence, by faction and the mutual distrust of citizens, by defeat on land and sea, by the sense of abasement and the presage of ruin. During more than twenty years of war Aristophanes was the best public teacher of Athens; but there were times when distraction was more needed than advice. One of the best of his plays belongs to the number of those which were meant simply to amuse the town at a time when it would have been useless to lash it. The comedy of the "Frogs" came out in a season of gloomy suspense—just after Athens had made a last effort in equipping a fleet, and was waiting for decisive news from the seat of war; in January of 405 B.C., eight months before Ægospotami and about fifteen months before the taking of Athens by Lysander. A succession of disasters and seditions had worn out the political life of the city;

[1] A Lecture delivered in Dublin before the Society for Afternoon Lectures on Literature and Art.

patriotic satire could no longer find scope in public affairs, for there were no longer any vital forces which it could either stimulate or combat. Nor could the jaded minds of men at such a time easily rise into a region of pure fancy, as when nine years before, on the eve of the last crisis in the war, Aristophanes had helped them to forget scandals of impiety and misgovernment on a voyage to his city in the clouds. What remained was to seek comfort or amusement in the past; and since the political past could give neither, then in the literary past—in the glories, fading now like other glories, of art and poetry.

It was now just fifty years since the death of Æschylus. It was only a few months since news had come from Macedonia of the death of Euripides. More lately still, at the end of the year before, Sophocles had closed a life blessed from its beginning by the gods and now happy in its limit; for, as in his boyhood he had led the pæan after Salamis, so he died too soon to hear the dirge of Imperial Athens—the cry, raised in the Peiræus and caught up from point to point through the line of the Long Walls, which carried up from the harbour to the town the news of the overthrow on the Hellespont.

With the death of Euripides and the death of Sophocles so recent, and no man living who seemed able to replace them, it might well seem to an Athenian that the series of the tragic masters was closed. In the "Frogs" Aristophanes supposes Dionysus, the god of dramatic inspiration, going

down to the shades, to bring back to Athens, beggared of poets and unable to live without them, the best poet that could be found below. It is hard to imagine anything more pathetic than an Athenian audience listening, at just that time, to that comedy in the theatre of Dionysus; in view of the sea over which their empire was even then on its last trial; surrounded by the monuments of an empire over art which had already declined—in the building, at once theatre and temple, which the imagination of the poets lately dead had long peopled with the divine or heroic shapes known to them and their fathers, but in which, they might well forebode, the living inspiration of the god would never be so shown forth again.

The interest of the comedy does not depend, however, merely on its character of epilogue to a school of tragic drama so masterly, of so short an actual life, of so perpetual an influence; it takes another kind of interest from the justness of its implicit criticism; the criticism of a man whose wit would not have borne the test of centuries and the harder test of translation, if he had not joined to a quick fancy the qualities which make a first-rate critic.

When Dionysus reaches the lower world, an uproar is being raised among the dead. It has been the custom that the throne of Tragedy, next to Pluto's own, shall be held by a laureate for the time being, subject to removal on the coming of a better. For some time Æschylus has held the

place of honour. Euripides, however, has just come down ; the newer graces of his style, which he lost no time in showing off, have taken the crowd ; and their applause has moved him to claim the tragic throne. Æschylus refuses to yield. As the only way of settling the dispute, scales are brought ; the weightiest things which the rivals can offer are compared ; and at last the balance inclines for Æschylus. But where, in the meantime, is Sophocles ? He, too, is in the world of the dead, having come down just after Euripides. "Did he" (asked Xanthias, the slave of Dionysus) "lay no claim to the chair ?" "No, indeed, not he," answers Æacus : "No—he kissed Æschylus as soon as he came down, and shook hands with him ; and Æschylus yielded the throne to him. But just now he meant, Cleidemides said, to hold himself in reserve, and, if Æschylus won, to stay quiet ; if not, he said he would try a bout with *Euripides*."

It is in this placing of Sophocles relatively to the disputants, even more than in the account of the contest, that Aristophanes has shown his appreciativeness. While he seems to aim merely at marking by a passing touch the good-humoured courtesy of Sophocles, he has, with the happiness of a real critic, pointed out his place as a poet. The behaviour of Sophocles in the "Frogs" just answers to his place in the literary history of his age. This place is fixed chiefly by the fact that Sophocles was a poet who did not seek to be a

prophet ; who was before all things an artist ; and who, living in the quiet essence of art, represented the mind of his day less by bringing into relief any set tendencies than by seizing in its highest unity the total spirit of the world in which he lived and of the legendary world in which his fancy moved, and bringing the conflicts of this twofold world into obedience, as far as possible, to the first law of his own nature—harmony. The workings of this instinct of harmony will be best seen, first, by viewing Sophocles as a poet in two broad aspects—in regard to his treatment of the heroic legends and in his relation to the social ideas of the age of Pericles ; next, by considering two of his special qualities—the quality which has been called his irony, and his art of drawing character.

The national religion of Greece was based upon genealogy. It carried back the mind by an unbroken ascent from living men to heroes or half-gods who had been their forefathers in the flesh, and thence to gods from whom these heroes had sprung. The strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest part ; enfeeblement of belief in the heroes implied enfeeblement of belief in the gods. The decreasing vividness of faith in the heroes is the index of failing life in the Greek national religion.

At the beginning of the fifth century before Christ this belief in the heroes was real and living. The Persian Wars were wars of race, the first general conflict of Hellene with barbarian ; and

it was natural that in such a conflict the Greek mind should turn with longing and trust towards those kindred heroes of immortal blood who long ago had borne arms for Achaia against Asia. It was told how, on the day of Marathon, the Athenian ranks had been cheered by the sudden presence among them of Theseus; while through the press of battle two other combatants had been seen to pass in more than earthly strength, the hero Echetlus and he who had given his name to the field. Just before the fight at Salamis a Greek ship was sent with offerings to the tombs of the Æacidæ in Ægina; and when the pæan sounded and the fleets closed, the form of a colossal warrior was seen to move over the battle, and the Greeks knew that the greatest of the Æacid line, the Telamonian Ajax, was with them that day, as he had been with their fathers at Troy.

But from the moment when the united Greek effort against Persia was over, the old belief which it had made to start up in a last glow began to die out. The causes of this decline were chiefly three. First, the division of once-united Greece into two camps—the Athenian and the Spartan,—a division which tended to weaken all sentiments based on the idea of a common blood; and the belief in the heroes as an order was one of these sentiments. Secondly, the advance of democracy, which tended to create a jealous feeling and a sarcastic tone in regard to the claims of the old families; chief among which claims was that of

kinship with the gods through the heroes. Thirdly, the birth of an historical sense. Before the Persian crisis history had been represented among the Greeks only by local or family traditions. The Wars of Liberation had given to Herodotus the first genuinely historical inspiration felt by a Greek. These wars showed him that there was a corporate life, higher than that of the city, of which the story might be told; and they offered to him as a subject the drama of the collision between East and West. With him, the spirit of history was born into Greece; and his work, called after the nine Muses, was indeed the first utterance of Clio. The historical spirit was the form in which the general scepticism of the age acted on the belief in the heroic legends. For Herodotus himself, the heroes are still godlike. But for Thucydides, towards the end of the century, the genuine hero-ship of Agamemnon and Pelops is no more; he criticises their probable resources and motives as he might have discussed the conduct or the income of a contemporary. They are real to him; but they are real as men; and, for that very reason, unreal as claimants of a half-divine character.

The great cycles of heroic legends furnished the principal subjects of Attic tragedy. Three distinct methods of treating these legends appear in Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.

The spirit of Æschylus is in all things more Hellenic than Athenian. The Pan-hellenic heroism of which in the struggle with Persia he had himself

been a witness and a part is the very inspiration of his poetry. For him those heroes who were the common pride of the Greek race are true demigods. In his dramas they stand as close to the gods as in the Iliad ; and more than in the Iliad do they tower above men. With him their distinctive attribute is majesty ; a majesty rather Titanic than in the proper Greek sense heroic. What, it may be asked, is the basis of this Titanic majesty ? It would be easy to say that the effect is wrought partly by pomp and weight of language, partly by vagueness of outline. But the essential reason appears to be another. The central idea of Greek tragedy is the conflict between free-will and fate. In Æschylus this conflict takes its simplest and therefore grandest form. No subtle contrivance, no complexity of purposes, breaks the direct shock of the collision between man and destiny. Agamemnon before the Fury of his house is even as Prometheus facing Zeus.

In thus imagining the heroes as distinctly superhuman, and as claiming the sympathy of men rather by a bare grandeur of agony than by any closely-understood affinity of experience, Æschylus was striving to sustain a belief which had not gone out of his age, but which was dying. In his mid-career, about ten years before his Oresteia, the so-called relics of Theseus found at Scyros were brought to Athens by Cimon and laid in a shrine specially built for them. The distinctly religious enthusiasm then shown implies the old faith. It is hard to suppose that a like incident could have

brought out a like public feeling even thirty years later.

Euripides, towards the end of the century, stood in nearly the same relation to his contemporaries as that of Æschylus to his at the beginning: that is, he was in general agreement with their beliefs, but held to some things from which they were going further and further away. The national religion was now all but dead. By the side of philosophic scepticism had come up the spurious scepticism which teachers of rhetoric had made popular. The devotional need, so far as it was felt, was usually satisfied by rituals or mysteries brought in from abroad; the old creed was not often attacked, but there was a tacit understanding among "able" men that it was to be taken allegorically; and a dim, silently spreading sense of this had further weakened its hold upon the people. What, then, was a tragic poet to do? The drama was an act of worship; the consecrated mythology must still supply the greatest number of its subjects. Euripides solved the problem partly by realism, partly by antiquarianism. He presented the hero as a man, reflecting the mind as well as speaking the dialect of the day; and he made the legend, where he could, illustrate local Attic tradition. The reason why this treatment failed, so far as it failed, has not always been accurately stated. Euripides has sometimes been judged as if his poetical fault had been in bringing down half-gods to the level of men and surrounding them with mean and ludicrous troubles. Probably this notion has been

strengthened by the scene in the "Acharnians" (the really pointed criticisms of Aristophanes upon Euripides are to be found elsewhere), in which the needy citizen calls on Euripides and begs for some of the rags in which he has been wont to clothe his heroes; and the tragic poet tells his servant to look for the rags of Telephus between those of Thyestes and those of Ino. But the very strength of Euripides lay in a deep and tender compassion for human suffering: if he had done nothing worse to his heroes than to give them rags and crutches, his power could have kept for them at least the sympathy due to the sordid miseries of men; he would only have substituted a severely human for an ideal pathos. His real fault lay in the admission of sophistic debate. A drama cannot be an artistic whole in which the powers supposed to control the issues of the action represent a given theory of moral government, while the agents are from time to time employing the resources of rhetorical logic to prove that this theory is either false or doubtful.

Between these two contrasted conceptions—the austere transcendentalism of Æschylus and the sophistic realism of Euripides—stands the conception of Sophocles. But Sophocles is far nearer to Æschylus than to Euripides; since Sophocles and Æschylus have this affinity, that the art of both is ideal. The heroic form is in outline almost the same for Sophocles as for Æschylus; but meanwhile there has passed over it such a change as came over the statue on which the sculptor gazed

until the stone began to kindle with the glow of a responsive life, and what just now was a blank faultlessness of beauty became loveliness warmed by a human soul. Sophocles lived in the ancestral legends of Greece otherwise than Æschylus lived in them. Æschylus felt the grandeur and the terror of their broadest aspects, their interpretation of the strongest human impulses, their commentary on problems of destiny : Sophocles dwelt on their details with the intent, calm joy of artistic meditation ; believing their divineness ; finding in them a typical reconciliation of forces which in real life are never absolutely reconciled—a concord such as the musical instinct of his nature assured him must be the ultimate law ; recognizing in them, too, scope for the free exercise of imagination in moral analysis, without breaking the bounds of reverence ; for, while these legends express the conflict between necessity and free-will, they leave shadowy all that conflict within the man himself which may precede the determination of the will.

The heroic persons of the Sophoclean drama are at once human and ideal. They are made human by the distinct and continuous portrayal of their chief feelings, impulses, and motives. Their ideality is preserved chiefly in two ways. First, the poet avoids too minute a moral analysis ; and so each character, while its main tendencies are exhibited, still remains generic, a type rather than a portrait. Secondly—and this is of higher moment—the persons of the drama are ever under the directly manifested,

immediately felt control of the gods and of fate. There is, indeed, no collision of forces so abrupt as in Æschylus; since the ampler unfolding of character serves to foreshow, and sometimes to delay, the catastrophe. On the other hand, there is no trace of that competition between free thought and the principle of authority which is often so jarring in the plots of Euripides. In the dramas of Sophocles there is perfect unity of moral government; and the development of human motives, while it heightens the interest of the action, serves to illustrate the power of the gods.

The method by which Sophocles thus combines humanity with idealism may be seen in the cases of Ajax, of Œdipus, and of Heracles.

Ajax had been deprived of the arms of Achilles by the award of the Atreidæ. The goddess Athene, whom he had angered by arrogance, had seized the opportunity of his disappointment and rage to strike him with madness. In this frenzy he had fallen upon the flocks and herds of the Greek army on the plain of Troy, and had butchered or tortured them, thinking that he was wreaking vengeance on his enemies. When he comes to his senses, he is overpowered by a sense of his disgrace, and destroys himself.

The central person of this drama becomes human in the hands of Sophocles by the natural delineation of his anguish on the return to sanity. Ajax feels the new shame added to his repulse as any man of honour would feel it. At the same time he stands

above men. An ideal or heroic character is lent to him, partly by the grandeur with which two feelings —remorse, and the sense that his dishonour must be effaced by death—absolutely predominate over all other emotions, as over pity for Tecmessa and his son; chiefly by his terrible nearness to Athene, as one whom with her own voice she had once urged to battle, promising her aid—when, face to face with her, he vaunted his independence of her, and provoked her anger;—then, as the blinded victim whom she, his pretended ally, had stung into the senseless slaughter—lastly, as the conscious, broken-hearted sufferer of her chastisement.

In the farewell of Ajax to Tecmessa and the seamen who had come with him from Salamis to Troy—a farewell really final, but disguised as temporary under a sustained (though possibly unconscious) irony—the human and the heroic elements are thus blended:—

"All things the long and countless years first draw from darkness, then bury from light; and nothing is past hope, but there is confusion even for the dreadful oath and for the stubborn will. For even I, I once so wondrous firm, like iron in the dipping felt my keen edge dulled by yon woman's words; and I have ruth to leave her a widow with my foes, and the boy an orphan. But I will go to the sea-waters and the meadows by the shore, that in the purging of my stains I may flee the heavy anger of the goddess.... Henceforth I shall know how to yield to the gods and learn to revere the

Atreidæ: they are rulers, so we must submit. Of course, dread things and things most potent bow to office. Thus it is that the snow-strewn winters give place to fruitful summer; and thus Night's weary round makes room for Day with her white horses to kindle light; and the breath of dreadful winds at last gives slumber to the groaning sea; and, like the rest, almighty Sleep looses whom he has bound, nor holds with an eternal grasp. And *we*, shall we not learn discretion? I chiefly, for I have newly learned that our enemy is to be hated but so far as one who will hereafter be a friend; and towards a friend I would wish so far to show aid and service as knowing that he will not always abide. For to most men the haven of friendship is false. But all this will be well.—Woman, go thou within, and pray to the gods that in all fulness the desires of my heart may be fulfilled. And do ye, friends, honour my wishes even as she does, and bid Teucer, when he come, have care for me and good-will to you as well. For I will go whither I must pass,—but do ye what I bid; and perchance, perchance, though now I suffer, ye will hear that I have found rest."

The story of Œdipus is more complex; alternations of alarm and relief, of confidence and despair, attend the gradual unravelling of his history; the miseries which crowd upon him at the last discovery seem to exhaust the possibilities of sorrow. A character so variously tried is necessarily laid open; and Œdipus is perhaps the best known to us of all the persons of Sophocles. Antigone, Electra,

Philoctetes are not less human; but no such glare of lightning flashes in the depths of their natures. At the opening of the play how perfect an embodiment of assured greatness is Œdipus the King, bending with stately tenderness to the trouble of the Theban folk:—

"O my children, latest-born to Cadmus who was of old, why bow ye to me thus beseeching knees, with the wreathed bough of the suppliant in your hands, while the city reeks with incense, rings with prayers for health and cries of woe? I deemed it unmeet, my children, to learn of these things from the mouth of others, and am come here myself, I, whom all men call Œdipus the famous."

And how thoroughly answering to this is the tone in which the priest, the leader of the suppliants, tells the trouble and the faith of Thebes:—

"A blight is on it in the fruit-guarding blossoms of the land, in the herds among the pastures, in the barren pangs of women; and withal that fiery god, the dreadful Plague, has swooped on us, and ravages the town; by whom the house of Cadmus is made waste, but dark Hades rich in groans and tears.

"It is not that we deem thee ranked with gods that I and these children are suppliants at thy hearth; but as deeming thee first of men, not only in life's common chances, but when men have to do with the immortals; thou who camest to the town of Cadmus and didst rid us of the tax that we paid to the hard songstress,—and this, though thou knewest nothing from us that could help thee, nor hadst been schooled;

no, with a god's aid, as we say and deem, didst thou uplift our life.

"And now, Œdipus, name glorious in all eyes, we beseech thee, all we suppliants, to find for us some succour; whether thou wottest of it by the whisper of a god, or knowest it in the power of man."

Then comes the oracle, announcing that the land is thus plagued because it harbours the unknown murderer of Laius; the pity of Œdipus is quickened into a fiery zeal for discovery and atonement; and he appeals to the prophet Teiresias:—

"Teiresias, whose soul grasps all things, the lore that may be told and the unspeakable, the secrets of heaven and the low things of the earth,—thou feelest, though thou canst not see, what a plague doth haunt our state,—from which, great prophet, we find in thee our protector and only saviour. Now, Phœbus —if perchance thou knowest it not from the messengers—sent answer to our question that the only riddance from this pest which could come to us was if we should learn aright the slayers of Laius, and slay them, or send them into exile from our land. Do thou, then, grudge neither voice of birds nor any other way of seer-lore that thou hast, but save thyself and the state and me, and take away all the taint of the dead. For in thee is our hope; and a man's noblest task is to help others by his best means and powers."

Teiresias is silent: the taunts of Œdipus at last sting him into uttering his secret—*Œdipus* is the

murderer: and thenceforward, through indignation, scorn, agonized suspense, the human passion mounts until it bursts forth in the last storm.

And now the human element of the history has been worked out. Œdipus has passed to the limit of earthly anguish; and, as if with his self-inflicted blindness had come clearer spiritual sight, he begins to feel a presentiment of some further, peculiar doom. "Suffer me to dwell on the hills," he asks of Creon, "that there I may die. And yet thus much I know, that neither sickness nor aught else shall destroy me; for I should never have been saved on the verge of death except for some *strange* ill." The second play of Sophocles—"Œdipus at Colonus"—has pervading it the calm of an assurance into which this first troubled foreboding has settled down: Œdipus, already in spirit separate from men, has found at Colonus the destined haven of his wanderings, and only awaits the summons out of life. At last from the darkness of the sacred cavern the voice long-waited for is heard,—"Œdipus, Œdipus, why do we tarry?" And the eye-witness of his passing says, "Not the fiery bolt of the god took him away, nor the tumult of sea-storm in that hour, but either a summoner from heaven, or the deep place of the dead opened to him in love, without a pang. For the man was ushered forth, not with groans nor in sickness or pain, but beyond all mortals, wondrously."

As Œdipus, first shown in the vividness of a tortured humanity, is then raised above men by

keen spiritual anguish, so it is earthly passion and bodily suffering which give a human interest to Heracles the very son of Zeus. He stands by the altar on Mount Cenæum, doing sacrifice to his Olympian Father for the taking of Œchalia; clad in the robe which his messenger, Lichas, has just brought him as the gift of Deianeira; the robe which she has secretly anointed with the blood of the Centaur Nessus, believing this to be a charm which shall win back to her the love of Heracles. What follows is thus told:—

"At first, hapless one, he prayed with cheerful heart, rejoicing in his comely garb. But when the flame of sacrifice began to blaze from the holy offerings and from the resinous wood, sweat broke out upon his flesh, and the tunic clung to his sides, and at every joint, close-glued as if by workman's hand; and there came a biting pain twitching at his bones; and then the venom as of a deadly, cruel adder began to eat him.

"Then it was that he cried out on the unhappy Lichas, in nowise guilty for *thy* crime, asking with what thoughts he brought this robe; and he, knowing nothing, hapless man, said that he had only brought thy gift, as he was charged. Then Heracles, as he heard it, and as a piercing spasm clutched his lungs, caught him by the foot, where the ankle hinges in the socket, and flung him at a rock washed on both sides by the sea; and Lichas has his white brain oozing through his hair, as the skull is cloven and the blood scattered therewith.

"But all the people lifted up a voice of anguish and of awe, since one was frenzied and the other slain; and no one dared to come before the man. For he was twitched to the ground and into the air, howling, shrieking; and the rocks rang around,—the steep Locrian headlands and Eubœa's capes. But when he was worn out with ofttimes throwing himself in his misery on the ground and often making loud lament, while he reviled his ill-starred wedlock with thee and his marriage into the house of Œneus, saying how he had found in it the ruin of his life—then, out of the flame and smoke that beset him, he lifted his distorted eye and saw me in the great host, weeping; and he looked at me, and called me, 'Son, come here, do not flee my woe, even if thou must die with me—come, bear me out of the crowd, and set me, if thou canst, in a place where no man shall see me; or, if thou hast any pity, at least convey me with all speed out of this land, and let me not die on this spot.'"

Presently Heracles himself is brought before the eyes of the spectators. In the lamentation wrung from him by his torment two strains are clear above the rest, and each is a strain of thoroughly human anguish. He contrasts the strength in which, through life, he has been the champion of helpless men—"ofttimes on the sea and in all forests ridding them of plagues"—with his own helpless misery in this hour; and he contrasts the greatness of the work to which he had seemed called with the weakness of the agent who has arrested it:—

"Ah me, whose hands and shoulders have borne full many a fiery trial and evil to tell! But never yet hath the wife of Zeus or the hated Eurystheus laid on me aught so dreadful as this woven snare of the Furies, which the daughter of Œneus, falsely fair, hath fastened on my shoulders, and by which I perish. Glued to my sides, it has eaten away my flesh to the bone; it is ever with me, sucking the channels of my breath; already it has drained my vigorous blood, and in all my body I am marred, the thrall of these unutterable bonds. Not the warrior on the battle-field, not the giant's earthborn host, nor the might of wild beasts, nor Hellas, nor the land of the alien, nor all the lands that I have visited and purged, have done unto me thus; but a woman, a weak woman, born not to the strength of man, alone, alone has struck me down without a sword.

"O King Hades, receive me!—Smite me, O flash of Zeus! O King, O Father, dash, hurl thy thunderbolt upon me! Again the pest eats me—it has blazed up, it has started into fury! O hands, hands, O shoulders and breast and trusty arms, ye, ye in this plight, are they who once tamed by force the haunter of Nemea, the scourge of herdsmen, the lion whom no man might approach or face—who tamed the hydra of Lerna and the host of monsters of double form, man joined to horse, with whom none might mingle, fierce, lawless, of surpassing might—tamed the Erymanthian beast and the three-headed dog of Hades underground, an appalling foe, offspring of the dread Echidna,—tamed the serpent

who guards the golden apples in earth's utmost clime. And of other toils ten thousand I had taste, and no man got a trophy from my hands. But now with joint thus wrenched from joint, with frame torn to shreds, I have been wrecked by this blind curse—I, who am named son of noblest mother—I, who was called the offspring of starry Zeus!"

Anon he learns that the venom which is devouring him is the poisoned blood of his old enemy, the Centaur Nessus. That knowledge gives him at once the calm certainty of death; and now, in the nearness of the passage to his Father, there arises, triumphant over bodily torment, the innate, tranquil strength of his immortal origin. He sees in this last chapter of his earthly ordeal the foreordained purpose of Zeus:—

"It was foreshown to me by my Father of old that I should die by no creature that had the breath of life, but by one who was dead and a dweller in Hades. So this monster, the Centaur, even as the god's will had been foreshown, slew me, a living man, when he was dead."

He directs that he shall be carried to the top of Mount Œta, above Trachis, sacred to Zeus; that a funeral pyre shall there be raised, and he, while yet living, laid upon it; that so the flame which frees his spirit from the flesh may in the same moment bear it up to Zeus. No one of the sacred places of Greece was connected with a legend of such large meaning, with one which was so much a world-legend, as this mountain-summit looking over the

waters of the Malian Gulf. As generation after generation came to the struggle with plagues against which there arose no new deliverer, weary eyes must often have been turned to the height on which the first champion of men had won his late release from the steadfast malignity of fate; where, in the words of the Chorus foreboding the return of Philoctetes to Trachis, "the great warrior, wrapt in heavenly fire, drew near to all the gods." It is Sophocles in the "Trachiniæ" who has given the noblest and the most complete expression to this legend; showing Heracles, first, as the son of Zeus suffering for men and sharing their pain; then, towards the end of his torments, as already god-like in the clear knowledge of his Father's will and of his own coming change to perfect godhead.

One aspect of the poetry of Sophocles has now been noticed; the character of the treatment applied by him to those legends which supplied the chief material of Greek tragedy. It has been pointed out that the heroes of Æschylus are essentially superhuman; that the heroes of Euripides are essentially human, and often of a low human type; that the heroes of Sophocles are at once human and superhuman: human generically, by the expression of certain general human qualities; superhuman, partly by the very strength in which these qualities are portrayed, partly by the direct relation of the persons with supernatural powers. It has been seen further that these three styles of handling correspond with successive phases of contemporary belief; the ten-

dency of Greek thought in the fifth century B.C. having been gradually to lower the ideal stature of the ancestral demigods.

But this change of feeling towards the myths is not the only change of which account has to be taken. The spirit of dramatic poetry was influenced, less directly, yet broadly, by the current of political change.

At the beginning of the fifth century B.C. Athens was a limited democracy; at the close of the century it was an absolute democracy. Three periods may be marked in the transition. The first includes the new growth of democracy at Athens, springing from the common effort against Persia—the reform of Aristeides and the reform of Pericles. Its net result was the formal maturing of the democracy by the removal of a few old limitations. The second period is one of rest. It covers those thirty years during which the recent abolition of conservative checks was compensated by the controlling power of Pericles, and there was "in name a democracy, but in fact government by the leading man[1]." The third period, beginning at the death of Pericles, at last shows the mature democracy in its normal working. The platform for a leader of the people which Pericles had first set up remains; it is held by a series of men subservient to the people; and the result is the sovereignty of the ecclesia. Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides represent respectively the first, second, and third of these periods.

[1] Thucyd. ii. 65.

Æschylus, whose mind was heated to its highest glow by the common Greek effort against Persia and thenceforth kept the impress of that time, was through life democratic just so far as Athens was democratic at the end of the Persian Wars. On the one hand, he shared the sense of civic equality created by common labours and perils. On the other hand, he held to the old religion of Greece and Athens, to the family traditions bound up with it and to the constitutional forms consecrated by both. His greatest trilogy, the Oresteia, marks the end of the first period just defined; and its third play, the "Eumenides," is a symbol of his political creed. On the one hand, it exalts Theseus, peculiarly the hero of the democracy; on the other, it protests against the withdrawal of a moral censorship from the Areiopagus.

Euripides, in the last third of the century, is a democrat living under a democracy which disappointed his theory. His constant praise of the farmer-class is meaning; he liked them because they were the citizens who had least to do with the violence of the ecclesia. It was the sense of this violence—the hopeless bane, as he thought it, of the democracy—which hindered him from having a thorough interest in the public affairs of the city and from drawing any vigorous or continuous life for his poetry from that source. It was natural that he should have been one of the literary men who towards the end of the war emigrated from Athens to Macedonia. The strain of social criticism, often

rather querulous, which runs through his plays gives them, in one respect, a tone strange to Attic tragedy. An Athenian dramatist at the festivals was a citizen addressing fellow-citizens; not only a religious but a certain political sympathy was supposed to exist between them. Æschylus and Sophocles, in their different ways, both make this political sympathy felt as part of their inspiration; Euripides has little or nothing of it. He shares the pride of his fellow-citizens in the historical or legendary glories of the city; as for the present, he is a critic standing apart.

More thoroughly than Æschylus in the first period or Euripides in the third, is Sophocles a representative poet in the second period of the century. The years from about 460 to about 430 B.C. have been called the Age of Pericles. The chief external characteristic of the time so called is plain enough. It was the age of the best Athenian culture; a moment for Greece such as the Florentine renaissance was for Europe; the age especially of sculpture, of architecture, and of the most perfect dramatic poetry. But is there any general intellectual characteristic, any distinctive idea, which can be recognized as common to all the various efforts of that age? The distinctive idea of the Periclean age seems to have been that of Pericles himself; the desire to reconcile progress with tradition. Pericles looked forward and backward: forward, to the development of knowledge and art; backward, to the past from which Athens had derived an inheritance of moral and religious

law. He had the force both to make his own idea the ruling idea in all the intellectual activity of his age, and to give to his age the political rest demanded for this task of harmonizing the spiritual past and future of a people. Thucydides—a trustworthy witness for the leading thoughts if not for the words of Pericles—makes him dwell on the way in which two contrasted elements had come to be tempered in the life of Athens. After describing the intellectual tolerance, the flexibility and gladness of Athenian social life, Pericles goes on: "Thus genial in our private intercourse, in public things we are kept from lawlessness mainly by fear, obedient to the magistrates of the time and to the laws—especially to those laws which are set for the help of the wronged, *and to those unwritten laws of which the sanction is a tacit shame*[1]."

It is by this twofold characteristic—on the one hand, sympathy with progressive culture, on the other hand, reverence for immemorial, unwritten law—that Sophocles is the poet of the Periclean Age. There are two passages which, above all others in his plays, are expressive of these two feelings. One is a chorus in the "Antigone"; the other is a chorus in the "Œdipus Tyrannus." One celebrates the inventiveness of man; the other insists upon his need for purity.

In the "Antigone" the Chorus exalts the might of the gods by measuring against it those human faculties which it alone can overcome:—

[1] Thucyd. ii. 37.

"Wonders are many, but nothing is more wonderful than Man; that power which walks the whitening sea before the stormy south, making a path amid engulfing surges; and Earth, the eldest of the gods, the immortal, the unwearied, doth it wear, turning the soil with the race of horses as the ploughs go to and fro from year to year.

"And the careless tribe of birds, the nations of the angry beasts, the deep sea's ocean-brood he snares in the meshes of his woven wiles, he leads captive, man excellent in wit. He conquers by his arts the beast that walks in the wilds of the hills, he tames the horse with shaggy mane, he puts its yoke on its neck, he tames the stubborn mountain-bull.

"And speech, and wind-swift thought, and all the moods that mould a state hath he taught himself; and how to flee the shafts of frost beneath the clear, unsheltering sky, and the arrows of the stormy rain.

"All-providing is he; unprovided he meets nothing that must come. Only from death shall he not win deliverance; yet from hard sicknesses hath he devised escapes.

"Cunning beyond fancy's dreams is that resourceful skill which brings him now to evil, anon to good. When he honours the laws of the land, proudly stands his city: no city hath he who in his rashness harbours sin. Never may he share my hearth, never think my thoughts, who doth these things!"

In the "Œdipus Tyrannus" the Chorus is in-

directly commenting on the scorn for oracles just expressed by Iocastê :—

"Mine be the lot to win a reverent purity in all words and deeds sanctioned by those laws of sublime range, brought forth in the wide, clear sky, whose birth is of Olympus alone ; which no brood of mortal men begat ; which forgetfulness shall never lay to sleep. Strong in these is the god, and grows not old.

"Insolence breeds the tyrant ; Insolence, once blindly gorged with plenty, with things which are not fit or good, when it hath scaled the crowning height leaps on the abyss of doom, where it is served not by the service of the foot. But that rivalry which is good for the state I pray that the god may never quell : the god ever will I hold my champion.

"But whoso walks haughtily in deed or word, unterrified by Justice, revering not the shrines of gods, may an evil doom take him for his miserable pride, if he will not gain his gains fairly, if he will not keep himself from impieties, but must lay wanton hands on things inviolable.

"In such case, what man can boast any more that he shall ward the arrows of anger from his life? Nay, if such deeds are honoured, what have I more to do with dance and song?

"No more will I go, a worshipper, to the awful altar at Earth's centre, no more to Abæ's shrine or to Olympia, if these oracles fit not the issue so that all men shall point at them with the finger. Nay, King—if thou art rightly called—Zeus, all-ruling, let it not escape thee and thy deathless power!"

We have now looked at a second general aspect of the poetry of Sophocles. As in his treatment of the heroic legends he interprets, but is above, the religious spirit of his age, so in his reconciliation of enterprise and reverence he gives an ideal embodiment to the social spirit of his age.

Æschylus is a democratic conservative; Euripides is the critic of a democracy which he found good in theory but practically vicious; Sophocles sets upon his work no properly political stamp, but rather the mark of a time of political rest and of manifold intellectual activity; an activity which took its special character from the idea of an elastic development reconciled with a restraining moral tradition.

As the general spirit of Sophocles is perhaps best seen in these two phases, so among the special qualities of his work there are two which may be taken as the most distinctive—his "irony," to give it the name which Bishop Thirlwall's Essay has made familiar; and his delineation of character.

The practical irony of drama depends on the principle that the dramatic poet stands aloof from the world which he creates. It is not for him to be an advocate or a partisan. He describes a contest of forces, and decides the issue as he conceives that it would be decided by the powers which control human life. The position of a judge in reference to two litigants, neither of whom has absolute right on his side, is analogous to the position of a dramatic poet in reference to his characters.

Every dramatic poet is necessarily in some degree ironical. In speaking, then, of the dramatic irony of Sophocles it is not meant that this quality is peculiar to him. It is only meant that in him this quality is especially noticeable and especially artistic.

Irony depends on a contrast; the irony of tragedy depends mainly on a contrast between the beliefs or purposes of men and those issues to which their actions are overruled by higher powers. Sophocles has the art of making this contrast, throughout the whole course of a drama, peculiarly suggestive and forcible. In his seven extant plays, the contrasts thus worked out have different degrees of complexity. The "Trachiniæ" and "Electra" may be taken as those in which the dramatic irony is simplest. In the "Trachiniæ" there is a twofold contrast of a direct kind: first, between the love of Deianeira for Heracles and the mortal agony into which she unwittingly throws him; then, between the meaning of the oracle (promising rest to Heracles), as understood by him and Deianeira, and its real import. In the "Electra" there is a particular and a general contrast, both direct; the sister is mourning the supposed death of her brother at the very moment when he is about to enter the house as an avenger; and the situation with which the play ends is the exact reversal of that with which it opened.

The "Ajax" and the two Œdipus plays, again, might be classed together in respect of dramatic

irony; in each case suffering is inflicted by the gods, but through this the sufferer passes to a higher state. Athene, the pretended ally of Ajax, humbles him even to death; but this death is a complete atonement, and his immortal fame as a canonized hero begins from the burial with which the drama closes. In the "Œdipus Tyrannus" the primary contrast is between the seeming prosperity and the really miserable situation of the king. A secondary contrast runs through the whole process of inquiry which leads up to the final discovery. The truth is gradually evolved from those very incidents which display or even exalt the confidence of Œdipus. In the "Œdipus at Colonus" this contrast is reversed. The Theban king is old, blind, poor, an outcast, a wanderer. But he has the inward sense of a strength which can no more be broken; of a vision clearer than that of the bodily eye; of a spiritual change which has made a sorrow a possession; of approach to final rest.

It is, however, in the two remaining plays, the "Antigone" and the "Philoctetes," that this irony of drama takes its most subtle and most artistic form. Antigone buries Polyneices against the law of the land; Creon dooms her to death, and thereby drives his own son to suicide. But the issue is not a simple conflict between state-law and religious duty. It is a conflict between state-law too harshly enforced and natural affection set above the laws. Creon is right in the letter and wrong in the spirit; Antigone is right in the spirit and wrong in the

letter. Creon carries his point, but his victory becomes his misery; Antigone incurs death, but dies with her work done. In the "Philoctetes," again, there is an antithesis of a like kind. Philoctetes is injured and noble; Odysseus is dishonest but patriotic. Odysseus wishes to capture Philoctetes in the public interests of the army at Troy. He urges on Neoptolemus that the end sanctifies the means. Neoptolemus at first recoils; then consents; finally deserts the plot in a passion of generous pity for Philoctetes. The result is that Philoctetes is brought back to Troy, but by fair means. He eventually agrees to do that of which he had loathed the thought, and goes back to his hated enemies under circumstances which make that return the happiest event of his life. Odysseus, on the other hand, gains his end; but not by the means which he had proposed to himself. He carries Philoctetes back to Troy; but only after his stratagems have been foiled. Neoptolemus, meanwhile—true, after his first lapse, to honour—conquers without a change of front.

It is that same instinct of harmony which has already been seen to rule the work of Sophocles in its largest phases, which gives its motive and its delicate precision to his management of dramatic irony. He works out the contrasts of drama so clearly and with such fineness because he aims at showing how a beneficent power at last solves them; not, as in Æschylus, by victory over a supernatural evil power, nor, as in Euripides, by abrupt inter-

vention; but through those natural workings of human character and action over which the gods watch.

The accurate delineation of human character has therefore a special importance for Sophocles. It has already been said that in the primary or heroic persons of the Sophoclean drama human character is delineated only broadly, with a deliberate avoidance of fine shading. It is therefore in the secondary or subordinate persons of the drama that we must look for the more delicate touches of ethical portraiture.

Sophocles shows his psychological skill especially in two ways: in following the process by which a sensitive and generous nature passes from one phase of feeling to another; and in tracing the action upon each other of dissimilar or opposite natures. Philoctetes, first rejoiced by the arrival of the Greeks on his island,—then suspicious,—then reassured,—then frenzied with anger,—then finally conciliated; Tecmessa, agitated successively by fear, by hope, by despair concerning Ajax; Electra, at first heroically patient in the hope that her brother will return as an avenger, then broken-hearted at the news of his death, at last filled with rapture by his sudden living presence; Deianeira, by turns anxious, elated, jealous, horror-stricken—these are examples of the power with which Sophocles could trace a chapter of spiritual history.

A closer examination of the character of Deianeira will help to set this power in a clearer

light. When the herald Lichas arrives at Trachis with the prisoners taken by Heracles at Œchalia, Iolê, beautiful and dejected, at once arouses the interest of Deianeira; but it is the interest of compassion merely, with a touch of condescension in its kindness. "Ah, unhappy girl, who art thou among women...?" "Lichas, from whom is this stranger sprung?" Lichas does not know; Iolê will not speak;—nor has she spoken, adds the herald, since they left Eubœa. So Deianeira says: "Then let her be left at peace and go into the house as best it pleases her, and not find a new pain at my hands beside her present ills; they are enough. And now let us all move towards the house."

Presently Deianeira is told by a man of Trachis, who had heard it from Lichas himself in the market-place, that Iolê is the daughter of Eurytus, King of Œchalia; and that it was to win Iolê that Heracles had stormed and sacked that town. "Ah me unhappy," she cries, "in what a plight do I stand! What hidden bane have I taken under my roof?" Her informant and Lichas are confronted with each other; Lichas is put to confusion; and then Deianeira turns to him with this appeal:—

"Do not, I pray thee by Zeus who sends forth his lightnings over the high Œtean glen, do not use deceitful speech. For thou wilt tell thy news not to a base woman, nor to one who knows not the estate of men, and how it is not in their nature always to take joy in the same things. Now whosoever stands up against Love, as a boxer to change

buffets, is not wise. For Love rules the gods as he will, and me also—why should he not?—yes, and many another such as I. So that I am quite mad if I blame my husband for being taken with this malady, or blame this woman, who has had part in a thing nowise shameful, and not in any wrong to me.... Come, tell the whole truth; it is a foul blight on a free man to be called a liar."

Lichas confesses all, and ends with this advice—"For both your sakes, for his and for thine own as well, bear with the woman;" and Deianeira pretends to have adopted his counsel: "Nay," she says, "even thus am I minded to do. Believe me, I will not bring on myself a self-sought bane by waging fruitless war with the gods."

But how different is the feeling which she presently avows to the chorus of Trachinian maidens: "Of anger against the man I have no thought; but to live in the same house with this girl—what woman could bear it?" Then she remembers the love-charm given her long ago by Nessus. There is a moment of feverish hope while she is preparing and despatching the robe for Heracles. But hardly has it gone when an accident reveals to her that she has anointed the robe with some poison of fearful virulence. In a moment, her thoughts rush forward to the worst; and her own words, in telling the story to the Chorus, foreshow the death to which she presently gives herself on hearing the tidings from Eubœa—"Life with a bad name must not be borne by her who glories to have been born not base."

The second special form in which Sophocles shows his power of drawing character consists in exhibiting the action upon each other of natures broadly or at least distinctly different. He loved to display this mutual action in an interview at which the two speakers exchange arguments. The sisters Electra and Chrysothemis, the sisters Antigone and Ismene, hold conversations of this kind. It might be objected that in these cases the influence can scarcely be called mutual; and that, while Electra makes Chrysothemis angry and Antigone makes Ismene feel ashamed, Chrysothemis produces no impression upon Electra nor Ismene upon Antigone. But it should be observed that in each case the weak sister had this important influence upon the strong sister;—she made her feel alone. The selfishness of Chrysothemis isolates Electra in the task of avenging their father, as the feminine timidity of Ismene isolates Antigone in the task of burying their brother. In each case, the heroine agitates the less courageous sister, and on the other hand the defection of a natural ally braces the heroine.

But the finest examples of such juxtaposition are to be found in the "Philoctetes": a tragedy which for artistic finish has often, and perhaps justly, been ranked as its author's masterpiece; and in which the absence of much incident permitted or exacted the utmost exercise of skill in delineating character. From many good passages in the play one may be chosen as a specimen—the opening scene between Odysseus and Neoptolemus. Odysseus,

holding that the public interest of the army at Troy justifies recourse to fraud, proposes to take Philoctetes by a stratagem. Neoptolemus, a young and generous man, is at first shocked; but Odysseus succeeds in making ambition conquer the sense of honour. The dialogue itself alone can give an idea of the fineness with which this is managed:—

"*Neoptolemus.* What wouldst thou?

Odysseus. The mind of Philoctetes must be snared by thee with a well-told tale. When he asks thee who and whence thou art, say—'The son of Achilles,'—*that* must not be garbled; but thou art homeward bound, having quitted the Greek armada, and conceived for them a deadly hatred.... The thing to be plotted is just this—how thou mayest compass to *steal* the unconquerable arms. I well know, my son, that by nature thou art unapt to utter or to frame such wiles. Yet victory, we know, is a sweet prize to win. Take heart: our honesty shall be proved another time. But now lend thyself to me for one little roguish day; and then, for all the rest of thy days, be called the most virtuous of men.

N. Son of Laertes, whatever counsels pain my ear, to the same I abhor to lend my hand. It is not in my nature to compass aught by knavery—neither in mine nor, as they say, in my father's. I am ready to take the man by force, not by fraud; with the use of only one foot he will never worst all of us in open fight. And yet, having been sent to aid thee, I am loth to be called traitor. But I wish,

Prince, to miss my mark by doing right rather than to win by baseness.

O. Son of a gallant sire, time was when I, too, in my youth had a slow tongue and an active hand. But now, when I come out to the proof, I see that words, not deeds, always come to the front with men.

N. In short, what dost thou bid me but to lie?

O. I bid thee take Philoctetes by guile.

N. And why by guile more than by persuasion?

O. He will never be persuaded; and by force thou art not likely to take him.

N. Hath he a strength so defiant, so dreadful?

O. Arrows inevitable and winging death.

N. One cannot dare, then, even to go near *him?*

O. No, unless thou snare him, as I bid.

N. So thou thinkest it no shame to lie?

O. None, if the lie is fraught with health.

N. And how shall a man have the face to utter it?

O. When thou dost aught for gain, it is unmeet to shrink.

N. And what gain for me is his coming to Troy?

O. Troy can be taken by these arrows alone.

N. Then *I* am not, as ye said, to be the captor?

O. Not thou apart from these, nor these from thee.

N. It seems, then, they must be won, if so it stands?

O. I tell thee by this deed thou shalt gain two gifts.

N. What are they? If I knew, I would not shrink.

O. Thou wilt be known as wise and brave.

N. Enough; I'll do it, and put away all shame."

I have attempted to show what is distinctive of the genius of Sophocles in a fourfold manifestation: in his blending of a divine with a human character in the heroes; in his expression of the effort to reconcile progress with tradition; in his dramatic irony—that is, in the precision with which he brings out contrasts, especially between the purposes of men and of the gods, in order that the final solution may be more impressive; lastly, in his portrayal of character—not in a series of situations, but continuously through chapters of spiritual history. It has been seen that the instinct which rules his work under each of these aspects is what may be called in the largest sense the instinct of harmony. His imagination has a tranquil mastery of the twofold realm of Tragedy—the natural and the supernatural—and tempers the conflicting elements of each or both with a sure sense of fitness and just proportion.

It is for this reason—because of all the Greek poets he is the most perfectly an artist—that his poetry has a closer significance than any other for that form of plastic art which stands nearest to drama. It is the best interpreter of those pieces of Greek sculpture, such as the groups of Niobe and Laocoon, which express a moment of conflict between human and superhuman force. It has been said that for the Greeks beauty was the index on the balance of expression—that is, a central control governing the equipoise between terror and pity.

The terror inspired by Niobe and by Laocoon, accusing with upturned eyes the destroying power; the pity inspired by their children, clinging to the shelter which cannot protect them: these are harmonized by the beauty, at once terrible and tender, of the whole. Just such is the harmony between the human and superhuman elements in the agony of Œdipus and of Heracles.

Again, it is chiefly because Sophocles had supremely this most Greek of instincts, the instinct of just proportion, that his mind was so perfectly attempered to the genius of Greek polytheism—a religion of which the piety was a reverent sense of beauty and of measure. He lived just when this religion had shed upon it the greatest strength of intellectual light which it could bear without fading; he is, perhaps, the highest type of its votary—the man for whom, more than for any other who could be named, the old national religion of Greece was a self-sufficing, thoughtful, and ennobling faith. Sophocles was, indeed, the perfect Greek ideal of a man who loved the gods and was loved by them—one, the work of whose life was their service under their direct inspiration; to whom they gave victory not followed by insolence, long years and opportuneness of death; and whom the most imaginative of satirists could not imagine, even among the boundless rivalries of the dead, less good-humoured than he had been upon earth.

PINDAR[1].

§ 1. PINDAR is a classic of whom the study may be expected to grow with the growth of an interest in Greek archaeology. Not, indeed, because it is indebted to him, so largely as to many other authors, for direct illustration. Rather because his "Odes of Victory" are lit up in a new way by a fuller knowledge of the places with which they are concerned, of the contests which they celebrate, of the art and religion by which they were inspired. To take a single instance—the discoveries at Olympia, which have restored for us the main features of the altis, have given a new meaning for every modern reader to the beautiful, but hitherto indistinct, picture suggested by Pindar's description of "all the holy place resounding with festal joy," when "the lovely light of the fair-faced moon shone forth" after a day of contests. Pindar's odes are poems of occasion, magnificent expressions of Hellenic life in its most distinctively Hellenic phases. Hitherto the real drawback to his popularity has not been obscurity of language, but the strain which he was felt to place on the modern imagination. Every step gained in the reconstruction of old Greek life is an addition

[1] Reprinted from the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. iii. p. 144.

to the most indispensable commentary on Pindar. It cannot be said that he has been neglected in recent times. Since the monumental labours of A. Boeckh, the edition of Dissen, and Bergk's in his *Poetae Lyrici*, we have had from Germany Tycho Mommsen's edition (1869), and more lately the recension by W. Christ in Teubner's series; since J. W. Donaldson's edition and Paley's translation, England has had the version in which Mr Ernest Myers shows so fine a sympathy with Pindar's spirit, and the able edition of the Olympian and Pythian Odes by Mr Fennell. In offering the following notes to the readers of this Journal, my object is merely to contribute something, however little, to a closer appreciation of a poet whose charm gains on those who endeavour to see him more clearly in his relation to the life of his day, to its thought and art, and, above all, to the art which he had made his own.

§ 2. The spirit of Pindar's poetry is Panhellenic. This is, indeed, a part of its essence. At Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, Corinth, Greeks of all cities were brought into sympathy by rites and beliefs common to all. Pindar is highly skilled in the treatment of local myths or cults, appropriate to the particular victory. But a sure instinct ever prompts him to link these interests of the individual city with topics which appeal to the religious sense or ancestral pride of the whole Hellenic name. The triumph which had owed its opportunity to the conception

of a national unity could not be worthily commemorated in song which that conception had not helped to inspire. Pindar's age was one in which a really great poet could scarcely fail to be in accord with the quickened sense of Hellenic kinship. The years 502 to 452 B.C. measure the limits of his extant work; his happiest activity falls in the period just before and after the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. A great danger had drawn the members of the Hellenic family closer together; a great deliverance had left them animated by the recent memory of deeds which seemed to attest the legends of Agamemnon and Achilles; warmed by a more vivid faith in those gods who had indeed been with them in the hour of trial; comforted by a new stability of freedom; cheered by a sense of Hellenic energies which could expand securely from the Pillars of Hercules to the Phasis, from the Nile to the furthest point that man may reach on the way to the Hyperboreans; exalted in thought and fancy by the longing to body forth all this joy and hope in the most beautiful forms which language and music, marble, ivory, and gold could furnish for the honour of the gods, and for the delight of men who were their seed through the heroes. Aeschylus, in his *Persae*, heralds as with a clarion-note the advent of this age: Pindar, in his Odes of Victory, expresses some of its most brilliant and most suggestive aspects.

§ 3. Every great Hellenic artist of the fifth century B.C. was vitally affected by his own relation

to the common life of the city and of Hellas. If it could be shown that Pindar, a loyal Theban, was a disloyal Greek, then we might well marvel if that profound discord with the very soul of Greek art did not utter itself in some jarring notes which even a modern ear could not fail to catch. A great scholar has said:—"Such a man as Pindar could take no part in the enthusiasm of the Wars of Liberation, and could shortly after the battle of Marathon sing the glories of an Athenian without giving one word to that great day."[1] The reference is to *Pythian* vii., of 22 lines only, for Megacles the Alcmaeonid, who won the four-horse-chariot race at Delphi in 490 B.C. Granting—what is not certain—that this slight ode was written after the battle, the absence of allusion to it would be sufficiently explained by the fact that such an allusion would have been singularly infelicitous. Athenian gossip accused the Alcmaeonidae of having signalled from Athens to the Persians, by raising a bright shield, immediately after the battle[2]. Turn to other odes, and we shall see how entirely Pindar rejoiced in the great national victory. Salamis, he says, is the glory of the Athenians, Plataea of the Spartans[3] —those fights "whereby the Medes with curved bows were overthrown." "Some god has turned aside from us the stone that hung over our heads,

National sympathies.

[1] Curtius, *Hist. Gr.* vol. ii. p. 264 (tr. Ward).

[2] Herodotus vi. 115.

[3] *Pyth.* i. 75. Cp. *Isthm.* iv. 49, on the distinction won by the Aeginetans at Salamis.

as over Tantalus,—a torment greater than Hellas could bear[1]. But now the fear hath gone by, and eased me from sore anguish." Still, indeed, there is grief in his heart (*καίπερ ἀχνύμενος θυμόν*); since Thebes, the native city which he loved so well, had no part in the glory. Elsewhere his feeling on this point comes out clearly, and in a way which is not without pathos. "In which of the fair deeds of yore done in thy land, immortal Thebe, didst thou take most delight?" When thou broughtest forth Dionysos with the flowing locks, who sits beside Demeter; when Zeus came to Alcmene's bed; when Teiresias had fame for prophecy, and Iolaos for the driving of chariots? "*But the grace of the old time sleeps*, and men forget it, save what hath been wedded to the glorious tide of song, and hath won the perfect meed of minstrel's skill." The greatness of Thebes, Pindar felt, belonged to the past, not to the present. As he exults in the deliverance of Greece Proper from the Persians, so he celebrates the nearly simultaneous deliverance of Sicilian and Italian Greece from the Carthaginians, by that victory of Hiero at Cumae which "drew Hellas out of heavy servitude[2]."

Thebes.

Sicily.

§ 4. Though his poetry has no immediate concern with politics, we can, I think, discern the outlines of his own political creed. His family belonged to a noble house of ancient renown in Greece,—the Aegeidae, who traced their descent

Political beliefs.

[1] *Isthm.* vii. 10.

[2] *Pyth.* i. 75.

from the "Cadmean" stock of prehistoric Thebes[1]. Before the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesus, while the lands beneath Taygetus on the eastern side were still possessed by the Achaean masters of Amyclae, the Aegeidae had settled among them, as well as some Minyans from Lemnos. After the Dorian conquest the Aegeidae, though of Cadmean descent, appear to have been adopted by the Spartans into one of the three Dorian tribes[2]; and hence Pindar can say,—"fame tells that from Sparta comes the fair glory of our house; thence sprang the Aegeidae, my sires, who went to Thera" (*Pyth.* v. 68). Elsewhere he alludes to the still earlier chapter in the story of the family, when they, sons of Thebes (σέθεν ἔκγονοι), "took Amyclae, by the oracles of Delphi" (*Isthm.* vi. 14). The Aegeidae had a branch at Cyrene as well as at Thera, Sparta, and Thebes. Pindar speaks of the Theban Aegeidae as "showing honour at the banquet" to Cyrene, when they keep the festival of the Carneia —a festival which, though in historical times associated with Dorians and especially with Sparta, had been originally brought from Thebes to Amyclae by the Cadmean Aegeidae, and had been of old associated with the worship of Demeter rather than with that of Apollo. Thus connected, by a lineage of which he was evidently proud, both with Cadmean Thebes and with Dorian Sparta, Pindar was not likely to have much personal sympathy with any

The Aegeidae.

[1] See Müller's *Orchomenus*, c. 5, p. 111 (2nd ed.).

[2] Müller, *Dorians* ii. 79.

advanced phase of democracy. The government of Thebes at the time of the Persian wars had been, in the phrase of Thucydides, a δυναστεία οὐ μετὰ νόμων,—an oligarchy of a narrow and non-constitutional type; this had been replaced, after the repulse of the Persian invasion, by an ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος (Thuc. iii. 62). The latter phrase well expresses, as I conceive, the shade of Greek political life most congenial to Pindar. See the suggestive passage in *Pythian* xi. (478 B.C.) 53: τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὑρίσκων τὰ μέσα μάσσονι σὺν | ὄλβῳ τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων· | ξυναῖσι δ' ἀμφ' ἀρεταῖς τέταμαι, κ.τ.λ.: "in polities I find the middle state crowned with more enduring good; therefore praise I not the despot's portion; those virtues move my zeal which serve the folk." One in whom pride of ancestry fostered a reverence for the traditions of Dorian civil life could have as little liking for absolutism as for the rule of the mob; and that Pindar felt such reverence is well seen in the passage which speaks of Hiero as having founded Aetna (the restored Catana) Ὑλλίδος στάθμας ἐν νόμοις, in the laws of the Hyllic rule: "yea," adds the poet, "and the Dorian sons of Pamphylus and of the Heracleidae, dwelling under the cliffs of Taygetus, are ever content to abide by the ordinances of Aegimius" (*Pyth.* i. 63)[1]. When Pindar speaks of the royal lot

Pindar an oligarch.

[1] The Ὑλλὶς στάθμα is identical with the τεθμοὶ Αἰγιμιοῦ. Pindar means: "At the new Aetna, as at Sparta, Dorians are true to their ancestral usages." Hyllus, son of Heracles, was said to have been adopted by Aegimius, the father of Pamphylus and

supremely happy and glorious (*τὸ δ' ἔσχατον κορυφοῦται βασιλεῦσι*, *Ol.* i. 113), this does not involve approval of the *τυραννίς* as a form of government. He is speaking with reference to victory in the great festivals; the four-horse-chariot race, the contest which contributed most to the splendour of such festivals, was possible only for very rich men; and *τύραννοι*, such as Hiero, commanded the amplest means of achieving such victories with impressive magnificence. Pindar's picture of the estimable *τύραννος* is one who is "gentle to the folk, not envious of the noble, and to strangers a father wondrous kind":—a character which, if realised, would have gone far to strip the Greek *τυραννίς* of its distinctive vices[1].

Reference to democracy.

On the other hand, there is only one touch in Pindar's extant work which can be said to reflect unfavourably on democracy,—his remark that the man of honest tongue has the advantage under every form of rule,—*παρὰ τυραννίδι, χὠπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός, χὤταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι*[2]. By *οἱ σοφοί* are meant "the few"—the houses in whom the ancient sacred rituals are hereditary,—the depositaries of ancient civil wisdom and law. Now it is worthy of notice that this occurs in an ode written for Hiero of Syracuse, and that in Pindar's time (if he died, as seems likely, about 441 B.C.) neither Greece Proper nor the Hellenic East yet presented

Dymas. (In *Isthm.* vii. 43 note *νεικέων πέταλα*, alluding to the *πεταλισμός*.)

[1] *Pyth.* iii. 71.

[2] *Pyth.* ii. 86.

any phase of democracy which could be intelligibly indicated as the rule of "*the raging crowd.*" Clearly, I think, he is referring—in phrase which *Siceliots* could well appreciate—to those violent democratic revolutions which more than once convulsed Sicilian cities, and overthrew tyrannies, in the earlier part of the fifth century. There is no reason to doubt the warmth or the sincerity of the admiration which Pindar felt for the type of stable and reasonable democracy—for the Athens of Themistocles and Pericles. "Fairest of preludes is the renown of Athens for the mighty race of the Alcmaeonidae[1].... What home, or what house, could I call mine by a name that should sound more glorious for Hellas to hear?" κλειναί, μεγάλαι, εὐώνυμοι, λιπαραί, ἰοστέφανοι, ἱεραί—such are the epithets which Pindar elsewhere bestows on Athens; but most interesting of all, perhaps, is the reference in *Nemean* v., where, speaking of Menander[2], the Athenian trainer of an Aeginetan victor, he says,—χρὴ δ' ἀπ' Ἀθανᾶν τέκτον' ἀθλητᾶισιν ἔμμεν: "meet it is that a shaper of athletes should come from Athens." Those who know Pindar's style, and who remember his frequent comparison of the poet's efforts to the athlete's, will scarcely doubt that, when he wrote those words, he was thinking of the early days when his own young powers had been disciplined at Athens by Lâsus of Hermione.

Feeling for Athens.

§ 5. Apart from his sympathies with any particular polity, or his relations to any one city, there

[1] *Pyth.* vii. *ad init.* [2] *Nem.* v. 49.

is a larger and grander aspect of Pindar's poetry in regard to the politics of Hellas. The epic poets had sung the glories of war. Pindar celebrates the rivalries of peace. Aegina—which claims a larger number of his odes than any other one city—was a great seat of commerce: he describes it as a "heaven-set pillar for strangers of every clime[1], wherein Saving Themis hath worship by the side of Zeus the god of the stranger." Corinth, "vestibule of the Isthmian Poseidon," is a city "wherein dwelleth Eunomia, and her sister, the upholder of cities, and unfailing Dicè, and like-minded Eirenè, watchers over wealth for men, golden daughters of wise-counselling Themis[2]." At Opus, again, there is a home for "Themis and her daughter, glorious Eunomia, who saveth[3]." *Tranquillity* is the friend of cities (Ἀσυχία φιλόπολις); and Tranquillity is the daughter of Justice[4]. We can often feel in Pindar that new sense of leisure for peaceful pursuits and civilising arts which came after the Persian Wars; there breathes in his poetry such a message of sacred peace as the Olympic festival itself proclaimed every year to Hellas by "the heralds of the seasons, the Elean truce-bringers of Zeus son of Cronus[5]"—κάρυκες ὡρᾶν,...σπονδοφόροι Κρονίδα Ζηνὸς Ἀλεῖοι.

Pindar the poet of peace.

Religious feeling.

§ 6. Pindar's attitude towards religion is that of a man who held devoutly the received national creed of Greece, but with whose faith were blended certain

[1] *Ol.* viii. 26.
[2] *Ol.* xiii. 8.
[3] *Ol.* ix. 15.
[4] *Ol.* iv. 16; *Pyth.* viii. 1.
[5] *Isthm.* ii. 23.

elements distinguishing it from that of the ordinary citizen of the more cultivated sort. Here, again, we must remember his connection with the Aegeidae. In such houses certain family rites and bodies of sacred lore were usually hereditary. These, combined with political influence, often gave such families peculiarly intimate relations with the chief centres of worship and divination, such as the temples at Delos, Abae, and, above all, Delphi. The direct influence of the great houses on the oracles can be constantly recognised in Greek history. Pindar was, besides, a man of lofty genius, and of that typically Greek temperament in which the sense of natural beauty rose to be a sense of awe as in presence of a divine majesty; as when Plato says of the soul that had looked upon the true loveliness, *σεφθεῖσα δὲ ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία*. Such a man was as perfect a teller-forth of the honour of the gods, as truly a heaven-born *προφήτης*, as the temple of Delphi could have found for its service; and the more we study Pindar's poetry, the more we shall read in it the mind of that Delphic religion which, in his time, was still a mighty, if a declining, power. I may illustrate my meaning by a particular trait. Pindar frequently refers to the art of divination as one by which skilled seers win unerring signs from the gods; more especially he renders homage to the great augural clan of the Iamidae, whose practice of the *μαντικὴ δι' ἐμπύρων* on the altar of Zeus entitles Olympia to be emphatically styled *δέσποιν' ἀλαθείας*,

Relation to Delphi.

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Mistress of Truth[1]. At other times, again, he declares with equal emphasis that no forecast of the future is possible. "Never yet has any mortal man won from the gods a sure token (*σύμβολον πιστόν*) of an event to come, but forecasts of the future have been doomed to blindness"; *τῶν δὲ μελλόντων τετύφλωνται φραδαί*[2]. Again: "the sign from Zeus attends not on men with clearness[3]." If Pindar had been asked to explain the apparent contradiction, the answer would probably have been that, when the gods give omens which they intend men to understand, these omens are infallible; but that often such divine tokens are altogether withheld; and that in many instances, when *some* sign is vouchsafed, but not of a clear kind,—as if to try the spiritual insight of men,—men interpret such a sign amiss. Such a view of divination would have been just such as it was the policy of an oracular priesthood to propagate. Those who worked the machinery of the great oracles were concerned to hold the balance between the doctrine that there *is* a sacred science of divination, that the gods *do* inspire their chosen ministers, and the plain lesson of experience, that inferences drawn from oracles or omens were often fallacious[4]. Pindar well re-

View of oracles.

[1] *Ol.* viii. *ad init.* [2] *Ol.* xii. 7.

[3] *Nem.* xi. 43.

[4] A suggestive example is the story which Herodotus tells with such delightful, though unconscious, humour. After his fall, Croesus sent to ask at Delphi whether it was the god's usual practice to deceive and ruin generous votaries. The reply was

presents the priestly attitude on the question, with this difference, that his external position exempts him from all suspicion of conscious imposture.

Reverence for the divine power is a strongly marked and ever-present characteristic of his work: everything must be ascribed to the gods as its author; "from the gods are all means of human excellence"; "it is the god who gives every accomplishment to men's hopes; the god can overtake the winged eagle; he is swifter than the dolphin in the sea; he bends the necks of the haughty; he gives to others a glory that never grows old[1]." Pindar's reluctance to relate aught that is unseemly concerning the gods appears in touches that, at a first glance, might remind us of Plato, or even of Euhemerus: yet his feeling as to the mythical theology seems to be essentially different from that of either. A typical case is his treatment of the story that, when the gods dined with Tantalus, they ate the flesh of his son Pelops. Pindar will not represent the gods as cannibals (*γαστριμάργους*): he prefers to believe that Poseidon, enamoured of Pelops, carried him away, like Ganymede, to Olympus; then the envious neighbours of Tantalus invented the story that Pelops had been devoured. The supposed conduct of the neighbours is, in itself,

Reverence for the gods.

(1) that Apollo had, in fact, done his best; he had persuaded the Moirae to delay the doom of Croesus for some years; (2) that Croesus had misunderstood the oracle which had emboldened him to engage in war with Cyrus.

[1] *Pyth.* i. 41: ii. 49.

a touch of Euhemerism, it is introduced, however, not to eliminate the marvellous, but merely to help the substitution of one marvel for another. On the other hand, the poet is not concerned for the moral effect of the myth on those who hear it; in this respect his own version is no improvement; it is the dignity and decorum of the gods—as he conceives these—which he is anxious to vindicate. In other words, his rejection of scandalising myths springs from an instinct of religious reverence; it is not based on moral grounds; it is an earnest expression of the Greek repugnance to *δυσφημία*, or, in his own phrase, of the *ἀδινὸν δάκος κακαγοριᾶν*, in regard to the highest beings whom he can imagine. "It is seemly (*ἐοικός*) to speak fair things of deities." "To revile the gods is a hateful work of poet's skill[1]."

Mystic doctrine.

§ 7. I referred above to certain further elements which are blended in Pindar with the popular form of the Hellenic faith. The chief of these is a mystic doctrine of the soul's destiny after it has left the body. After death, the guilty soul pays penalty for all sins committed "in this realm of Zeus"; there is a judge who tries them, "pronouncing sentence *ἐχθρᾷ ἀνάγκᾳ*, by a dread necessity," under a law which puts inexorable constraint upon his compassion[2]. "Those who have had the courage to be steadfast thrice in this world, and thrice in the world of spirits, and to keep their souls utterly from wrong, ascend by the path of Zeus to the tower of

[1] *Ol.* i. 35: ix. 37. [2] *Ol.* ii. 60.

Cronus; there the breezes of Ocean breathe around the Islands of the Blest; and flowers of gold are bright, some on the fair trees of that land, and some in the waters, with chains and wreaths whereof they twine their hands, by the righteous decrees of Rhadamanthys[1]." The ἐς τρὶς ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες brings before us the mystical doctrine of the myth in the *Phaedrus*. Here we see that Pindar was at least familiar with the idea of metempsychosis; how far he was a disciple of Pythagoreanism is less certain. Another passage has been taken to imply the Pythagorean doctrine of a relative ethical mean; another, a Pythagorean division of virtue as fourfold —temperance, courage, justice, prudence[2]. The impression which such utterances of Pindar leave on the mind is that he was acquainted with the teaching of Mysteries, especially, perhaps, the Orphic; that he held this doctrine as an esoteric supplement to the popular religion, harmonising them in some way which satisfied his own religious sense; but that his speculations had not taken any shape so clear or definite as to deserve the name of a philosophy. A contradiction has sometimes been felt between those passages in which he anticipates a fully conscious existence for the soul after death, determined by the moral character of the earthly life, and other passages in which he might seem rather to echo the popular language in

Pythagoreanism?

[1] *Ol.* ii. 68.

[2] *Pyth.* ii. 34 (χρὴ δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὁρᾶν μέτρον): *Nem.* iii. 74 (τέσσαρας ἀρετάς).

regard to Hades, as peopled by shadows whose being is "the lowest degree of existence above annihilation"; such a being as the Homeric Achilles conceives:—*ἦ ῥά τις ἔστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν*[1]. On a closer examination, the supposed contradiction seems to me to depend on the sense which we are to attach to a phrase in *Pyth.* v. 90 f., where he is speaking of "holy kings who have passed to Hades" (*λαχόντες Ἀΐδαν*):—*ἀκούοντί που χθονίᾳ φρενὶ | σφὸν ὄλβον υἱῷ τε κοινὰν χάριν*: "they hear, I ween, *with the mind of the nether world*, their own good fortune and the fame which their son shares with them." If *χθονίᾳ φρενί* meant, "with such *imperfect* consciousness as the dead possess," then Pindar would be speaking like the Homeric Achilles. But surely this would be a strained and arbitrary construction. It is more in accord with Pindar's manner to regard *χθονίᾳ* as conveying a shadowy suggestion that the intelligence which belongs to the unseen world is of a different order from the intelligence of the living.

The phrase *χθονίᾳ φρενί*.

§ 8. The elastic word *ἀρετή*, as used by Pindar, covers all excellence, physical, moral, and mental: though, as might have been expected, his most frequent use of the word relates to "prowess," especially at the festivals. One of Pindar's dominant thoughts is that *φυή*, native temperament—the direct gift of the gods—is the grand source of *ἀρετή*[2], and that training is of comparatively slight

Nature is the chief source of *ἀρετή*.

[1] *Il.* xxiii. 104.

[2] *Nem.* vii. 54.

power. The similarity of phrase might lead us to regard Pindar's depreciation of διδακταὶ ἀρεταί[1] as a forerunner of the famous οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή,—the paradoxical formula by which Plato expressed that "virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him." There is not, however, much connection between the two sentiments which happen to have clothed themselves in like words. The ἀρετή which Pindar has in view is mainly that of the victorious athlete, to whom physical gifts are essential; and of the poet, who is "born, not made." He has, further, the belief—fostered by his own pride of Aegid descent—that the qualities of a good stock are hereditary. Thus he speaks of "an upright mind derived from noble sires" (πατέρων ὀρθαὶ φρένες ἐξ ἀγαθῶν)[2]. But his belief in heredity is duly guarded. "The virtues of old time repeat their strength *at intervals* (ἀμειβόμεναι) in the generations of men; even as the black soil of the tilth yields not fruit continually, and as trees will not bear a fragrant bloom of like richness with every returning year: even thus doth Fate lead on the mortal race[3]." Destiny—Πότμος ἄναξ (*Nem.* iv. 42)—appears with Pindar under a more benignant aspect than with his contemporary Aeschylus. For Pindar, it is rather the supreme Intelligence—the concentrated embodiment of a divine Providence—than that relentless Aeschylean "Necessity" of which the ministers are "the threefold Fates and the mindful Furies."

Inherited qualities.

[1] *Ol.* ix. 100. [2] *Ol.* vii. 91. [3] *Nem.* xi. 37.

Pindar's Ethics.

The maxims of conduct and the moral reflections which are strewn through Pindar's poetry express the peculiarly Greek feelings about life in an earnest and sometimes beautiful form. "One race is there of men, one race of gods; and from one mother (Earth) we both have our being; but in our power are we wholly separate; for the race of men is naught; but the brazen heaven abides, a dwelling-place steadfast for ever. Yet withal we have some likeness to the Immortals, perchance in lofty mind, perchance in form; though we know not what line Fate hath marked for the goal of our course, whether in the day-time or in the watches of the night[1]." "Verily the hopes of men are oft tossed up and down, as they cleave the waves of vain deceit....Many things fall out for men beyond their reckoning, sometimes adverse to joy; but sometimes they who had encountered the billows of woe have suddenly changed that trouble for bliss abounding[2]." Time alone can show whether a seeming ill is not a blessing in disguise[3]; and Time is the only sure vindicator of truth[4]. In the very spirit of the sacred festivals, their poet says, διάπειρα βροτῶν ἔλεγχος, trial against their fellows is the test of men[5]. The first incentive to honourable effort is "Shame, daughter of Forethought,"—a provident desire for the good opinion of the good[6].

Trial tests men.

[1] *Nem.* vi. *ad init.*
[2] *Ol.* xii. 6.
[3] *Ol.* vii. 25.
[4] *Ol.* xi. 53.
[5] *Ol.* iv. 18.
[6] *Ol.* vii. 44, Προμαθέος Αἰδώς—whose opposite is Ἐπιμαθέος

A further incentive is the noble desire of *victory*, χάρμα, "the light of life[1]." And the highest worth of victory is not in the momentary triumph, but in that lasting renown which the poet can confer. "The word lives longer than the deeds,"—ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει[2]. The elements of "sane happiness" (ὑγίεις ὄλβος)—such as has least reason to dread the jealousy of the gods—are, substance sufficing for daily wants, and a good name among men (εὐλογία). He who has these must not "seek to be a god." To a few is given the best lot that man can attain,—πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος, wealth set with virtues—as gold with gems more precious still. This is "a star exceeding brilliant, the truest light for man"; and it is so because it "bringeth opportunity for various deeds[3]." It would be a view very unfair to Pindar which interpreted this as mere worship of wealth. We have here the characteristically Greek conception that man's highest happiness is to be found in the unimpeded development and active exercise of all faculties, bodily and spiritual. Pindar's praise of wealth rests ultimately on the same basis as Aristotle's requirement that one should be "adequately equipped with the external goods"—adequately, that is, for free and complete self-development. The other side is given in Pindar's own phrase:

Limits of earthly fortune.

Pindar not a worshipper of wealth.

ὀψινόου θυγατὴρ Πρόφασις,—"Excuse, daughter of tardy Afterthought" (*Pyth.* v. 25).

[1] *Ol.* xi. 23.

[2] *Nem.* iv. 6.

[3] *Ol.* ii. 53.

"this, they say, is the sorest pain—that one who hath sense of noble things should perforce turn his feet away from them[1]." The Theban poet quotes this as a well-known saying. Thebes was the scene of that banquet in 479 B.C. at which, as Herodotus relates, the Persian exclaimed to his fellow-guest, "This is the most cruel pang that man can bear—to have much insight, but power over nothing[2]." May not Pindar have been thinking of the same story, which had become a proverb for his native city?

Pindar not only poet but prophet.

§ 9. Pindar could not be one of the self-effacing poets. The conditions of his art, in those lofty hymns which celebrate victories consecrated by religion, demanded that he should come forward as the inspired envoy of the gods. If he magnifies his office, it is because the part which he fills is not only that of the minstrel; it is also closely allied to the function of the priest and of the seer (*μάντις*). We are always on dangerous ground in seeking illustrations for Greek things from non-Hellenic sources; but, with due reservations, it would not be improper to suggest an analogy between the didactic element in Pindar and the same element in Hebrew Prophecy. The personal character of Pindar is more surely indicated by the spirit of his work than by particular sentiments which occur in

Personal character.

[1] *Pyth.* iv. 288, *φαντὶ δ' ἔμμεν | τοῦτ' ἀνιαρότατον, καλὰ γινώσκοντ' ἀνάγκᾳ | ἐκτὸς ἔχειν πόδα.*

[2] Her. ix. 16, *ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν.*

it; these γνῶμαι are of the Delphian prophet rather than of the man. We note that, while the sense of beauty which possesses his mind is normally Greek, as finding its full satisfaction in human splendour of every kind, it differs from the ordinary Greek type in a deeper sympathy with external nature. He delights in the season when, after dark winter, "the chamber of the Hours is opened, and delicate plants perceive the fragrant spring" (*frag.* 45—where οἰχθέντος Ὡρᾶν θαλάμου recalls the modern Greek ἄνοιξις): he compares joy following sorrow to the bursting of the vernal earth into bloom (*Pyth.* iv. 64, *Isthm.* iii. 36). When Iamus prays to Apollo beneath the clear night sky (νυκτὸς ὑπαίθριος, *Ol.* vi. 61); when Jason, about to sail with the Argonauts, invokes "the rushing strength of waves and winds, and the nights, and the paths of the deep" (*Pyth.* iv. 194),—the Greek words are chosen with a magic which seems to place us under the stars or on the waters of the South. Both Aeschylus and Pindar speak of Etna in volcanic eruption. But Aeschylus —thoroughly Greek in this—fixes our thought on the scathe done to man's labour: "rivers of fire shall burst forth, rending with fierce fangs the level meads of fruitful Sicily." Pindar gives a picture of natural grandeur and terror: when Etna, "pillar of the sky, nurse of keen snow all the year," from secret depths hurls forth "pure springs of fire unapproachable; and in the daytime those rivers pour out a stream of lurid smoke; but in the darkness a red rolling flame bears rocks with a roar to the

Sympathy with nature.

wide deep" (*Pyth.* i. 20). The lines on the eclipse of the sun (*frag.* 74) are sublime. But it is not the moral sublimity of Aeschylus. Pindar never rises into the sphere of titanic battle between destiny and will. He is always of the earth, even when he is among the gods. For him, past and present are linked by the descent of men, through the heroes, from the gods; he is always thinking of the present in relation either to the heroic past, or to some change which the gods may have in store for the near future. His ethics are not subtle or original, but frankly express the common creed of "good men" in his time: φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν· ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρὸν ἄτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι, | ἄλλ' ἄλλοτε πατέων σκολιαῖς ὁδοῖς (*Pyth.* ii. 83): "Friendship for friend: foe will I thwart as foe, wolf-like, with changeful course in crooked paths." An ingenious interpretation of the context would make this a sentiment *condemned* by Pindar. But it seems to be merely the common Greek maxim of his age, that all is fair in war. Compare *Isthm.* iii. 65, where he praises a man for being in courage a lion, in craft a fox (μῆτιν δ' ἀλώπηξ), with the comment,—χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντα μαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν, "'tis well to worst a foe by any deed." Compare the utterances of Menelaus in the *Ajax* (1132 f.), and of Creon in the *Antigone* (522).

Always human.

'All fair in war.'

§ 10. Pindar has much of the old epic tone, and cleaves to the old epic view of the poet as the inspired minstrel. On the other hand, he frequently evinces the sense that poetry has become an art

Pindar's art.

with elaborate technical methods, and that the exercise of this art is a profession. In the *Iliad*, it will be remembered, ἀοιδοί appear only as the hired chanters of laments for the dead (xxiv. 720)—that is, if we except the passage (*Il.* xviii. 604), not found in any MS. of the *Iliad*, and almost certainly an interpolation, where the ἀοιδός plays for the dancers on the Shield of Achilles. In the *Odyssey*, the ἀοιδός is already a semi-professional character; the epithet δημιοεργός can be applied to him as well as to the soothsayer, the physician, the herald, the carpenter; though he is still surrounded by the reverence felt for a recipient of direct inspiration. His presence restrains Aegisthus from meditated crime; nor does Aegisthus dare to shed his blood. With Pindar we have come, of course, to the age of professional rhapsodes, who bear the branch of laurel (ῥάβδος): *Isthm.* iii. 55:—Ὅμηρος...πᾶσαν ὀρθώσαις ἀρετὰν κατὰ ῥάβδον ἔφρασεν | θεσπεσίων ἐπέων λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν: "Homer hath done right to all the prowess (of Ajax), and hath made it a theme for men after-born, by the wand of his lays divine"—where κατὰ ῥάβδον = κατὰ παράδοσιν, the branch being the symbol of the tradition. So *Nem.* ii. 1, the rhapsodes—Ὀμηρίδαι ῥαπτῶν ἐπέων ἀοιδοί—begin "with a prelude to Zeus" (Διὸς ἐκ προοιμίου). The so-called Homeric Hymns are such προοίμια, intended for the use of rhapsodes, and the latest of them are probably as late as Pindar's youth. Pindar's own affinity with the Homeric spirit is seen not merely in echoes of Homeric language

The Homeric ῥάβδος.

Affinity with Homer.

(as *Ol.* vi. 17, *ἀμφότερον, μάντιν τ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ δουρὶ μάρνασθαι*), but also in such touches as his tacit correction of Hesiod (*Pyth.* iii. 28). Hesiod (*frag.* 225 Goettl.) had said that a crow was the messenger who announced the infidelity of Coronis to Apollo; Pindar refers the discovery to Apollo's "all-knowing mind" (*πάντα ἴσαντι νόῳ*), and represents him, with Homeric vigour, as reaching the scene "at the first stride" of his immortal feet (*βάματι ἐν πρώτῳ*): cp. *Il.* xiii. 20, of Poseidon,—*τρὶς μὲν ὀρέξατ' ἰών, τὸ δὲ τέτρατον ἵκετο τέκμωρ.* Thoroughly Homeric, too, in spirit is Pindar's derivation of the name *Aias* from *αἰετός*, the eagle which was the omen of his birth, rather than from the plaintive *αἶ αἶ* to which another legend pointed: *Isthm.* v. 53, *καί νιν ὄρνιχος φανέντος κέκλετ' ἐπώνυμον εὐρυβίαν Αἴαντα.* In the same ode, 47, it may be remarked that *ἄρρηκτον φυάν* means "stalwart," not "invulnerable," and that, therefore, Pindar has not departed from Homeric sobriety by adopting the later tradition.

§ 11. Pindar's personal sympathies are strongly knit to that heroic age in which his ancestry claimed a part, and in which his own imagination could still move with such noble freedom. All the more he feels the change which has come over the *motives* of poetry. "*The men of old* lightly sent forth shafts of song that told their loves" (*οἱ πάλαι... ῥίμφα παιδείους ἐτόξευον...ὕμνους*). Here he is thinking, not of Homeric epos, but of the lyric poetry which came after it,—of Alcaeus, Sappho,

Ibycus, Anacreon. "For *then* the Muse was not yet greedy of gain, nor a hireling; and sweet songs of tender sound were not yet sold by honey-voiced Terpsichore with faces made fair by silver"—(ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα). "But *now* the Muse bids heed that word of the Argive [Aristodemus] which cleaves to the paths of truth: 'Money, money maketh man,' said he, when with loss of wealth he lost his friends" (*Isthm.* ii. 1—11). The sentiment in *Pyth.* iii. 54, ἀλλὰ κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεται ("but even science is in bonds to gain"), has immediate reference to Cheiron's art, yet with a side-glance at the poet's own, which is constantly denoted by σοφία. Pindar appears to regard the contemporary poet as one whose calling has been made distinctly professional by the circumstances of his age,—by the struggle for existence, and the necessity of winning bread. On the other hand, he implicitly protests against the notion that, because it is professional, it must therefore be mercenary. The "songs with faces made fair by silver" are poems which owe their cold glitter of flattery or false sentiment to the promise of reward. Simonides was the elder contemporary of Pindar. We are reminded of the story in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (iii. 2 § 14) that Simonides was once asked to write an ἐπινίκιον for a victory in the mule-car race, when, being dissatisfied with the sum offered, he declined to praise ἡμίονοι. But, the fee having been raised, he sang —χαίρετ', ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων. In Arist. *Rhet.* ii. 16 § 2, Simonides is quoted as saying to

The poet is now professional —but not necessarily mercenary.

Simonides.

the Syracusan Hiero's wife that it is better to be πλούσιος than σοφός: and his avarice is again a subject of allusion in Arist. *Eth. N.* iv. 2 *ad fin.*, as well as in Aristophanes, *Pax*, 697 f. This illustration of Pindar's ἀοιδὴ ἀργυρωθεῖσα πρόσωπον might be further recommended by the fact that elsewhere he uses πρόσωπον figuratively of the front or *opening* of a poem. In *Nem.* viii. 37:—χρυσὸν εὔχονται, πεδίον δ' ἕτεροι | ἀπέραντον· ἐγὼ δ' ἀστοῖς ἀδὼν καὶ χθονὶ γυῖα καλύψαιμ', | αἰνέων αἰνητά, μομφὰν δ' ἐπισπείρων ἀλιτροῖς: "Some pray for gold and some for boundless land; mine be it to have pleased my folk e'en till I lay my limbs in earth, still praising things worthy of praise, but sowing censure for evil doers." It is, I venture to think, a mistaken cynicism which would regard this utterance as conventional. Rather may we believe that one of Pindar's distinctions among contemporary poets was just the desire to raise his art, by the free and earnest exercise of original genius, above the reproach of a sordid servility,—from which, as Aristotle shows, even such a man as Simonides was not exempt. We may infer this, not merely from detached texts, but from Pindar's poetry as a whole, and from the spirit which study can discern to be the animating and dominant influence. He claims that he is independent—giving praise only where it is due. Note, as illustrating this, a well-marked trait of the Odes—Pindar's insistence on the merit of the trainer or the charioteer, even where this might somewhat detract from the lustre of the victor for whom the

Pindar's desire to raise his art.

Praise of the trainer or charioteer.

ode is written. Thus at Aegina, where there was a strong jealousy of Athens, he insists—though he shows his consciousness that the topic will not be popular—on doing justice to the Athenian trainer Melesias (*Ol.* viii. 54). He even can say that the trainer is to the victor as Achilles to Patroclus (*Ol.* xi. 19). He does not shrink from reproving the king of Cyrene for harshness to a kinsman, or the tyrant of Syracuse for listening to flatterers. He says of a successful boxer that he is ὀνοτὸς μὲν ἰδέσθαι, "mean to look upon" (*Isthm.* iii. 68), though συμπεσεῖν ἀκμᾷ βαρύς, "sore to meet in his strength." Pindar is not (to my thinking) deficient in tenderness; but he has too much truth of nature to be sentimental. "A son born in wedlock is dear to a father who is now moving on the path that wends away from youth; yea, it warmeth his soul with love; *for* when wealth is doomed to be the charge of an alien sought from without, 'tis most grievous to the dying" (*Ol.* xi. 86). Universally, Pindar's tone resembles nothing less than that of a hireling encomiast or a courtly flatterer. Even towards the most illustrious of the victors, his attitude is invariably that of an equal, and of one who is privileged to teach, to exhort, and, if need be, to rebuke. We shall readily understand this if we remember the value, for his own day in Greece, of his threefold claim—Aegid descent, intimate relation with the worship of Apollo, and poetical genius.

His tone—never that of a flatterer?

§ 12. The task proposed to Pindar by those

forms of poetry which he cultivated may be described in his own words. It was—*φόρμιγγά τε ποικιλόγαρυν καὶ βοὰν αὐλῶν ἐπέων τε θέσιν | συμμίξαι πρεπόντως*: "meetly to blend the cithern's various voice, and the sounding flutes, and verses set thereto" (*Ol.* iii. 8). And so the teacher of the chorus, whose duty was to superintend the choral rehearsals of an ode, is called *γλυκὺς κρατὴρ ἀγαφθέγκτων ἀοιδᾶν* (*Ol.* vi. 91), one who "*sweetly tempers* resounding strains"; who sees that the flutes do not overpower the cithern, or either the words, but that the several elements are blended in a harmonious whole. Compare *Ol.* xiv. 17, *Λυδίῳ γὰρ Ἀσώπιχον ἐν τρόπῳ | ἔν τε μελέταις ἀείδων ἔμολον*: "I have come [to Orchomenus], hymning Asopichus in Lydian mood, by voices of ripe skill"; literally, "in the Lydian mood, and by aid of practisings": where *ἐν Λυδίῳ τρόπῳ* refers to the poet's composition, and *ἐν μελέταις* to the rehearsals of the chorus. This point is missed by translating *μελέταις* simply "strains"—a sense to which it surely cannot be reduced. We have some glimpses of the long technical development through which, before Pindar's day, Greek lyric poetry had passed; as in the reference to the improvement of the dithyramb (*Ol.* xiii. 18); to the *πολυκέφαλος νόμος* said to have been invented by Olympus or Crates (*κεφαλᾶν πολλᾶν νόμον*, *Pyth.* xii. 23); to the *ὕμνου τεθμὸς Ὀλυμπιονίκας* (*Ol.* vii. 88); and in the contrast between the *καλλίνικος ὁ τριπλόος*, —the so-called "song of Archilochus," with the

refrain *τήνελλα καλλίνικε*—and a more elaborate ode in praise of a victor (*Ol.* ix. 1). Pindar's art demanded laborious studies in metre, in music, and in the adaptation of both to *ὀρχηστική*—the highly intricate systems of the choral dance. Tradition gives him several instructors—Scopelinus, Agathocles or Apollodorus, Lâsus of Hermione—not to mention the criticisms of Corinna. Good teaching, he says, can give a keener edge to native power (*θήξαις κε φύντ' ἀρετᾷ*, *Ol.* xi. 20). But, wherever he alludes to the poet's craft, he dwells on the distinction between acquired skill and the inborn gift. *Ol.* ii. 86 :—*σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ· μαθόντες δὲ λάβροι | παγγλωσσίᾳ, κόρακες ὥς, ἄκραντα γαρύετον | Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον* : "The bard is he whose mind is rich by nature's gift; men shaped by lore have sound and fury effecting nought; 'tis the chattering of crows against the godlike bird of Zeus." *Ol.* ix. 100 :—*τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν· πολλοὶ δὲ διδακταῖς | ἀνθρώπων ἀρεταῖς κλέος | ὤρουσαν ἀρέσθαι· | ἄνευ δὲ θεοῦ σεσιγαμένον | οὐ σκαιότερον χρῆμ' ἕκαστον· ἐντὶ γὰρ ἄλλαι | ὁδῶν ὁδοὶ περαίτεραι, | μία δ' οὐχ ἅπαντας ἄμμε θρέψει | μελέτα· σοφίαι μὲν | αἰπειναί* : "Nature's gift is alway best; but many men have strained to win renown by feats whereto they had been schooled. Yet, where the god is not, a truer instinct ever counsels silence; paths are there beyond paths; one training will not form us all; the heights of art are steep." *Nem.* iii. 40 :—*συγγενεῖ δέ τις εὐδοξίᾳ μέγα βρίθει· | ὃς δὲ διδάκτ' ἔχει, ψεφηνὸς ἀνὴρ | ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα πνέων*

Metre—music—dancing.

Genius *versus* skill.

οὔποτ' ἀτρεκέϊ | κατέβα ποδί, μυριᾶν δ' ἀρετᾶν ἀτελεῖ | νόῳ γεύεται. "Born with him is the power that makes a man's name great; but whoso hath the fruits of lore alone, he walks in a vain shadow; his spirit veers with every breeze; he never plants a sure foot in the lists; he dallies with ambitions numberless, but his mind achieves not one."

Reference to Bacchylides?

§ 13. The third Nemean cannot be dated; but another of the odes just quoted, the second Olympian (for Thero of Acragas) is of 476 B.C.; and in the second Pythian—of 477 B.C.—occurs the well-known passage in which Pindar warns Hiero of Syracuse against flatterers,—adding that those who seek to snatch an unfair start (στάθμας... ἑλκόμενοι περισσᾶς, *v.* 90) sometimes overreach themselves. It can scarcely be doubted that the emphatic contrast of poetical φυὴ and μάθησις has some personal reference. But I cannot believe that Simonides is the person intended. His *avarice* is probably (as suggested above) an object of Pindar's allusion elsewhere; but, so far as we can now judge, the work of Simonides bore a stamp so distinctive that it would have been unmeaning to speak of him as devoid of native faculty. In 476 B.C., however, Bacchylides, the nephew of Simonides, was still a young poet; about that time—the year is doubtful—he had written on a victory won at Olympia by a horse of Hiero's called Pherenicus—which (or a namesake) is mentioned in Pindar's first Olympian ode (472 B.C.); and he was probably rising into notice at the courts of the Sicilian princes, where

the established fame of Simonides would afford a favourable introduction. Now, one of the fragments of Bacchylides (Bergk, no. 17) runs:—*ἕτερος ἐξ ἑτέρου σοφὸς τό τε πάλαι τό τε νῦν· | οὐδὲ γὰρ ῥᾴστον ἀρρήτων ἐπέων πύλας | ἐξευρεῖν*: "bard follows bard [*i.e.* poet teaches poet by example]: for 'tis no light quest to find the gates of unattempted song" [to devise a thoroughly original strain]; where *ἀρρήτων* means,—*not* "unspeakable" (like Milton's "inexpressive" song),—but "*unspoken*," unsung before: cp. Soph. *Antig.* 556, *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρρήτοις γε τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις*. This is the sentiment of one who viewed lyric poetry as a traditional art—as, indeed it was, and an art of elaborate method—without any strong consciousness of original genius. Nay, we should do no force to the words if we read in them an implied tribute from the nephew to the uncle who had been his master and his model. When Pindar depreciates the singer who is a mere pupil of others; when he says that "one training will not form us all," or lift the uninspired man to the heights of poetry; may he not be hinting that the young Bacchylides—a new competitor for Sicilian laurels—was only a feeble echo of Simonides? In an ode written for Hiero in 474 B.C. Pindar expresses the hope of "surpassing rivals" (*ἀμεύσασθ' ἀντίους, Pyth.* i. 45): he touches on the baneful power of envy and slander,—but adds, "yet forego not noble aims; 'tis better to be envied than pitied" (*κρέσσων γὰρ οἰκτιρμοῦ φθόνος, ib.* 85). The tone of this and other passages is (to my mind)

Slanderers.

not that of a jealous man, but of one who is maintaining an attitude of defence against calumny; and it is difficult to resist the impression that, at this time, Pindar had been the object of some hostile intrigue at Hiero's court, which he associated with the desire of Simonides to advance the fortunes of a young kinsman more distinguished by diligence than by originality.

Pindar claims originality.

§ 14. Next, remark the distinctness with which Pindar claims, not only native faculty (*φυή*), but novelty of style and treatment. "Awake for them a strain of clear-toned verse; praise thou old wine, but *newer* flowers of song" (*αἴνει δὲ παλαιὸν μὲν οἶνον, ἄνθεα δ' ὕμνων | νεωτέρων*, *Ol.* ix. 48). The Muse stands by his side and inspires him to devise a strain "of glossy newness" (*νεοσίγαλον εὑρόντι τρόπον*, *Ol.* iii. 4). And in *Ol.* ix. 80 he clearly marks the qualities which he regards as peculiarly his own:—*εἴην εὑρησιεπὴς ἀναγεῖσθαι | πρόσφορος ἐν Μοισᾶν δίφρῳ· | τόλμα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφὴς δύναμις ἔσποιτο.* "Mine be it to invent new strains, mine the skill to hold my course in the chariot of the Muses; and may courage go with me, and power of ample grasp." "If the theme ordained be praise of fortune high, or might of hand, or steel-clad war, ho, trace me a far line for my leap; I have light vigour in my limbs: yea, eagles whirl their flight beyond the deep" (*Nem.* v. 19). What were the principal traits in which Pindar's originality consisted? In so far as it resided in metrical novelties, in new adjustments

of metre to music and dancing, we have no longer any precise gauge for it, since we have no sufficiently large examples of contemporary work in the same kind. But there are at least some aspects of his work which we can more confidently recognize as original. One of these is his treatment of the heroic legends which he interwove with his celebration of victories. It may often be remarked that his claim of novelty is made as the immediate prelude to the introduction of such a legend. Thus in *Ol.* iii. 4—14 such a claim prefaces the story of Heracles having brought the Olympian olive from the land of the Hyperboreans; in *Ol.* ix. 49 it prepares the mention of the flood, with the mythical derivation of the Opuntian heroes from the λίθινος γόνος of Deucalion and Pyrrha; in *Nem.* v. 19 it leads up to the legend of the favours which the gods bestowed on the Aeacidae of old. *Allusion* to local or family myths must have been a familiar resource of the lyrical, as it was of the rhetorical, panegyrist. But we can well believe that no poet before Pindar had shown such boldness or such varied ingenuity in linking his immediate subject with mythical themes which were neither obvious nor trite. In cases such as those just mentioned, Pindar seems to be calling attention to the daring ease of his own transitions. Further, he does not merely introduce mythology as a background to the scene of the festivals, but often elaborates a particular episode so as to give it the separate value of a small but highly finished picture set

Original features.

(1) treatment of heroic legends—δαιδάλλειν.

in the massive framework of the ode. Such a picture is the birth of Iamos (*Ol.* vi.); the vision of Bellerophon (*Ol.* xiii.); the rape of Cyrene (*Pyth.* ix.); the infant Heracles (*Nem.* i.); the death of Castor (*Nem.* x.); Heracles predicting the birth of Ajax (*Isthm.* v.). This mode of treatment I should conceive to have been one marked trait of Pindar's originality,—exhibiting his wide and complete command of epic material in a form shared by no other Greek lyrist. In saying this, I do not forget the exquisite *Danae* of Simonides; but that, apparently, was a piece complete in itself, not a gem adorning a larger piece on another subject. Pindar is fond of the phrase δαιδάλλειν: the image might well express his own manner of inlaying his odes with these mythical subjects.

Example—Fourth Pythian ode.

The fourth Pythian ode is the largest and most brilliant example; it also illustrates with peculiar clearness Pindar's art of rapid transition from theme to myth, and from myth back to theme. The Muse is invoked to sing the victory of Arcesilas, king of Cyrene, at Delphi; *where* (ἔνθα, *v.* 4) that oracle was given which sent Battus, the founder of the dynasty, from Thera to colonise Cyrene: *and* (καί, *v.* 9) thus to fulfil the prophecy of Medea. "Now she spake thus (εἶπε δ' οὕτως) to the heroes who sailed with the warrior Jason"; and then the story of her prophecy is related (*vv.* 11—58). "Such were Medea's prophetic strains; with bowed heads, mute and motionless, the godlike heroes stood, as they hearkened to the rede of her wisdom." Here

the poet returns to Battus (*v.* 59). "Thee, happy son of Polymnêstus, loyal to Medea's word, the oracle of the Delphic bee lifted to honour by a summons which thou hadst not sought,—who bade thee thrice hail, and declared thee Cyrene's destined king";—and from Battus the eighth in descent is Arcesilas, "on whom Apollo and Pytho have bestowed glory of the chariot-race among all who dwell around. To the Muses will I give him for their theme, *and the golden fleece of the ram; for 'twas in quest thereof that the Minyae had sailed, when heaven-sent honours were planted for his house*": ἀπὸ δ' αὐτὸν Μοίσαισι δώσω | καὶ τὸ πάγχρυσον νάκος κριοῦ· μετὰ γὰρ | κεῖνο πλευσάντων Μινυᾶν θεόπομποί | σφισιν [*i.e.* for the Battiadae] τιμαὶ φύτευθεν. Note the bold simplicity of the transition here from Arcesilas, the immediate theme of the ode, to the myth of the Argonauts. Now, from *v.* 70 to *v.* 246, that myth is presented in a series of splendid pictures; the coming of Jason to Iolcus; the scene between Jason and Pelias; the sailing of the Argo; the ploughing with the brazen bulls of Aeetes. The slaying of the dragon which guarded the fleece, the flight of Medea with Jason, and his triumphant return, were subjects which Pindar could have treated with equal splendour, and which a less daring poet might even have regarded as forming the indispensable climax. But at this point a constraining sense of καιρός makes Pindar feel that he must return from myth to theme,—from Jason to Arcesilas; and observe how he manages

it. (v. 247.) *μακρά μοι νεῖσθαι κατ' ἀμαξιτόν· ὥρα γὰρ συνάπτει· | καί τινα οἶμον ἴσαμι βραχύν· πολλοῖσι δ' ἄγημαι σοφίας ἑτέροις. | κτεῖνε μὲν γλαυκῶπα τέχναις ποικιλόνωτον ὄφιν, | ὦ 'ρκεσίλα, κ.τ.λ.* "'Tis far for me to fare along the well-worn track; time urges; yea, and I know a speedy path; *to many have I shown the ways of song.* The speckled dragon with the glaring eyes he slew, *Arcesilas,* by wiles...." Remark the skill of the abrupt vocative, which at once turns our thoughts back to the primary theme. A few rapid verses now carry us from Colchis to Lemnos—where the Argonaut Euphemus begat the ancestry of Battus—and from Lemnos to Cyrene, the realm committed by Apollo to "the upright counsels" of the dynasty which Arcesilas represents. This directly leads to a criticism—veiled in the beautiful allegory of the oak—on the sentence by which Arcesilas has lopped a goodly branch from the tree of the Cyrenean State; and the ode concludes with a noble and touching plea for Damophilus, the banished kinsman of the prince.

The *οἶμος βραχύς.*

It is interesting to note the connection of the words quoted above—*πολλοῖσι δ' ἄγημαι σοφίας ἑτέροις.* He is cutting short an epic narrative in a fashion altogether his own. The *οἶμος βραχύς* which he claims to know is the art of *swift* passage from myth back to theme; and he says that he can exercise this art with confident tact, being, in truth, the leader who has shown lyric poets how mythical ornament may be a source of endless variety and

novelty in the handling of contemporary topics. The fourth Pythian ode forcibly exemplifies the δύναμις ἀμφιλαφής (*Ol.* ix. 80), the "power of ample grasp," to which, as we saw, he aspires; and also the meaning of ἀναγεῖσθαι ἐν Μοισᾶν δίφρῳ (*ib.*)—"to hold the onward course" of a continuous epic recital.

(2) Language.

§ 15. Pindar's language has a character distinct from that of every other Greek poet known to us. A comparison with the lyric parts of tragedy serves only to bring out this distinction more clearly. The modern reader finds this language, for the most part, exceedingly difficult and obscure; even when he is familiar with it, it still taxes the attention. The ultimate source of this difficulty is the continual demand on the imagination; and I believe that ease in reading Pindar can in large measure be attained by a clear perception of certain general forms in which his thought tends to clothe itself. It is with the view of illustrating these forms that I give the following notes—as contributions to the outline of an analysis which the student can develop for himself.

Metaphor.

Metaphor is not reserved for occasional ornament, but is habitually used for the translation of common thoughts or phrases. "Having passed out of the ranks of youths," ἐξελθὼν ἐφήβων, becomes with Pindar, συλαθεὶς ἀγενείων (*Ol.* ix. 89), "reft from the beardless company." "He is deprived of joy," ἀπεστέρηται εὐφροσύνης, becomes "he is in banishment from joy," εὐφροσύνας ἀλᾶται (*Ol.* i. 58).

"It is near to madness," *ἐγγύς ἐστι μανιῶν*, becomes *μανίαισιν ὑποκρέκει* (*Ol.* ix. 39), "it sounds a note attuned to frenzy,"—a phrase suggested by the common *συνᾴδει*, "is accordant with." "Deep desire of *pursuing*" (various ambitions,—including victory in the games) is *βαθεῖα μέριμνα ἀγροτέρα* (*Ol.* ii. 54), "deep desire *of the chase*," where *ἀγροτέρα* is a bold figure for *τοῦ διώκειν*. "The lyre bestows fame," is *λύρα ἀναπάσσει χάριν* (*Ol.* xi. 93),—"sprinkles grace,"—like flowers. A cloak is "a warm remedy for winds," *εὐδιανὸν φάρμακον αὐρᾶν* (*Ol.* ix. 97). A bridle is a "soothing spell," or "charm," for a horse: *φάρμακον πραΰ, φίλτρον ἵππειον* (*Ol.* xiii. 85, 68). An anchor is "swift Argo's bridle," *θοᾶς Ἀργοῦς χαλινός* (*Pyth.* iv. 25). "To send a shout along the line," is not *παραπέμπειν*, but *παραιθύσσειν θόρυβον* (*Ol.* xi. 72), "to send it rippling along." "To raise one's prosperity," not *αἴρειν*, but *πέμπειν ἀνεκὰς ὄλβον* (*Ol.* ii. 21,—where the metaphor may be from a wheel). "To be in the decline of life" is *ἵκειν νεότατος τὸ πάλιν ἤδη* (*Ol.* xi. 87), "to be moving now in the opposite direction from youth": contrast the *ἕρπουσαν πρόσω ἤβην* of Sophocles. "He has his share in offerings to the dead," *μέμικται ἐν αἱμακουρίαις* (*Ol.* i. 90). "It enables one to judge of it," *δίδωσιν ἔλεγχον περὶ ἑαυτῆς*, becomes *διδοῖ ψᾶφον περ' αὑτᾶς* (*Pyth.* iv. 265). "The thunderbolt, that hath part in every victory of Zeus," is expressed by the strangely bold *ἐν ἅπαντι κράτει κεραυνὸν ἀραρότα* (*Ol.* xi. 82). To enjoy, or cherish, happiness,—*ὄλβον ἄρδειν*

(*Ol.* v. 23), where the metaphor is from watering a garden. To hold themes in reserve, *τὰ μὲν ἡμετέρα γλῶσσα ποιμαίνειν ἐθέλει* (*Ol.* x. 9). To show pleasure at good news (said of friends), *σαίνειν ποτὶ γλυκεῖαν ἀγγελίαν* (*Ol.* iv. 5). To pass through life prosperously, *κούφοισιν ἐκνεῦσαι ποσίν* (*Ol.* xiii. 114). Grief is more than compensated by blessings, *πένθος πιτνεῖ κρεσσόνων πρὸς ἀγαθῶν* (*Ol.* ii. 23).

Images for the superlative.

§ 16. Images for the highest excellence are drawn from the furthest limits of travel and navigation, or from the fairest of natural objects. Pindar delights in what may be called *the imagery of the superlative.* Thus, of consummate good fortune (in the games, &c.):—*ἅπτεται οἰκόθεν Ἡρακλέος σταλᾶν*: "in his own strength he touches the Pillars of Hercules." *Γαδείρων τὸ πρὸς ζόφον οὐ περατόν· ἀπότρεπε | αὖτις Εὐρώπαν ποτὶ χέρσον ἔντεα ναός* (*Nem.* iv. 70), "none may pass beyond Gadeira into the gloom of the West: to Europa's land turn back the tackle of our ship." *περαίνει πρὸς ἔσχατον | πλόον· ναυσὶ δ' οὔτε πεζὸς ἰὼν ἂν εὕροις | ἐς Ὑπερβορέων ἀγῶνα θαυματὰν ὁδόν* (*Pyth.* x. 30): "he fares as far as man may sail: not by sea or land couldst thou find the wondrous way to the gathering of the folk that dwell beyond the Northern Wind." *ἐσχατιὰς ἥδη πρὸς ὄλβου | βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἐών* (*Isthm.* vi. 11): "now at the limits of bliss he casts his anchor, having glory from the gods." The supreme hospitality of a man who kept open house all the year round is thus figured: *ἐπέρα ποτὶ μὲν Φᾶσιν θερείαις, | ἐν δὲ χειμῶνι πλέων*

Νείλου πρὸς ἀκτάς (*Isthm.* ii. 42): "far as to Phasis was his voyage in summer days, and in winter to the shores of Nile." Such imagery is of peculiar interest as recalling the wide area of Greek colonisation in Pindar's time, and the impulse with which commerce was carrying Greek sailors to the bounds of the known earth, still bordered by a region of wonder and fable to the west and the north of the Mediterranean. Again, a victor's merits are countless as the sand:—ψάμμος ἀριθμὸν περιπέφευγεν (*Ol.* ii. 98): Olympia is "the crown" of festivals—κορυφὰ ἀέθλων—where the image is from a mountain-peak: or the flower, ἄωτος: it is excellent as water,—bright as that gold which shines among all possessions as a fire by night,—brilliant as the sun in the noonday sky (*Ol.* i. *ad init.*).

Area of Greek colonisation.

§ 17. Pindar's figurative language often seems to *invert* the natural mode of expression: as ἀκέρδεια λέλογχεν θαμινὰ κακαγόρος (*i.e.* κακαγόρους), *Ol.* i. 53: "misfortune hath oft marked slanderers for her own," instead of κακαγόροι λελόγχασιν ἀκέρδειαν. So ἤδη με γηραιὸν μέρος ἁλικίας ἀμφιπολεῖ (*Pyth.* iv. 157), "the evening of life is already closing around my path." ἱερὸν ἔσχον οἴκημα ποταμοῦ, Σικελίας τ' ἔσαν | ὀφθαλμός, αἰών τ' ἔφεπε μόρσιμος (*Ol.* ii. 9), "they won the sacred home beside the river, and were the light of Sicily, and *life went with them to man's due term*"—*i.e.* they were not cut off by premature deaths. λαγέτας ἕξ, ἀρεταῖσι μεμαλότας υἱούς (*Ol.* i. 89), "chieftains six, sons dear to chivalry." ὕμμε δ' ἐκλάρωσεν πότμος | Ζηνὶ

Natural mode of expression inverted.

γενεθλίῳ (*Ol.* viii. 15), "Destiny hath given you for his own to Zeus, your fathers' god": *i.e.* you are under his peculiar care. ἔδωκ' Ἀπόλλων θῆρας αἰνῷ φόβῳ (*Pyth.* v. 60), "Apollo made the fierce beasts a prey to terror." κράτει προσέμιξε δεσπόταν (*Ol.* i. 22), "he brought his master to the goal of victory." It will be seen that the distinctive character of such expressions depends on *a personification, not express, but implied;* or (as in the last instance) on the conception of an abstract idea—such as κράτος—in the form of a concrete object, such as a goal (or perhaps a person) awaiting the runner at the end of the race-course. Implied personification.

§ 18. Pindar is especially fertile in similitudes for poetical effort. The most striking class of such images is that derived from the contests of the festivals. Thus:—(i) *javelin-throwing.* αἰνῆσαι μενοινῶν ἔλπομαι | μὴ χαλκοπάραον ἄκονθ' ὡσείτ' ἀγῶνος βαλεῖν ἔξω παλάμᾳ δονέων (*Pyth.* i. 43), "fain to praise, I have hope not to go wide of due aim, when I hurl the javelin, bronze-armed, that quivers in mine hand." (ii) *The chariot-race.* ὦ Φίντις, ἀλλὰ ξεῦξον ἤδη μοι σθένος ἡμιόνων . . . χρὴ τοίνυν πύλας ὕμνων ἀναπιτνάμεν αὐταῖς (*Ol.* vi. 27). Phintis was the charioteer who had gained the victory. Characteristically Pindaric is the identification of the *actual* chariot with the chariot of song in which the poet is to be borne:—"Ho, Phintis, yoke for me the strength of thy mules, that we may urge our chariot in swift and free career, till I come e'en to the lineage of the race (the victor's ancestry); Similes for poetical effort.

they, best of all, know how to lead us on this path, since they have won crowns at Olympia; therefore must the gates of song be thrown wide at their coming." (iii) *The leap.* μακρὰ δὴ αὐτόθεν ἅλμαθ' ὑποσκάπτοι τις· ἔχω γονάτων ἐλαφρὸν ὁρμάν (*Nem.* v. 19)—noticed above. Other images occur which, though not taken from the games, are similar. The song is often compared to an arrow: πολλά μοι ὑπ' ἀγκῶνος ὠκέα βέλη | ἔνδον ἐντὶ φαρέτρας | φωνάντα συνετοῖσιν· . . . . ἔπεχε νυν σκοπῷ τόξον. ἄγε, θυμέ, τίνα βάλλομεν | ἐκ μαλθακᾶς αὖτε φρενὸς εὐκλέας ὀιστοὺς ἱέντες (*Ol.* ii. 83); "many swift arrows are there in the quiver beneath my arm, shafts with a message for the wise. . . . . Bend now thy bow against the mark. Say, whom are we to strike, my soul, when once again from gentle fantasy we send the arrows of glorious song?" Notice the "confusion of metaphor"—as we should call it—in βέλη φωνάντα, εὐκλέας ὀιστούς, &c. A remarkably bold use of the arrow metaphor occurs in *Ol.* ix. 5, Μοισᾶν ἀπὸ τόξων | Δία τε φοινικοστερόπαν σεμνόν τ' ἐπίνειμαι ἀκρωτήριον Ἄλιδος | τοιοῖσθε βέλεσσιν: "enter on the theme of Zeus, who sends the lightning's glare, enter on the holy mount of Elis [the Κρόνιον] with such shafts from the Muses' bow." Again, the poet's tidings bear the victor's fame "swifter than gallant steed or winged ship"—καὶ ἀγάνορος ἵππου | θᾶσσον καὶ ναὸς ὑποπτέρου (*Ol.* ix. 23). The poet is as one who sets forth on a voyage of happy promise: εὐανθέα δ' ἀναβάσομαι στόλον ἀμφ' ἀρετᾷ κελαδέων (*Pyth.* ii. 62): "Sounding the praise of valour, I

will mount the flower-crowned prow." Another place where the same image occurs affords a striking example of two incongruous metaphors brought close together:—*κώπαν σχάσον, ταχὺ δ' ἄγκυραν ἔρεισον χθονὶ | πρῴραθε, χοιράδος ἄλκαρ πέτρας. | ἐγκωμίων γὰρ ἄωτος ὕμνων | ἐπ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὥτε μέλισσα θύνει λόγον* (*Pyth.* x. 51): "stay the oar; let the anchor from the prow quickly grip the earth, that we strike not on a sunken reef; for the bright wing of the songs of praise is darting like a bee from flower to flower." Incongruous metaphors.

The poet's province is "the choice garden of the Graces" (*ἐξαίρετον χαρίτων νέμομαι κᾶπον, Ol.* ix. 27); he tills the field of Aphrodite or the Graces (*Ἀφροδίτας ἄρουραν ἢ Χαρίτων ἀναπολίζομεν, Pyth.* vi. 1). An image for a *digression* is suggested by those "Branching Roads"—the *σχιστὴ ὁδός* near Daulis in Phocis—which Pindar must so often have passed on his way from Thebes to Delphi: *ἦ ῥ, ὦ φίλοι, κατ' ἀμευσίπορον τρίοδον ἐδινάθην, ὀρθὰν κέλευθον ἰὼν τοπρίν* (*Pyth.* xi. 38): "verily, friends, I have lost my bearings at such a meeting of three roads as leadeth men to change their course, though before I was wending on a straight path":—where *ἐδινάθην* seems to suggest the idea of turning quickly round and round until one no longer knows the points of the compass. The thought which inspires a strain is compared to the whetstone which sharpens the knife,—and here, again, note the mixture of metaphors: *δόξαν ἔχω τιν' ἐπὶ γλώσσᾳ ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς, | ἅ μ' ἐθέλοντα προσέρπει καλλιρόοισι πνοαῖς* (*Ol.* vi. 82): "I have

The *ἀκόνη* or whetstone.

a thought upon my lips that lends keen motive to my song; it woos my willing soul with the spirit of fair-flowing strains." The image of the whetstone recurs in *Isthm.* v. 72: φαίης κέ νιν ἀνδράσιν ἀθληταῖσιν ἔμμεν | Ναξίαν πέτραις ἐν ἄλλαις χαλκοδάμαντ' ἀκόναν: "well mightest thou say, such is he among athletes as the stone of Naxos among stones, the grinding whet that gives an edge to bronze."

With regard to this metaphor, as to many others in Greek lyrics which are apt to strike us as harsh or even grotesque, there is a general principle which ought, I think, to be clearly perceived. Most Indo-European nouns expressed some one obvious and characteristic quality of the object which they denoted: *e.g.* ναῦς is "the swimmer," δρῦς, "the thing which is cleft," &c. Similarly, ἀκόνη is the *sharpener*, κρατήρ is the *mixer*, &c. A Greek who called a thought an ἀκόνη was thus using a less startling image than we should use in calling it a *whetstone*; to call the teacher of a chorus a κρατήρ was not the same thing as it would be for us to call him a *bowl*. And such phrases are less audacious in proportion as they are old,—*i.e.* near to the time when the language was still freshly conscious of the primary sense in such words as ἀκόνη.

Bold metaphor—a modifying cause.

§ 19. The range of Pindar's comparisons for his own art would not have been completely surveyed if we overlooked some of a more familiar or even homely kind. Poets are "the cunning builders" of song (τέκτονες οἷα σοφοὶ ἄρμοσαν, *Pyth.* iii. 113).

Homely images.

An ode is sent over the sea "like Phoenician merchandise" (*κατὰ Φοίνισσαν ἐμπολάν*, *Pyth.* ii. 67). The poet's mind is a register of promised songs, in which a particular debt can be searched out: *ἀνάγνωτέ μοι | Ἀρχεστράτου παῖδα, πόθι φρενὸς ἐμᾶς γέγραπται·* "read me where the son of Archestratus [an Olympian victor] is written in my memory" (*Ol.* xi. 1). Ample praise, long deferred, is *τόκος*, payment with interest (*ib.* 9). The trainer who faithfully conveys the poet's thoughts to the chorus is *ἄγγελος ὀρθός, ἠϋκόμων σκυτάλα Μοισᾶν* (*Ol.* vi. 91), "an upright envoy, interpreter from man to man of the Muses with the beauteous hair": the point of *σκυτάλη* being that the message would not be intelligible if carried by one who was not in *exact* possession of Pindar's ideas. The cithern is invoked as *Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ἰοπλοκάμων σύνδικον Μοισᾶν κτέανον* (*Pyth.* i. 1), "*witness* for Apollo and the Muses with violet locks, whose thou art": cp. *Ol.* ix. 98, *σύνδικος αὐτῷ Ἰολάου | τύμβος εἰναλία τ' Ἐλευσὶς ἀγλαΐαισιν*, "the tomb of Iolaus [at Thebes] and Eleusis by the sea is *witness* to his glories."

A register.

Usury.

The *σκυτάλη*.

In other connections also Pindar can use homely images, which link his lofty style with the idiom and proverbial philosophy of daily life. Thus:—*ἴστω γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ πεδίλῳ δαιμόνιον πόδ' ἔχων | Σωστράτου υἱός* (*Ol.* vi. 8); "yea, let the son of Sostratus know that in this sandal he hath his foot, by grace divine": *i.e.* stands in this case. One recalls the famous *σὺ μὲν ἔρραψας τοῦτο τὸ ὑπόδημα,*

The shoe.

Ἀρισταγόρας δὲ ὑπεδύσατο (Her. vi. 1). Then, of bearing adversity:—*τὰ μὲν ὦν οὐ δύνανται νήπιοι κόσμῳ φέρειν, | ἀλλ' ἀγαθοί, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαντες ἔξω* (*Pyth.* iii. 83): "now the foolish cannot bear ills in seemly wise, but the noble can, when they have turned the fair side outward," *i.e.* brave men in misfortune show a cheerful front to the world, and conceal the seamy side of their fortune. The process of dyeing or staining suggests *οὐ ψεύδεϊ τέγξω λόγον* (*Ol.* iv. 17). An inglorious youth is likened to the *ἐνδομάχας ἀλέκτωρ* (*Ol.* xii. 14), "the chanticleer who fights at home." In *Ol.* xi. 37, we read of a city *βαθὺν εἰς ὀχετὸν ἄτας | ἴζοισαν*,—"settling into the deep bed of ruin"—a singularly vivid image from the action of running water on the basements of buildings. The idea of wiping off a stain, rather than that of transferring a burden, seems to have suggested the extraordinarily bold imagery of *Ol.* viii. 68, *ἐν τέτρασιν παίδων ἀπεθήκατο γυίοις | νόστον ἔχθιστον καὶ ἀτιμοτέραν γλῶσσαν καὶ ἐπίκρυφον οἶμον*: "On the bodies of four youths hath he put off from him the doom of joyless return, and slighted voice, and furtive path." The *ἐξομόργνυσθαι μωρίαν τινί* of Euripides is tame in comparison with this, —which surely no Greek but Pindar could have written.

The seamy side.

Order of words.

§ 20. The natural *order of words* is sometimes deranged in a way which can be explained only by the exacting requirements of the intricate metres. Thus *Ol.* viii. 5, *μαιομένων μεγάλαν | ἀρετὰν θυμῷ λαβεῖν*, means "yearning in heart to achieve great

prowess," *not* "yearning to seize great prowess in their thoughts," to conceive it. In *Ol.* iv. 1, *τεαὶ γὰρ ὧραι | ὑπὸ ποικιλοφόρμιγγος ἀοιδᾶς ἑλισσόμεναί μ' ἔπεμψαν*, the sense is: "thy seasons, as they come round, have sent me with the cithern's varied strains." In *Pyth.* iv. 24, *ἄγκυραν ποτὶ χαλκόγεννυν . . . ναὶ κρημνάντων*, "hanging the anchor of biting bronze to the ship," the place of *ποτί* is very harsh. In the same ode, 214, *ποικίλαν ἴυγγα τετράκναμον Οὐλυμπόθεν | ἐν ἀλύτῳ ζεύξαισα κύκλῳ | μαινάδ' ὄρνιν Κυπρογένεια φέρεν | πρῶτον ἀνθρώποισι*, the whole order is strangely involved: "The Cyprus-born queen first brought from Olympus to men the speckled wry-neck, the maddening bird, when she had bound it fast upon a four-spoked wheel." In *v.* 106, *ἀρχαίαν κομίζον . . . τιμάν*, the last word is separated by three lines from the former. A very strong instance is *Isthm.* iii. 36, *μετὰ χειμέριον ποικίλων μηνῶν ζόφον χθὼν ὥτε φοινικέοισιν ἄνθησεν ῥόδοις*, "as, after the *gloom of winter*, the earth blossoms with the red roses *of the many-coloured months*," — where the position of *ποικίλων μηνῶν* between *χειμέριον* and *ζόφον* is one for which it would be hard to find a parallel.

Syntax.

§ 21. Apart from such dislocations, Pindar's syntax is rarely difficult. I would note the following points: (1) Co-ordination of clauses (parataxis) is preferred to subordination (hypotaxis), — an epic feature of which the peculiarly Pindaric form is concerned with the introduction of a simile: as in *Ol.* i. 3, *εἰ δ' ἄεθλα γαρύεν | ἔλδεαι, ...μηκέτ' ἀελίου*

σκόπει | ἄλλο θαλπνότερον...ἄστρον,.. μηδ' | Ὀλυμπίας ἀγῶνα φέρτερον αὐδάσομεν, instead of saying, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἂν σκοποῖς, οὕτω μηδ' αὐδήσωμεν. Cp. *Ol.* ii. 98. (2) The so-called σχῆμα Πινδαρικόν or Βοιωτικόν (singular verb with plural subject) occurs in *Ol.* x. 5, (τέλλεται,—where, as Fennell suggests, it would be much softened if we read ἀρχή,) in *Pyth.* x. 71 (κεῖται: where W. Christ gives κεῖνται); frag. 53, 15 (βάλλεται...φόβαι, ἀχεῖταί τ' ὀμφαί). Similarly the grammarians gave the name of Ἀλκμανικὸν σχῆμα to such a structure as *Odyssey* x. 513, Πυριφλεγέθων τε ῥέουσιν | Κώκυτός τε. (3) *Zeugma. Ol.* i. 88, ἕλεν δ' Οἰνομάου βίαν πάρθενόν τε σύνευνον: "he overcame mighty Oenomaus, and won the maiden for his bride." *Pyth.* i. 40, ἐθελήσαις ταῦτα νόῳ τιθέμεν εὔανδρόν τε χώραν, "deign to lay these prayers to thy heart, and to make the land happy in her sons." (4) *Cases.* (i) Genitive where dative would be usual: *Pyth.* iii. 5, νόον ἔχοντ' ἀνδρῶν φίλον, "kindly to men." *Ol.* vii. 90, ὕβριος ἐχθρὰν ὁδὸν | εὐθυπορεῖ, "he walks in the straight way that abhors insolence." (ii) Dative where genitive would be usual: *Pyth.* v. 58, ὄφρα μὴ ταμίᾳ Κυράνας ἀτελὴς γένοιτο μαντεύμασιν, "that he might not fail to fulfil his oracles to Cyrene's lord" (instead of μαντευμάτων). *Pyth.* iv. 296, ἀσυχίᾳ θιγέμεν, and elsewhere. (iii) Accusative after πονεῖν as = "to trouble": *Pyth.* iv. 151, οὐ πονεῖ με ταῦτα. In *v.* 36, οὐδ' ἀπίθησέ νιν, W. Christ reads Fιν (= οἱ) with Hermann. (5) *Prepositions. Ol.* v. 6, ὑπὸ βουθυσίαις (ἐγέραρεν), "honoured *by*" (dative for genitive): con-

versely, *Ol.* xi. 30, δοκεύσαις ὑπὸ Κλεωνᾶν, "*under*" (genitive for dative); *Pyth.* iii. 60, γνόντα τὸ πὰρ ποδός, "aware what lies before him," not strictly equivalent to the common παρὰ πόδα (*by* the foot), but rather denoting that which will be met at the next step forward. *Pyth.* v. 54, περὶ δείματι φύγον, "for terror," *prae timore* (so Aeschylus, *Cho.* 32, περὶ τάρβει). *Ol.* iii. 31, πνοιαῖς ὄπιθεν, "behind the blasts": *Ol.* vii. 18, πέλας ἐμβόλῳ. *Pyth.* ii. 11, ἐν ἅρματα, Aeolic for εἰς, and elsewhere. (6) κεν with future infinitive: *Ol.* i. 109, γλυκυτέραν κεν ἔλπομαι κλεῖξειν. (7) Optative *without* ἄν in abstract supposition: *Ol.* iii. 45, οὔ μιν διώξω· κεινὸς εἴην. *Pyth.* iv. 118, οὐ ξείναν ἱκοίμαν γαῖαν. *Ol.* x. 20, ἐμφυὲς οὔτ' αἴθων ἀλώπηξ οὔτ' ἐρίβρομοι λέοντες διαλλάξαιντο ἦθος. (8) The *active* sense of the epithet may be noted in καθαρὸς λέβης, "vessel of cleansing" (*Ol.* i. 26), φρίσσοντες ὄμβροι, "chilling rains" (*Pyth.* iv. 81), μαινὰς ὄρνις (216), "bird that maddens."

Vocabulary.

The number of words peculiar to Pindar is large in proportion to the volume of his extant work. In several, as ἀλεξίμβροτος, ἐναρίμβροτος, μελησίμβροτος, ὀπισθόμβροτος, πλειστόμβροτος, ἀλιτόξενος, ἀρχεδικᾶν, καταφυλλοροεῖν, we can see how dactylic metre (especially in its Pindaric combinations) stimulated the formation of new compounds.

χάρις —the Χάριτες.

§ 22. The spirit of art, in every form, is represented for Pindar by χάρις—"the source of all delights to mortals" (ἅπερ ἅπαντα τεύχει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς, *Ol.* i. 30)—or by the personified Charites. While Sparta knew only two Graces (Κλήτα and

Φαεννά),—as Athens, again, had but two (Αὐξώ and Ἡγεμόνη),—it was the Boeotian Orchomenus, near the Theban poet's home, which possessed an ancient worship of three sisters, Εὐφροσύνη, Ἀγλαΐα, Θαλία (Paus. ix. 35). "Illustrious queens of bright Orchomenus, who watch over the old Minyan folk, hear me, ye Graces, when I pray! For by your help come all things glad and sweet to mortals, whether wisdom is given to any man, or beauty, or renown. Yea, the gods ordain not dance or feast apart from the majesty of the Graces; the Graces control all things wrought in heaven; they have set their throne beside Pythian Apollo of the golden bow; they adore the everlasting godhead of the Olympian father" (*Ol.* xiv. 3). When Pindar compares the brightening fortunes of a victor's house to "the fulness of spring with its bright blossoms" (φοινικανθέμου ἦρος ἀκμᾷ, *Pyth.* iv. 64), to the earth, "after winter's gloom, blossoming with the red roses of the many-coloured months" (*Isthm.* iii. 36), we remember that the Charites were often represented as young maidens decking themselves with early flowers; the *rose*, in particular, was sacred to the Charites as well as to Aphrodite[1]. In Pindar's mind, as in that old Greek conception from which the worship of the Charites sprang, the instinct of beautiful art was one with the sense of natural beauty. It is interesting to consider the relation of Pindar's poetry to other contemporary forms of Greek art, especially to that which, in his latter

Invocation of the Graces.

[1] See A. S. Murray, *Manual of Mythology*, p. 174.

days, was drawing near to ripe perfection, the art of sculpture.

Relation to Sculpture.

§ 23. The period of Pindar's activity (502 to 452 B.C.) coincides with the close of that period in Greek sculpture which immediately preceded the culmination of the art under Pheidias. To take Overbeck's broad division, we have :—(1) The early age, to 460 B.C.; its second period being from about 540 to 460: (2) The age of maturity, 460 to 300 B.C.; its second period being from about 396 to 300. From a slightly different point of view, we might close the archaic age at 500 B.C., and regard 500 to 460 B.C. as a distinct period, that in which the schools of Argos, Sicyon, and Aegina were effecting the transition from archaic types. And this is precisely the age to which most of Pindar's extant odes belong.

Argos—Sicyon—Aegina.

Olympia.

The central link between Pindar's poetry and Greek sculpture is Olympia. The earliest Greek plastic art was directly and exclusively the handmaid of religion: the god and the demigod were considered the only proper subjects for its exercise. But as the glory of the Olympian festival grew, as the worship of the Olympian Zeus became more and more a national bond among all Hellenes, an Olympian victor was raised to a rank so eminent that it seemed no longer irreverent to pay him an honour similar to that which was rendered to ἡμίθεοι: especially as this honour was in some sort rendered, not merely to the man, but also to the gods and demigods of Olympia. Hence, in the course of the sixth century B.C., sculpture was already

600–500 B.C. Statues of athletes.

finding a new field in the commemoration of athletes. And this work, while still prompted by the best inspirations of Greek religion, was so far *secular* as to relax those hieratic bonds in which the art of Egypt had remained bound. A pancratiast named Arrachion, victorious at Olympia in *Ol.* 50 (564 B.C.), was commemorated by a stone statue which Pausanias mentions (viii. 40, 1) as of archaic type (σχῆμα), and which seems to have been of the same general character as the Apollo of Tenea now at Munich[1]. Praxidamas, a boxer of Aegina (544 B.C.), and Rhexibius of Opus (536 B.C.), were commemorated by statues in wood. Earlier still (about 580 B.C.) the Argives had dedicated at Delphi portrait-statues (εἰκόνες, Her. i. 31) of Cleobis and Biton, on account of their eminent piety (ὡς ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων). About 520 B.C. Entelidas and Chrysothemis, sculptors of the Argive school, wrought statues of two Olympian victors, Demarchus and Theopompus.

Arrachion, &c.

Sculpture and Poetry —sister arts.

§ 24. Pindar, in a striking passage, recognizes Sculpture and Poetry as sister arts employed in the commemoration of the athlete's fame, and contrasts the immobility of the statue with the wide diffusion of the poem (*Nem.* v. 1): οὐκ ἀνδριαντοποιός εἰμ', ὥστ' ἐλινύσοντά μ' ἐργάζεσθαι ἀγάλματ' ἐπ' αὐτᾶς βαθμίδος | ἑσταότ', ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάσας ὁλκάδος ἔν τ' ἀκάτῳ, γλυκεῖ' ἀοιδά, | στεῖχ' ἀπ' Αἰγίνας. "No sculptor I, to fashion images that shall stand idly on one pedestal for aye: no, go thou forth from

[1] See Perry's *Greek and Roman Sculpture*, p. 57.

Aegina, sweet song of mine, on every freighted ship, on each light bark." In Pindar's frequent insistence on the *supreme* value of song as the record of great deeds we can sometimes feel a tacit reference to the art with which here he openly contrasts his own. Such princes as the Syracusan Hiero were patrons alike of poet and of sculptor. Without imagining any rivalry in a jealous or sordid sense, we can understand how a poet, conscious that his work possessed the secret of unfading youth, should have been impelled to claim for it a permanence so much less obvious to the many in his own day than that of the marbles which seemed to have made the victory immortal. The marble has too often perished; the song—the breath of an hour, as the hearers may have thought it—attests for us the truth of Pindar's claim, *ῥῆμα ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει.* Within his lifetime, the school of Argos was represented by Ageladas, the master of Myron, Polycleitus, and Pheidias. Among the works of Ageladas, Olympia possessed a chariot-group commemorating the victory of Cleisthenes of Epidamnus in 517 B.C., besides two statues of athletes. At Olympia were Myron's Discobolus, his statue of the runner Ladas (who expired in the moment of victory), of the Lacedaemonian Chion, of a boy-boxer, of a pancratiast, and of a victor in the chariot-race. Myron, though of the Argive school, was a native of Eleutherae in Boeotia, and helps to illustrate Pindar's exulting refutation of the proverbial Βοιωτίαν ὗν (*Ol.* vi. 90). Canachus, of the

Pindar is claiming *permanence* for song.

school of Sicyon, wrought a group of boys riding race-horses, and thus belongs to the list of sculptors contemporary with Pindar who took subjects from the games.

School of Aegina.

§ 25. But the school of Aegina is that of which we naturally think first in connection with Pindar. Of his extant epinicia, Sicily claims 15; the Epizephyrian Locrians, 2; Cyrene, 3; the mainland of Greece, 13, of which 4 are for Thebes; Aegina, 11. In the island which was so fertile of athletes, the sculptors of Pindar's day had begun to take as their model an ideal athlete, of a type characterised by spareness of form, showing the bones at knee-joints, in chest and ribs, with the legs rather too long and the arms too short; whence the "Aeginetan" manner means for Pausanias "archaic" as distinguished from "Attic" or mature art[1]. The temple of Athene at Aegina had groups of sculpture on both pediments, —the east (which was the front), and the west. The Aeginetan marbles at Munich are statues which formed parts of these groups. Their date falls within Pindar's lifetime. The subject of the east pediment (it is unnecessary to enter on controverted details of restoration) was that war against Laomedon in which Heracles was helped by Telamon. The subject of the west pediment was one probably connected with the death of Patroclus, and the chief figure was Ajax, son of Telamon. All through Pindar's odes for Aeginetan victors the dominant mythical theme is fitly the glory of the Aeacidae,

'Aeginetan' manner = archaic.

[1] See A. S. Murray, *History of Greek Sculpture*, pp. 147, 160.

Telamon, Ajax, Peleus, Achilles. In the fifth Isthmian ode, Pindar gives a most brilliant treatment to the initial episode of the very theme which occupied the east pediment of the temple at Aegina,—Heracles coming to seek the aid of Telamon against Troy, when Telamon gave his guest "a wine-cup rough with gold," and Heracles prophesied the birth and the prowess of Ajax. Here then, is a case in which we can conceive that the poet's immediate theme may have occurred to his mind as he gazed on the sculptor's work in the splendid entablature of the temple; and we recall Pindar's own comparison of an opening song to the front of a stately building—*ἀρχομένου δ' ἔργου χρὴ πρόσωπον θέμεν τηλαυγές.*

E. pediment of temple at Aegina.

The contrast in style between the work on the western and eastern pediments at Aegina would correspond with the difference between the older, stiffer school of Callon and that fresher impulse which in Pindar's day was represented at Aegina by Onatas. If Onatas had indeed a chief hand in the eastern pediment, then the praise of the Aeacidae associated Onatas and Pindar at Aegina as the praise of Hiero's victory in the chariot-race—which Onatas commemorated by a group—associated them at Olympia. Bronze race-horses, one of which, with a boy-rider, stood on each side of the chariot wrought by Onatas, were the work of Calamis, who represents Athenian art just before it reached its greatest perfection under Pheidias. It was Calamis whom Pindar chose to execute a statue which he dedicated at Thebes. The subject was Zeus Ammon, whom Pindar may have

The sculptor Onatas.

Calamis.

specially venerated on account of the connection of his own ancestry, the Aegeidae, with Cyrene, which he describes as founded Διὸς ἐν Ἄμμωνος θεμέθλοις, "on the ground where Zeus Ammon hath his seat," —*i.e.* near the oasis and temple (*Pyth.* iv. 16). A lost hymn by Pindar began, Ἄμμων Ὀλύμπου δέσποτα (*frag.* 11). The statue and shrine of Cybele, also dedicated by Pindar at Thebes, are ascribed to the Theban artists, Aristomedes and Socrates. These, with another of the same period, Ascarus, are the names by which Thebes first takes a place in the history of Greek art[1]; and it is an interesting fact that her earliest known sculptors should have been the contemporary of her greatest poet.

Theban sculptors.

Subjects common to Pindar and sculptors,

§ 26. The mythical material of sculpture in or just before Pindar's age is not, as a rule, taken directly from our Homer, but more largely from episodes treated in other and (as I believe) chiefly later poems. Many of these subjects come within the range of Pindar's treatment or allusion. I may give a few instances, by way of showing how Pindar and the sculptors were working in the same field.

(1) The Gigantomachia (Pindar, *Nem.* i. 67) adorned the pediment of the Megarian "Treasury" at Olympia; next to Zeus, Poseidon, and Ares, the chief figure was Heracles, whom Pindar also makes prominent.

(2) The wedding of Heracles with Hebe (Pind. *ib.* and *Isthm.* iii. 78) was the subject of a relief (of Pindar's age) on the low wall round the mouth of a well (περιστόμιον) found at Corinth. Pindar may have

[1] Cp. Perry's *Greek and Roman Sculpture*, p. 92.

lived to see the eastern pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, by Paeonius, though not the western, by Alcamenes; the subject of the eastern was the chariot-race of Pelops and Oenomaus (Pind. (3)
Ol. i. 76); of the western, the war of the Centaurs with the Lapithae (Λαπιθᾶν ὑπερόπλων, *Pyth.* ix. (4)
14). Pindar's mention of the "*fair-throned* Hours" (εὔθρονοι Ὧραι, *Pyth.* ix. 60) reminds us that the (5)
Heraion at Olympia possessed a chryselephantine group of the Horae seated on thrones, by Smilis of Aegina, whose date has been referred to the earlier half of the sixth century. Hiero of Syracuse, who was engaged in war while suffering from gout and stone, is compared by Pindar with Philoctetes, ἀσθενεῖ μὲν χρωτὶ βαίνων, ἀλλὰ μοιρίδιον ἦν (*Pyth.* i. 55). (6)
At that very time Syracuse contained the famous statue of the limping Philoctetes, by Pythagoras of Rhegium, of which Pliny says that those who looked at it seemed to feel the pain (xxxiv. 59). Even if we hesitate to believe that the sculptor intended an allusion to Hiero[1], we may well suppose that Pindar's comparison was suggested by the work of Pythagoras. Pindar touches on a legend which represented (7)
Heracles in combat with Apollo and two other gods (*Ol.* ix. 30 f.). A similar contest between Heracles and Apollo was the subject of a group executed in Pindar's time (about 485 B.C.) by three artists of Corinth—Diyllus, Amyclaeus, and Chionis—and offered by the Phocians in the temple at Delphi

[1] See Watkiss Lloyd, *History of Sicily*, p. 315; and A. S. Murray, *History of Greek Sculpture*, p. 203.

(Paus. x. 13, 7). The religious reserve with which Pindar alludes to the strife between Heracles and the god (*Ol.* ix. 35, ἀπό μοι λόγον | τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥῖψον) has led critics to infer that the story was one of the ἱεροὶ λόγοι pertaining to mysteries[1]. His reticence probably reflects the tone of the Delphic priesthood in regard to the closely kindred subject which he must have seen in their temple.

Broad causeways.

§ 27. A favourite image for the paths of song is drawn by Pindar from broad, stately causeways like that σκυρωτὴ ὁδός (*Pyth.* v. 87) which his own feet had perhaps trodden in the African Cyrene. See *Nem.* vi. 47 (πλατεῖαι πρόσοδοι): *Isthm.* iii. 19 (μυρία παντᾶ κέλευθος): v. 22, μυρίαι δ' ἔργων καλῶν τέτμηνθ' ἑκατόμπεδοι ἐν σχερῷ κέλευθοι, "countless roads of a hundred feet [in width] are cleft for onward course of noble deeds." Such touches are suggestive of the improvement in the laying out of Greek towns which took place in Pindar's later years, when Hippodamus, for instance, the architect of the Peiraeus, is said to have introduced broad, straight streets, intersecting each other at right angles (Arist. *Pol.* ii. 5). Besides works in stone, Pindar alludes to artistic works (ἔργα) in several other materials. We hear of silver cups (ἀργυρίδες, *Ol.* ix. 90), goblets of gold (φιάλαν πάγχρυσον, *Ol.* vii. 1), tripods and caldrons (λέβητες, *Isthm.* i. 19): in one case, χαλκὸς μυρίος, "prizes in bronze past counting" (*Nem.* x. 45). A song is likened to cunning work which blends gold, ivory, and coral

Works in metal, &c.

[1] Cp. Paley on *Iliad* v. 396.

(*Nem.* vii. 78). Pindar's epithets sometimes suggest that he was thinking of colours which he had seen in works of art (sculpture or painting). Thus *Ol.* vi. 94, φοινικόπεζαν Δάματρα λευκίππου τε θυγατρός, Demeter with red sandals, Persephone with white horses; *Pyth.* iv. 182, Zetes and Calais, ἄνδρας πτεροῖσιν νῶτα πεφρίκοντας ἄμφω πορφυρέοις, "with purple wings erect upon their backs": *Ol.* vi. 14, φαιδίμας ἵππους, perhaps alluding to the *white* horses of Amphiaraus (Philostr. *Imagines* i. 27): the saffron swaddling bands of Heracles, the saffron robe of Jason (*Nem.* i. 38, *Pyth.* iv. 232). The poet's own feeling for colour appears in the beautiful story of the birth of Iamus; Evadne lays aside her silver pitcher and her girdle of scarlet web; the babe is found ἴων ξανθαῖσι καὶ παμπορφύροις ἀκτῖσι βεβρεγμένος ἁβρὸν | σῶμα, "its delicate body steeped in the golden and deep purple rays of pansies" (*Ol.* vi. 55). Colour in Pindar.

§ 28. In concluding this sketch of Pindar's relation to the art of his own day, we may notice one or two glimpses which he gives us of archaic Greek art. In *Ol.* vii. 50 f. he mentions the Heliadae, a clan or hereditary guild of artists in Rhodes, united by the cult of Helios (the sun-god) as their ancestor. To them Athene gave skill above that of other men: "and the ways of Rhodes bare works like to beasts and creeping things; and theirs was wealth of fame. *Yea, for him who hath knowledge science also is greater when 'tis guileless*" (δαέντι δὲ καὶ σοφία μείζων ἄδολος τελέθει). The latter words Glimpses of archaic art. Heliadae.

Telchines.

allude to the mythical Telchines (Τελχῖνες), the earliest artistic workers in metal, whom legend represented as magicians (γόητες), wizards who cast an evil eye on all who dared to compete with them (βάσκανοι, φθονεροὶ δαίμονες): Strabo xiv. 653: Tzetzes, *Chil.* vii. 123 f. The same charge of sorcery was laid against the Dactyli (Δάκτυλοι) of Ida in the Troad (or, as some have it, in Crete), who figure as the earliest blacksmiths: γόητες, φαρμακεῖς, schol. Apol. Rhod. *Arg.* i. 1129[1]. It was the wonder of a dark age for "uncanny" skill, expressing itself as it did towards the "adepts" of the middle age—when Michael Scott, for instance, a respectable young diplomatist who had dabbled in chemistry, passed for a wizard in the Border country, when he retired to study Aristotle in the gaunt house which may still be seen by the Yarrow. Pindar means: "The Heliadae, who wrought metal into images of living things without the aid of sorcery, were greater artists than the Telchines or Dactyli. Success in art *also* (like success in other things) is a greater achievement when it is honest. So, at least, it must seem to a man of understanding (δαέντι)." These earliest efforts of metal-working were especially associated with the mineral resources of Phrygia, Cyprus, Crete, and Rhodes. Another passage of Pindar recalls the age of rude wood-carving. The ornamented harness dedicated in the temple of Delphi by the victorious charioteer of

Early metal-working.

Wood-carving.

[1] For other passages on the Telchines and the Dactyli, see Overbeck's *Schriftquellen* § 27 f.

Arcesilas was placed in a shrine of cypress (*κυπαρίσσινον μέγαρον*), hard by the statue which the bow-bearing Cretans set in the Parnassian house [the temple], the statue *in one piece of native growth*": *ἀμφ' ἀνδριάντι σχεδόν,* | *Κρῆτες ὃν τοξοφόροι τέγεϊ Παρνασίῳ κάθεσσαν, τὸν μονόδροπον, φυτόν* (*Pyth.* v. 37). The image was doubtless a piece of wood that had grown in some shape which was fancied to resemble the human form; though *φυτόν* does not seem to exclude the supposition that this likeness had been developed by rough carving. The name *ἀνδριάς* would at least not have been given to a shapeless log, such as once symbolised Athene at Lindus and Artemis at Icarus. Daedalus was especially associated with wood-carving, as at Athens, where a guild of wood-carvers bore his name, and two *Cretan* "Daedalidae"—Dipoenus and Scyllis, about 500 B.C.—are said to have made a wooden image (*ξόανον*) of the Munychian Artemis for Sicyon (Clem. *Protrept.* iv. 42).

Corinth—its *σοφίσματα.*

§ 29. To these notices of early work in metal and in wood, I would add Pindar's mention of arts for which Corinth had early been famous. *Olymp.* xiii. 16, *πολλὰ δ' ἐν καρδίαις ἀνδρῶν ἔβαλον* | *Ὧραι πολυάνθεμοι ἀρχαῖα σοφίσματ'· ἄπαν δ' εὑρόντος ἔργον.* "Many devices, from olden time, have the flower-crowned Hours put in the hearts of (Corinthian) men; and every work is his who wrought it first." What are these *ἀρχαῖα σοφίσματα*? As examples, Pindar mentions (1) the development of the dithyramb, (2) certain improvements in the appliances for harnessing and

driving horses, (3) the addition of the pediment (*οἰωνῶν βασιλέα δίδυμον, i.e. ἀετόν*) to temples. But these are merely a few instances pertinent to his theme, and it is plain that, in his thought, *πολλὰ σοφίσματα* included more than these. Nor have we far to seek. Corinth had been one of the oldest seats of sculpture in bronze: cp. Horace *Sat.* II. iii. 21, where the collector seeks for a bronze *ποδανιπτήρ* which Sisyphus might have used. But Corinth was more peculiarly associated with the earliest modelling in clay, in which the Corinthian Butades was the first traditional name. The story was that three artists, Eucheir, Diopos and Eugrammos, exiled from Corinth about 665 B.C., introduced the art into Etruria. With regard to the rival claim of the Samians, Theodorus and Rhoecus, to have been the first modellers in clay, Mr A. S. Murray has well remarked that they, as workers in bronze, may have used clay for preliminary models, while the Corinthian Butades may have been the first to produce clay figures which, when coloured, were substantive works of art.

Sculpture in bronze.

Clay-modelling.

§ 30. The spirit of drama often breathes in Pindar. Thus the interview between Jason and Pelias (*Pyth.* iv.) is the sketch of a splendid scene. The meeting of Apollo and Cheiron (*Pyth.* ix.), the episode of Castor and Polydeuces (*Nem.* x.), the entertainment of Heracles by Telamon (*Isthm.* v.), and many other passages, are instinct with truly dramatic touches. These are from a man who was accustomed to see beautiful forms in vivid action or in vivid art. He sought to body forth the persons

Dramatic passages.

of legend with equal vividness. Continuous narratives of the heroic past had ceased to satisfy the imagination; but faith was still living. The effort of Pindar's age—stirred as it had been to the core by that great trilogy of national life, the Persian invasions—was to grasp a well-defined episode; to see the heroes moving; to hear them speaking; to throw back upon their world such a light of contemporary reflection as should make them seem nearer and more real. The history of Greek literature is not a series of chapters, but the course of a natural growth, the voice of Greek life from age to age. Pindar's place in that development is of singular interest. He stands between epos and drama. The phase of Greek mind which shaped the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is passing into that which shaped Attic Tragedy. Pindar is the lyric interpreter of the impulse which received mature expression from Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Olympia, with its athletes, its statues, and its temples corresponded to the essence of Greek drama—action idealised by art and consecrated by religion. When Sophocles, by an effective anachronism, describes the chariot-race of Orestes at the Pythian games, we feel how naturally and easily a Greek imagination could revive the heroes amid the surroundings of such a festival. It is not only by his subjects, but still more by his manner of treatment, that Pindar exhibits the influence of the *πανηγύρεις*: and, like Olympia itself, the temper of his work illustrates the spiritual unity of the best Greek art in every form.

Pindar stands between epos and drama.

THE AGE OF PERICLES[1].

The debt which the modern world owes to the best age of ancient Greece is well summed up in some words which the late Professor Green wrote in his "Prolegomena to Ethics":—"When we come to ask ourselves what are the essential forms in which, however otherwise modified, the will for true good—which is the will *to be* good—must appear, our answer follows the outlines of the Greek classification of the virtues. It is the will to *know* what is true; to *make* what is beautiful; to endure pain or fear; to resist the allurements of pleasure (i.e., to be brave and temperate),—if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the State, yet in some form of human society;—to take for oneself, and to give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is *inclined* to give or take, but what is *due*."

Accepting this as a concise description of the Hellenic ideal, we find that the period during which it was most fully realised was that which we are accustomed to call the age of Pericles. The period so named may be roughly defined as extending from 460 to 430 B.C. Within those thirty years the

[1] Glasgow, March 1889. From the author's MS.

political power of Athens culminated; the Athenians developed that civic life which, as sketched in the great oration attributed to Pericles by Thucydides, made Athens, as the orator says, the school of Greece, and, as we moderns might add, the teacher of posterity; within those thirty years were created works of art, in literature, in architecture, and in sculpture, which the world has ever since regarded as unapproachable masterpieces. This period, so relatively short and yet so prolific in varied excellence, followed closely on the war in which united Greece repelled the Persian invasion. It immediately preceded the war of the two leading Greek cities against each other, in which Sparta ultimately humbled Athens. Athens, as it appears in the national struggle against Persia, is not yet the acknowledged head of Hellas. The formal leadership belongs, by common consent, to Sparta; and though Athens is already pre-eminent in moral qualities,—in unselfish devotion to the national cause, and in a spirit which no reverses can break,—these qualities appear as they are embodied in a few chosen men, in a Themistocles and an Aristeides; the mass of Athenians whom they lead is still a comparatively rude multitude, not yet quickened into the full energy of conscious citizenship. If, on the other hand, we look to the close of the Age of Pericles—if we pass to the opening years of the Peloponnesian war—we find that the Athenian democracy already bears within it the seeds of decay. The process of degeneration has already

begun, though a century is still to elapse before Philip of Macedon shall overthrow the liberties of Greece at Chaeronea.

The interval between the Persian war and the Peloponnesian war—the space which we call the Age of Pericles—is a space of comparative peace and rest, during which all the faculties of the Hellenic nature attain their most complete development in the civic community of Athens. Yet this interval is the only period in Athenian history of which we have no full or continuous record from a contemporary source. Herodotus leaves us at the end of the Persian invasion. Thucydides becomes our guide only at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It is true that in the opening of his work he glances rapidly at the intervening years. But his hints serve rather to stimulate than to appease our curiosity. We learn from him little more than a few external facts which, taken by themselves, tell us little. With regard to the inner life of Athens in the age of Pericles—the social and the intellectual life—he is silent. Among the names which are nowhere mentioned by him are those of the poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes; the philosopher Anaxagoras; the sculptor Pheidias; the architect Ictinus. He incidentally notices the Parthenon, but only as a treasury; he notices the Propylaea,—but only as a work which had reduced the balance in the treasury. This silence, however tantalising it may be for us, admits of a simple explanation. His chosen subject, as he conceived it, was a purely

political one,—the Peloponnesian war; and he did not regard such matters as pertinent to it. The art and poetry of the day, the philosophy and the social life, were, in his view, merely decorations of the theatre in which the great drama of the war was being enacted. One thing, however, he allows us to see clearly,—viz. that the "Age of Pericles" is fitly so called. Even in his slight sketch, a central and commanding figure is brought before us. And it is significant that the famous Funeral Oration sums up all that Thucydides tells us as to the life of Periclean Athens. It is as if he felt that his own silence on that subject should be broken by no voice save that of Pericles.

Thus it comes to pass that, in regard to the age of Pericles, we have to rely mainly on two sources of information. On the one hand, we have the surviving monuments of its literature, and some fragments of its art. On the other hand, we have that description of its general tone and spirit which Thucydides has embodied in the Funeral Oration. But this description is only in general terms. To those who heard it, of course, its abstract statements were full of vivid meaning, suggesting a thousand familiar details of their daily life. We moderns, however, have to reconstruct that life as best we may, by piecing together scattered bits of evidence. The questions for us are,—What were the aims which Pericles set before him? By what means did he succeed in so impressing his own ideas upon his age that the period has ever since been distinctively

associated with his name? And what was it in the civic life thus developed which made its atmosphere so incomparably favourable to the creative energies of the intellect? We cannot hope to answer these questions fully; but it is possible to suggest some considerations which may assist clearness of thought in regard to them.

First of all, we must remember the idea which lay at the root of Greek education generally in the period before the Persian wars. That idea was a free cultivation of the mental and bodily powers, not limited or specialised by a view to any particular occupation in after life. The main instruments of mental cultivation were poetry and music, both of them in a close connection with the traditional popular religion. The instruments of physical training were the exercises of the palaestra. When the youth had become a man, his mental education was tested in public counsel and speech, his physical training in military service for the State. This harmonious education of mind and body on certain prescribed lines created a general Hellenic tradition, which was constantly confirmed by the influence of the festivals, with their recitations of poetry and their athletic contests. Hellenes, to whatever part of Hellas they belonged, felt themselves united by a common descent, a common religion, a common language, and a common type of social life. The two first of these ties,—descent and religion,—were, for a Greek, interdependent; for Greeks conceived themselves as sprung from heroes, and these heroes

as sprung from the gods; thus, in Mr Grote's phrase, the ideas of ancestry and worship coalesced. It was only about a century before the Persian wars that this primitive Hellenic tone of mind began to be troubled by the new scepticism which had its birth in Ionia. The Ionian thinkers, in their attempts to solve the problem of the universe, gave the first shock to the old uncritical acceptance of the popular theology. People began to ask whether gods could do such things as they were said to do; whether these gods were more than symbols or fictions. Athens does not seem to have been much affected by Ionian philosophy before the Persian wars; though, in that earlier time, the social life of Athens was externally more Ionian than it afterwards became. And the effect of the Persian wars on Athens was, in one way, such as to confirm Athenian adherence to traditional modes of thought. Those wars had brought the sturdy Attic husbandmen to the front,—the men in whom the old Attic beliefs were strongest; while at the same time Athenians had become conscious of their superiority to the Ionians, the vassals of Xerxes, whom they had routed at Salamis. A feeling was thus generated strongly antagonistic to innovation, especially when it appeared irreligious, and when it came from Ionia. This, however, was not the only effect which the Persian wars left behind them. In those struggles, the Athenian powers of mind and body had been strained to the uttermost. When the effort was over, the sense of stimulated activities remained;

it was no longer easy to acquiesce in the routine of ancestral usage; there was a desire for an enlargement of the mental horizon, an eagerness to enter new fields of endeavour, corresponding to the new consciousness of power. Thus, especially in minds of the higher order, a welcome was prepared for intellectual novelties. It is significant that the Ionian Anaxagoras, the foremost speculative thinker of the time, chose Athens as the most congenial abode that he could find. We note also how eagerly Athens received from Sicily the new art of Rhetoric, and from Ionia the practical culture brought by the so-called Sophists.

This sympathy with innovation, and on the other hand a newly reinforced conservatism, were the forces which divided Athens at the moment when Pericles entered public life. His father, Xanthippus, belonged to the old nobility of Attica, the Eupatridae. His mother, Agaristè, was a member of a family who belonged to the younger nobility, the Alcmaeonidae, and had latterly been identified with the popular party; Agaristè was a niece of the great reformer Cleisthenes. Thus, while the maternal descent of Pericles would recommend him to the party of progress, his lineage on the father's side was a claim to the respect of their opponents. In his character, from youth onwards, one of the strongest traits seems to have been an unceasing desire of knowledge; he sought knowledge, however, not as Goethe did—to whom, in some aspects, he might be compared—with a view merely to satis-

fying his own intellectual needs, but rather from the point of view of a statesman—in order to strengthen the mental powers by which he aspired to guide the course of the city. Another quality which distinguished him was self-restraint. In pursuing his aims, he showed the highest degree of patience, moderation, and self-denial. The natural fire of his temperament, which flashed out at times in his oratory, was perfectly under the control of his judgment. His career may be divided into two parts. During the first, down to 444 B.C., Pericles appears as a party man,—as the leader of the reformers. From 444 B.C. to his death in 429 B.C. he occupies a position raised above party, and has the government of Athens virtually concentrated in his hands. Let us consider the nature of the reforms with which he was associated, or which he initiated, during the earlier part of his career. First of all, the Council of the Areopagus was deprived of certain general powers which rendered it a stronghold of the party opposed to change. Next, it was provided that the State should make a small payment to every citizen for each day on which he served as a juror in the law-courts, or attended the meetings of the public assembly. Also, that the State should supply to every citizen who required it the sum needful to procure his admission to the theatre at the public festivals. In modern eyes these measures may not seem very important. But in reality they constituted a revolution of the most momentous kind. In order to see this, we have only to recall a broad difference

between the ancient and modern conceptions of the State. A British citizen does not feel himself the less so if he happens to have no direct share in the central conduct of public affairs. When he speaks of the State in its active capacity, he commonly means the Executive Power. He may fully recognise that he ought to live, and, if need be, die, for his country ; but, unless he is a person of exceptional temperament, the thought of the State as a parent thus entitled to his devotion is not habitually present to him in everyday life ; it is in a colder and more prosaic aspect that the State is chiefly familiar to his thoughts,—viz., as an institution to which he owes certain duties, and from which he receives certain rights. But in the theory of the ancient Greek State, the citizen's whole life was most intimately identified with the life of the city. The city was a larger family, to which every member was bound by a supreme obligation, overriding all private considerations of every kind. Further, a citizen was not regarded as enjoying full citizenship unless he had a direct personal share in public affairs, —either continuously, or at least in his turn. No such thing as representative government was known ; the civic assembly was open to all citizens, and a citizen could use his franchise only by speaking or voting in person. Such was the theory ; in practice, however, it was modified in various ways by various circumstances. If we look back to the earlier days of Greece, before the age of Pericles, we perceive the prevalence of a feeling which tended practically

to disfranchise many of those who, by birth, were citizens,—a feeling, namely, that the possession of independent means, up to a certain point, should be a qualification for taking part in public life.

At Athens, in the time of the Periclean reforms, there does not seem to have been much civic pauperism. A hundred and fifty years or so before, Solon's great agrarian reform had taken a load of debt off the cultivators of the soil, and had done much to limit the size of landed estates. In the days of Pericles probably more than one half of the Attic citizen-body were owners of land. It was a law that every Athenian citizen should bring up his son to some calling or trade by which he could subsist. With its harbours and its fleet, Athens had unrivalled opportunities for commerce. But Pericles saw that, if the encouragement of industry and commerce was truly to strengthen the city, the artisan and the merchant must feel that they were in deed, and not merely in name, citizens. The unity of the State must be realised as far as possible according to the Greek idea; that is, every citizen must have some personal share in public business. Here, however, a grave difficulty encountered him. A poor citizen could not be expected to serve as a juror in the law-courts, or to attend the public assembly, if such public duties were to suspend the pursuit of his private calling. This difficulty was met by the proposal of Pericles to pay the citizen for the time which he gave to the State. The payment was extremely small; at first it was one obol, a little more than

1½*d.* for each day in the law-courts or in the assembly; it was afterwards raised to about 4½*d.* At this time the average day's wage of an Athenian artisan was about nine-pence. The public assembly met, as a rule, only four times a month. The jury-courts sat almost every day. Every year 5000 citizens, with a further reserve of 1000, were chosen by lot, as the body from which the juries for that year should be drawn; and a man who was in that body could do but little work at his trade during that year. Thus, notwithstanding the small payment from the State, he was serving the State at a sacrifice. Neither in that case, nor in regard to the public assembly, was he under any temptation to abandon his trade, and to live on the State bounty. Pericles had foreseen that danger, and had guarded against it by the scale of payment. A century later, the public pay had become a mischief; but that mischief was rather the result than the cause of social disorganisation. Now, then, we can understand the full significance of the words which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles (II. 40),—"An Athenian citizen," he says, "does not neglect the State because he takes care of his own household; and even those who are engaged in business (ἔργα) can form a very fair idea of politics. We regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs as a useless man; and if few of us are originators of a policy, we are all sound judges of it." Not less essential to the statesman's purpose was the measure which ensured the presence of the poorer citizens at the public festivals, when tragedy

or comedy was performed in the theatre of Dionysus. This theatre-money has rightly been compared to modern grants in aid of education, or to the remission of school-fees. At these festivals, which were religious ceremonies animated by the noblest poetry, the citizen felt himself a sharer in the best spiritual inheritance of the city. The Thucydidean Pericles alludes to this when he says, "we have provided for a weary mind many relaxations from toil, in the festivals and sacrifices which we hold throughout the year" (II. 38). If we are inclined to be surprised at the extreme smallness of the State-payments above noticed, and to ask how they could make any appreciable difference, we must remember three things: first, that the purchasing power of money was immensely greater then than it is now; next, that ancient civilisation rested on a basis of slavery, without which the full development of the Attic democracy would have been impossible; lastly, we must remember the genuine frugality and simplicity of Athenian life—greatly favoured, as it was, by a happy climate;—the simplicity to which Pericles refers when he says, "we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness." In the same Funeral Oration, indeed, Pericles speaks of the beautiful objects which surrounded Athenians in their private houses,—objects of which the daily delight, as he says, banishes gloom; but it would be an error to imagine that these words could apply only to the homes of the richer citizens; nothing was more

characteristic of Greek art than the skill with which it gave lovely forms to the cheapest and homeliest articles of daily use.

The great work, then, which Pericles achieved during his period of political struggle might be briefly characterised as follows. He realised the essential idea of the Greek city more fully than it had ever been realised before, or was ever realised after; and he did this by enabling every citizen, poor no less than rich, to feel that he was a citizen indeed, taking his part in the work of the city without undue sacrifice of his private interests, and sharing in the noblest enjoyments which the city had to offer.

The second part of the career of Pericles dates from the banishment of Thucydides, son of Melesias, in 444 B.C. That event marked the final triumph of the reformers, and left Pericles without even the semblance of a political rival. The contemporary historian describes the position of affairs by saying that Athens was now nominally governed by a democracy, but really by her foremost citizen. The position of Pericles was now, in fact, such as would be that of an immensely popular Prime Minister who not only commanded an overwhelming majority in Parliament, but who could look forward to a tenure of power limited only by his own vitality. The recent defeat of the party opposed to Pericles was only one of the facts which help to explain this unique ascendancy. It is certain that he must have possessed one of the greatest and most versatile

intellects ever given to man. On no other hypothesis can we explain the extraordinary impression which he made on the ablest of his contemporaries, and the unequalled reputation which he left behind him. Then his moral qualities were not only great in themselves, but peculiarly fitted to impress his countrymen. He was, as Thucydides says with emphasis, of stainless personal integrity. His private life was entirely free from ostentation. He was rarely seen at public festivals; indeed, he was seldom seen at all, except at his public work, or on his way to it. He was compared by contemporary wits to the *Salaminia*—a ship, employed in State service, which appeared only on great occasions. He gave no opening to the jealousy of fellow-citizens, and at the same time never risked his hold on their respect, —acting in the spirit of Henry IV.'s advice to his son:

> "Had I so lavish of my presence been,
> So common-hackneyed in the eyes of men,
> So stale and cheap to vulgar company,
> Opinion, that did help me to the crown,
> Had still kept loyal to possession..."

In manner, we are told, he was grave and reserved; his public speaking was marked by a studious terseness, which however, did not prevent him from rising, when strongly moved, into majestic eloquence, adorned by bold and striking imagery, of which a few examples remain. His quick-witted and excitable fellow-citizens were held in awe by the massive mind which they felt under his grave calm,—a calm which sometimes gave place to the rushing impulse

of great thoughts, but never to irritation, even when the provocation was sorest. Hegel says of him: 'To be the first man in the State, among this noble, free, and cultivated people of Athens, was the good fortune of Pericles. Of all that is great for humanity the greatest thing is to dominate the wills of men who have wills of their own.'

At the time when Pericles became thus virtually supreme, Athens had reached a position wholly different from that which she had held before the Persian wars. Then, she was merely the chief town of Attica, a small district, of little natural wealth. But in the course of the last thirty years she had become an Imperial city, the head of a great confederacy which embraced the islands and coasts of the Aegean Sea. The common treasury of the league had been removed from the island of Delos to Athens, and located in the temple of Athena on the Acropolis. This transfer,—a bold step which Pericles had strongly advocated,—was a formal recognition of Athens as the capital of a wide empire. Almost all the cities which had originally been her free allies had now become her subjects; year by year their tribute flowed to the temple on her citadel. And these revenues were administered by Athenian officials, subject to the authority of Athens. The revenues proper to Athens herself had been greatly enlarged by the development of the silver mines of Laurium in Attica, and by the acquisition of gold mines in Thrace. Thus the organisation of finance had assumed a new political importance. It should

be noticed that the idea of a public treasure—a permanent store on which the State could draw in emergencies—had not hitherto been fully worked out in a Greek democracy. The economical basis of the old Greek commonwealth was different from that to which we are accustomed. The Greek city was, in this aspect, more like a corporation possessing property, and paying its current expenses out of that property. The Greek citizens were like joint administrators of a trust fund, for the common benefit. To take a modern illustration on a small scale, we might compare them to the Fellows of a College, in whom is vested the administration of the College property. The Greek city depended very little on direct taxation of the citizen. Hence it had small opportunities of forming a public reserve fund of any magnitude. That would have had to be done mainly out of its annual income, and at the cost of retrenchments which would not have been generally popular. Of course, where a despot had contrived to obtain the supreme power in a Greek city, *he* could exact from his subjects the means wherewith to form a public treasure. Peisistratus did so, when he was despot of Athens; so also did the Sicilian despots, and many more. Thus, a power based on *money* had hitherto in Greece been characteristic of a tyranny, not of a free commonwealth. But Pericles saw that the imperial position of Athens, and the naval power on which her Empire rested, could be secured only by creating a public reserve fund on an adequate scale. And since the tribute paid by the

subject allies was now at the absolute disposal of Athens; since, further, in any emergencies that might arise, the interests of Athens would be identified with those of her dependents; it was now comparatively easy for a statesman to effect this object. He was further assisted by the peculiar relation which existed between public finance and religion. The temples were the public banks of ancient Greece; the safest places of deposit. Under the provisions made by Pericles, the public funds lodged in the temple of Athena on the citadel were of three kinds. First, the fund designed to meet the current expenses of the State, which were consigned merely to the temporary guardianship of the goddess. Secondly, there were moneys which were formally consecrated to Athena, and which were made her own property. These could not be touched, except by way of loan from the goddess, and under a strict obligation to repay her; to take them in any other way would have been sacrilege. Thirdly, there were certain definite sums, also consecrated to her, which could not even be borrowed from her, except in certain specified cases of extreme need;—as if, for example, a hostile fleet threatened the Peiraeus. The care of these funds, and the administration of all the other sources of Athenian revenue, were organised under Pericles on a complete and elaborate system. Thus it was his merit to secure for a free State that financial stability which had elsewhere been only a pillar of despotism. We see an immediate result of this in the simple fact that

the Peloponnesian war lasted 27 years. Without the treasure on the Acropolis, the naval resources of Athens must have collapsed in a very much shorter time.

I can but touch briefly on the part which colonisation played in the policy of Pericles. His principle was to avoid enlarging the empire, but to bind the existing empire together as strongly as possible. When cities which had revolted against Athens had been subdued, their territory was in some cases confiscated by Athens. Such land was then divided into a certain number of allotments. Athenian citizens of the poorer class, who wished for allotments, were then asked to send in their names, and the holdings were assigned by ballot. A successful applicant could do either of two things. He could go out and farm the land himself; in which case the State helped him with his outfit. Or he could stay at Athens, and make the former owner of the foreign land his tenant. In either case he retained his full rights as an Athenian citizen: whereas in an ordinary colony the Athenian emigrant became a citizen of the new settlement. Moreover, the ownership of the allotment was hereditary.

All things naturally conspired at this period to make Athens the great Hellenic centre of industry and of commerce. The Peiraeus, the harbour town of Athens, with its magnificent port, was the market to which all commodities flowed from east and west. From the Euxine came cargoes of fish or of hides; papyrus came from Egypt, frankincense from Syria,

dates from Phoenicia, ores from Cyprus, silphium from Cyrene; Thrace sent timber; Sicily and the Aegean islands sent their fruits, wines, and other luxuries. Athens itself had a special repute for earthenware, for some kinds of metal work, and for work in leather. It is not surprising, then, that Athens began to suffer from an inconvenience which at the present day is felt on a greater scale in the United States,—viz. the influx of aliens, anxious to share in the advantages of citizenship. Pericles checked this evil by reviving the old rule, which had long fallen into disuse, viz. that full citizenship could be enjoyed only by a person, both of whose parents were of Attic birth. A re-enforcement of this rule, though unpopular at first, was made comparatively easy by the favourable conditions granted to aliens who wished to fix their abode at Athens.

Thus far we have been considering Periclean Athens chiefly as the most perfect example of Greek civic life; as an imperial city, in which the fullest individual freedom was enjoyed without prejudice to the strength of the State; as a great seat of industry and a focus of commerce. The memorials of all these things have well-nigh vanished; but the modern world still possesses monuments of the literature, and at least fragments of the art, which proclaim Athens to have been, above all, the great intellectual centre of that age. The influence of Periclean Athens is deeply impressed on the History of Herodotus, and moulded the still greater work of Thucydides; Athens was the home of the philo-

sopher Anaxagoras, and the astronomer Meton; it was at Athens that prose composition, which had hitherto been either colloquial or poetical, was first matured; at Athens, too, oratory first became the effective ally of statesmanship; both Tragedy and Comedy were perfected; the frescoes of Polygnotus, the architecture of Ictinus, the sculpture of Pheidias, combined to adorn the city; and when we think of these great writers and artists, we must remember that they are only some of the more eminent out of a larger number who were all living at Athens within the same period of thirty years. How far can this wonderful fact be directly connected with the influence of the political work done by Pericles, or with the personal influence of the man? We must beware of exaggerating such influences. Statesmanship may encourage men of genius, but it cannot make them. When we look back on that age, we seem to recognise in its abounding and versatile brilliancy rather the golden time of a marvellously gifted race, than merely the attraction which a city of unique opportunities exercised over the rest of the world. The great national victory over Persia had raised the vital energy of the Greek spirit to the highest. But we must also recollect that, owing to the very nature of Greek literature and art, such a city as the Athens of Pericles could do more for it than any modern city could do for modern art or literature. Greek literature was essentially spontaneous, the free voice of life, restrained in its freedom only by a sense of measure which was part

of the Greek nature; the Greek poet, or historian, or philosopher, was not merely a man of letters in the narrower modern meaning of the term; he was first, and before all things, a citizen, in close sympathy, usually in active contact, with the public life of the city. For a Greek, therefore, as poet or historian or philosopher, nothing could be more directly important than that this public life should be as noble as possible; since, the nobler it was, the higher and the more invigorating was the source from which he drew his inspiration. Among the great literary men who belonged to the age of Pericles, there are especially two who may be regarded as representative of it,—its chief historian and its most characteristic poet,—Thucydides and Sophocles. The mind of Thucydides had been moulded by the ideas of Pericles, and probably in large measure by personal intercourse with him. We recognise the Periclean stamp in the clearness with which Thucydides perceives that the vital thing for a State is the spirit in which it is governed; and that, apart from this spirit, there is no certain efficacy in the form of a constitution, no sovereign spell in the name. In Sophocles, again, we feel the Periclean influence working with the same general tendency as in the plastic arts; he holds with the ancient traditions of piety, but invests them with a more spiritual and more intellectual meaning. With regard to the fine arts, it was the resolve of Pericles that they should find their supreme and concentrated manifestation in the embellishment of Athens.

Thucydides, with all his reticence as to art, is doubtless a faithful interpreter of the spirit in which that work was done, when he makes Pericles speak of the abiding monuments which will attest to all posterity the achievements of that age. This feeling was not prompted merely by Athenian patriotism; Athens was the city which the Persian invader, bent on avenging Sardis, had twice laid in ruins. The fact that Athens should have risen from its ashes in unrivalled strength and grace was, as Pericles might well feel, the most impressive of all testimonies to the victory of Hellene over barbarian.

When Pericles reached his full power the port of Athens was already a handsome town, with regular streets, spacious porticoes, large open spaces and perfectly equipped harbours. But the Upper City —Athens proper—with which the Peiraeus was connected by the long walls, remained comparatively poor in ornament. It still showed some traces of the haste with which it had been rebuilt after the Persian wars. Now, under the guiding influence of Pericles, architects, sculptors, and painters combined in adorning it. That which gave its distinctive stamp to their work was, ultimately, the great idea which animated them. Its inspiration was the idea of the Imperial City, Athens, as represented and defended by the goddess Athena; the Athens which, with the aid of gods and heroes, had borne the foremost part in rolling back the tide of barbarian invasion.

In no other instance which history records, has art of a supreme excellence sprung from a motive at

once so intelligible to the whole people, and so satisfying to the highest order of minds.

It is well to remember that the story of Greece was not closed when the Greek genius reached the brief term of its creative activity. It is well to follow the work of the Greek mind through later periods also; but those qualities which were distinctive of its greatness can best be studied when the Greek mind was at its best. That period was unquestionably the Fifth Century before Christ—the Age of Pericles.

ANCIENT ORGANS OF PUBLIC OPINION[1].

During several weeks in the early part of this year, the attention of the English public was fixed with intense anxiety on the fortunes of one man, who had undertaken a perilous mission in the service of his country. When the Egyptian difficulty was at its worst, General Gordon had started for Khartoum, to aid the Government, by his personal influence, in the policy of rescuing the garrisons and retiring from the Soudan. The journey, while it reflected fresh honour on him, necessarily imposed a grave responsibility on those who had sanctioned it. Any moment might bring the news of his death. If such news came, it was generally thought and said, the Ministry would fall. In a country with the temperament of England, the mere existence of such a belief set one thinking. A year ago, Gordon's

[1] The writer of these pages had the honour of delivering the annual Oration in the Sanders Theatre of Harvard University, under the auspices of the Φ. B. K. Society, on June 26, 1884. The following paper is the substance of the address then spoken, with such modifications as appeared appropriate to the present form of publication. (*Fortnightly Review*, 1884.)

name, though familiar to the well-informed classes, would not have acted like a spell on the nation. But a popular biography of him which had appeared had given occasion for much writing in the newspapers. A short time had sufficed to make the broad facts of his career known throughout the length and breadth of the land. People knew that he had welded a loose Chinese rabble into an army which saved the reigning dynasty of China; that, alone of Christians, he is named in the prayers of Mecca; that he does not care for personal rewards; that he is fearless of death; and that he trusts in God. To impress these facts on the popular imagination had been the work of a few weeks; to concentrate the force of popular opinion, if he had been sacrificed, would have been the work of a few hours. Seldom, perhaps, has anything illustrated more vividly that great and distinctive condition of modern existence in free countries,—the double power wielded by the newspaper press, at once as the ubiquitous instructor and as the rapid interpreter of a national mind. It was natural at such a time, for one whose pursuits suggested the comparison, to look from the modern to the ancient world, and to attempt some estimate of the interval which separates them in this striking and important respect. In the ancient civilisations, were there any agencies which exercised a power analogous in kind, though not comparable in degree, to that of the modern press? To begin with, we feel at once that the despotic monarchies of the ancient East will not

detain us long. For them, national opinion normally meant the opinion of the king. We know the general manner of record which is found graven on stone in connection with the images or symbols of those monarchs. As doctors seem still to differ a good deal about the precise translation of so many of those texts, it might be rash to quote any, but this is the sort of style which seems to prevail among the royal authors: "He came up with the chariots. He said that he was my first cousin. He lied. I impaled him. I am Artakhshatrá. I flayed his uncles, his brothers, and his cousins. I am the king, the son of Daryavush. I crucified two thousand of the principal inhabitants. I am the shining one, the great and the good." From the monarchical East we turn with more curiosity to Greece and Rome. There, at least, there was a life of public opinion. Apart from institutions, which are crystallised opinion, were there any living, non-official voices in which this public opinion could be heard?

The Homeric poems are not only the oldest monuments of Greek literature, but also the earliest documents of the Greek race. Out of the twilight of the prehistoric past, a new people, a new type of mind, are suddenly disclosed in a medium of pellucid clearness. Like Athene springing adult and full-armed from the head of Zeus, this new race, when Homer reveals it, has already attained to a mature consciousness of itself, and is already equipped with the aptitudes which are to distinguish it throughout

its later history. The genius of the Homeric Greek has essentially the same traits which recur in the ripest age of the Greek republics,—even as Achilles and Ulysses are personal ideals which never lost their hold on the nation. This very fact points the contrast between two aspects of Homeric life—the political and the social. In Homeric politics, public opinion has no proper place. The king, with his council of nobles and elders, can alone originate or discuss measures. The popular assembly has no active existence. But the framework of Homeric monarchy contains a social life in which public opinion is constantly alert. Its activity, indeed, could scarcely be greater under the freest form of government. And we see that this activity has its spring in distinctive and permanent attributes of the Hellenic race. It arises from quickness of perception and readiness of speech. The Homeric Greek feels keenly, observes shrewdly, and hastens to communicate his thoughts. An undertone of popular comment pervades the Homeric poems, and is rendered more impressive by the dramatic form in which it is usually couched. The average man, who represents public feeling, is expressed by the Greek indefinite pronoun, τις. "Thus would a man speak, with a glance at his neighbour," is the regular Homeric formula. We hear opinion in the making. This spokesman of popular sentiment is constantly introduced at critical moments: for the sake of brevity we may call him by his Greek name *Tis*. When the fight is raging over the corpse of Patroclus,

Tis remarks to his friends that they will be disgraced for ever if they allow the Trojans to carry off the body;—better die on the spot. Hector, in proposing a truce to Ajax, suggests that they should exchange gifts, and imagines what *Tis* will say: *Tis* will approve of it as a graceful courtesy between chivalrous opponents. Menelaus considers that another hero, Antilochus, has beaten him in a chariot race by unfair means; but thinks it necessary to take precautions against *Tis* imagining that he has brought this complaint in the hope of prevailing by the influence of his rank. This is perhaps one of the most remarkable Homeric compliments to the penetration and to the influence of *Tis*. When the sounds of music and dancing, as at a marriage feast, are heard in the house of Odysseus in Ithaca, *Tis* is listening outside; and he blamed Penelope for her fancied hardness of heart, "because she had not had the courage to keep the great house of her gentle lord steadfastly till he should come home." *Tis* is not always the mouthpiece of such elevated sentiments. With a frank truth to life and nature, Homer depicts *Tis* as indulging an ignoble joy by stabbing the corpse of his once-dreaded foe, Hector, and remarking that he is safer to handle now than when he was burning the ships. In the *Odyssey*, when the maiden Nausicaa is conducting Odysseus to the city of her father Alcinous, we catch glimpses of a *Tis* who nearly approaches the character of Mrs Grundy, with an element of spiteful gossip added. The fidelity with which *Tis* reflects

public opinion is further seen in the circumstance that his solicitude for the rights of man is not strong enough to counteract his natural disposition to exult over the fallen. Thersites was a commoner who presumed to speak his mind among his betters,—when one of them, Odysseus, dealt him a smart blow on the back, and caused him to resume his seat in tears. *Tis* laughed for joy, saying in effect that it served Thersites right, and that he probably would not do it again. The Tory sentiment of this passage makes it appropriate to quote the version of it by the late Lord Derby:—

> "The Greeks, despite their anger, laughed aloud,
> And one to other said, 'Good faith, of all
> The many works Ulysses well hath done,
> Wise in the council, foremost in the fight,
> He ne'er hath done a better, than when now
> He makes this scurril babbler hold his peace.
> Methinks his headstrong spirit will not soon
> Lead him again to vilify the kings.'"

Here it might be said that *Tis* figures as the earliest authentic example of a being whose existence has sometimes been doubted by British anthropologists, the Conservative working-man. But, if we would be just to *Tis* in his larger Homeric aspects, we must allow that his sympathies are usually generous, and his utterances often edifying. As to the feeling with which *Tis* was regarded, Homer has a word for it which is hard to translate: he calls it *aidos*. This *aidos*—the sense of reverence or shame—is always relative to a standard of

public opinion, *i.e.* to the opinion formed by the collective sayings of *Tis*; as, on the other hand, the listening to an inner voice, the obedience to what we call a moral sense, is Homerically called *nemesis*. And just as *Tis* is sometimes merely the voice of smug respectability, so *aidos* is sometimes conventional in a low way. When Diomedes is going by night to spy out the Trojan camp, several heroes offer to go with him, but only *one* can be chosen. Agamemnon tells him that he must not yield to *aidos*, and take the man of highest station rather than the man of highest merit: where *aidos* appears as in direct conflict with *nemesis*. But more often these two principles are found acting in harmony,—recommending the same course of conduct from two different points of view. There is a signal example of this in the *Odyssey*, which is also noteworthy on another ground, viz., as the only episode in the Homeric poems which involves a direct and formal appeal from established right of might to the corrective agency of public opinion. The suitors of Penelope have intruded themselves into the house of her absent lord, and are wasting his substance by riotous living. Her son Telemachus convenes the men of Ithaca in public assembly, and calls on them to stop this cruel wrong. He appeals to *nemesis*, to *aidos*, and to fear of the gods. "Resent it in your own hearts; and have regard to others, neighbouring folk who dwell around,—and tremble ye at the wrath of the gods." The appeal fails. The public opinion exists, but it has not the power, or the courage, to act.

After the age which gave birth to the great epics, an interval elapses before we again catch the distinct echoes of a popular voice. Our Homeric friend *Tis* is silent. Or, rather, to be more exact, *Tis* ceases to speak in his old character, as the nameless representative of the multitude, and begins to speak in a new quality. The individual mind now commences to express itself in forms of poetry which are essentially personal, interpreting the belief and feelings of the poet himself. *Tis* emerges from the dim crowd, and appears as Tyrtaeus, summoning the Spartans, in stirring elegy, to hear *his* counsels; or as Sappho, uttering *her* passion in immortal lyrics; or as Pindar, weaving *his* thoughts into those magnificent odes which glorify the heroes and the athletes of Greece. It is a capital distinction of classical Greek literature that, when its history is viewed as a whole, we do not find it falling into a series of artificial chapters, determined by imitation of models which were in fashion at this or that epoch. Greek literature is original, not derivative; we trace in it the course of a natural growth; we hear in it the spontaneous utterance of Greek life from generation to generation. The place of Pindar in this development has one aspect of peculiar interest. There is a sense in which he may be said to stand midway between Homeric epos and Athenian drama[1]. His poetical activity belongs to the

[1] In an essay on "Pindar" in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (vol. iii.), from which some points are repeated in this paragraph, I have worked this out more in detail.—See above, p. 41.

years which immediately preceded and followed the invasions of Greece by the hosts of Persia. A great danger had drawn the members of the Hellenic family closer together; a signal deliverance had left them animated by the memory of deeds which seemed to attest the legends of Agamemnon and Achilles; warmed by a more vivid faith in those gods who had been present with them through the time of trial; comforted by a new stability of freedom; cheered by a sense of Hellenic energies which could expand securely from the Danube to the Nile, from the Euxine to the Atlantic; exalted in thought and fancy by the desire to embody their joy and hope in the most beautiful forms which language and music, marble, ivory, and gold could furnish for the honour of the gods, and for the delight of men who, through the heroes, claimed a divine descent. The Greek mind, stirred to its centre by the victorious efforts which had repelled the barbarian, could no longer be satisfied by epic narratives of the past. It longed to see the heroes moving; to hear them speaking; to throw back upon their world the vivifying light of contemporary reflection. In a word, the spirit of drama had descended upon Hellas; and already it breathes in Pindar, the poet of the games. Olympia, with its temples, its statues, and its living athletes, corresponded to the essence of Greek drama—action idealised by art and consecrated by religion. Pindar, the last of the great lyric poets, is the lyric exponent of an impulse which received mature expression from Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.

The community which Athenian drama addressed was precisely in the mood which best enables a dramatist to exert political and moral force. There was much in its temper that might remind us of Elizabethan England; but I would venture to illustrate it here by words borrowed from the England of a later time. The greatest plea in the English language for the liberty of the press—or perhaps we should rather say, for the freedom of the mind—belongs to the close of that year which saw the hopes of the Parliamentarians, in their struggle with the Royalists, raised to an assurance of final success by the crushing defeat of Rupert. An enthusiastic confidence in the large destinies opening before the English people already fired the mind of the poet who was to end his days, like Samson,

> "Eyeless in Gaza, at the mill with slaves,
> Himself in bonds under Philistian yoke."

Then, in 1644, Milton, thinking of the victory of Marston Moor, was rather like Aeschylus raising his dramatic paean for the victory of Salamis; and the glowing language in which he describes the new alertness of his country's spirit might fitly be applied to the Athens for which the great dramatists wrote. "As in a body, when the blood is fresh, the spirits pure and vigorous not only to vital but to rationall faculties and those in the acutest and the pertest operations of wit and suttlety, it argues in what good plight and constitution the body is, so when the cherfulnesse of the people is so sprightly up, as that it has not only wherewith to guard well its own

freedom and safety but to spare, and to bestow upon the solidest and sublimest points of controversie and new invention, it betok'ns us not degenerated, nor drooping to a fatall decay, but casting off the old and wrincl'd skin of corruption to outlive these pangs and wax young again, entring the glorious waies of Truth and prosperous vertue destin'd to become great and honourable in these latter ages. Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant Nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an Eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazl'd eyes at the full midday beam, purging and unscaling her long abused sight at the fountain it self of heav'nly radiance."

In estimating the influence of Athenian drama on public opinion, we must, first of all, remember the fact which makes the essential difference between the position of the dramatist—viewed in this light—and that of the epic poet. The epic poet gave expression to a mass of popular belief and feeling in an age when they had as yet no direct organ of utterance. But in the Athens of the dramatists the popular assembly was the constitutional organ of public opinion. Every Athenian citizen was, as such, a member of that assembly. The influence of the Athenian dramatist was thus so far analogous to that of the modern journalist, that it was brought to bear on men capable of giving practical effect to their sentiments. A newspaper publishes an article intended to influence the voters in a parliamentary

division, or the constituents whom they represent. An Athenian dramatist had for his hearers, in the theatre of Dionysus, many thousands of the men who, the next day, might be called upon to decide a question of policy in the assembly, or to try, in a law-court, one of those cases in which the properly legal issues were often involved with considerations of a social or moral kind. Even Tragedy, in its loftiest and severest form, might be the instrument, in a skilful hand, of inculcating views or tendencies which the poet advocated—nay, even of urging or opposing a particular measure. Thus, in his *Furies*, Aeschylus finds occasion to encourage his fellow-citizens in their claim to a disputed possession in the Troad, and utters a powerful protest against the proposal to curtail the powers of the Areopagus. He becomes, for the moment, the mouthpiece of a party opposed to such reform. In verses like the following, every one can recognise a ring as directly political as that of any leading article or pamphlet. "In this place"—says the Athene of Aeschylus—that is, on the hill of Ares, the seat of the Court menaced with reform—

> "Awe kin to dread shall stay the citizens
> From sinning in the darkness or the light,
> While their own voices do not change the laws...
> Between unruliness and rule by one
> I bid my people reverence a mean,
> Not banish all things fearful from the State.
> For, with no fear before him, who is just?
> In such a righteous dread, in such an awe,
> Ye shall possess a bulwark of the land,

A safeguard of the city, not possess'd
By Scythia or the places of the south.
This court, majestic, incorruptible,
Instant in anger, over those who sleep
The sleepless watcher of my land, I set."

Again, there are at least two tragedies of Euripides —the *Heracleidae* and the *Supplices*—in which the strain of allusion to the politics of the Peloponnesian War in unmistakable. It is needless to dwell on the larger sense in which Euripides everywhere makes drama the vehicle of teachings—political, social, moral—which could nowhere have received such effective publicity as in the theatre. Nowadays, they would have been found in the pages of a newspaper or a magazine accepted as the organ of a party or a school. In the days of Voltaire, journalism, as free countries now understand it, had no more existence than in the days of Euripides; and, as a recent historian of French literature remarks, it has been thought that the tragedies of Voltaire owed their popularity chiefly to the adroit manner in which the author made them opportunities for insinuating the popular opinions of the time[1]. We must not forget that peculiar feature of Greek drama, the Chorus, who may be regarded as a lineal descendant of the Homeric *Tis*. The interest of the Chorus, in this connection, does not depend so much on the maxims that it uttered as on the fact that it constituted a visible link between the audience and the drama, bringing the average spectator into

[1] Saintsbury's *Short History of French Literature*, p. 405.

easier sympathy with the action, and thereby predisposing him to seize any significance which it might have for the life of the day. I have so far dwelt on this aspect of Athenian Tragedy, because we might be rather apt to regard it as a form of art altogether detached from contemporary interests, and to overlook the powerful influence—not the less powerful because usually indirect—which it must undoubtedly have exercised in expressing and moulding public sentiment.

But we must now turn to that other form of Athenian drama in which the resemblance to the power of the modern press is much more direct and striking—that which is known as the Old Comedy of Athens. Mr Browning, in his *Apology of Aristophanes*, makes the great comic poet indicate the narrow limits to the influence of Tragedy on opinion. The passage is witty; and though, as I venture to think, it considerably underrates the effect of Tragedy in this direction, at least it well marks the contrast between the modes in which the two forms of drama wrought. When we think of the analogy between Aristophanes and the modern political journalist, one of the first things that strikes us is the high and earnest view Aristophanes took of his own calling. He had gone through every stage of a laborious training before he presumed to come before the Athenian public. He had seen his predecessors fail, or fall from favour. So in the *Peace*, he claims that he has banished the old vulgar tomfoolery from the stage, and raised his art "like an edifice stately

and grand." He saw clearly the enormous force which this literary engine, Comedy, might wield. He resolved that, in his hands, it should be directed to more elevated and more important aims. Instead of merely continuing the traditions of scurrilous buffoonery, in which virulent personality was often the only point, he would bring his wit to bear on larger aspects of politics and society.

But, while his wit and his style have the stamp of bold originality, Aristophanes is not the champion of original ideas. Rather his position depends essentially on the fact that he represents a large body of commonplace public opinion. He represents the great "stupid party," to use a name which the English Tories have borne not without pride, and glories to represent it; the stupid party, who are not wiser than their forefathers; who fail to understand how the tongue can swear, and the soul remain unsworn; who sigh for the old days when the plain seafaring citizen knew only to ask for his barley-cake, and to cry "pull away"; who believe in the old-fashioned virtues, and worship the ancient gods. He describes himself as the champion of the people, doing battle for them, like a second Hercules, against superhuman monsters. The demagogues, whom he lashes, try to represent him as slandering the country to foreigners; but he is the country's best friend. Athenians are hasty, fickle, and vain. He has taught them not to be gulled by flattery. He has taught them to respect the rights and redress the wrongs of their subjects. The envoys who bring

the tribute from the islands long to see him. The King of Persia, he says, asked two questions about the combatants in the Peloponnesian War. Which side had the strongest navy? and which side had Aristophanes? Thirlwall, in his *History of Greece*, denies that Aristophanic Comedy produced any serious effect. "We have no reason," he says, "to believe that it ever turned the course of public affairs, or determined the bias of the public mind, or even that it considerably affected the credit and fortunes of an obnoxious individual." Grote's opinion is much the same, except that he is disposed to credit Comedy with a greater influence on the reputations of particular men. The question is much of the same nature as might be raised concerning the precise effect of political writing in newspapers, or of literary reviews. The effect is one which it is impossible to measure accurately, but which may nevertheless be both wide and deep.

In the first place, we must dismiss the notion that Comedy could make no serious impression because the occasion was a sportive festival. The feelings of Athenians at Comedy were not merely those of a modern audience at a burlesque or a pantomime. Comedy, like Tragedy, was still the worship of Dionysus. Precisely in those comedies which most daringly ridicule the gods—such as the *Birds* and the *Frogs*—we find also serious expressions of a religious sense, illustrating what might be called the principle of compensatory reverence. Again, the power of the Old Athenian Comedy is

not to be gauged by any influence which it exercised, or sought, over special situations or definite projects. Indeed, it rarely attempted this. Almost the only extant instance occurs in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes, where he urges that a general amnesty should be granted to all citizens who had been implicated in the Revolution of the Four Hundred. In such a sense, it may be granted, Comedy might do little; but its real power operated in a totally different way. When a large body of people has common opinions or feelings, these are intensified in each individual by the demonstration that so many others share them. A public meeting tends in itself to quicken enthusiasm for a party or a cause, be the oratory never so flat and the sentiments never so trite. Aristophanes gave the most brilliant expression to a whole range of thought and feeling with which thousands of minds were in general sympathy. Can it be doubted that he contributed powerfully to strengthen the prejudice against everything that he regarded as dangerous innovation? Or, again, can it be doubted that he did much to give his fellow-citizens a more vivid insight into the arts of unscrupulous demagogues? The cajolers of the people, as depicted in the comedy of the *Knights*, are drawn in strong colours, but with fine strokes also: while the character of Demus, the People—their supposed dupe—is drawn with a tact which no satirist or political journalist has ever surpassed. If I had to stake the political power of Aristophanes on the evidence of one short passage, it should be that

dialogue in which the Knights deplore the dotage of Demus, and Demus tells them that, while he seems to doze, he always has one eye open (*vv.* 1111—1150).

When a change of Ministry occurs in England, no one would undertake to say exactly what share in that result is attributable to journalistic repetition and suggestion—to the cumulative impression wrought on the public mind, through weeks, months, and years, by the Conservative or the Liberal press. And he would be a bold man who presumed to say how little or how much the Old Comedy may have to do with the phenomena of oligarchic reaction in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War, or with the stimulation of all those sentiments which have their record in the death of Socrates. The confused travesty of Socrates in the *Clouds* corresponds, in its general features, with the confused prepossessions of which he was afterwards the victim. In this case, as in others, Comedy was not the origin, but the organ, of a popular opinion. It did not create the prepossessions; but it strengthened them by the simple process of reflecting them in an exaggerated form. Briefly, Aristophanic Comedy had many of the characteristics of vehement party journalism, but was directed either against persons, on the one hand, or against general principles and tendencies, on the other—not against measures. Its most obvious strength lay in brilliant originality of form; but its political and social effect depended essentially on its representative value. It was the great

ancient analogue of journalism which seems to lead opinion by skilfully mirroring it—unsparing in attack, masterly in all the sources of style, but careful, where positive propositions are concerned, to keep within the limits of safe and accepted generalities.

Just as the Old Comedy was losing its freedom of utterance, a new agency began to appear, which invites comparison with journalism of a calmer and more thoughtful type. Rhetoric, of which we already feel the presence in Athenian drama, had now become a developed art. Skill analogous to that of the modern journalist was often required, for purposes of speaking, by the citizen of a Greek republic[1]. He might desire to urge his views in a public assembly where the standard of speaking was high and the audience critical. He might be compelled to defend his fortunes, or even his life, before a popular jury of many hundreds, when the result would depend in no small measure on oratorical dexterity. Already a class of men existed who composed speeches for private persons to deliver in law-courts. The new art was naturally enlisted in the service of party politics. A skilful writer now felt that there was a way of producing an effect which would be less transient than that of a speech in the assembly. From the end of the fifth century B.C. we begin to meet with a species of composition which may best be described as a political pamphlet.

The paper on the Athenian polity, which has

[1] In the *Attic Orators*, vol. ii. p. 42, I pointed out this analogy.

come down under Xenophon's name, is an aristocratic manifesto against the democracy, which might have appeared in an ancient *Quarterly Review*. The paper on the *Revenues of Athens*, belonging to the middle of the fourth century B.C., is a similar article in favour of peace and the commercial interests. Many of the extant pieces of the orator Isocrates, in the fourth century B.C., though couched in the form of speeches, were meant to be read, not spoken, and are in reality highly finished political pamphlets. More, perhaps, than any writer of antiquity, Isocrates resembles a journalist who is deeply impressed with the dignity and responsibility of his calling; who spares no pains to make his work really good; and who has constantly before his mind the feeling that his audience is wider, and his power greater, than if he was actually addressing a public assembly on the same theme. His articles—as we may fitly call them—are usually intended to have a definite effect at a particular moment. He wishes to make Athens and Sparta combine at once in an expedition to Asia. He wishes to strike in with a telling argument for peace at the moment when negotiations are pending between Athens and her allies. He desires to strengthen the hands of the party, at Athens and at Sparta, who refuse to recognise the restoration of Messene by the power of Thebes. In this last case, we know that a pamphlet on the other side was written by the rhetorician Alcidamas. Here then is an example of literary controversy on contemporary public affairs.

Nor is it merely in regard to the political questions of the day that Isocrates performs the part of a journalist. He deals also with the social life of Athens. He expresses the feeling with which men of the old school observed a deterioration of manners connected, in their views, with the decay of Conservative elements in the democracy. He shows us the throngs of needy citizens, eagerly casting lots outside the law-courts for the privilege of employment as paid jurymen—while at the same time they are hiring mercenary troops to fight their battles abroad. He pictures the lavish display which characterized the festivals of the improvident city—where the amusement of the public had now become a primary art of statesmanship—when men might be seen blazing in gold-spangled robes, who had been shivering through the winter in rags. He brings before us the young men of a degenerate Athens—no longer engaged in vigorous exercises of mind and body, in hunting or athletics; no longer crossing the market-place with downcast eyes, or showing marks of deference to their elders—but passing their hours in the society of gamesters and flute-players, or lazily cooling their wine in the fountain by the Ilissus. He is, in brief, a voice of public opinion on all the chief matters which come within the province of the publicist. In order that such a writer should have an influence similar to that of a newspaper, it was enough that copies of his writings should be sufficiently multiplied to leaven the conversation of the market-place and of

private society. Every possessor of a copy was a centre from which the ideas would reach the members of his own circle. And there is good evidence that, in the fourth century B.C., the circulation of popular writings throughout the Hellenic world was both wide and rapid. The copying-industry, in the Greece of that age, doubtless fell far short of the dimensions to which the labour of cultivated slaves (the *literati*) afterwards raised it at Rome—where we hear of Augustus, for instance, confiscating no fewer than two thousand copies of a single work—the pseudo-Sibylline books. But it was still amply sufficient to warrant a general comparison, in the sense just defined, between the influence of such a writer as Isocrates, and that of a modern journalist.

We have hitherto spoken only of the written rhetoric, in which the form of a speech was merely a literary fiction, like that adopted—in imitation of Isocrates—by Milton, when he chose to couch his *Areopagitica* in the form of a speech addressed to the Lords and Commons of England. But in passing, we should note that the actually spoken rhetoric of antiquity—especially of Greece—bore a certain analogy to the more elaborate efforts of journalism. This depends on the fact that ancient usage fully recognised, and generally expected, careful premeditation; while the speaker, conscious of the demand for excellence of form, usually aimed at investing his speech with permanent literary value. Demosthenes and Cicero are both witnesses to this: Cicero, doubtless, piqued himself on a faculty of

extemporising at need, but probably trusted little to it on great occasions; while with Demosthenes it was the rule, we are told, never to speak without preparation. Take the oration delivered by Lysias at the Olympian festival, where he is exhorting the assembled Greeks to unite against the common foes of Hellas in Sicily and in Persia. Here the orator is essentially an organ of patriotic opinion, and his highly-wrought address is a finished leading-article, for which the author sought the largest publicity.

In turning from Greece to Rome, we are prepared to find literature holding a different relation towards public opinion. The Greek temperament, with its quick play of thought and fancy, had an instinctive craving to make the sympathy of thoughts continually felt in words, and to accompany action with a running comment of speech. The Roman, as we find him during Rome's earlier career of conquest, was usually content to feel that his action was in conformity with some principle which he had expressed once for all in an institution or a statute. His respect for authority, and his moral earnestness —in a word, his political and social gravity—rendered him independent of the solace which the lively Greek derived from a demonstrated community of feeling. Rome, strong in arms, severe, persistent, offering to people after people the choice of submission or subjugation; Rome, the head of the Latin name, the capital of Italy, the queen of the Mediterranean, the empress of a pacified, because disarmed, world; Rome, who never deemed a war done until

conquest had been riveted by law which should be the iron bond of peace,—this idea was the true inspiration of the Roman; and, as the literature was matured, it was this which added order to strength, and majesty to order, in the genius of the Roman tongue. It is especially curious to observe the fate which Comedy experienced when it first appeared at Rome, and endeavoured to assume something of the political significance which its parent, Greek Comedy, had possessed at Athens. The poet Naevius appeared just after the first Punic War. He was a champion of popular liberties against the domination of the Senate; and, in his plays, he treated some of the Senatorian chiefs with satire of a quality which, to judge from the extant specimens, was exceedingly mild. "Who had so quickly ruined the commonwealth?" was a query put in one of his comedies; and the reply was, "New speakers came forward—foolish young men." In another piece, he alluded to the applauses bestowed on him as proving that he was a true interpreter of the public mind, and deprecated any great man interfering with him. A very slave in one of his comedies, he added, was better off than a Roman citizen nowadays. Contrast these remarks with the indescribable insults which Aristophanes had boldly heaped on the Athenian demagogues. Mild as Naevius was, however, he was not mild enough for the "foolish young men." Having ventured to observe that the accession of certain nobles to high office was due to a decree of fate,

he was promptly imprisoned; he was afterwards banished; and he died in exile. This seems to have been the first and last attempt of Roman Comedy to serve as an organ of popular opinion. The Roman reverence for authority was outraged by the idea of a public man being presented in a comic light on the boards of a theatre. On the other hand, Roman feeling allowed a public man to be attacked, in speaking or in writing, with almost any degree of personal violence, provided that the purpose was seriously moral. Hence the personal criticism of statesmen, which at Athens had belonged to Comedy, passed at Rome into another kind of composition. It became an element of Satire.

The name of Satire comes, as is well known, from the *lanx satura*, the platter filled with first-fruits of various sorts, which was an annual thank-offering to Ceres and Bacchus. "Satire" meant a medley, or miscellany, and the first characteristic of Roman satire was that the author wrote in an easy, familiar way about any and every subject that was of interest to himself and his readers. As Juvenal says,—

> "Men's hopes, men's fear—their fond, their fretful dream—
> Their joys, their fuss—that medley is my theme."

Politics, literature, philosophy, society—every topic of public or private concern—belonged to the *Satura*, so long as the treatment was popular. Among all the forms of Roman literature, Satire stands out with a twofold distinction. First, it is

genuinely national. Next, it is the only one which has a continuous development, extending from the vigorous age of the Commonwealth into the second century of the Empire. Satire is pre-eminently the Roman literary organ of public opinion. The tone of the Roman satirist is always that of an ordinary Roman citizen who is frankly speaking his mind to his fellow-citizens. An easy, confidential manner in literature—as of one friend unbosoming himself to another—seems to have been peculiarly congenial to the ancient Italian taste. We may remember how the poet Ennius introduced into his epic a picture of the intimate converse between himself and the Roman general Servilius Geminus—a picture not unworthy of a special war-correspondent attached to head-quarters. Then Satire profited by the Italian gift for shrewd portraiture of manners. Take, for instance, the picture of a coquette, drawn some twenty centuries ago by Naevius :—

"Like one playing at ball in a ring, she tosses about from one to another, and is at home with all. To one she nods, to another she winks; she makes love to one, clings to another.....To one she gives a ring to look at, to another blows a kiss; with one she sings, with another corresponds by signs[1]."

The man who first established Satire as an outspoken review of Roman life was essentially a slashing journalist. This was Lucilius, who lived in the latter years of the second century B.C. He attacked the high-born statesmen who, as he put it, "thought

[1] Professor Sellar's rendering, *Roman Poets of the Republic*, p. 55.

that they could blunder with impunity, and keep criticism at a distance by their rank." On the other hand, he did not spare plebeian offenders. As one of his successors says, "he bit deep into the town of his day, and broke his jaw-tooth on them." Literature and society also came under his censures. He lashes the new affectation of Greek manners and speech, the passion for quibbling rhetoric, the extravagance of the gluttons and the avarice of the misers. Even the Roman ladies of the time do not wholly escape. He criticises the variations of their toilettes. "When she is with *you*, anything is good enough; when visitors are expected, all the resources of the wardrobe are taxed." The writings of this trenchant publicist formed the great standing example of free speech for later Roman times. Horace eschews politics; indeed, when he wrote, political criticism had become as futile as it was perilous; but he is evidently anxious to impress on the Roman public that he is true to the old tradition of satire by fearlessly lashing folly and vice. Persius, who died at the age of twenty-eight in the reign of Nero, made Roman Satire a voice of public opinion in a brave and pure sense. Horace had been an accomplished Epicurean, who found his public among easy-going, cultivated men of the world. Persius spoke chiefly to minds of a graver cast: he summoned Roman citizens to possess themselves of a moral and intellectual freedom which no Cæsar could crush, the freedom given by the Stoic philosophy,—that philosophy which had moulded the jurisprudence

of the Republic, and was now the refuge of thoughtful minds under the despotism of the Empire. Then we have once more a slashing publicist in Juvenal, who is national and popular in a broader sense than Horace or Persius. His fierce indignation is turned against the alien intruders, the scum of Greece and Asia, who are making Rome a foreign city, and robbing Roman citizens of their bread. He denounces the imported vices which are effacing the old Roman character. He is the last of the Roman satirists, and in much he resembles the first.

It may be noted that each of the three satirists of the Empire—Horace, Persius, Juvenal—gives us a dialogue between himself and an imaginary friend, who remonstrates with him for his rashness in imitating Lucilius, the outspoken satirist of the Republic. Horace replies, in effect, "Never mind, *I'm* not afraid—Augustus will stand by me as Scipio and Laelius stood by Lucilius"; but, in fact, Horace never strikes like Lucilius; he keeps us smiling while he probes our faults; "he gains his entrance, and plays about the heart"; his censures, even when keen, show cautious tact. Persius replies: "You need not read me if you do not like: but the joke is too good; I *must* tell some one that Midas has the ears of an ass." When Juvenal is warned, we catch quite a different tone in the answer. After painting the Rome of his day, he says (I venture to give a version of my own):—

"Nought worse remains: the men of coming times
Can but renew our lusts, repeat our crimes.

Vice holds the dizzy summit: spread thy sail,
Indignant Muse, and drive before the gale!
But who shall find, or whence—I hear thee ask—
An inspiration level with the task?
Whence that frank courage of an elder Rome,
When Satire, fearless, sent the arrow home?
'Whom am I bound,' she then could cry, 'to spare?
If high-placed guilt forgive not, do I care?'
Paint *now* the prompter of a Nero's rage—
The torments of a Christian were thy wage,—
Pinned to the stake, in blazing pitch to stand,
Or, on the hook that dragg'd thee, plough the sand...
* * * * * *
No danger will attend thee if thou tell
How to Aeneas warlike Turnus fell;
No spite resents Achilles' fateful day,
Or Hylas, with his urn, the Naiads' prey:
But when Lucilius, all his soul afire,
Bared his good sword and wreak'd his generous ire,
Flush'd cheeks bewrayed the secrets lock'd within,
And chill hearts shivered with their conscious sin.
Hence wrath and tears. Ere trumpets sound, debate:
Warriors, once armed, repent of war too late.
'Then shall plain speech be tried on those whose clay
Rests by the Latin or Flaminian Way.'"

He did indeed try the plainest of speech, not only on dead tyrants and their ministers, but on the society of his own time. The elder Disraeli remarks that Richard Steele meant the *Tatler* to deal with three provinces—manners, letters, and politics; and that, as to politics, "it remained for the chaster genius of Addison to banish this disagreeable topic from his elegant pages." Horace was in this respect the Addison of Satire under the Empire. In Juvenal the Italian medley once more exhibits, though with neces-

sary modifications, the larger and more vigorous spirit of its early prime. The poetical epistle, which in Horace is so near to Satire, usually differed from it in having less of the chatty miscellaneous character, and in being rather applied to continuous didactic exposition. The prose epistle, which was often meant for publication even when formally private, also contributed not only to express, but to mould, public opinion. Epigrams and lampoons might happen to be vehicles of a general feeling; but they differ from the forms of literature here considered in being essentially personal, like the satirical poetry of early Greece.

There is yet another agency, common to Greece and Rome, at which we must glance—the Oracles. Often, of course, they had a most important part in directing public opinion at critical moments; but this was not all. There were occasions on which an oracle became, in a strict sense, the organ of a political party. Thus the noble Athenian family of the Alcmaeonidae bribed the Delphian priests to make the oracle an organ of public opinion in favour of freeing Athens from Peisistratus. Accordingly, whenever Spartans came to consult the god on any subject whatever, this topic was always worked into the response. Apollo, in short, kept up a series of most urgent leading-articles; and at last the Spartans were roused to action. Then, when Cleomenes, one of the two Spartan kings, wished to have his colleague Demaratus deposed, he made friends with an influential man at Delphi; the influential man bribed

the priestess; and the oracle declared that Demaratus was not of the royal blood. In this case, the fraud was found out; the priestess was deposed; and when Cleomenes died mad, men said that this was the hand of Apollo. When the Persians were about to invade Greece, the Delphic oracle took the line of advising the Greeks to submit. The Athenians sent to ask what they should do, and the oracle said, "Fly to the ends of the earth." The Athenians protested that they would not leave the temple until they got a more comfortable answer. Hereupon an influential Delphian advised them to assume the garb of suppliants; and this time Apollo told them to trust to their wooden walls. Herodotus mentions between seventy and eighty oracles (I believe) of one sort or another, and less than half of these contain *predictions.* The predictions usually belong to one of two classes; first, those obviously founded on secret information or on a shrewd guess; and, secondly, those in which the oracle had absolutely no ideas on the subject, and took refuge in vagueness.

Any one who reads the column of Answers to Correspondents in a prudently conducted journal will recognise the principal types of oracle. In truth, the Delphic oracle bore a strong resemblance to a serious newspaper managed by a cautious editorial committee with no principles in particular. In editing an oracle, it was then, as it still is, of primary importance not to make bad mistakes. The Delphian editors were not infallible; but, when a blunder had

been made, they often showed considerable resource. Thus, when Croesus had been utterly ruined, he begged his conqueror to grant him one luxury—to allow him to send to Delphi, and ask Apollo whether it was his usual practice to treat his benefactors in this way. Apollo replied that, in point of fact, he had done everything he could; he had personally requested the Fates to put off the affair for a generation; but they would only grant a delay of three years. Instead of showing annoyance, Croesus ought to be grateful for having been ruined three years later than he ought to have been. There are Irish landlords who would see a parable in these things. Sometimes we can see that Apollo himself is slightly irritated, as an editor might be by a wrong-headed or impertinent querist. Some African colonists had been pestering Apollo about their local troubles and his own former predictions; and the response from Delphi begins with the sarcastic remark, "I admire your wisdom if you know Africa better than I do." The normal tendency of the Delphic oracle was to discourage rash enterprise, and to inculcate maxims of orthodox piety and moderation. The people of Cnidos wanted to make their peninsula an island by digging a canal, but found it very hard work; and the oracle told them that if Zeus had meant the peninsula to be an island, he would have made it an island—which reminds one of some of the arguments against the Channel Tunnel. In one special direction, however, Delphi gave a real impulse to Hellenic progress. It was a powerful promoter of coloniza-

tion: for instance, the first Greek settlements in Corsica and on the coast of Africa were directly due to Delphic oracles. We even find the oracle designating individuals for work abroad; as when it nominated a man of Mantinea to reform the constitution of Cyrene. In Scotland we are wont to take a keen interest in everything that bears on colonial careers for young men; and one day a Greek class had been reading about the Delphic oracle telling some Thracians to choose as their king the first man who should ask them to dinner. Miltiades had this privilege, and forthwith got the Thracian appointment. "Do you think," a thoughtful student asked, "that there could have been any collusion?"

A brief mention is due to those Roman publications which, in form, came nearest to our newspapers —the official gazettes. Julius Caesar, when consul in 59 B.C., first caused the transactions of the Senate (*Acta Senatus*) to be regularly published: before his time, there had been only an occasional publication of its decrees. Augustus stopped the issue of this Senatorial Gazette, though the minutes continued to be regularly kept, at first by senators of the Emperor's choice, afterwards by a secretary specially appointed. Further, Julius Caesar instituted a regular official gazette of general news, the *Acta diurna*, which continued under the Empire. There was an official editor; the gazette was exhibited daily in public, and copied by scribes, who sold it to their customers; the original copy was afterwards laid up

in the public archives, where it could be consulted. This gazette contained announcements or decrees by the Government, notices relating to the magistrature and the law-courts, and other matters of public interest; also a register of births, marriages, and deaths, and occasionally other advertisements concerning private families. This gazette had a wide circulation. Tacitus, for example, says that a certain event could not be hidden from the army, because the legionaries throughout the provinces had read it in the gazette. But it was simply a bald record of facts; there was no comment. Cicero, writing from Asia, complains that a private correspondent at Rome has sent him only such news as appears in a gazette—about matches of gladiators and adjournment of courts—and has given him no political intelligence.

The *Gentleman's Magazine* for 1740 contains a short and quaint paper by Dr Johnson, in which he transcribes some supposed fragments of a Roman gazette for the year 168 B.C. These were first published in 1615, and in 1692 were defended by Dodwell, but are now recognised as fifteenth-century forgeries. We have no genuine fragments of the Roman gazettes. None the less, Johnson's comparison of them with the English newspapers of 1740 may well suggest a reflection. The Roman gazette under the Empire did not give the transactions of the Senate, any more than it admitted political comment. In the newspapers of Johnson's time, the parliamentary reports were still very irregu-

lar and imperfect; while criticism of public men was fain to take the disguise, however thin, of allegory. Thus the *Gentleman's Magazine* regaled its readers, from month to month, with "Proceedings and Debates in the Senate of Lilliput." It was when the House of Commons had ceased to represent the public opinion of the country, that this opinion became resolved to have an outlet in the press. Parliament having ceased to discharge its proper function, the press became the popular court of appeal. The battle for a free press, in the full modern sense, was fought out between 1764 and 1771—beginning in 1764 with the persecution of Wilkes for attacking Bute in the *North Briton*, and ending with the successful resistance, in 1771, to the proclamation by which the Commons had forbidden the publication of their debates. Six printers, who had infringed it, were summoned to the bar of the House; five obeyed; and the messenger of the House was sent to arrest the sixth. The Lord Mayor of London sent the messenger to prison. The House of Commons sent the Lord Mayor to the Tower. But he was followed by cheering crowds. He was released at the next prorogation; and the day on which he left the Tower marked the end of the last attempt to silence the press. The next few years saw the beginning of the first English journals which exercised a great political and social power. The *Times* dates from 1788. Thus a period memorable for Americans has something of analogous significance for their kinsmen in England. For the

English people, also, those years contained a Declaration of Independence; they brought us a title-deed of freedom greater, perhaps, than the barons of the thirteenth century extorted from John—the charter of a complete freedom in the daily utterance of public opinion.

The attempt here has been to indicate some of the partial equivalents for such an utterance which may be traced in classical literature. A student of antiquity must always, in one sense, resemble the wistful Florentine who, with Virgil for his guide, explored the threefold realm beyond the grave. His converse is with the few, the spirits signal for good or for evil in their time; the shades of the great soldiers pass before him,—he can scan them closely, and imagine how each bore himself in the hour of defeat or victory on earth; he can know the counsels of statesmen, and even share the meditations of their leisure; the poets and the philosophers are present: but around and beyond these are the nameless nations of the dead, the multitudes who passed through the ancient world and left no memorial. With these dim populations he can hold no direct communion; it is much if at times the great movements which agitated them are descried by him as the surging of a shadowy crowd, or if the accents of their anguish or triumph are borne from afar as the sound of many waters. So much the more, those few clear voices which still come from the past are never more significant than when they interpret the popular mind of their generation. The modern

development of representative institutions has invested the collective sentiment of communities with power of a kind to which antiquity can furnish no proper parallel. But this fact cannot dispense the student of history from listening for the echoes of the market-place. And such attention cannot fail to quicken our sense of the inestimable gain which has accrued to modern life through journalism. It is easy to forget the magnitude of a benefit when its operation has become regular and familiar. The influence of the press may sometimes be abused; its tone may sometimes be objectionable. But take these three things—quickness in seeking and supplying information,—continual vigilance of comment,—electric sympathy of social feeling: where in the ancient world do we find these things as national characteristics, except in so far as they were gifts of nature to the small community of ancient Athens—gifts to which her best literature owes so much of its incomparable freshness and of its imperishable charm? It is mainly due to the agency of the press that these things are now found throughout the world,—these, which, in all lands where man has risen above barbarism, are the surest safeguards of civilisation and the ultimate pledges of constitutional freedom.

LUCIAN[1].

I.

Lucian, a native of Samosata in northern Syria, lived in the middle and latter part of the second century; the date of his birth and of his death is unknown. Early in life he adopted the calling of a rhetorician, or "sophistes," lecturing in Ionia, Syria, Greece, Italy, and Gaul. Afterwards he settled at Athens, and devoted himself to the literary work which made his fame. It is his peculiar distinction in the history of letters that he was the first to employ the form of dialogue, not on grave themes, but as a vehicle of comedy and satire. He intimates this claim in the piece entitled *The Twice-accused*, which is so called because Lucian is there arraigned by personified Rhetoric on the one part and by Dialogue on the other. Rhetoric upbraids him with having forsaken her for the bearded Dialogus, the henchman of philosophy; while Dialogus complains that the Syrian has dragged him from his philosophical heaven to earth, and given him a tragic instead of a comic mask. Lucian's dialogues blend

[1] One of a series of "Lectures to Clergy at Cambridge," July, 1900.—Published in *The Guardian*, August 29, 1900, and next number.

an irony, in which Plato had been his master, with an Aristophanic mirth and fancy. His satire ranges over the whole life of his time. And he has been an originating force in literature. His *True History* is the prototype of such works as *Gulliver's Travels*; his *Dialogues of the Dead* were precursors of Landor's *Imaginary Conversations*. A man of letters in Lucian's day might have said with Virgil, but in a yet wider sense, "Omnia iam vulgata." Lucian always tried, in his own phrase, to keep out of the ruts (ἁρματοτροχίας ἀλεείνειν, Δημ. Ἐγκ., 23). Thus in his *Encomium on Demosthenes* he lends freshness to a well-worn theme by the ingenious fiction of an old manuscript containing a journal of the Macedonian Court, and recording, among other things, a conversation between the Regent Antipater and the man Archias, whom he sent to arrest the Athenian orator. But the present lecture cannot attempt to deal with the whole range of Lucian's writings. Its scope will be confined to three points—(1) Lucian's testimony to the state of pagan religion in his own day; (2) his view of contemporary philosophy; (3) his references to Christianity.

It will be remembered that Lucian's time—the second half of the second century—was a critical moment in the history of the Church. The dilemma which then confronted Christians has been thus stated by Professor Harnack:—

"Should the Church take the decisive step into the world—consent to its arrangements, conform to its customs, acknowledge as far as possible its authorities, and satisfy its requirements? Or

ought she, on the other hand, to remain, as she had been at first, a society of religious devotees, separated and shut out from the world by a rigorous discipline, and working on it only through a direct propaganda?"

The Church, as a whole, took that step, while Montanism was the protest of a minority against it. The Church—

"Marched through the open door into the Roman State, and settled down there for a long career of activity, to Christianize the State along all its thoroughfares by the word of the Gospel, but at the same time leaving it everything except its gods."

A special interest therefore belongs to such literature as can help to illustrate the intellectual and moral conditions of the pagan world at the moment when the Church was about to take this step. And there is, perhaps, no pagan writer of precisely that time who is more suggestive in this respect than Lucian. We will consider first, then, what he has to tell us concerning the condition of the old polytheism and the superstitions which engrafted themselves upon it. Here a concrete example, with details, will be more illuminating than any abstract statement. We may begin with one of his most instructive pieces, that which is entitled *Alexander, or the False Prophet*—an account of a person whom he had known and of a career which he had watched.

This Alexander entered on his course of imposture with many personal advantages. He was tall, well-looking, and of a commanding presence; his fair complexion, his brilliant eyes, and the comely locks to which he added a profusion of false curls,

gave him an Olympian air in the eyes of the multitude ; and his voice was singularly melodious. In youth he apprenticed himself to a magician who had himself been a disciple of that renowned impostor, Apollonius of Tyana ; and from this man he acquired a smattering of medicine which he afterwards turned to good account. His master having died, Alexander entered into partnership with an unsuccessful writer of comedy at Byzantium, and the worthy pair went about the neighbouring regions, fleecing the ignorant country people. At Pella, in Macedonia, they happened to notice a species of large serpents, tame and harmless, which were domestic pets with the inhabitants ; and they bought a fine specimen of this creature for a few pence. An idea had occurred to them. The old oracles of Delphi and other places were decaying, or already dumb ; they would set up a new oracle. Where was it to be? The Byzantine suggested Chalcedon ; but Alexander insisted that no seat for the oracle could be so suitable as his own birth-place, an obscure little town on the coast of Paphlagonia, called Abonoteichos, where the population was grossly superstitious. They laid their plans accordingly. In a half-ruined temple of Apollo at Chalcedon they buried a pair of brass tablets, with this inscription : "Aesculapius and his father Apollo will presently pass into Pontus, and fix his abode at Abonoteichos." Alexander took care that these tablets should soon be dug up ; and the fame of the discovery spread quickly through northern Asia Minor. At Abonoteichos itself—the

favoured town designated in the inscription—the inhabitants immediately set about digging the foundations of a temple. Alexander now went thither, provided with an oracle which declared him to be descended from the Homeric physician, Podaleirius, and connected with the hero Perseus. He wore a white robe, striped with purple, and carried a scimitar such as that which was usually given to Perseus in works of art. At intervals he was seized with a prophetic frenzy, when he seemed to foam at the mouth, an appearance which he produced by chewing the root of soap-wort. It was now time that the expected deity himself, Aesculapius, should appear. One night, therefore, Alexander stole out of his house and went to the spot where the foundations of the new temple were being excavated. Some water was collected in the diggings. Alexander had previously scooped out a goose's egg and enclosed a new-born little snake in the shell, carefully overlaying the seam with wax. He now buried the goose's egg in the mud at the bottom of the diggings, and went home again. Next morning he rushed into the town with an embroidered apron about his loins and the scimitar in his right hand, shaking his dishevelled locks like one inspired, sprang upon an altar, and greeted the people with the glad tidings that Aesculapius was about to appear among them. Then he ran to the new temple with the whole town at his heels. On reaching the pool of water at the diggings he sang a hymn to Apollo and Aesculapius. He then asked for a cup, with which he carefully extri-

cated the goose's egg from the mud. "Here," he cried, holding up the egg, "I have him; I will show you Aesculapius." The people, already astonished by the discovery of the egg, watched intently to see what would happen next. When he broke the shell, and received the little snake into the hollow of his hand, and when they saw the creature moving and twisting about his fingers, they shouted for joy, welcomed the god, and congratulated their town. Alexander hastened back to his house, carrying with him the infant Aesculapius. After a few days of seclusion he announced that Aesculapius was prepared to receive his votaries. The crowd who flocked to Alexander's house passed through a dimly lighted room, in which Alexander was seated. The large tame serpent—that which he had bought at Pella—was twined round his neck and breast. A linen mask had been prepared, representing a large serpent's head, but with some resemblance to a human face, and provided with a contrivance of horse-hairs for opening the mouth, and thrusting forth a black, forked tongue. This head peeped from under the prophet's right arm. People came from all parts of the country to see the newly arrived Aesculapius. Alexander next made it known that the divinity was ready to give oracles. Any one who wished to consult the god must write his question on a little scroll, seal it up, and give it to the prophet, who would take it into the temple, and on coming out report the god's answer. The fee for an oracle was about tenpence, and so enormous was the demand

that even at this modest price the prophet was soon making an income equivalent to about £500 a year. And now comes what is, perhaps, the most instructive part of the story. Thus far Alexander had been dealing with simple provincials, mostly rustics, in Asia Minor. But his renown had now spread to Italy. Romans of the highest position sent messengers to consult him. Some of the questions asked by these eminent persons would, if published, have endangered their fortunes or lives. In all such cases Alexander was careful to retain the papers. He thus held their wealthy writers in his power. A remarkable illustration of his *prestige* was afforded about the year 166, when a pestilence was ravaging large portions of the empire. An oracle given by Alexander was at that time displayed on the front of innumerable houses as a charm against the plague. A few years later, when Marcus Aurelius was engaged in his Germanic wars, Alexander sent a ridiculous oracle to the Roman camp, promising victory if two lions were thrown into the Danube; and it was actually done. But the next advantage, unfortunately, was gained by the Germans; and Alexander had to explain, like Apollo to Croesus, that he had not said which side was to win. On another occasion a whole household of slaves was cast to the wild beasts, because Alexander had accused them of murdering their young master, who reappeared a few years later. Emboldened by success, Alexander instituted new mysteries, in which the birth of Aesculapius was one of the principal

features, and another was the prophet's own marriage with the Goddess Selene. On the first day of these mysteries the following proclamation was made:—"If any atheist, Christian, or Epicurean has come to espy our holy rites, let him flee hence." Alexander then cried, "Turn out the Christians"; and the crowd responded in chorus, "Turn out the Epicureans." Lucian—who himself was friendly to the Epicureans—laid some ingenious traps for Alexander's oracle, and records some of the absurd answers which he received. On one occasion he personally visited Alexander at Abonoteichos:—

"On coming into the room," he says, "I found a throng of people about Alexander; but luckily I had brought two soldiers with me. He extended his hand for me to kiss, as usual; I pressed it to my lips, and gave it such a bite that I nearly maimed him. The bystanders were ready to beat or strangle me for the sacrilege; they had already been annoyed by my addressing him as 'Alexander,' and not as 'Prophet.' He, however, bore it right manfully, pacified them, and promised to render me quite docile, so as to illustrate the goodness of his god in softening the roughest natures. Then he ordered the rest to withdraw, and proceeded to remonstrate with me. 'What motive can you have,' he said, 'for treating us thus, when I could do so much to help you?' For my part," says Lucian, "I was only too glad to meet these advances, when I saw how narrow my escape had been; and presently I came out of the room on amicable terms with him—a fresh miracle in the eyes of his admirers."

In another of Lucian's pieces—the *Philopseudes*, or "lie-fancier"—there is, I think, an allusion to this interview. A person asks what it is that makes so many people take a positive pleasure in telling untruths; and his friend suggests the motive of

self-interest. The other speaker explains that he is thinking only of objectless falsehoods, and adds :—

> "Indulgence, or, in some cases, commendation, may be granted to ruses practised on an enemy, or to people who tell an untruth to save themselves in peril—as Ulysses often did, 'guarding his own life, and his comrades' return.'"

Lucian may well have been thinking of his feigned reconciliation with Alexander, by which alone, as it seemed, he could save himself and the companions of his journey. He relates that, shortly after this reconciliation, Alexander plotted to have him drowned at sea, and that he escaped only by a change of purpose in the captain of the vessel, who had been bribed to do the murder, but at the last moment recoiled from such a villainy.

The portrait of this Alexander, which Lucian has drawn with so much detail, is interesting for the vivid light which it casts on the condition of declining paganism. The extreme crudeness of the charlatan's methods did not prevent his having an immense and prolonged success. His dupes were not found only among ignorant rustics, but also among people of good education, and even in the high places of the empire. We may be sure, too, that this Alexander was no solitary phenomenon, but a type. Apollonius of Tyana, in the first century, was doubtless a man of different calibre from the prophet of Abonoteichos ; but the state of mind to which he appealed was much the same, and his claims were of a kindred order. The normal forces of the old polytheism were well-nigh spent. It was

only by some startling novelty—such as that which this Alexander provided in the new birth of Aesculapius—that the flagging interest of the populace could be revived. The general deadness of the pagan world in regard to religion, and the dearth of higher intellectual interests, made an opening for every kind of superstition, which could not be too gross or too stupid if only it furnished excitement.

In the satire which Lucian directs against the pagan gods, irony is blended with Aristophanic mockery; but the tone of the whole is far removed from that of the old comedy. It is not the tone of the Attic Dionysia, a festival at which the gods themselves were deemed to permit and enjoy raillery; it is that of an age in which the divinities of the old popular faith were no longer seriously taken by the majority of intellectual men, even though such men might acquiesce or participate in the ceremonies of a cult still upheld by the State. The pervading idea of Lucian's satire in this province is exceedingly simple. Pagan polytheism was anthropomorphic. Be it so, says Lucian; your gods are men and women; let us then represent them consistently as men and women. His device consists merely in pushing bare anthropomorphism to its extreme logical result; much as Swift, in *Gulliver's Travels*, deduces all the marvels, with logical precision, from the relative scales and properties of certain given creatures. As an example, we may take a passage from that ingenious piece, *Zeus Tragoedus*, "Jupiter in Buskins." At the opening of the scene Zeus is

surrounded by the deities who form the inner circle of his court. In great agitation he confides to them that, the day before, he had overheard a Stoic and an Epicurean philosopher arguing about the gods before a large and able audience. The Epicurean maintained that the gods, if they existed at all, had no concern with human affairs. The Stoic maintained that the gods cared for men. "You see our danger," says Zeus to his advisers; "we depend on a single man." A general council of gods is then summoned. As they arrive, Hermes, bearing his wand of office, shows them to their appointed places. While this is being done, the following conversation proceeds:—

"*Zeus*—Good, Hermes, good; here they come: place them in order of merit, according to their material and workmanship—the golden gods first—then, the silver—next, the ivory—last, the bronze or stone; and among these let the works of good artists have precedence. As to the clumsy rabble, they must be packed together and hold their peace at the end of the hall.

"*Hermes*—Yes, sire. But may I ask one question? If a heavy golden fellow comes, is he to sit before the bronze gods of Myron and Polycleitus and the stone gods of Pheidias and Alcamenes? Or is *art* to have precedence?

"*Zeus*—It should have, by rights; but, as things are, gold must have the front seats.

"*Hermes*—I see; we are an aristocracy of wealth. This way, golden gods! This way to the reserved seats! (*Aside.*) Zeus, the barbarian gods will have the front seats all to themselves! You see what the Greek gods are like—graceful, comely, artistically dressed—but all stone or bronze, or ivory at the best, with perhaps a little surface gleam of gilding, and a body of wood, and whole troops of mice in their interiors. But here is Bendis, and Anubis, and Attis beside him, and Mithras and Mên—all of sterling bullion, and really worth their weight in gold.

"*Poseidon*—Do you mean to say, Hermes, that you are going to put this dog-faced Egyptian above *me*, Poseidon?

"*Hermes*—Yes, my Earth-shaker; but Lysippus made you of poor bronze, as the Corinthians had no gold at the time, and this god is whole mines richer. So you must pocket the indignity, and not be put out if you have to sit below the possessor of such a splendid golden nose.

"*Aphrodite*—Now, Hermes, give me a place in the front seats; *I* am golden.

"*Hermes*—Madam, I really cannot perceive it. Unless I am very purblind, you are of white marble, from the quarry of Pentelicus, a goddess by the grace of Praxiteles, and the property of the good people of Cnidus by contract...."

After several other protests—including one from the Colossus of Rhodes on the score of his weight—all the members of the assembly are seated. Silence is proclaimed, and all are waiting for Zeus to open the proceedings, when he whispers to Hermes, in great agitation, that he has forgotten every word of an elaborate exordium which he had prepared:—

"*Hermes* (*aside, to Zeus*)—Do as the orators do—take the opening of one of the *Philippics*, just changing a word or two.

"*Zeus*—Yes, a very good suggestion.

"*Hermes*—Begin, then, *do*.

"*Zeus*—Few things, I believe, would be more gratifying to the honourable deities in this House than to learn the nature of the business for which it has now been convoked. Such being the case, I may venture to ask for your close attention. The present crisis, I would tell this House, has almost an articulate voice, with which it proclaims that we must lay a vigorous grasp on the opportunity which will else elude us. To this opportunity, I fear, honourable members are but too indifferent.....I cannot remember any more Demosthenes.....Well, I want to tell you plainly what alarmed me into calling this meeting. Yesterday, as you know, Captain Goodman, the skipper, offered a thanksgiving

sacrifice for the safety of his ship, which had narrowly escaped being wrecked, and we were his guests in the Peiraeus—I mean, as many of us as he invited. When it was over, and I was taking my evening stroll in the Peiraeus, I meditated on the shabbiness of Captain Goodman, who asked sixteen gods to his table, and gave them nothing but one cock, a very old and fusty bird too, and four grains of frankincense, which were so mouldy that they were smothered at once by the coals, without gratifying our noses with the faintest whiff—and this, though the fellow had promised us roast oxen by the hundred, when he was drifting on to the rock inside the reefs. Well, as I was pondering these things, I came opposite the Painted Porch, and saw a great crowd of people, some of them within the porch itself, others in the open verandah, others on the benches, shouting and gesticulating. I guessed the state of the case—that these were philosophers of the disputatious sort—and I felt desirous to draw nearer and to hear what they were saying. So, as I happened to be wearing one of my thick clouds, I draped it in philosopher's fashion, pulled down my beard a little, till I looked just like one of themselves, and elbowed my way through the crowd without being recognised. I found that rascally Epicurean Damis, and Timocles, the Stoic, a thoroughly good fellow, engaged in a fierce dispute. Timocles was perspiring, and had almost lost his voice from bellowing; Damis was smiling with sardonic derision, and exasperating him still more. Now, their whole talk was about us. That blessed Damis said that we took no care of men, and did not regard what happens on earth—in short, he denied our existence, for that was really what his argument came to. Timocles was on our side, and stood up for us, and protested, and battled for us in every possible way, praising our care, and explaining how we conduct and dispose every province of affairs in an orderly and fitting manner. He had some few supporters, but, in fact, he was utterly exhausted, and was speaking indistinctly, while the crowd was all in favour of Damis. I saw our peril; so I ordered Night to lower her veil and break up the meeting....The people separated, agreeing to meet again to-morrow and conclude the discussion....This is why I have convened you. It is very serious, if you reflect that all our honour and glory and revenue depend on mankind....You

must all devise some means of making Timocles win, and having Damis laughed down by his hearers. For I do not feel quite sure that Timocles can win by himself, unless some aid is given to him by you."

Zeus having thus opened the debate, it is taken up by Momus, the spirit of censure, who tells the assembly some truths. Honourable members must not be surprised, says Momus, to hear that such opinions prevail on earth. What are mortals to think when they see the best men perishing in poverty and sickness and slavery, while the worst men are loaded with riches and honours? "If the truth must be told," Momus concludes, "we sit here, indifferent to everything except the sacrifice and the savoury steam from the altars. Everything else goes with wind and tide, and as chance may waft it." This avowal scandalises the assembly, and Momus is reproved. But no one has anything practical to suggest. Poseidon proposes that Zeus should strike Damis with a thunderbolt, but is bluntly told that the idea is worthy only of a sea-pig; how could it be done without the consent of Destiny? Apollo intervenes with a criticism on Timocles. Timocles, he observes, is a worthy man, of good repute as a professor, and has large classes; it is only when he goes on a platform that he is apt to lose his head and flounder. The great point is to secure that he shall speak clearly. Here Momus interrupts :—

"Quite right, Apollo, to commend clearness—though your own oracles are not everything that might be desired in that respect. But what do you propose?"

Apollo suggests that they might provide Timocles with an orator to put his ideas into words. But Momus rejoins that it would certainly make the crowd laugh, if Timocles merely acted as prompter to a rhetorician who, perhaps, would not understand the thoughts which he was putting into fine language. Apollo is now called upon to prophesy the result of the pending encounter between Stoic and Epicurean. After some excuses about not having a tripod or a fountain at hand, Apollo gives a very cautious and obscure oracle; whereupon Momus laughs aloud, and, on being called to order by Zeus, says roundly that Apollo is a humbug, and that they are no better than asses or mules for believing in him. At this awkward moment Hercules comes forward with a suggestion. He is for leaving the two philosophers to fight it out as best they can; but offers, if Timocles is vanquished, to pull down the Painted Porch on the head of the victorious Damis. Zeus protests, in the first place, against destroying such good frescoes, and adds that the thing cannot be done: a god can kill no one without the leave of the Fates. Hercules retorts:—

"I am a plain fellow, who calls a spade a spade (*τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγων*), and, if that is what your Olympian estate means, farewell to it; I will go to Hades, and chase the shades of the monsters which I slew on earth."

Zeus exclaims that such a speech as that of Hercules would be a splendid argument for their enemy the Epicurean. But just then a messenger arrives from earth to announce that the discussion between

Timocles and Damis has recommenced. The gods suspend their own debate and listen anxiously to the mortals. What need to describe the course of the controversy? Timocles storms; Damis blandly presses his points; Timocles is hopelessly discomfited, amid the jeers of the multitude; and Damis runs away in fits of laughter, followed by Timocles, pouring forth a torrent of insulting language, and threatening to break his head with a potsherd.

II.

Lucian's mockery of the pagan gods is an unrestrained exercise of wit and humour. He does not affect to do more than deal with the surface of the old polytheism in its most obvious and popular aspects. It can hardly be said that there is any controversial purpose in this department of his satire. In the eyes of most people who were sufficiently cultivated to read Lucian's writings, the crude anthropomorphism of pagan legend had long ago been discounted. When Lucian mocked the Zeus or Apollo of the popular mythology he was, for such readers, merely slaying the slain; and, for himself, the effort was purely sportive. Polytheism was a field abounding with comic as well as pathetic material, where he could revel in the indulgence of his fancy—at the same time blending this diversion with strokes of satire on the foibles of mankind. But there is more pungency in his treatment of contemporary philosophies. It is true that even here,

as a rule, he only touches the surface. There is no evidence that he had deeply studied the tenets of any school, still less that he was qualified to institute a comparison of any scientific value between the various schools to which he refers. Still, it is interesting to note the general results of the survey taken by such a mind as his—thoroughly sceptical indeed, but ready to honour the search for truth wherever he was convinced that it was sincere; while, on the other hand, he was earnest, and even fierce, in his hatred of shams. In the dialogue called *Hermotimus* one of the speakers bears a name resembling his own—Lucinus—and may probably be understood as expressing Lucian's own view, so far as the subject of that piece is concerned. Lucinus maintains, in effect, that there is no criterion of absolute truth. He is a pure sceptic, and he further holds that life is too short for the purpose of sifting all the guesses at truth. In order to acquire a fair elementary acquaintance with the leading philosophies, and so become qualified to make an intelligent choice among them, Lucinus computes that it would be necessary to study the subject, with undivided attention, for a period of two hundred years. On the whole, then, Lucinus concludes, it seems better to let speculation alone and to be satisfied with trying to do one's unquestionable duties as a citizen. This negative conclusion doubtless represents Lucian's general attitude; but from other passages in his writings it appears that he at least discriminated degrees of merit as between some of

the philosophies known to him. In the *Auction of Lives* Zeus offers a series of great thinkers for sale, while Hermes, acting as auctioneer, extols each new lot as it is put up. Socrates fetches far the highest price—nearly £500—while Diogenes the Cynic goes for twopence. But, except as regards these two, we cannot assume that the valuation represents Lucian's opinion, since Chrysippus fetches much more than Epicurus—which is in flat contradiction to Lucian's own estimate. There is another piece, called *The Fisherman; or, the Dead come to Life*, in which Lucian vindicates himself from a misapprehension. The philosophers who have come to life again—such as Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Plato, with Socrates at their head—attack Lucian as the enemy of philosophy. Socrates proposes that he should be tried, and that Philosophy herself should preside over the court. Lucian declares that he does not know where to find such a being, though he has long been in search of her. At last, however, she appears, and Lucian then delivers his defence. He pleads that he is on the same side as the real philosophers: they and he alike are in search of truth; only truth is so difficult to find. His enemies are the enemies of truth and wisdom, who degrade or misrepresent the doctrines which they profess. "I am the foe," he says, "of pretension, quackery, falsehood, and conceit"—*μισαλάζων, μισογόης, μισοψευδής, μισότυφος*. These words, indeed, well describe the most general characteristics of the mind which appears in his writings. The trial is held on the Acropolis of

Athens. Philosophy is judge, with the goddesses Truth, Virtue, and Modesty among her assessors. Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus—all have grievances against Lucian; but the cynic Diogenes is chosen as spokesman for the prosecution, while the accused pleads his own cause, giving his name as *Parrhesiades* —"Outspoken." In the result he is triumphantly acquitted, receiving compliments not only from the august judges, but from the true philosophers, who had formerly been prepossessed against him. Here it may be remarked, in passing, that a writer less skilful than Lucian would scarcely have escaped ridicule if, after proclaiming his hostility to all pretension, he had made himself the recipient of such eulogies; but Lucian uses the comic element in a manner which just screens him from this objection, without turning the edge of his satire; it is a good example of tact in the use of irony. The piece ends with a droll fancy, from which it takes its title of *The Fisherman*. Parrhesiades—*i.e.*, Lucian—with the sanction of his late judges, dangles a fishing-rod from the Acropolis, so that the line falls into the streets of Athens below; the hook is baited with a bunch of figs and a purse of gold. Hungry philosophers, who are wandering in the neighbourhood, rush at the bait—are hooked one after another, landed on the Acropolis, and then thrown from the cliff. This is savage, and quite in the manner of Swift. But the jest quickly takes a gentler turn. At the bidding of the goddess Truth, Parrhesiades descends into Athens, accompanied by Elenchos—"Examination"

—for the purpose of distinguishing the true philosophers from the false. They are authorised to bestow an olive-crown on any thinker who deserves it; while those who fail to pass the scrutiny of Elenchos are to be branded in the forehead with the stamp of a fox or an ape. As they are setting out on this errand Parrhesiades remarks to his companion, "Wherever we go, we shall not need many olive wreaths; but we shall require plenty of branding irons."

Of all the philosophical sects the Cynics are the objects of Lucian's greatest aversion. He is also severe on the Stoics, whose methods of reasoning are satirised in the *Auction of Lives*. There are fewer hints of his positive preferences; but it may be said that there are two thinkers for whom, on different grounds, he felt a genuine admiration. In the *Fisherman* (22) he pays Chrysippus an unwonted compliment by making him the mouthpiece of his own feeling for the literary genius of Plato. In Plato, it is there said, we find a wonderful greatness of thought, a beauty of language which is typically Attic, a charm of style which is singularly persuasive, in alliance with insight, precision, and the faculty of clinching an argument at the right moment. But while Lucian thus appreciated Plato as a consummate artist, as a brilliant master of dialectical fence, and as a comrade in the war upon sophistry, there is another whom he ranks even higher. His fullest sympathy is given to Epicurus. That teacher's writings, he says, have virtue to free the soul from

vain terrors—from spectres of supernatural beings called up by the imagination, from deceptive hopes and excessive desires; arming it with reason, and purifying it not by mystic tapers or the like, but by sound ideas, by truth, and by fortitude. The Roman Lucretius hails Epicurus as one who, amid thick darkness, raised a beacon on high and lit up the real interests of life. In a similar spirit, but in a still higher strain, this Hellenised Syrian extols Epicurus as a truly sacred name, a man of gifts indeed divine, the *only one* who has rightly perceived and handed on the truth, and has so become the emancipator of his votaries. (Ἀλέξανδρος, 61.)

Among the genuine writings of Lucian there are only two pieces which allude to Christianity. One of these has already been noticed. It is the memoir of Alexander. As we have seen, the mysteries of the false prophet were prefaced by a proclamation—"If any atheist, Christian, or Epicurean has come to spy out the sacred rites, let him flee" (Ἀλέξ. 38). In an earlier passage of the same piece we learn that at one time there was a movement against Alexander on the part of the more intelligent people in Asia Minor, who saw through his impostures, and that in this reaction the Epicureans, a numerous body, took the lead. Alexander met this danger with a bold front. He proclaimed that—

"All Pontus was full of *atheists and Christians*, who dared to utter the vilest blasphemies concerning him; and he exhorted the people to stone them out of the country if they wished to have the favour of his god." (Ἀλέξ. 25.)

It appears, then, that in the large regions of Asia Minor over which this Alexander operated, Christians and Epicureans were the two sects to which the charge of *atheism—i.e.*, of rejecting the pagan gods —could be attached with most popular effect. We see also that the Christians must then have been numerous in those regions, as we know, on Lucian's own testimony, that the Epicureans were. Some sixty or seventy years had then elapsed since the younger Pliny, as propraetor in the Asiatic province of Pontica, had consulted Trajan about Christianity —that new superstition which he described as having spread not only through cities, but through villages and country districts also. Pliny thought, however, that the taint could still be arrested and cured, while Trajan's brief reply indicates that he regarded the matter as of small importance. Lucian's words suggest—what, indeed, we know to be the fact—that the Christian community in Asia Minor, besides having increased numerically, had now more of corporate influence. But it is in another piece of Lucian's that we find by far the most important of his references to Christianity. This is the treatise on the death of Peregrinus, a native of Parium on the Hellespont, a charlatan who, after playing so many parts as well to justify his assumption of the name Proteus, finally succeeded in making a sensation by publicly burning himself to death at Olympia. The insane passion for notoriety which prompted his last act was the ruling motive in every phase of his career. At one time Peregrinus was

a Christian, and, according to Lucian, prominent among Christians :—

"He had thoroughly learned," says Lucian, "the wondrous philosophy of the Christians, having consorted in Palestine with their priests and scribes. What would you expect? He speedily showed that they were mere children in his hands; he was their prophet, the chief of their religious fraternity (*θιασάρχης*), the convener of their meetings (*συναγωγεύς*)—in short, everything to them. Some of their books he interpreted and elucidated; many of them he wrote himself. They regarded him as a god, made him their law-giver, and adopted him as their champion (*προστάτην ἐπεγράφοντο*)."

Here we may pause to observe that the mention of "priests and scribes" is suggestive of some confusion in Lucian's mind between Christianity and Judaism; while the alleged concern of Peregrinus, as interpreter or as author, with the Christian Scriptures looks like a statement derived from an anti-Christian, possibly a Jewish, source. With regard to the words describing the pre-eminence of Peregrinus among the Christians—*θιασάρχης, συναγωγεύς, προστάτης*—they are merely such terms as a pagan writer might naturally employ to describe leadership in a religious community of which the organisation was not accurately known to him. They do not warrant, for example, the inference which has been drawn from the word *προστάτην* that Peregrinus at one time held the office of Bishop. Then Lucian goes on to relate how Peregrinus was imprisoned by the Roman Governor of Syria, and how the Christians behaved on that occasion. They looked on his imprisonment as a common misfortune, and tried every means to

obtain his release. Failing in that, they ministered to him in prison. From early dawn widows and orphans might be seen waiting at the prison-doors. (In the widows here mentioned commentators recognise deaconesses.) The rulers of the Christian community (οἱ ἐν τέλει αὐτῶν) made interest with the jailors that they might pass the night within the prison. They brought choice meals (δεῖπνα ποικίλα) in to him. (This has been taken, somewhat rashly perhaps, as an allusion to the "love-feasts" of the Church.) They read their sacred books with him. Christians came from some of the cities in Asia, as delegates from the community (ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ), to aid and encourage him. There is much in this account which brings to mind the imprisonment of St Paul, and the "prayer that was made of the Church" for him—when Philemon and Onesiphorus "ministered to him in his bonds," and some of the chief men of Asia "were his friends." As to this episode, at least, Lucian seems to have been well-informed. But more criticism has been provoked by his account of the man's death at Olympia, which he professes to have witnessed. One night, at the end of the Olympic festival, Peregrinus—or, as he then called himself, Proteus—moved, with an escort of friends, towards a great pyre which had been erected near the Hippodrome. Laying aside the coarse cloak, wallet, and staff of the Cynic—for such he had lately been—he mounted the pile clothed only in a squalid linen tunic. He threw some frankincense on the flames; then turned his face to the

south, crying, "Spirits, maternal and paternal, receive me"; sprang into the fire, and was seen no more. Lucian adds that, on his way home, he met some persons, who questioned him, and that for their benefit he added some touches to the story—how the earth shook, and how a *vulture* was seen soaring from the pyre. We remember the Christian legend that a dove flew upward from the funeral-pile of Polycarp, whose martyrdom occurred probably a few years before the death of Peregrinus. Was Lucian glancing at that legend? Possibly; but there is no other trait in his narrative which warrants the notion that it was meant as a travesty of Christian martyrdoms—an hypothesis in which Bishop Pearson has had some followers. There is no doubt that Peregrinus, *alias* Proteus, is an historical character: Aulus Gellius speaks of him from personal knowledge, and the fact that he burned himself at Olympia does not rest on the statement of Lucian only; it is recorded also by Tatian, by Tertullian, and by Eusebius.

But let us now briefly consider what Lucian says in this piece concerning the tenets of the Christians:—

"They still reverence," he says, "that great one (τὸν μέγαν... ἐκεῖνον), the man who was crucified in Palestine, because he brought this new mystery (τελετὴν) into the world....The poor creatures have persuaded themselves that they will be altogether immortal, and live for ever; wherefore they despise death, and in many cases give themselves to it voluntarily. Then their first Lawgiver [*i.e.*, Christ] persuaded them that they were all brethren, when they should once have taken the step of renouncing the

Hellenic gods, and worshipping that crucified one, their sophist, and living after his laws. So they despise all things alike [*i.e.*, all dangers and sufferings], and hold their goods in common; though they have received such traditions without any certain warrant. If, then, an artful impostor comes among them, an adroit man of the world, he very soon enriches himself by making these simple folk his dupes."

The first point to be noted in this passage is that, though the general tone is disdainful towards Christianity as a creed, there is nothing which indicates hostility or malice. At the time when Lucian wrote, the term *σοφιστής*, which he applies to the Founder of Christianity, had not necessarily a bad sense. It had become a *quasi*-professional designation, analogous to "professor" or "doctor." Under Hadrian and the Antonines, the Sophists reached a high degree of dignity and influence. The chair of Sophistic—concerned with the theory and art of rhetoric—held an honourable place among the professorships which Marcus Aurelius founded in the University of Athens. But the title "sophist," like "professor" or "doctor," could be tinged with irony by the context; and, when Lucian speaks of "their crucified sophist," that tone is apparent, just as when he calls the religion of Christians their *θαυμαστὴν σοφίαν*. He also refers to Christ as "that great one," *τὸν μέγαν ἐκεῖνον*. It has been proposed to change *μέγαν* into *μάγον*: but this, though specious at first sight, is not really probable. Lucian would not have used the word *μάγον* unless he had meant to suggest trickery and fraud; but nothing else in the passage suggests that he would

have gone so far. On the other hand, we seem precluded by the tenour and tone of the passage as a whole from regarding the phrase τὸν μέγαν ἐκεῖνον as a serious tribute to a greatness of soul and character which Lucian could recognise in one whose teaching he rejected. The words are not derisive, but they are mildly ironical: "the Christians still reverence that person who (to them) is so great."

Next, we should observe the characteristics which Lucian ascribes to Christians collectively. These are chiefly three:—(1) Their belief that immortality is assured to them; (2) their consequent indifference to earthly things, and readiness to meet death; (3) their sense of brotherhood—leading them to hold their goods in common, and to spare no effort or sacrifice in aid of a suffering fellow-Christian. Lucian has not a word of moral disparagement for Christianity. On the other hand, he regards Christians as simple-minded people, who believe without proof, and who fall an easy prey to imposture. Christian writers of a later age denounced Lucian as a blasphemer. The author of the short article on him in the lexicon of Suidas supports this charge by reference to the very passage which we have just been considering. There would be better ground for such a charge, if Lucian were indeed the writer of a piece called the *Philopatris*, which is traditionally included among his works. That piece contains two distinctly anti-Christian passages: one refers to the doctrine of the Trinity; the other mentions "a Galilæan who, having soared to the third heaven

and learned precious things, renews us by water." This has been explained as a confused reference to St Paul. But few who have studied Lucian's style and mind will question the conclusion of modern criticism that the *Philopatris* is the production of a different hand and of a later age. The real Lucian was no more an enemy of Christianity than he was a friend. He would never have called it, as Tacitus does, a detestable superstition. Having, apparently, only a slight and distant knowledge of it, he regarded it merely as one of those new philosophies or cults which illustrated the credulity of mankind. But he would have allowed that the hope associated with this enthusiasm was lofty, that the impulses which it fostered were amiable, and that the efforts which it could evoke were extraordinary. On the other hand, it did not appeal to his intellectual curiosity; evidently he had not felt moved to examine its doctrines more closely. From that point of view it interested him probably less than some of the philosophies which he had studied just enough to reject them.

It is Lucian's attitude as a detached and somewhat cynical observer that constitutes much of his value as a witness to the character of his age. His impartial satire—more often sportive than bitter—plays on the old popular faith that was decaying, on the new superstitions that blended themselves with it, and on the various schools of philosophy which divided the higher thought of the time, while not one of them was satisfactory to more than a limited

circle. A writer of great seriousness and depth could doubtless have given us a better insight into the measure of good or evil which was to be found in one or another part of that vast field. But Lucian's keen intelligence, with its wide outlook, sheds a vivid light on the general situation. The broad fact which Lucian brings out is that the pagan world, in the latter half of the second century, contained no central and commanding force, religious, intellectual, or moral. Such forces as existed were moribund, mutually conflicting, and either wholly ineffectual, or effective only within small areas. Christianity, now about to exchange the aloofness of the primitive Church for a more active position in the Roman world, had yet to undergo a struggle with the State. But, though pagan festivals could still delight the populace, and though philosophic or mystic sects could still claim ardent disciples, Christianity had no longer a rival in its power to quicken the spiritual life of men, to satisfy their higher aspirations, to give life a zest which would have been incomprehensible to the Epicurean, to inspire a fortitude in the presence of suffering and death which transcended the teaching of the Porch, to concentrate unselfish energies on noble aims, and to sustain them by an ideal loftier than any which had been presented to the ancient world by religion, by patriotism, or by speculative thought.

DELOS[1].

The island of Delos is rather less than four miles long from north to south, with a greatest breadth of about a mile and a half. In its midst the granite platform of Cynthus rises to a height of some 350 feet above the sea-level. From the summit of Cynthus, looking westward, there is a view of rare beauty and surpassing interest. The narrow plain which extends along the western shore of the island was once covered by the ancient town of Delos. Near its middle point, a little to our right, and not far from the principal harbour, stood the temple of Apollo, with a cluster of sacred buildings surrounding it, in the brightness of Parian marble. The larger island of Rheneia, separated from Delos by a channel with an average breadth of half a mile, lies parallel with it on the west, but projects beyond it on the north,—veiling it from those who approach in a straight course from Syra. The two islets in this strait between Delos and Rheneia are now called *Rheumatiari* (ῥευματιάρια), "the channel isles"; the largest and southernmost once bore the name of *Hecate*, being the place where the women of Delos made their offerings of cakes to that goddess.

[1] *Hellenic Journal*, 1880.

Look over Rheneia to the west: around us, beyond broad spaces of clear blue sea, the inner circle of the Cyclades rise in that marvellous harmony of clear contour with subtle blending of colour which is distinctive of Aegean scenery. There is Syra (the "isle Syria" of the *Odyssey*) in front, to the west,—a long dark line, with the conical hill above its busy port, Hermupolis, strongly marked;—to the right of Syra, in the north-west background, a glimpse of Gyaros,—one of the two islands (Myconos being the other) to which the legend said that floating Delos was made fast; on our right, to the north, rugged Tenos springs bluffly from the waves, its shoulder blocking Andros out of sight in the far north-west. Turn to the east—there is Myconos, hospitable in this century to the Greek exiles of Psara, a huge granite rock with a town nestling on an arable slope,—some two miles and a half away: and then in the south-east, about twenty miles off, the great island of Naxos, once the foremost of the Cyclades, whose early school of art has left traces here in Delos; next to it, to the south-west, its lesser neighbour, Paros, the mine of marble,—once, in Roman days, protectress of this island; between Naxos and Paros, a gleam of Ios, where old Greece said that Homer lay buried; and, remote in the south-west distance, little Seriphos, and Siphnos, in all ages nursing mother of seamen; just beyond it—though unseen from here—is Melos. As we look out on this wide sea-view, the past lives again; the "Songs of Deliverance" (ῥύσια) are once more

floating on the breeze as the ships bear the sacred envoys to Delos ; but, of all ancient memories, there is one which rises more vividly than the rest. In that north-west opening between Syra and Tenos we can see the sacred ship from Athens moving into the waters of the Cyclades : yesterday the Athenian priest of Apollo crowned it in the Peiraeus ; to-day an Athenian court has passed sentence of death on Socrates : the ship will come into the harbour at our feet, the envoys will approach the temple beneath us with chants of praise to the giver of light and health, they will stay here in the summer sunshine of the holy month, while Socrates is waiting in the prison at Athens for their return, and is speaking words of good hope for the soul in that voyage on which it must soon put forth over the untried sea.

The position of Delos is central in a threefold sense. First, it is indeed what Callimachus called it, the Hearth of the Cyclades[1]. Secondly, it is nearly at the centre of the southern Aegean, equally accessible from Greece Proper and from Asiatic Hellas, from Rhodes and Crete on the south, from Chios and Lesbos on the north. Thirdly, if our survey embraces the most distant regions to which early Greece sent out its colonies, or to which Greek civilisation was carried by the conquests of Alexander, Delos is still approximately at the mid-point of this Greater Hellas. It is a holy spot on which offerings might well converge—as it is known that they did—from Syria and from Sicily, from

[1] ἱστίη ὦ νήσων : *Hymn. Del.* 325.

Egypt and from Italy, from the Marseilles to which Phocaean settlers had brought the fire of Ionian gods, and from that far place by the Inhospitable Sea where, as tradition told, priests from Delos itself had established the rites of the Tauric Artemis on the bleak shores of the Crimea.

This Sacred Island of the old world has been attended by a singular destiny. Delos emerges into the light of history as the seat of a worship distinctively Hellenic, yet embodying relics of older faiths. The story of Delos ceases when that Hellenic worship perishes. The modern life of Arachova and Salona has crept up to the very doors of the silent adyton in the cliff at Delphi. The plain of Olympia can show the ruins of a Byzantine church in close neighbourhood to the temples of Zeus and Hera. But since the days when the Emperor Julian, going to fight and fall in the East, sought counsel from the failing accents of the god who still haunted Delos, this rock, the birthplace of Apollo, has been only his grave. The Sibylline verse said—

ἔσται καὶ Σάμος ἄμμος, ἐσεῖται Δῆλος ἄδηλος—

Samos also shall be sand; the Far-seen Isle shall be obscure[1]:

and, for Delos, it has come true enough. No

[1] *Orac. Sibyll.* iii. 363, ed. C. Alexandre. Samos lost its privileges as a free state in the reign of Vespasian; and the decay of its ancient prosperity seems to have commenced about the end of the first century A.D. Tertullian paraphrases this verse (de pallio 2, *inter insulas nulla iam Delos, harena Samos*), which must therefore be older than about 200 A.D.

famous place could be named which is at once so conspicuously and so exclusively identified with the Hellenic past.

The topography of ancient Delos is not known in detail from any extant work. When Strabo wrote (circ. 18 A.D.), Delos had already entered on the period of decadence: he merely mentions a few of the leading facts in its history. Pausanias (160 A.D.) seems never to have visited it: in his day it was deserted by all but the priests. His passing notices do little more than attest its decay. Probably the guides in Greece Proper (and we know how much he was in their hands) told him that there was little to see in the island. As it is, we have to form our idea of ancient Delos from scattered hints in Greek and Roman literature, from the Homeric hymn to the writings of the Christian Fathers. Our modern authorities date from the opening of the fifteenth century. Cyriac of Ancona, who travelled in the East between 1412 and 1447, collected several inscriptions in Delos, as in other islands of the Aegean. He appears to have seen there a large quantity of ancient marbles: at Myconos he saw Delian monuments which had been brought thither for sale. His contemporary, Bondelmonte, whose journeys belonged to the years 1414–1422, notices "an ancient temple in the plain," "a prostrate statue of vast size" (*idolum quod in tanta magnitudine iacet* —the Naxian colossus of Apollo), and "more than a thousand statues here and there." After the Turkish conquest of Constantinople (1453), even these slight

remains were rapidly destroyed or exported. The lower parts of Delos are covered with lime-kilns, which were actively employed as lately as 1820. Marble statues or slabs, which could be easily broken, were the first victims of the kilns. Then other relics followed, until scarcely a whole stone remained, except what had been buried under layers of earth accumulated upon the ancient soil. The scanty salvage from this general wreck had passed into the hands of Western collectors before the end of the sixteenth century. Wealthy Venetians obtained probably the largest share of such prizes. A few waifs and strays found their way to England[1].

Spon's account of Delos (1676) indicates that he saw little more than is to be seen at the present day. He tells a story of a proveditore at Tenos, who, baffled in an attempt to remove the colossus of Apollo, had sawed off a piece of the face as a souvenir. The church of Tenos, it may be remarked, is built of old materials brought from Delos. The German traveller Ross (1835) states that the Turks were in the habit of resorting to Delos for marbles with which to make their turbaned tombstones. The first accurate map of Delos was that

[1] Two marbles, now at Oxford, bear inscriptions of which the origin has hitherto been doubtful: one (*Corp. Insc. Gr.* 2860), a list of gifts to Apollo, was attributed by Böckh to Ephesus; the other (*C. I. G.* 2953 *b*), containing the accounts of a temple called the Artemision, was ascribed by Böckh to Ephesus, by Corsini to Smyrna. M. Homolle has shown that the first certainly, the second presumably, belongs to Delos (*Bulletin de Corr. hellén.* vol. ii. p. 321 f.).

published in his *Voyage du Levant* (1727) by Tournefort. Stuart and Revett (1810) added measurements and details relative to some of the remains. Leake spent only a few hours at Delos (1806), and could do little more than verify the observations of predecessors. A thorough exploration of the Sacred Island may be said to have commenced with the labours of the scientific Commission sent to the Morea by the French Government (1829). One of its members, M. Blouet, accurately delineated that portion of Delos, between Mount Cynthus and the western shore, in which the principal temples were situated. Ulrichs (1863) supplied many details relating to the ancient harbours and to the arrangements of commerce. In 1873 M. J. Albert Lebégue, a member of the French School of Athens, was authorised by the Minister of Public Instruction to commence excavations on Mount Cynthus, where an ancient grotto had already engaged the attention of M. Burnouf. The results of M. Lebégue's researches—to which I shall return—were published in an able monograph (1876). In 1876 M. Th. Homolle, also a member of the French School, was commissioned by its Director, M. Dumont, to visit Delos, and in 1877 commenced excavations on the site of the temple of Apollo in the plain—that part of the island which M. Blouet had carefully described. It was in the summer of 1878—the second year of M. Homolle's researches—that I enjoyed the advantage of seeing the excavations, on Cynthus and on the plain, under his kind

and instructive guidance. The task to be attempted in these pages is one which, so far as I am aware, has not yet been performed, but for which the materials already accumulated are sufficiently abundant[1]. I shall endeavour to give a brief but systematic account of the results attained by the labours of the French explorers in Delos up to the present time.

These results may be classified under the heads of topography, sculpture, and epigraphy. But, as might have been expected from the special conditions, it is in the province of epigraphy that the harvest has been largest. And the principal value of the inscriptions consists in the light thrown on details in the history and administration of the island. It follows, however, from the complex

[1] They are principally these:—*Expédition Scientifique de Morée*, edited by M. Blouet (Paris, 1838); vol. iii. contains 23 plates relating to Delos, with a brief prefatory notice of the state in which the island was found.—*Recherches sur Délos*, by M. J. Albert Lebégue (Paris, 1876).—*Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique:* the following articles by M. Th. Homolle, giving details of his excavations at Delos, and of inscriptions or sculptures found there:—vol. i. (1877), pp. 219, 279; vol. ii. (1878), pp. 1, 397; vol. iii. (1879), pp. 1, 99, 116, 290, 360, 473, 515; vol. iv. (1880), pp. 29, 182, 320, 345, 471: by M. O. Riemann;—vol. i. p. 81: by M. Ernest Renan;—vol. iv. p. 69.—*Monuments grecs*, No. 7 (1878), Les Fouilles de Délos, by M. Th. Homolle (pp. 25—63).—*La Chronologie athénienne à Délos*, by M. Albert Dumont (*Rev. archéol.* 1873, xxvi. 257).—Articles on the grotto of Cynthus, by M. Émile Burnouf (*Rev. archéol.* Aug. 8, 1873), and Hr. Adler (*Archaeolog. Zeitung*, ed. Curtius and Schöne, vol. viii. p. 59, May, 1875).

relations of Delos that these details are seldom of merely local import, and that in numerous instances they are significant for the general history of the Hellenic or Roman world.

I believe that the best way of presenting these epigraphic results will be to exhibit them in chronological sequence. I shall first, therefore, sketch the story of Delos from the dawn to the close of its ancient life, inserting in the proper place each new fact derived from the inscriptions.

The Homeric hymn to the Delian Apollo is the oldest document for the history of the island. The earliest historical fact is that Delos was the seat of a Pan-Ionic festival. But mythology has something to tell. Three leading facts may be gathered from the myths. First, that the Hellenic sanctity of Delos was derived from a pre-Hellenic antiquity; secondly, that various races and cults had left their traces in the island; thirdly, that these older elements were partly displaced, partly absorbed, by a cult which came to Delos from Asia Minor, and which, fostered by Ionians on both shores of the Aegean, grew to be the worship of the Delian Apollo.

The *Iliad* never mentions Delos: but in the *Odyssey* Odysseus compares Nausicaa, flower of maidens, to the young sapling of a palm-tree which he had seen in Delos, springing up beside the altar of Apollo[1]. He had seen it, he says, when he visited Delos, and much people with him, on that journey

[1] *Od.* vi. 162.

which was to bring him sore troubles. This leads us directly to the most suggestive of the Delian legends —that which concerns Anios[1]. Anios figures as the son of Apollo, and as his prophet at Delos. He receives the host of Agamemnon on their way across the Aegean. After the fall of Troy, he gives a hospitable welcome to Aeneas. Anios has three daughters,—Oeno, Spermo, Elaïs. These, by grace of Dionysos, command the gifts of wine, corn, and oil. Collectively they are called *οἰνοτρόποι*,—apparently with special reference to the faculty of the eldest, since she could turn water into wine[2]. This legend of Anios seems to disclose a glimpse of Delos in that phase of society which the Homeric poems mirror. We see an island governed by a patriarchal priest-king. Peaceful amid wars, because sacred, it can receive Greek and Trojan alike; and it has a local cult of deities who preside over the fruits of the earth. The fact that the infant Anios reaches Euboea in a floating chest (as Perseus reaches Seriphos), and is thence carried by Apollo to Delos,

[1] M. Lebégue (p. 225) has collected the ancient sources for the myth. Vergil (*Aen.* iii. 80) marks the essential point,—that Anius is 'rex idem hominum Phoebique sacerdos.'

[2] Tzetzes *ad Lycophr.* 370 (*Cycl. fragmenta*, ed. Didot, p. 593). *γεννᾷ τὰς Οἰνοτρόπους, Οἰνὼ Σπερμὼ καὶ Ἐλαΐδα· αἷς ὁ Διόνυσος ἐχαρίζετο, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, οἶνον σπέρματα καὶ ἔλαιον ποιεῖν καὶ λαμβάνειν κατὰ τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσεις.* We are reminded of the name Oeneus derived from *οἴνη*, the vine-plant, his son being called Φύτιος (Hecataeus in Müller, *Frag. Hist. Gr.* i. 26). Can *οἰνοτρόφοι* have been corrupted to *οἰνοτρόποι*, and the fable invented to explain the latter?

has been thought by some to betray the influence of Phoenicia on the myth[1]. However that may be, there can be no doubt that Phoenicia was in contact with Delos from an early time; at first, through the occasional voyages of Phoenician traders,—then through the posts of Phoenician commerce in the Aegean. The quail (ὄρτυξ), from which Delos took the name of Ortygia, was sacred not only to the Hellenic Leto but also to the Tyrian Heracles,—a solar god, whose worship at Delos, it can scarcely be doubted, was older than that of Apollo. Asteria, another name given to Delos, appears to have been sometimes confused or identified with Astarte[2]: and the Syrian Aphrodite, who at a later period held a shrine in Delos, had probably been known there since the first days when the traders of Tyre had entered the waters of the archipelago. Crete, again, has prehistoric relations with the sacred island. It is from Crete that Theseus brings to Delos the ancient wooden statue of Aphrodite. Cretan traits belong to another goddess worshipped at Delos,—Eileithyia[3]. The connection between Delos and Egypt, though perhaps later, was at any rate old. The oval basin[4]

[1] Ῥοιώ (ῥοιά, pomegranate) is the Danae of the story, and her father Στάφυλος is the Acrisius (Tzetzes, *l.c.*).

[2] The name of Astartê is given to Delos only by Latin mythographers of the decadence (Lebégue, p. 21); but the associations which suggested it may have been very ancient.

[3] Olen had composed hymns to this goddess (Paus. ix. 27. 2), in whom the character of an Hyperborean Artemis seems blended with that of a Cretan Aphrodite.

[4] Theognis, v. 7; Callim. *Hymn. Del.* (τροχόεσσα) 261; *In Apoll.* 59 (περιηγής): cp. Her. ii. 170.

(τροχοειδὴς λίμνη) at Delos recalls that of Saïs: the Delian stream called the Inopus was believed to swell with the rising of the Nile[1]. Among the early visitors to Delos we must not omit the Carians. The fact that part of Caria was known as Phoenice corresponds with the somewhat indeterminate use of the term "Carian" which may be remarked in Greek writers. The Carians are "speakers of a barbarous tongue"; and yet the Hellenic Apollo deigns to employ their language. The fact seems to be that the tribe or tribes of Hellenic origin settled in this south-west corner of the Asiatic sea-board were deeply saturated with alien and especially Semitic influences: by the other Hellenes they were not always recognised as kinsmen: and sometimes the name of "Carian" was applied to people who were wholly non-Hellenic, especially to Phoenician settlers on that part of the coast. In early times the "Carians" appear as pirates, clad in bronze armour, who make raids on the Aegean islands. The graves found on Delos when the Athenians exhumed the dead in 426 B.C. were chiefly Carian; and it is to the Carians that M. Lebégue would ascribe the primitive temple which he has excavated on Cynthus[2].

The Hellenic period of Delos begins with the

[1] Callim. *l.c.* 206; Paus. ii. 5. 2. Tournefort heard a local legend that the spring in the N.E. of Delos was fed by the Jordan. But the same thing was said also of a spring in Mykonos (Lebégue, p. 16).

[2] Thuc. iii. 104; Lebégue, p. 75. Carians preceded Ionians in other places which afterwards became seats of Apollo's worship —as at Tralles, Colophon, Claros, and Miletus.

arrival of Apollo. Prophet, musician, archer, he comes with attributes lent by Lycia, Ephesus, and the Troad. The Greek legend of his birth is preserved in two hymns which represent, on the whole, an older and a later version,—the Homeric hymn to the Delian Apollo, and the hymn "To Delos" by the Alexandrian Callimachus (circ. 260 B.C.). Setting minor discrepancies aside, we may say that the salient points of difference between the two versions are these:—(1) In the Alexandrian hymn, Delos is a floating isle, which becomes fixed when Leto touches it. The Homeric hymn knows nothing of this; it merely describes Delos as fearing lest it should be sunk in the depths by the spurning foot of the new-born god. The legend of a floating isle is, however, at least as old in Greece as Pindar, and is implied in the apparently ancient belief that Delos could no longer be shaken by earthquake[1]. (2) In the Homeric hymn, Hera is resolved to prolong the pangs of Leto even after she has reached Delos, and it is only by a ruse that the aid of Eileithyia is obtained. In the Alexandrian hymn, Hera relents as soon as Leto touches the sacred

[1] Πόντου θύγατερ, χθονὸς εὐρείας ἀκίνητον τέρας: Pind. *frag.* 58 (from a παιὰν προσοδιακός, a paean to be sung during the procession to Apollo's Delian temple). Herodotus (vi. 98) had been told at Delos of an earthquake said to have occurred there in 490 B.C. Thuc. (ii. 8) mentions another "shortly before" 431 B.C. *Each* is the first and only earthquake. The statements cannot, and need not, be reconciled. By ascribing their own tremors to their island the Delians maintained its divine prestige, and marked their recurring sense of a crisis.

isle: the whole spirit of this later poem is one of mature reconciliation between the claims of conflicting worships. (3) In the Homeric hymn, the solar character of Apollo is seen through a transparent disguise of imagery: this radiant god who is rising on the world is swathed in white and finely woven raiment; his girdle is of gold[1]. In the Alexandrian hymn this origin has been obscured under the symbolism of a learned theology; if any one aspect of the god predominates, it is the prophetic. But the leading idea of both hymns is the same:—Delos shall be for ever precious to Apollo as the place of his birth.

The "birthplace" of a god is the place where his votaries, or their informants, have first known his worship. In the case of Apollo, this place was, for the Greeks of the Asiatic seaboard, Lycia; for the Greeks of the Aegean and of the western coast, Delos. Delos was the point at which this worship, brought from Asia, first became conspicuous and familiar to this group of votaries. Other groups had other traditions: for the Cretans, Apollo was born in Crete; for the Boeotians, in Boeotia; for the Arcadians, in Arcadia. But, with regard to these three latter traditions, it may be remarked that every one of them belongs to a population detached, in the historical age, from the main current of Greek beliefs and sympathies. The tradition which placed the birth of Apollo in Delos was the most widely received: indeed, its acceptance was well-nigh

[1] Hom. *Hymn. Apoll.* 121.

universal. This fact is probably connected with the political insignificance of the oracle at Delos from the beginning of the historical age. There was a good understanding between Delos and Delphi. Delos yielded the palm of prophecy to Delphi ; the influence of Delphi was used to sustain the belief that Delos had a separate and unique claim to reverence as the birthplace of the god.

Artemis, like Apollo, came to Delos from Asia. The legends vary. Sometimes she appears as a native of another place. More often she is said to have been born at Delos, either as the twin-sister of Apollo or before him by one day : in the latter case she becomes the Eileithyia who delivers Leto. The brother and sister are essentially alike in this—they displace solar deities who held Delos before them, and who are either merged in them or subordinated to their worship. A solar character clearly belongs to the nymphs who come to Delos from the Hyperboreans, who figure as handmaidens of Artemis, and whose tombs are made within the precincts of her shrine,—Opis (Ὦπις), Loxo, Arge, Hecaerge, Hyperoche. Down to late times Delos received offerings of first-fruits (ἀπαρχαί), wrapped in plaited straw (καλάμη), which were forwarded from distant temples, and which were designed to symbolize the immemorial tribute of the Hyperboreans[1]. There is some reason (as will be seen below) to believe that Apollo was at first co-templar on Cynthus with a solar god whom he eventually dethroned or sub-

[1] Callim. *Hymn. Del.* 285 ff.

jected ; and it would not be rash to conjecture that this god was the Tyrian Heracles. Apollo further succeeded at Delos to the oracular functions of older deities. Some of these prophetic gods were marine, —Poseidon, Glaucus, the Nereids ; others were forms of Gaia and Themis. A goddess called Brizo, who sends portents in dreams, continued to be an object of popular reverence in Delos after the official cult of Apollo had been established[1].

The dawn of the historical age is now at hand. Delos has become the seat of a distinctively Hellenic worship : at the same time, in dependence on that worship, it preserves religious associations fitted to attract the veneration of visitors from the non-Hellenic East. Henceforth the history of Delos may be cast into four periods. We may call them the Early-Ionian ; the Athenian ; the Macedonian ; and the Roman.

I. *The Early-Ionian Period :* to 478 B.C.

The golden age of the Ionian race falls between the conquest of the Peloponnesus by the Dorians and the subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks by the kings of Lydia. In the absence of data for a precise chronology, we may assign the best days of Ionian

[1] Eustath. *ad Od.* xii. 252, who says that the Delian women offered dainties to Brizo : Hesych. *βριζόμαντις*, *ἐνυπνιόμαντις*. At Delphi, as M. Lebégue notes (p. 117), divination by dreams is found in early rivalry with the oracle of Apollo (cp. Eur. *I. T.* 1250 f.) : at Delos there is no trace of such a conflict.

predominance in the Aegean to the interval between 900 and 700 B.C. All the members of the Ionian family—in Greece Proper, in the islands, in the Asiatic settlements—were closely united by the sentiment of a common ancestry and a common worship, which formed a circle within the circle of Hellenic kinship. Apollo Patroüs was the god of all who sprang from the loins of Ion: the true "sons of Javan" felt a peculiar pride in that Ionian name which, for Eastern nations, had become the universal appellative of the Hellenes. Athens was not as yet pre-eminent: Megara on one side of it, Chalcis and Eretria on the other, were at least its equals; and it may be noted that the Homeric hymn bears a slight but sure mark of its own age in the passage which speaks of "Euboea famed for ships[1]."

Delos was the centre of a great Pan-Ionic gathering (*πανήγυρις*), to which Ionians resorted from all the islands and the coasts. It was held in the month Thargelion, on the seventh day of which (about May 20) the birth of Apollo was celebrated and, like the later Ephesia, it was probably annual,—as the sacred embassies (*θεωρίαι*) and sacrifices certainly were from a very early time. The Homeric rhapsode of Chios has described it: "Many temples are thine, and wooded groves; all heights are dear to thee, and jutting capes of lofty hills, and rivers that flow to the sea; but it is in Delos that thy heart takes most joy. There, in thy

[1] v. 30, *ὅσσους Κρήτη τ' ἐντὸς ἔχει καὶ δῆμος Ἀθηνῶν, | νῆσός τ' Αἰγίνη ναυσικλειτή τ' Εὔβοια.*

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honour, Phoebus, the long-robed Ionians assemble, with their children and their gracious dames: so often as they hold thy festival, they celebrate thee, for thy joy, with boxing, and dancing, and song. A man would say that they were strangers to death and old age evermore, who should come on the Ionians thus gathered: for he would see the goodliness of all the people, and would rejoice in his soul, beholding the men and the fairly-cinctured women, and their swift ships and their great wealth; and besides, that wonder of which the fame shall not perish, the maidens of Delos, handmaidens of Apollo the Far-darter. First they hymn Apollo, then Leto and Artemis delighting in arrows; and then they sing the praise of heroes of yore and of women, and throw their spell over the tribes of men[1].' The Delian panegyris combined the characters of a festival and a fair: like the temple at Miletus, like the Artemision of Ephesus and the Heraeon of Samos, the Delian shrine was a focus of maritime trade. The Pan-Ionic festival at Delos had much of the celebrity to which the Olympian festival succeeded, and in two points it indicates a higher phase of society. Women participate in it; and it includes a competition in poetry (*μουσικὸς ἀγών*), whereas the

[1] vv. 143–161. The Δηλιάδες "know how to imitate the voices of all men, and the sounds of their castanets" (*κρεμβαλιαστύν—i.e.* the measures of their dances): "each man would say that he was speaking himself, so wondrous is the weaving of their lay": *ib.* 162–165. This has been referred to ventriloquism (?) At any rate, it suggests the variety of the elements which composed the Pan-Ionic gathering.

literary displays at Olympia were not among the regular contests[1].

The decline of the Delian festival must have begun with the gradual estrangement of the Asiatic Ionians from their brethren in the west. A softer luxury crept into the Ionian life of Asia, preparing the decline of Ionian spirit and freedom. Under the Mermnad dynasty of Lydia the process of reducing Ionia occupied some hundred and fifty years (circ. 700–550 B.C.). About the time of the Persian conquest (circ. 546 B.C.) we find the Asiatic Ionians of the twelve allied cities meeting at the Panionion on Mycale. For them, this gathering had probably superseded the Delian festival from a far earlier date[2]. In the age of Thucydides the *Panionia* had in turn yielded place to the *Ephesia*. But if Delos was no longer the Pan-Ionic centre, it could still look to the Ionians of the west, of whom the Athenians were now the foremost. At a later time Athens is found claiming Erysichthon, a legendary Athenian king, as the builder of the first temple at Delos[3]. This pretension doubtless arose at the time

[1] Thus Lysias, Or. xxxiii. § 2, is accurate in speaking of γνώμης ἐπίδειξιν : cp. the note in my "Selections from the Attic Orators," p. 188.

[2] Speaking of the reign of Gyges, whose accession he would place about 716 B.C., Professor E. Curtius says, "the federal festival on Delos, which had formerly united the Ionians on either side of the sea, had long lost all its significance" (vol. ii. 104, tr. Ward). For Thucydides, the festival already belongs to a past age, of which "Homer" is the chief witness (iii. 104).

[3] Euseb. *Chron.* ii. (sub ann. 500 after Abraham); other accounts make him merely erect a statue. See Lebégue, p. 223.

when the representation of the Ionian race at Delos had been left mainly to the Athenians. Peisistratus, when despot of Athens (560–527 B.C.), purified Delos, "in accordance with the oracles" (ἐκ τῶν λογίων), by removing to another part of the island all the graves which could be seen from the temple[1]. A more signal act of homage is ascribed to Polycrates (circ. 550–522 B.C.), tyrant of Samos, whose naval power had given to him the empire of the Aegean islands. Having taken Rheneia, he consecrated it to the Delian Apollo, and attached it by a chain to Delos[2]. It was probably his object to secure a religious sanction for a naval Ionian league under Samos, which would derive both lustre and strength from a revival of the Pan-Ionic festival in the sacred island. Meanwhile Delos had been receiving the first tributes of a nascent art: the infancy of Greek sculpture—as we shall presently see—has its memorials in the birthplace of Apollo.

Nor was it by Greeks alone that Delos was revered. At the approach of the Persians in 490 B.C. the Delians fled to Tenos. But, as the fleet drew near, Datis, the Persian general, sailed ahead, and directed his ships to anchor, not at Delos, but off Rheneia. He then sent a herald to Tenos, with this message:—"Holy men (ἄνδρες ἱροί), why have ye fled away, and judged me so harshly? It hath been enjoined on me by the king,—yea, and I myself have wit enough,—not to harm the place in which the Two Gods were born,—no, nor the dwellers

[1] Her. i. 64. [2] Thuc. iii. 104.

therein. Now therefore return to your own, and inhabit your island[1].' He then offered 300 talents-weight of frankincense on the altar of Apollo. Just before this, his army had burned the Greek temples of Naxos. The host of Xerxes ten years later destroyed the temple of Apollo at Abae, and attacked Delphi. The special reason assigned by Datis for sparing Delos—that it had borne "the two gods"—appears rather Persian than Phoenician. So comprehensive were the claims to sanctity which interwoven traditions had concentrated on Delos. Outside of the Hellenic circle, the prestige of the Sacred Island could appeal to Aryan worshippers of Mithra and Homa no less than to Semitic votaries of Melcarth or Astarte.

Thus far the religious character of Delos has been joined to political independence; in the age which now opens we shall find them severed.

II. *The Athenian Period:* 478–322 B.C.

When, after the Persian Wars, the allies transferred the leadership from Sparta to Athens, the new Confederation took the solemn form of an *amphictyony:* that is, the federal obligations laid on the members were placed under a religious sanction, symbolized by common worship at a central shrine. For an Aegean amphictyony, this central shrine could be nowhere but at Delos, which therefore

[1] Her. vi. 97.

became the treasury (ταμιεῖον)[1] of the League,—the meetings of the deputies being held in the temple of the Delian Apollo. The Hellenotamiae (who were exclusively Athenians) were concerned solely with the Federal fund. But the temples of Delos were placed under the protection of the League. This afforded an easy pretext for meddling with their administration. The transference of the Federal treasury from Delos to Athens had taken place before 454 B.C. But Athens continued to interfere in the local management of Delian affairs. An inscription found at Athens, and referring to the years 434–433 B.C.[2], warrants the inference that the sacred revenues of the Delian Apollo were at that date controlled by Athenian officials; who, though now representing imperial Athens alone, presently appear under the plausible title of *amphictyones*, "Federal Commissioners." With a decent respect for the forms of independence, Athens still, indeed, permits the name of a Delian archon to appear in company with that of the Athenian eponymus.

It was in the winter of 426 B.C. that the Athenian Demos, imitating the example of the Athenian despot, undertook the purification of Delos. Peisistratus had obeyed a sacred text; and they too, says Thucydides, acted "on some oracle or other" (κατὰ χρησμὸν δή τινα). All the coffins (θῆκαι) in the

[1] Thuc. i. 96.

[2] *Corpus Inscr. Att.* i. No. 283. The inscription gives the accounts of the officials who administered the sacred revenues in Ol. 86, 3, 4.

Sacred Island were taken up:—more than half of them, we are told, contained bodies which could be recognised, by the fashion of the armour and by the mode of burial, as Carian. These remains were removed. It was ordered that henceforth all dying persons, and all parturient women, should be transported from Delos to Rheneia. At the same time a new festival was instituted. Year by year the sacred embassies, bringing choruses and offerings, had continued to visit Delos. But since the cessation of the Pan-Ionic gatherings, the brilliant contests had in great measure ceased. The Athenians now founded a celebration to be held in the third year of every Olympiad. The list of the ancient contests was enlarged by the addition of chariot-races[1]. Religion and policy alike counselled such a measure. Athens had lately been delivered from the plague. The Athenians and their allies were still excluded from Olympia. But the regulation of births and deaths had an ulterior aim which it is not difficult to perceive. When the Delians, in Plutarch's story, complain to the Spartan king, he drily rejoins that, under this double restriction, Delos has well-nigh ceased to be their own country[2]. The best comment on this apocryphal sarcasm is the next step actually taken by Athens. In 422 B.C. the Delians were

[1] Thuc. iii. 104.

[2] Plutarch, *Apophth. Lacon.*, Παυσανίου τοῦ Κλεομβρότου, i. (p. 230 D); πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, αὕτη πατρὶς [ἂν] ὑμῶν εἴη, ἐν ᾗ οὔτε γέγονέ τις ὑμῶν, οὔτ' ἔσται; The last word seems corrupt. I would read, οὔτε κείσεται;

expelled from their island; but the Apollo of Delphi pleaded for his birthplace, and in 421 the survivors were permitted to return.

Soon after this date may be placed a memorable and picturesque incident in the history of the island —the sacred embassy from Athens which was led by Nicias. The new Delian festival fell in the third year of each Olympiad: this embassy probably belonged to the first celebration after the peace of 421 B.C.,—that, namely, of Ol. 90. 3, or 418 B.C. Hitherto, it appears, an unseemly disorder had attended the arrival of sacred missions at the island. On the approach of vessels from the various cities, bringing the choruses who were to chant Apollo's praise, a crowd had thronged down to welcome them at the harbour of Delos. The persons (Δηλιασταί) who were to form the sacred procession had been compelled to disembark hurriedly, in the very act of donning their festal garb and adjusting the wreaths upon their heads. An idle population—those "parasites of Greece" whom Delos nourished—had been accustomed to press around them as soon as they touched the shore, to impede their movements, and to derange the spectacle of their progress to the shrine. Nicias was resolved to prevent this indecorum. Instead of proceeding directly to Delos, he landed, with his chorus, with the animals destined for sacrifice, and with all his sacred gear, on the adjacent isle of Rheneia. A wooden bridge had been prepared at Athens, and brought in pieces on a ship. During the night this bridge was erected, not,

as Plutarch implies, between Rheneia and Delos, which would make it at least half a mile long, but obviously between the landing-place of Delos and the more northerly of the two small islands in the channel, just opposite the landing-place, where the distance to be spanned is about 150 yards. Next morning the expectant populace beheld an unwonted sight. Across the bridge, splendid in gold and colours, festooned with wreaths and spread with carpets, a magnificent procession, raising the chant of the festival, slowly passed into the Sacred Isle, and moved in stately order to the temple of Apollo. When the sacrifices and the games had been celebrated, and the feasting was over, Nicias dedicated to Apollo the offering of a palm-tree in bronze. He also purchased and presented to the Delians a site to be used for sacrificial banquets; placing on it a column with an inscription which prayed the feasters *to ask many blessings for Nicias from the gods.* Five years later he was to die miserably in Sicily—after that terrible retreat, at the outset of which he makes his confident appeal to the tenor of "a life religious before the gods, just and without offence among men[1]." Subsequently the bronze palm-tree was blown down by a storm, overturning in its fall a colossus of Apollo, which had been dedicated at an earlier time by the Naxians. Perhaps the superstition of those days may have whispered that the Erinyes of the unhappy Athenian were wroth with the god whom he had adored in vain[2].

[1] Thuc. vii. 77. [2] Plutarch, *Nicias*, 3.

It has hitherto been supposed that, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta left to Athens the control of Delos. This belief rested, partly on the Plutarchic anecdote of the Delians failing to obtain relief from Sparta, partly on the silence of ancient writers, and on the general probability of a concession at once cheap and politic. These grounds are inconclusive. And a fragmentary inscription lately found at Delos by M. Homolle makes it highly probable that the case was otherwise[1]. The words are *...καὶ θεῶν καὶ ναῶν καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ. Ἐβασίλευον· Ἄγις Παυσανίας. Ἔφοροι ἦσαν· Θυιωνίδας Ἀριστογενίδας Ἀρχίστας Σολόγας Φεδίλας. Ἐν Δήλῳ [δ' ἦρχεν ?...]* The mention of Delos indicates that this document concerned the island. Agis I. and Pausanias II. were the only two Spartan kings of those names who reigned together: the date must therefore be either 427–426 B.C. or 401–398 B.C. ; since Pleistoanax, the father of Pausanias, was recalled in 426 and reigned till 408. Now, if the date was 427–426 B.C., one of the five ephors named by the inscription ought to occur in that list of eponymous ephors from 431 to 404 B.C. which is read in Xenophon[2]. But it is not so. Probably, then, the date lies between 408 and 398 B.C. The genitives at the beginning seem to depend on some lost verb with the notion of *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*. We know from Diodorus[3] that Athens

[1] *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique*, vol. iii. p. 12.

[2] *Hellen.* ii. 3, §§ 9, 10.

[3] xii. 73.

had occasion to complain of intrigues between Delos and the Peloponnesus. The story of the Delians applying to Pausanias points in the same direction.

It seems, then, a not unwarrantable hypothesis that, in this inscription, we have the fragment of a convention between Sparta and Delos with regard to the administration of the Delian temples and their treasures; and that this convention was made after the defeat of Athens in 404 B.C. If the hypothesis is correct, and if the Delians recovered for a time any measure of their old autonomy, this independence was not of long duration. Inscriptions found at Athens, and referring to Ol. 100. 4, Ol. 101. 1, 2, 3—*i.e.* to 377–374 B.C.—show that the sacred revenues of Delos were at that date administered by the Athenian officials called *amphictyones*[1]. We have the table of their receipts and expenses. They receive interest on money lent by the temple of the Delian Apollo, and rents of houses or lands appertaining to it. Their expenses are connected with the sacred mission, the sacrifices, and the

[1] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 158, 159. The library of Trinity College, Cambridge, contains the original *Marmor Sandvicense*, so called because it was brought to England, and presented to the college, by John, Lord Sandwich, in 1739. Under that name it was first described by Dr John Taylor (Cambridge, 1743): see also Rose, *Inscr. Graec.* (1825), p. 313. The opening words are Τάδε ἔπραξαν ἀμφικτύονες Ἀθηναίων. Then follow (1) receipts from communities (chiefly insular) and individuals; (2) expenses connected with the worship of the Delian Apollo; (3) arrears due from the public and private debtors. The whole statement covers the four years ending with the archonship of Socratides (374 B.C.).

games. More curious than these details is an item which figures among their receipts. Fines, equivalent to about £30 a head, had been levied on certain Delians guilty of assaulting the Athenian officials in the island,—dragging them from the temple of Apollo,—and beating them. Delos still possessed the shadowy privilege of nominating archons; and the Delian archons contemporary with this outrage bear in three instances the same names as the culprits. If the Delian archons were not chosen by lot, prominence in an insult to the tyrants from over the water would doubtless have commended a candidate to the constituency with a force which we can easily understand.

The existence of a home-rule party in the Sacred Island is indeed attested by a less obscure incident which occurred some years later. Delians who resented the usurpation of Athens might well think that their grievances could never have a better chance of being redressed than at the moment when Philip of Macedon had succeeded to the place of Phocis in the Council of the Delphic Amphictyony (346 B.C.). A court which at all times was peculiarly bound to chastise sacrilege now had for its virtual president a judge not too partial to Athens. In 345 B.C. the case (διαδικασία) came before the Amphictyonic Council. Euthycrates, the betrayer of Olynthus, was the advocate of the Delians. The Athenian cause had been entrusted by the Ecclesia to Aeschines, whose former relations with the Amphictyonic Council, and whose favour with Philip,

must have designated him for the office. A belief grew, however, that Philip was playing into the hands of the Delians. It was resolved—probably on the motion of Demosthenes—that the final choice of an orator should be referred to the Areopagus. That body selected Hypereides. His speech before the Amphictyonic Council,—famous in antiquity as "the Delian oration,"—traced the history of the island temple to an Athenian origin, while it did not fail to remind the judges of those immemorial ties which linked Athens with Delphi. His ingenious eloquence prevailed: the Amphictyonic tribunal confirmed Athens in the administration of the Delian sanctuary[1]. After this repulse, it might have seemed that Delos was fated to remain in permanent dependence; but the time was at hand when the island was to enter on a new life of freedom and of brilliant prosperity.

III. *The Macedonian Period:* 322–166 B.C.

An Athenian inscription, presumed to be an inventory of objects preserved at Delos, mentions a gift bearing the date of the archon Polemon, *i.e.* 312 B.C.[2] It has been inferred that the Athenian domination in Delos still existed then[3]. But this

[1] Schäfer, *Demosth. u. seine Zeit*, vol. ii. pp. 346 f.: the fragments of the Δηλιακός of Hypereides in Sauppe, *Frag. Or. Att.* p. 285.

[2] Le Bas, *Voy. archéol.*, Inscr. att. no. 245, l. 31.

[3] M. Homolle, *Bulletin de Corr. hellén.* vol. ii. p. 582. The

inference presumes that the Athenians would no longer have registered and dated their own offerings in the Delian temple when they had ceased to administer it. At any rate, the Delians became independent not much later,—if, indeed, the submission of Athens to Antipater after the battle of Crannon (322 B.C.) had not already emancipated them. The constitution of free Delos was like that of other Greek cities: it had a popular assembly and a senate. We find the guild of "Dionysiac artists" (τεχνῖται Διονυσιακοί) applying to the senate and people for permission to erect a statue, and these bodies appointing a committee (πρυτάνεις) to assign a site[1]. Hitherto epigraphy has given us only rare flashes of light: but from 300 to 100 B.C. the inscriptions are numerous: and from about 250 B.C. to 166 B.C. they are most abundant of all. They are chiefly of three classes: (1) decrees of the Delian Senate and People, awarding distinctions to benefactors of the island; (2) dedications, in honour of gods or men; (3) inventories of objects preserved in the temples.

The decrees are the most numerous. Their formula is nearly constant. A preamble sets forth that such or such a person "perseveres in benefits" (διατελεῖ ἀγαθὸς ὤν) to "*the temple and the people*" (τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν δῆμον) "*of the Delians*": that therefore it has seemed good to the Senate and the

doubt, which appears to me well-founded, is expressed by M. Lebégue, p. 301, *note*.

[1] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 3067.

People to confer upon him such or such privileges. These are, in most cases, (i) the right of acquiring land and house-property in the island,—*γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις*: (ii) exemption from taxes,—*ἀτέλεια*: (iii) precedence in the law-courts,—*δίκαι πρόδικοι*: (iv) the right of bringing private business before the Senate or People immediately after the affairs of religion,—*πρόσοδος πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τὸν δῆμον πρώτοις μετὰ τὰ ἱερά*. A rarer distinction is a place of honour at festivals—*προεδρία*. Rarer still is the distinction of being publicly eulogized and crowned at the *Apollonia* (a festival distinct from the *Delia*, as another inscription shows[1])—when the sacred herald (*ἱεροκῆρυξ*) proclaimed the name of the person thus honoured. The decree usually adds that the recipient is to possess *πάντα ὅσα δέδοται τοῖς προξένοις καὶ εὐεργέταις*, all the privileges assigned to the public friends and benefactors of Delos[2].

Among the persons thus distinguished we find Pnytagoras[3], king of Salamis in Cyprus, and Philocles, king of Sidon, who had established a

[1] *Bulletin de Corr. hellén.* vol. iii. p. 379: a dedication by parents in honour of their daughter, *καληφορήσασαν Δήλια καὶ Ἀπολλώνια*.

[2] About fifty decrees of *προξενία* have been found, of which some thirty are complete: see M. Homolle, *Monuments grecs*, No. 7, p. 38; *Bulletin de Corr. hellén.* vol. i. p. 279, where some specimens are given in full.

[3] A temple-inventory mentions an offering on which the decree in his favour was engraved—*ἔχον προξενίαν Πνυταγόρᾳ Βασιλεῖ Σαλαμινίῳ*: *Mon. grecs*, l. c. p. 49.

claim on the regard of the Delians by helping them to recover their debts from the islands[1]. A wreath is voted to a poet of Andros named Demoteles, because "he has made the Temple his theme, and has commemorated the legends of the place[2]." A physician named Archippus[3], of Ceos, receives the honours of hereditary *proxenia* because he has served Delos "by his medical science, as in other ways." Antiochus III. (the Great) of Syria, and his son Antiochus Epiphanes, are among those to whom statues were raised at Delos during this period, and who are commemorated in extant dedications; also a certain Sostratus, who may possibly be the builder of the Alexandrian Pharos in the reign of the first Ptolemy; and Heliodorus, the false treasurer of Seleucus Philopator, whose miraculous punishment for attempted sacrilege at Jerusalem is mentioned in the Second Book of Maccabees[4]. Two different inscriptions, on the bases of statues erected by private persons (one, a Rhodian), commemorate Masinissa, king of Numidia, the ally of Rome against Carthage. They style him Βασιλέα Μασανν*άσαν*, Βασιλέως Γ*αί*α[5]. The MSS. of Livy give his

[1] See the inscription in the *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. iv. p. 327. Philocles *πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιήσατο ὅπως Δήλιοι κομίσωνται τὰ δάνεια.*

[2] *πεπραγμάτευται περί τε τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ μύθους τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους γέγραφεν*: *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. iv. p. 345.

[3] *Ib.* p. 349.

[4] *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. iii. pp. 360 ff.

[5] *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. ii. p. 400; vol. iii. p. 469. These inscriptions may be referred to 200–150 B.C.; whether they were

father's name as *Gala*. Another dedication honours Chysermus (of Alexandria), who lived in the reign of Ptolemy III. (Euergetes), 247–222 B.C. He is styled "kinsman of the king," "doctor of sacred law," "president of the physicians," "director of the Museum[1]." This is the man named by Plutarch as father of that Ptolemaeus who was involved at Alexandria in the tragic end of Cleomenes III.

From 300 to 200 B.C. every shore of the Mediterranean was constantly sending tributes to Delos. If the spirit of the old Greek worship was sinking, the area of Hellenic civilization had been greatly enlarged. The rulers of the new kingdoms into which Alexander's empire had been divided were proud of Hellenic lineage, or anxious to claim it. For them, it was a point of honour or of policy to heap gifts on the Aegean birthplace of Apollo. The Ptolemies, the Seleucidae, the kings of Macedon from Demetrius to Perseus, are among the benefactors of the temple. Choruses of maidens (Δηλιάδες) for the festivals of Apollo are provided at the charges of Alexandria, Megalopolis, Cos, and Rhodes. Gifts are sent by the Cyclades, Crete, Sicily, Rome. The mention of "a bowl presented by the people of the Tauric Chersonese" (φιάλη

earlier or later than 166 B.C. can scarcely be determined. The latter has Πολυάνθης ἐπόει (*sic*). The same sculptor's name occurs in an inscription of Melos, published by M. Tissot (*Bulletin*, vol. ii. p. 522), where we read, Πολυάνθης ἐποίησεν.

[1] Τὸν συγγενῆ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου καὶ ἐξηγητὴν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ Μουσείου: *Bulletin*, vol. ii. p. 470. His son, too, is styled φίλος τοῦ βασιλέως, Plut. *Cleom.* 36.

Χερσονησιτῶν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου) proves the continued intercourse between Delos and the remotest of her daughters[1]. It was at this period—between 300 and 200 B.C.—that Delos began to merit in the fullest degree that title which Pausanias gives to it, as "the common mart of the Greeks," τὸ κοινὸν Ἑλλήνων ἐμπόριον[2]. Its importance in this respect is indicated by the fact that the Tyrian traders of Delos formed a separate guild, which recorded decrees[3]. Both as a sanctuary and as a resort of merchants or sightseers, Delos offered peculiar advantages for the display of public documents. Thus a treaty between the Boeotians and Perseus of Macedon (172 B.C.) was exhibited on graven columns placed at Thebes, Delphi, and Delos[4]. When Perseus wished to give all possible publicity to an amnesty recalling exiles to Macedonia, Delos, Delphi, and the Itonian temple in Phthiotis were the three places at which he announced it[5]. A convention between towns of Lesbos, a convention between towns of Crete, decrees by the authorities of Tenos,

[1] *Monuments grecs*, No. 7, p. 45.

[2] Paus. viii. 32, 2.

[3] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2273. The funeral inscriptions of Rheneia (*ib.* 2319*b*, 41), and a Delian dedication (*ib.* 2290) further attest the presence of the Tyrians in Delos.

[4] Liv. xlii. 12 : Tribus nunc locis cum Perseo foedus incisum litteris esse ; uno Thebis ; altero ad Delum, augustissimo et celeberrimo templo ; tertio Delphis.

[5] Polyb. xxvi. fr. 5, 1, 2 : τούτων ἐξετίθει προγραφὰς εἴς τε Δῆλον καὶ Δελφοὺς καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰτωνίας Ἀθήνας ἱερόν : a place which makes against the proposed emendation *Delium* in Liv. *l. c.*

Syros, Ceos, Teos, are registered at Delos[1]. The people of Cyzicus on the Propontis had obtained an oracle from Delphi, declaring their city to be sacred. They send an embassy to request that this response may be published in the temple of the Delian Apollo[2].

It is due to this quality of Delos as the common depository of archives that recent researches have been able to throw some fresh light on an interesting institution. For more than a century after Alexander the history of the Aegean islands is obscure. But three inscriptions published by Böckh had already taught us that there existed at this period a *Confederation of the Islands*, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν νησιωτῶν. One of these inscriptions was a decree in favour of a Syracusan named Timon; two others were dedications, in honour respectively of Ptolemy Philadelphus and of a Rhodian named Agathostratus[3]. M. Homolle has discovered at Delos five more inscriptions which record acts of this Island League. Two are dedications on statues erected by the Confederation,—one in honour of "the navarch Callicrates of Samos"—possibly the very navarch of that name mentioned in the epigrams of Poseidippus—the other, to Apollo. Three are decrees. In one, it is

[1] Lesbos: *Expédition de Morée*, vol. iii. Inscriptions of the Aegean isles; Delos, No. 2, p. 24:—Tenos, Ceos, Teos, *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2334, 2272, 3067:—Syros, Crete, inscriptions found by M. Homolle, *Bulletin de Corr. h.* vol. iii. p. 292.

[2] *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. iv. p. 471.

[3] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2234, 2273, 2283 *c*.

ordered by the "Council (*σύνεδροι*) of the Islanders" that a certain Thrasyllus shall be crowned "at the first contest of the *Ptolemaea*, when the tragic poets compete." Two others requite the services of Egyptian officials[1]. This Island League may probably be referred to the period from 300 to 180 B.C. The mention of a festival called *Ptolemaea*,—the fact that two of the persons honoured are described as "ministers of king Ptolemy" (*τεταγμένος ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον*),—sufficiently indicate that the Confederation was protected by the dynasty of the Lagidae. The Second Ptolemy (Philadelphus, 285–247 B.C.) had sufficient naval power for that purpose. The last mention of the League is in an inscription found at Tenos,—one of those already published by Böckh,—which must be earlier than 166 B.C. Tenos was one, at least, of the meeting-places[2]. There is no proof that the League, or its Council (*σύνεδροι*), exercised any functions beyond the regulation of festivals and of honorary rewards. It was probably in political dependence on Egypt. When the Delians desired to collect the moneys which they had lent to the Island Confederation, it is significant that their appeal was made to Philocles, king of Sidon.

While Delos was subject to Athens, the temples were administered by the Athenian "amphictyones."

[1] *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. iv. pp. 320 f.

[2] Strabo notices the size of the *ἑστιατόρια* at the Tenian temple of Poseidon as a proof that the festivals there must have been largely attended (x. v. 11).

In free Delos these duties were entrusted to Delian officials called *hieropoioi* (ἱεροποιοί), "ministers of public worship." Like the "amphictyones," these guardians held office for one year only, at the end of which they rendered a minute account of their stewardship. The inventories or accounts relating to the temples form the most numerous class of Delian inscriptions. They give us a curious insight into the sacred administration at the period when the Delian sanctuary was most prosperous. The outgoing "hieropoioi" handed over the charge to their successors in presence of the Delian Senate. On doing so, they presented an inventory in two parts. The first part enumerates all the objects which they had received from their predecessors,—beginning with the temple of Apollo, and going on to the other Delian temples, of which (like the Athenian *ταμίαι τῆς θεοῦ*) they had the general charge. The formula is—*τάδε παρελάβομεν ἐν τῷ ναῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, κ.τ.λ.* The second part enumerates the objects acquired during their year of office. Articles of gold, silver, bronze, iron, marble, wood, glass, ivory, tortoise-shell, are successively recorded. Some of these are kept in coffers (*κιβώτια*); others, on stands of which the shelves or drawers (*ῥυμοί*) are numbered and catalogued; in other instances the place is indicated by a phrase: "on the right," or "left," "as you enter"; "near the corner of the picture"; "near the sun-dial"; "hanging against the wall." The objects themselves are of every kind: bowls (*φιάλαι*—of which Apollo's temple alone

had some thousands); vases and chests or coffers of every class; lamps; censers; small altars or braziers; pictures (*πίνακες*); portraits (*πίνακες εἰκονικοί*); mosaics (*πίνακες ἐμβλητοὺς γραφὰς ἔχοντες*); statues of gods (*ἀγάλματα*) or men (*ἀνδριάντες*); jewellery; engraved gems. When there is an inscription on the gift, it is often quoted; in the case of the precious metals, the weight is given. The minuteness of description is often remarkable: "a little cow [dedicated to Isis in the Serapeion?] without its left horn"; "a kettle which has lost its bottom and its handles"; "a golden laurel-crown with twisted leaves"; "a golden wreath with [so many] leaves, counting those that have dropped off";—for the smallest fragments, the very morsels of gold dust (*θραύματα, κλάσματα, ψήγματα*) were recorded. Ex-voto offerings are frequently named—beaks of ships, rudders, a herald's staff, shields, spears, greaves, bows. A fragment of one such ex-voto has been found, part of a leaden quiver, with the legend, *ταῦτα γὰρ πεινῆν ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς*,—"these [arrows] saved us from starving":—one thinks of Philoctetes at Lemnos. Sacred envoys (*θεωροί*) used to wear a sort of plaited head-dress called *στλεγγίς*, and among the ex-votos are mentioned *στλεγγίδια θεωρικά*. One article is named which the modern world would gladly purchase at the cost of much else which the Delian temple contained—*θήκην τρίγωνον ἔχουσαν βιβλία Ἀλκαίου, a three-cornered case containing works of Alcaeus*[1].

[1] *Monuments grecs*, No. 7, pp. 40 f.

But the wealth of the Delian god did not consist merely in the contents of his temple. He was also a land-owner and a money-lender. Rheneia, the greater part of Delos, and (in the second century B.C.) part of Myconos, were included in his domain. His revenues comprised rents of arable land (*ἐνηρόσια*), of pastures (*ἐννόμια*), and of houses (*ἐνοίκια*). The house-property is multifarious,—workshops, cellars, dwelling-houses, lodging-houses (*συνοικίαι*), an apothecary's shop, a bath. Apollo further levied taxes on the purple-fishery, on anchorage, and on the disembarcation of merchandise[1]. One item figures as *στροφεῖα*. I take this to mean charges for the use of windlasses employed in warping ships up to the jetty, or in landing their freight[2]. The Delian temple, like other rich temples, put out the balance of its revenues at usury. The town of Delos, the island communities, and also private persons, appear as debtors in the temple-register of loans. The capital sums (*δάνεια*) were usually lent for terms of five years, at the annual interest of ten per cent. (*τόκοι ἐπιδέκατοι*). An inscription presents us with a contract for repairing the temple of Apollo. In supervising this work the regular "hieropoioi" are assisted by inspectors termed *ἐπιστάται* or *ἐπιμεληταί*: and the signatures of guarantors are subjoined. The document certainly belongs to free

[1] *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. ii. pp. 341 f.

[2] Cp. Lucian, *πλοῖον* 5, where *αἱ ἄγκυραι καὶ στροφεῖα* (windlasses) *καὶ περιαγωγεῖς* (capstans) are among the objects which the visitor admires on the deck.

Delos, and may probably be placed shortly before 200 B.C.[1]

During the Macedonian age we have seen Delos independent, widely venerated, and increasingly prosperous. In the period which now opens, independence is once more taken from it; worship gradually forsakes it; and the marts of Delos, still busy for a space, presently share the ruin of her freedom and the silence of her shrines.

IV. *The Roman Period:* from 166 B.C.

Livy says that Athens recovered Delos in 196 B.C.; Polybius, in 166 B.C.[2] The latter is doubtless right. Athenian hopes may have been raised when Rome proclaimed the freedom of Greece in 196 B.C., but they were realised, after urgent demands, only thirty years later[3]. From 166 B.C. onwards the archons of Athens are, as M. Dumont has shown, the archons of Delos also[4]. The last shadow of autonomy has vanished; Delos is more completely dependent than an ordinary cleruchia. The supreme administration was vested in an Athenian governor (ἐπιμελητής). But a special cause sustained, or stimulated, Delian commerce.

[1] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2266; Lebégue, p. 303.

[2] Liv. xxxiii. 30; Polyb. xxx. 18.

[3] The question has been discussed by Hertzberg, *Gesch. Griechenlands*, vol. i. p. 84, who in his note (60, *ib.*) collects the authorities.

[4] *Revue archéol.* 1873, xxvi. pp. 257 f.

The position of the Aegean island rendered it, at this time, a convenient station for the Romans in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome granted to Delos the privilege of exemption from taxes on imports and exports. The result was to give Delos a decisive advantage over her commercial competitor, Rhodes[1]. The trade of Rhodes was, in fact, ruined. The prosperity of Delos, on the other hand, is sufficiently attested by inscriptions. Dedications belonging to the years 200–80 B.C. constantly speak of "the Romans,—Italians and Greeks,—who are trading in the island[2]." Many Orientals were settled in Delos or Rheneia; the Tyrian trading-guild has already been noticed. The Delians had some local industries. They manufactured a species of bronze much used for the legs of tables and like purposes; they prepared a certain unguent which was in request; they sold fish, and the honey of the Cyclades; they fattened fowls; and they maintained

[1] In his work on the *Chronological Sequence of the Coins of Ephesus* (1880), Mr Barclay V. Head has proved a fact which is of interest for the commercial history of Rhodes. He has shown that the pan-Asiatic coinage of the cistophori was introduced by Eumenes II. of Pergamus, with the consent of the Romans, about 167 B.C., when Rhodes shared in the reverses of Macedonia. Hitherto the Rhodian coinage had been the general medium of commerce in the Eastern Mediterranean: the new cistophori were designed to supplant it.

[2] *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. iii. p. 371. Ῥωμαίων οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι—Ῥωμαίων Ἰταλικοὶ καὶ Ἕλληνες οἱ κα ... (?)—"Italicei et Graecei qui negotiantur." We may complete the lacuna after κα with the letters πλεύοντες: unless it was κατοικοῦντες.

that ancient prestige as cooks which led ungrateful gourmands to nickname them ἐλεοδύται, "scullions[1]." Delos was an active centre of the slave-trade. The site of an enclosure in which the human cattle were penned can still be traced at the north-east corner of the island; and this traffic, flourishing close to the altars of the god whose praise was to kindle a light for the prisoners of darkness and pain, must have made Delos a name of horror to thousands of miserable beings.

The glory of Hellenic worship in the island had already paled. Kings who felt or affected reverence for the Greek Apollo had been replaced by Roman officials, who were sceptical, avaricious, or both. But the administration of the temples—now once more controlled by Athens—seems to have been continued on the ancient lines. The new Athenian officials, who succeeded to the *hieropoioi* of free Delos, have no longer the specious name of *amphictyones*, as in

[1] Pliny, xxxiv. 4, xiii. 2: Dioscorides, ii. 101: Athenaeus, iv. 173 A (who explains the nickname, διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἐλεοῖς ὑποδύεσθαι, διακονοῦντες ἐν ταῖς θοίναις). The preparation of sacrificial feasts had always been an engrossing occupation for the islanders: μαγείρων καὶ τραπεζοποιῶν παρείχοντο χρείας τοῖς παραγιγνομένοις πρὸς τὰς ἱερουργίας (*l. c.*). Besides the general appellative ἐλεοδύται, they had, says Athenaeus, many special soubriquets—such as Χοίρακοι, Ἀμνοί, Σήσαμοι, etc. Cp. Cic. *Acad.* 2, 26. Nothing is certain about the Δηλιάς of the comic poet Nicochares (in Aristot. *Poet.* 2, Castelvetro would read Δειλιάδα, *poltroniad*): but Philostephanus wrote a comedy called Δήλιος (Athen. vii. 293 A), and the Δηλιάδες of Cratinus is often cited (Meineke, *Frag.* I, p. 11). The Δηλία of Antiphanes is known only by name (*ib.* p. 364).

the fifth and fourth centuries. They are described merely as "those appointed to the charge of the sacred treasure and the other revenues of the temple," οἱ (καθιστάμενοι) ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προσόδων τῶν τοῦ ναοῦ[1]. This was a time at which mystic rites and Oriental worships probably gained the ascendancy at Delos. We find that mysteries (noticed also by Iamblichus) were celebrated on the top of Cynthus, near a cistern adjoining the temple of the Cynthian Zeus and Athena. One inscription of this age directs that the votaries shall ascend to that temple "*pure in soul*," "*in white raiment*," "*with no shoes upon their feet*[2]." Other inscriptions refer to the temple of Serapis lower down on the north-west slope of Cynthus; they mention the black-stoled priestesses (μελανηφόροι) and canephori of Isis[3]. A native of Ascalon is among those whose dedications are recorded[4]. The shrine of the Syrian Aphrodite and of the Tyrian Heracles had numerous worshippers in the island.

The first Mithridatic War (88–84 B.C.) brought the catastrophe of Delos. While Athens joined the Pontic king, the poorly defended isle was held loyal to Rome by interest and fear. During the tyranny of Aristion at Athens, Apellicon, whose prestige was that of a Peripatetic philosopher, received the

[1] *Monuments grecs*, No. 7, p. 41.

[2] Lebégue, p. 158: ψυχῇ καθα[ρούς]—ἔχοντας ἐσθῆτα λευκήν . . ἀνυποδέτους.

[3] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2293–2298.

[4] Lebégue, p. 116, Inscr. No. 21.

command of an expedition against Delos. Successful at first, he was surprised and driven off, with the loss of his whole force, by the Romans under Orobius. Presently, however, the generals of Mithridates reduced the Cyclades. Menophanes (according to Pausanias) was the leader who captured Delos. "Delos was unfortified, and its inhabitants were unarmed. He sailed down upon it with his triremes; he slaughtered both the natives and the resident foreigners; he plundered much of the property belonging to the merchants, and all the objects dedicated to the gods. He further enslaved the women and children; and levelled the town of Delos with the soil" (*αὐτὴν ἐς ἔδαφος κατέβαλε τὴν Δῆλον*). At a later time the town of Boiae, opposite Cythera, possessed an ancient wooden statue of Apollo. Tradition said that, at the sack of Delos by Menophanes, the image had been cast into the sea, and that the waves had wafted it to the Laconian shore[1].

This event may be placed in 87 B.C. Two inscriptions[2] indicate that, during a brief space, Athens held Delos for the king of Pontus. Both he and his father, Mithridates Euergetes, figure among those who had sent gifts to the Sacred Isle. Its severe doom may have seemed in his eyes the merited recompense of ingratitude.

In 86 B.C. Sulla took Athens; and the peace of 84 B.C. restored Delos to Rome. A little later we

[1] Paus. iii. 23.

[2] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2279, 2277; Lebégue, p. 318.

find Delos placed under the control of Paros, but with municipal autonomy, and with the right of nominating archons. In a decree preserved by Josephus[1], Julius Caesar charges the Senate and People of Paros to protect the Jews of Delos in the free exercise of their religion. Delos was finally restored to Athens about 42 B.C.[2] Henceforth, as from 166 to 87 B.C., it is administered by an Athenian governor (ἐπιμελητής).

The island never completely recovered from the blow dealt by Menophanes. It further suffered from the piracy which then infested the Aegean[3]. If Cicero may be believed, Verres attempted to carry off some statues by night, but failed to ship them[4]. It would, however, be a mistake to conceive Delos as already abandoned to the spoiler. Though much had been injured or removed, it was still the isle radiant with marble of which the poets speak[5]: its holy places could still attract the lovers of art and

[1] *Ant. Jud.* xiv. 10, 8.

[2] Ἀλέξανδρος Πολυκλείτου Φλυεύς is named as ἐπιμελητής (Athenian governor) of Delos in the archonship of Zenon: *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2287. Two archons of the name occur at this period—in 54 B.C. and 41 B.C. (Dumont, *La Chronol. athén. à Délos*). M. Homolle recognises the earlier Zenon here (*Bulletin de C. h.* iii. 372): M. Lebégue (p. 321), the later.

[3] Photius (cod. 97) quotes Phlegon of Tralles for the statement that the pirate Athenodorus made a successful descent upon Delos, and carried many of the inhabitants into slavery.

[4] *In Verrem*, De praetura urbana, 17, 18.

[5] Ovid, *Heroid.* Ep. xxi. 82, *Candida Delos: Anthol. Gr.*, ed. Jacobs, ii. 149, No. 421, v. 5, ἡ τότε λευκὴ Δῆλος.

the pious students of antiquity. The general features in Ovid's description are doubtless borrowed from what he or his contemporaries had seen. His Cydippe sees the ancient altar which Apollo was said to have made from the horns of she-goats, and the tree at which Latona gave him birth. But that is not all. "Now I roam in colonnades," she cries, "now I marvel at the gifts of kings, and at the statues which are everywhere[1]." The dedications show that under the late Republic and the early Empire statues were still raised to distinguished persons. Among these we note Julia, the daughter of Augustus[2], and Herod Antipas, the tetrarch of Galilaea and Peraea[3]. Yet the phrases used in these dedications serve to mark how commercial life was slowly ebbing from Delos. Three formulas of dedication prevail between 166 B.C. and about 50 A.D. The first we have already quoted. The second is current from about 80 to 28 B.C., and commonly runs thus:—"*The Athenians, Romans, and Greeks*

[1] Ovid, *l. c.* 97, "Et modo porticibus spatior, modo munera regum Miror, et in cunctis stantia signa locis."

[2] *Bulletin de C. h.* vol. ii. p. 399. The date, M. Homolle thinks (*ib.* iii. 155), may have been 17 B.C., when Julia visited Asia Minor with her husband Agrippa.

[3] *Bulletin de C. h.* iii. 366. The Herods, as M. Homolle remarks, were brought into relation with the Greeks by their tastes, and (as at Delos) by the instrumentality of Jewish colonies. A statue to Herod Antipas had been erected at Cos also (*Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2502); and his father, Herod the Great, had received a like honour at Athens (*Corp. Inscr. Att.* iii. 1, 550). The date is somewhere between 4 B.C. and 38 A.D.

generally who reside in Delos, with the merchants and ship-masters visiting it[1]." The third formula occurs from about 28 B.C. onwards: it is simply this:—"*The Athenian people, and the residents in the island.*" The mention of the traders is no longer necessary[2].

It has been inferred from Lucan[3], and is more than likely on general grounds, that the oracle of Delos was still consulted in the first century A.D. The *Delia* are mentioned in an inscription of Hadrian's reign (117–138 A.D.), who, while at Athens, may have done something to restore the worship of the Sacred Isle[4]. In the time of Pausanias, however (circ. 160 A.D.), Delos was deserted, "if we leave out of account those who are sent from Athens to take care of the temple[5]." The most striking and interesting evidence of this statement is afforded by a series of epigrams in the Greek Anthology,—all, probably, of the first or early second century A.D.

[1] Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων οἱ κατοικοῦντες ἐν Δήλῳ καὶ οἱ παρεπιδημοῦντες ἔμποροι καὶ ναύκληροι. Sometimes παρεπιδημοῦντες is replaced by καταπλέοντες εἰς τὴν νῆσον: sometimes ξένων is substituted for Ἑλλήνων: sometimes we have Ἀθην. καὶ Ῥωμ. οἱ κατοικοῦντες ἐν Δήλῳ καὶ οἱ ἔμποροι καὶ οἱ ναύκληροι (*Bulletin de C. h.* iii. 371).

[2] ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων καὶ οἱ τὴν νῆσον οἰκοῦντες (*ib.*).

[3] *Pharsal.* vi. 425 (of Sextus Pompeius), *Non tripodas Deli, non Pythia consulit antra.*

[4] Lebégue, 263, 326: referring to Heydemann, *Die Antiken Marmorbildwerke* (1874), No. 235.

[5] Paus. viii. 33, 2.

"Would I were still drifting before the breath of all winds, rather than that I had been stayed to shelter homeless Leto! Then had I not so greatly mourned my poverty. Ah, woe is me, how many Greek ships sail past me, Delos the desolate, whom once men worshipped! Hera is avenged on me for Leto with vengeance late but sore[1]."

"Ye desolate isles, poor morsels of the earth, girdled by the waves of the sounding Aegean, ye have all become as Siphnos or parched Pholegandros, ye have lost your brightness that was of old. Verily ye are all ensampled of Delos,—of her who was once fair with marble, but was first to see the day of solitude[2]."

"Famous wert thou, Tenos, I deny it not; for of yore the winged sons of Boreas [slain in Tenos by Heracles] gave thee renown. But renowned was Ortygia also, and her fame went even to those who dwell beyond the North Wind on Rhiphaean hills. Yet now thou livest, and she is dead. Who would have looked to see Delos more lonely than Tenos[3]?"

[1] *Anthol. Graec.* ed. Jacobs, vol. ii. p. 144, No. 408 (*εἴθε με παντοίοισιν—*).

[2] *ib.* p. 149, No. 421 (*νῆσοι ἐρημαῖαι—*).

[3] *ib.* p. 195, No. 550 (*κλεινὴν οὐκ ἀπόφημι—*). Antipater of Thessalonica, to whom these epigrams are ascribed (though the first is given also to Apollonides) lived in the early part of the first century A.D. In another epigram (Jacobs, ii. 35, No. 100, *Λητοῦς ὠδίνων ἱερὴ τροφέ*) Alpheus of Mitylene (whose date was about the same) says that he cannot follow Antipater in calling Delos wretched (*δειλαίην*): the glory of having borne Apollo and Artemis is enough for all time.—I may note in passing that

Delos had been an important station only so long as the Romans had no firm footing on the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean. As that footing became more secure, the Aegean stepping-stone lost its value. Delos was not to the Roman world what it had been to the Hellenic: in the course of the first century A.D. it was already little more than a sacred rock on which temples were kept up by Athens. How Delos may have fared under the successors of Constantine can be guessed from the case of a shrine hardly less famous. When the Emperor Julian paid his devotions to the Apollo of Daphne near Antioch, he found that the once rich offerings had dwindled to "a single goose, provided at the expense of a priest, the pale and solitary inhabitant of this decayed temple[1]." The last recorded incident in the annals of ancient Delos fitly recalls the chief source of its early fame. At the moment of vanishing from history it appears once more among the great oracles. Julian, when meditating that invasion of Persia in which he perished, consulted before all others the priests of Delphi, Dodona, and Delos[2]. Thus, on the threshold of

Tibullus, iii. 27 (*Delos ubi nunc, Phoebe, tua est?*), inadvertently quoted by M. Lebégue (324) as referring to the decay of Delos, has a different context.

[1] Gibbon, ch. xxiii. vol. iii. p. 168 (ed. Dr Smith).

[2] Theodoretus, *Hist.* iii. 16, *πέμψας δὲ εἰς Δελφοὺς καὶ Δῆλον καὶ Δωδώνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα χρηστήρια, εἰ χρὴ στρατεύειν ἐπηρώτα τοὺς μάντεις· οἱ δὲ καὶ στρατεύειν ἐκέλευον καὶ ὑπισχνοῦντο τὴν νίκην.* Gibbon has not recorded this detail, which, trivial in itself, is highly characteristic of Julian's reverence for pagan precedents.

Asia, he honours these three great shrines, as Alexander, in whose steps he aspired to tread, had designed to honour them when his work in the East was done[1]. The Sacred Isle, which belongs so wholly to the pagan world, fitly passes out of view with this last champion of the pagan gods,—with him who in visions of the night saw the Genius of the Empire receding with veiled head from his tent, and to whom, on the eve of his death among the Persian hills, a lurid meteor showed the warning face of Mars[2].

Julian died in 363 A.D. In 376 the Scythians and Goths ravaged the Cyclades. If worship had not already ceased in Delos, it probably came to an end under Theodosius (378–395), or at latest in the reign of Justinian (527–565). The final destruction of the monuments must have been hastened by the Saracens[3], the Slavs in the eighth century, and the Agarenian pirates from Spain in the ninth. Some remains on the top of Cynthus have been supposed to mark the site of a castle built by the Knights of

[1] Delphi, Dodona, and Delos were the three holy places beyond the limits of Macedonia at which Alexander had intended to build new temples: Droysen, *Gesch. des Hellenismus*, ii. 38.

[2] The presage of the meteor ("facem cadenti similem...minax Martis sidus," Ammian. Marcell. xxv. 2) may have been more instantly striking to Julian, if he had in his mind the only oracle concerning his campaign of which Theodoretus (*l. c.*) gives the terms: *νῦν πάντες ὡρμήθημεν θεοὶ νίκης τρόπαια κομίσασθαι παρὰ Θηρὶ ποταμῷ* (the Tigris). *τῶν δ' ἐγὼ ἡγεμονεύσω, θοῦρος πολεμόκλονος Ἄρης.*

[3] Finlay, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 190.

St John, who, according to Cantacuzenus, occupied Delos. M. Lebégue is of opinion that these vestiges are exclusively Hellenic or Roman[1]. If the Hospitallers had permanent quarters, they were probably on Rheneia. In 1878 there were no habitations whatever on Delos: on Rheneia, only a cottage or two, and the buildings erected by the Greek government for the officers of quarantine.

The foregoing sketch will have served to show the historical interest of the Delian inscriptions. Many gaps in our previous knowledge have been filled up. Much that was dim and vague has become vivid and precise. For the years from 300 to 100 B.C. the gain is especially large. Delos stands out with a more continuous clearness in its relations to the Greek and Roman world. The Sacred Isle is like a tiny disc in which a wide landscape is mirrored.

This general survey taken, we may next turn to the new results in topography. On the accompanying sketch-map, reduced from M. Lebégue's, I have marked the principal points of interest. (1) The summit of Cynthus, on which stood the temple of Zeus Cynthius and Athena Cynthia. (2) A grotto, once used as a temple, in the western face of Cynthus. (3) The temple of Serapis (designated by earlier writers as a temple of Isis), near the junction of two sacred roads leading to the temples higher up on Cynthus. (4) The theatre, of which the left

[1] *Recherches sur Délos*, p. 129.

ISLE
OF
DELOS.
SCALE
0 100 200 300 400 500 1000 M.
C. Camilla
Chersonesus
Lesser
Rheumatiari
Central
Harbour
Greater
Rheumatiari
Rheneia
TOMBS
Harbour
of Fourni
N.
Rheneia
MYKONOS
DELOS
TOMBS

wing was hollowed out of the hill, while the right was of marble. (5) A small amphitheatre, capable of seating about 100 persons, where the Delian Senate, or its committee (*πρυτάνεις*), may have met. (6) A deep ravine, which some take for the bed of the stream called the Inopus. (7) Ruins of the temple of Apollo in the plain. (8) A dot marking the place where the Naxian colossus of Apollo stood. (9) Ruins of a portico built by Philip V. of Macedon (220–179 B.C.). (10) An oval basin, about 289 ft. by 200, encircled by a granite wall about 4 feet high, and placed in a large rectangular precinct once surrounded by a colonnade. This was the famous *τροχοειδὴς λίμνη*. The swans of Apollo floated upon its waters, which were brought by a conduit still traceable at the north-east corner. Near it was the palm-tree at which Leto had given birth to Apollo: also the *κεράτινος βωμός*, the altar made by Apollo with the left-horns of she-goats slain by Artemis on Cynthus (according to Callimachus),—or with the right horns of oxen (Plutarch). Around this was performed the ancient dance called the *γέρανος*. "*Behind*" the *κεράτινος βωμός* (Diog. Laertius viii. § 13)—more we do not know—was the altar of Apollo Genitor (*γεννήτωρ*, *γενέτωρ*), on which only cereal gifts were offered, and which was thence called "bloodless," or "the altar of the pure[1]." It

[1] Cyril, *Adv. Julian.* ix. 307 B (quoting Porphyry, *περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων*), *θεωρῆσαι δ' ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Δῆλον ἔτι σωζομένου βωμοῦ· πρὸς ὃν οὐδενὸς προσαγομένου παρ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ θυομένου εὐσεβῶν κέκληται βωμός.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vii. 848, *τὸν μὲν ἀρχαιότατον*

was said that, when Pythagoras visited Delos, this was the only altar at which he worshipped[1]. Near this, too, must have been the κακὸς βωμός, round which sailors were whipped, with their hands tied behind their backs, while they bit morsels of sacred olive[2]. (11) A modern well (perhaps on the site of an ancient one), called "the well of the Maltese." (12) Site of a gymnasium. (13) A stadium. (14) Remains of walls built across the north-east isthmus; probably a depôt for slaves to be sold. (15) A clear and copious spring. Some think that this was the "Inopus," and that it was connected with the well (No. 11).

The points to which research has been chiefly directed since 1873 are marked on our map by (2) and (7). M. Lebégue has explored the grotto on Mount Cynthus. M. Homolle has examined the site of Apollo's temple in the plain.

The grotto[3] is about half-way up the western slope of Cynthus. The bare hill is here cleft by a long and narrow ravine with granite sides. The grotto spans the lower end of this ravine. The granite sides of the ravine form natural side-walls for the grotto. The roof is artificial. It is formed

βωμὸν ἐν Δήλῳ ἁγνὸν εἶναι τεθρυλλήκασι, κ.τ.λ. Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* 5, τὸν ἀναίμακτον λεγόμενον τὸν τοῦ Γενέτορος Ἀπόλλωνος βωμόν.

[1] *l. c.*: Diog. Laert. viii. § 13: Macrobius, *Sat.* iii. 6.

[2] Callim. *Hymn. Del.* 321.

[3] See Fig. 1. The original in M. Lebégue's work is from a drawing by M. É. Burnouf.

by five pairs of massive stones, leaning against each other by their tops. A number of rough granite blocks had been piled on the roof. Some of these blocks have rolled off. Those that remain have a layer of small stones and lime between them and the roof. They help to make the grotto look like a natural cavern. The western entrance of the grotto was closed by a wall with a door in it, of which parts



Fig. 1.

remain. The eastern end, resting against the mountain, was not so completely closed but that light could penetrate. The floor, though artificially raised, was not paved. As the ravine widens in descending, the grotto widens also. At the west entrance it is about 16 ft. broad: at the back, only 7 feet 8 inches. From the top of the roof (inside)

to the floor, its height is 18 feet 11 inches. Its length is 17 feet 1 inch.

Within the grotto, to the north side, is a deep receptacle for water, which is supplied by a small spring in the cavern. This is the χάσμα, which was a constant feature of oracular caves. On the floor of the grotto was found a pedestal, with the left foot of a statue still placed upon it. Other fragments of the same statue,—pieces of arm, leg, and shoulder, were found near: the statue was of good workmanship: it represented a young god, and was about 6 feet 6 inches high. Two marble claws were also found: M. Lebégue thinks that they belonged to a large lion. Another marble fragment showed part of a tree's trunk with a lion's skin hanging on it. A holy table had been supported by two pieces of Parian marble. Fragments of amphoras (Thasian or Cnidian) occurred near the south-west corner of the grotto: one vase had borne the letters ΚΡΟ. Lastly, it must be noted that the pedestal above-mentioned is supported on one side by a huge block of granite, which had been cut to receive it. Outside the west front of the grotto was a sacred precinct. Here, at about 23 ft. from the door of the grotto, were found two fragments of a rough marble basin, notched in three places as if to receive the metallic legs of a tripod, which had probably supported a cortina. Near this some Athenian coins were found. Between the fragments of the basin and the door of the grotto a small square pit was filled with cinders, probably from ancient sacrifices:

but the precinct was too small for sacrifice on any large scale. A flight of thirteen steps, descending from the south-west corner of the temenos, leads to a sacred way which went down the mountain and came out near the temple of Serapis.

These facts warrant at least the following inferences :—

1. The grotto on Cynthus was a primitive temple[1], whoever were the people that first worshipped there. It shows the very genesis of the early temple from step to step. First, an altar in the open air; then a roof to shelter the altar; next, a door to keep out the profane; lastly, a precinct added to the house of the god.

2. This temple was the seat of an oracle. The presence of the cleft for water (χάσμα) in such a cavern would of itself make this almost certain. The grotto on Cynthus is analogous in this respect to the adyton at Delphi, the cave of the Clarian Apollo, the cave of Trophonius, the shrines of the Sibyl at Cumae and Lilybaeum, the oracle of the earth in Elis, with many more that could be named[2]. We need not lay stress on the probable presence of tripod and cortina.

3. Among the deities once adored here was a young god whose statue shows Greek workmanship of a mature age.

[1] Virgil's phrase, "Templa dei *saxo* venerabar *structa vetusto*" (*Aen.* iii. 84) is referred by M. Lebégue to the grotto. I hesitate to recognise so special an allusion.

[2] Lebégue, p. 89.

4. The whole character of the grotto proves, however, that it must have been used as a temple long before such Greek art existed. We have mentioned the enormous block of granite in which the pedestal of the statue was set. This block was probably a *βαίτυλος*—one of those stones which were worshipped as having fallen from heaven, or as emblems of gods. It may have symbolized the god originally worshipped in the grotto, before the days of even archaic sculpture. The baetyl and the later statue probably represented different gods. But they may have represented the same god, just as stones (*πέτραι*), said to have fallen from heaven, were worshipped in the ancient temple of the Orchomenian Charites conjointly with "the finished statues" (*ἀγάλματα τὰ σὺν κόσμῳ πεποιημένα*), made in the time of Pausanias himself, who notes a similar conjunction of sacred stone (*πέτρα*) and brazen image (*εἰκών*) in the Orchomenian shrine of Actaeon[1].

Before going further, or discussing the place which this grotto held among the shrines of Delos, we must refer to the results obtained by M. Homolle at another point. His excavations were upon and around the site occupied by the temple of Apollo in the plain between Cynthus and the sea. I give a tracing (Fig. 2) from the plan published by M. Blouet, in the *Expédition Scientifique de Morée* (Paris, 1838, vol. iii. pl. 1), which will serve to indicate roughly where the groups of remains lie. A, site of temple of Apollo; B, ruins of a portico

[1] Paus. ix. 8, 4.

about 197 feet long. It was of Oriental character, supported by pillars of which the capitals were formed by pairs of kneeling bulls, and adorned with heads of bulls in the middle of the triglyphs. C, remains too slight to permit measurement or description of the buildings to which they belonged; one

Fig. 2.

was a large oblong, facing east and west. D, remains of the portico of Philip (in grey marble). E, the oval basin.

An examination of the remains at A has enabled M. Homolle to determine the dimensions and the general arrangement of Apollo's temple. Two rectangles can be traced, one exterior, the other

interior. The exterior rectangle supported the steps and columns of a portico. It measured, on the north and south sides, 29·49 mètres, or 96 feet 9 inches nearly ; on the west and east sides, 13·55 mètres, or 44 feet 6 inches nearly. The interior rectangle supported the walls of the cella, which stood between two porticoes, one on the east, the other on the west. It measured, on the north and south sides, 20·67 mètres, or 67 feet 7 inches nearly ; on the west and east sides, 7·53 mètres, or 24 feet 8 inches nearly.

The temple at Delos was thus a little smaller than the temple at Athens known as the Theseion, and its plan was similar. It was enclosed by a colonnade (περίστυλος) ; it comprised pronaos, naos, and opisthodomos; it had six columns on each front, east and west (ἑξάστυλος), and it was peripteral,—the columns at each side (north and south) being thirteen in number, counting the corner column. There is nothing to show whether the entrance was at the west front, on the side of the sea (as practical convenience would rather have suggested), or on the east, as in the temples of the Athenian acropolis. M. Homolle notes that the columns (Doric) were fluted only at the base of the shaft and again just below the capital; the rest of the shaft was left smooth. Other temples exhibit the same peculiarity. But at Segesta (for example) it is merely a sign of unfinished work. At Delos it appears to have been a deliberate device of artists who sought novelty at the expense of good taste. On the whole, the mason's work is excellent; one mark is present which

M. Beulé regards as characteristic of good Greek building—the double-T joining of stones; but in the style M. Homolle finds a certain heaviness, a want of character and elegance. Judging by the evidence of the remains themselves, he concludes that the temple of Apollo is "at least of the fourth century B.C., and doubtless of the beginning of that century."

Along the outer rectangle of the temple, on its north side, was an avenue about 9 feet 10 inches broad, which was once bordered on right and left by two lines of small marble pedestals. Here were found some 150 inscriptions, chiefly accounts relating to the temple of Apollo and the temple of Artemis. North of this avenue, which separated it from the temple of Apollo, stood a much smaller temple on a different plan: it had four columns on each front, east and west, but no columns on the sides, north and south (ἀμφιπρόστυλος); the cella was probably square: it had pronaos and naos, but no opisthodomos. This may have been the Artemision; or, if Artemis shared the temple of Apollo, the Letoön. The former hypothesis seems the more probable, but it is not certain.

Such, in brief, is the sum of the topographical results to which M. Homolle's researches have led. He had to deal, in truth, with "the ruins of ruins," and it required such skill and perseverance as his to ascertain thus much. But, even if he had not been rewarded with some 350 new inscriptions, and with some valuable relics of art, his labour would not have been in vain. We now know the exact site, the size,

the character, and the arrangements of Apollo's Delian temple[1].

A question at once occurs. Was this temple (which M. Homolle would refer to the beginning of the fourth century B.C.) the earliest which Apollo possessed at Delos? And if not, can any earlier temple of Apollo be traced? M. Lebégue holds that the grotto on Cynthus was the primitive temple and oracle of Apollo, who succeeded a solar god previously worshipped there; that, when the later temple was built in the plain, some of the legends, migrating from Cynthus, attached themselves to the new site; but that the grotto continued to be the *oracle*, just as the temple (ἱερόν) of Apollo is distinguished from the oracle (μαντεῖον) at Claros and at Branchidae[2]. Among the texts on which this view relies, two are prominent: (1) Leto, according to the Homeric hymn (v. 17), bears her children, "reclining against the lofty hill, the slope of Cynthus, close to the palm, by the streams of Inopus." And Leto promises (v. 80) that Apollo shall build "a beauteous shrine, to be an oracle of men," at Delos first of all, before he builds his temples elsewhere. This, it is argued, shows (i) that the birthplace of Apollo was originally placed on Cynthus, not in the plain; (ii) that there was an oracular shrine of such immemorial age that the building of it could be ascribed to Apollo himself. This latter point may be allowed. As to the first, the words of the hymn would, I think, be

[1] *Monuments grecs*, No. 7, pp. 28–34.

[2] Paus. vii. 3, 1; 2, 6.

equally suitable if the scene of Leto's pangs had been in the neighbourhood of the oval basin. I rendered *κεκλιμένη πρὸς* "reclining *against*," for argument's sake: but it is not necessarily more than "reclining *towards*," *i.e.* on the ground at the foot of the hill. (2) Themistius (circ. 360 A.D.) says:—"In Delos the inhabitants say that a certain temple is shown, simple in style and furniture, but venerable by reason of its tradition and of the legends which are told concerning it. There, the story has it, Leto was released from her pangs when she was giving birth to the two gods; and, in honour of the spot, Apollo fixed there his sacred tripods, and thence gave his decrees to the Greeks[1]." This passage is very striking. Clearly it would not apply to a handsome temple in the plain, close to the town. It implies that the shrine had to be sought out. And the description applies exactly to the grotto on Cynthus, before which a tripod appears to have stood in a conspicuous place.

It has been seen that the Phoenicians had probably been in contact with Delos before the worship of Apollo had come thither from Asia, and had brought with them a cult which is found in Delos at

[1] *Orat.* 18. 1, *ἐν Δήλῳ, ταύτῃ τῇ νήσῳ, νεών τινα φασὶν οἱ ἐπιχώριοι δείκνυσθαι, λιτὸν μὲν ταῖς κατασκευαῖς, εὐαγῆ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ διηγήμασιν. ἔνθα κατέχει λόγος, ὅτε ἔτικτεν ἡ Λητὼ τοὺς θεούς, λυθῆναι τὰς ὠδῖνας αὐτῇ, καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα τιμῇ τοῦ χωρίου μετὰ κλάδων ἐκεῖ τοὺς ἱεροὺς πηγνύμενον τρίποδας θεμιστεύειν ἐκεῖθεν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.* The word *θεμιστεύειν* reminds us that in the Homeric hymn Θέμις attends the birth of the Delian Apollo (94).

a later time—that of Melcarth, the Tyrian Heracles, a solar divinity. M. Lebégue seems unquestionably right in holding that the grotto on Cynthus was once associated with Apollo. If this grotto was the most venerable sanctuary of the island at the early time when the worship of Apollo first came in, it would doubtless have become the dwelling of the new god as soon as he had prevailed over his predecessors. Among the marble fragments found in the grotto were a lion's claws and part of the trunk of a tree, covered with a lion's skin.

I think that these objects may help us to conjecture what happened. The solar god of Tyre may have been in possession of the grotto when Apollo came. By and by Apollo became its principal divinity; but the memory of his predecessor was still preserved, and the granite baetyl remained in the grotto as the sacred emblem of the earlier solar god. Afterwards a new temple for Apollo was built in the plain. This now became the principal seat of his worship. Greeks visiting the less frequented grotto on Cynthus, and finding there the traditions of a god whom they identified with their own Heracles, worshipped the ancient god of the grotto as Heracles; and thus the Tyrian sun-god, though still associated with Apollo, may once more have become the chief deity of that primitive shrine. The number of Tyrians who visited or inhabited Delos in the age of its commercial prosperity would have favoured such a result. The temple of the Tyrian Heracles at Delos is mentioned in an

inscription[1]. The tripod and cortina were attributes of Heracles as well as of Apollo. So long as oracles continued to be given at the grotto, they were doubtless given in Apollo's name.

But, granting that the grotto was the *earliest* temple of Apollo, was it his *only* Delian temple down to such a date as (say) 400 B.C., the superior limit which M. Homolle is disposed to assign for the temple in the plain? I will briefly state the reasons which make such a hypothesis very difficult to my mind.

1. In the days of Ionian greatness the Pan-Ionic festival drew to Delos all the wealth of the race. The Homeric hymn pictures the Ionians of all cities vying with each other in the display of their "swift ships and great possessions." All were animated and united by a common sentiment of devotion to Apollo, the father of Ion. Is it conceivable that no fraction of their wealth was expended on an object which the spirit of the festival so strongly commended, and which would have brought public credit to the donor—on making offerings (*ἀναθήματα*) to the god? It is surely certain that, besides votive statues, the Apollo of the Ionians must have received gifts of gold, silver, bronze, gifts of those various materials and forms which his temple is known to have contained at a later time. But if he then had no temple but the grotto,—17 feet long, with an average breadth of 11, seamed by the chasma, and partly open to the sky,—where

[1] *Corp. Inscr. Graec.* 2271.

could those gifts have been preserved? The Greek priests had always the instinct of bankers. When the fountain of piety, quickened by vanity, was flowing so freely, they would not have seen it run to waste. It would have been strange if, in the course of two or three centuries, the whole wealth of the Ionian world had not housed their god and his treasures in some better abode than the granite hovel half-way up Cynthus.

2. Supposing—though to me the supposition is scarcely possible—that no new temple of Apollo had been built in the Ionian days, at least the sixth century B.C. would hardly have passed by without seeing it arise. Peisistratus showed devotion to Delos. If the Delian Apollo still lacked a treasure-house, to build one for him would have been to balance the influence which the Alcmaeonidae had gained by a similar attention to the Apollo of Delphi. Polycrates, again, by becoming the founder of a Delian temple, could have secured just the hold which he desired to have on the Sacred Island.

3. Thucydides says, speaking of the formation of the Delian Confederacy (i. 96), *ἦν δ' ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἑξήκοντα, ταμιεῖόν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίγνοντο.* The word *ταμιεῖον* means that the great sums raised by the levy of tribute on the allies were kept for security in the temple at Delos, as they were afterwards kept in the temple on the Acropolis: we remember that the sacred treasurers at Athens

were called ταμίαι τῆς θεοῦ. Now the grotto on Cynthus certainly could not have been used for such a purpose: neither its structure nor its situation afforded the needful security.

Considering all these facts, we cannot, I think, resist the conclusion that, as early at least as 475 B.C., and almost certainly at a much earlier date, Apollo already possessed a temple in Delos distinct from the grotto. Now we know that the most ancient altars in Delos (the κεράτινος and that of Apollo Genitor) stood near the oval basin. And, as early at least as the *Odyssey*, the palm which saw Latona's pangs was shown near an altar. The site of Apollo's temple can scarcely be sought, then, elsewhere than on the spot where remains now exist. If all these remains were of the same age, we should have our choice between referring them to a much higher date than 400 B.C., or supposing that the temple to which they belonged had occupied the site of an older building. I have stated my difficulty. I do not propound a definite solution, for which it may be doubted whether sufficient data exist. The hypothesis, however, to which I should incline is this. The temple, of which the remains have been examined by M. Homolle, may have been partially repaired at more than one time, and these fragments, from which he estimates the date of the whole building, may be of the age which he assigns to them, *i.e.* about 400 B.C. But, either on these foundations, or at least on this plain, a temple of Apollo, however rude, must have stood long before

400 B.C.; probably as early as 700 B.C.; in any case, not later than 475 B.C.

Before parting from the grotto on Cynthus, the students of ancient astronomy may be invited to consider a question which can scarcely fail to interest them. In the *Revue archéologique* of August, 1873, M. Burnouf intimated that "a series of astronomical considerations, supported by numerous texts, had led him to think that Delos had been a centre of very ancient observations, and had performed for the Ionians a part similar to that which afterwards belonged to the Acropolis of Athens." The solar character of Apollo was, he added, in favour of this view. This theory has been developed with great ingenuity by M. Lebégue. We have seen that the east end of the grotto—that which rests against Cynthus—was not completely closed. On an April morning a ray of the sun pierces the cavern and fills it in a moment. Apollo was supposed to spend the winter in Lycia, and to revisit Delos with the spring: we hear, too, of his Delian oracle being consulted in the morning. M. Lebégue suggests that the grotto may have been a station at which the process of the seasons was observed by noting the length and inclination of the sun's rays. Solstitial dials or gnomons were known from a remote age in Greece, which may have received them, through the Phoenicians, from Chaldaea. Referring to *Odyssey*, xv. 403,

> νῆσός τις Συρίη κικλήσκεται, εἴ που ἀκούεις,
> Ὀρτυγίης καθύπερθεν, ὅθι τροπαὶ ἠελίοιο,

"There is an isle called Syria (Syros), west of Ortygia (Delos), *where are the turnings of the sun*": M. Lebégue takes this to mean; "where the course of the sun on the ecliptic is observed from the grotto on Cynthus." Eustathius took ὅθι τροπαὶ ἠελ. to mean, "where (at Syria) is the sunset"; but adds this remarkable comment:—ἕτεροι δέ φασι σπήλαιον εἶναι ἐκεῖ, δι' οὗ τὰς ἡλίου, ὡς εἰκός, ἐσημειοῦντο τροπάς, ὃ καὶ ἡλίου διὰ τοῦτο σπήλαιον ἔλεγον. Didymus, also, in his commentary on the *Odyssey*, mentioned the ἡλίου σπήλαιον. Nothing could be more brilliant, more tempting, than this combination. It is an ungracious task to confess the fear that it is too brilliant. Yet I cannot but think that the words ὅθι τροπαὶ ἠελίοιο merely express a hazy notion of the poet's—whence derived, the Muses alone can tell—that "the Syrian isle" lay beneath a turning-point in the sun's heavenly course. As to the comment of the old grammarians, I conceive that it blends two elements. (i) This grotto in Delos may have been anciently called "the Cavern of the Sun" because a solar god had been worshipped there; and (ii) τροπαὶ ἠελίοιο at once suggested the familiar word ἡλιοτρόπιον, a sun-dial[1].

Scarcely any objects of ancient art have been discovered at Delos, except marble statues, more or

[1] Among the miscellaneous objects found on the top of Cynthus was part of a ἡλιοτρόπιον—viz.: the two supports, and a piece of the dial, which was almost vertical, like the hemisphere at Ravenna and the old solar dials in the Naples Museum (Lebégue, p. 136).

less fragmentary. The state of the island when the French explorers came to it sufficiently explains this. But, among M. Homolle's prizes, some are of the very highest interest and value. In July, 1878, he found about a dozen pieces of sculpture beneath the soil of a hollow which divides the group of remains at C from the ruins of the two temples at A. Among these sculptures were six statues of Artemis. They are of life-size, and are all archaic in style. Five of them are tightly swathed in a robe which, slightly drawn from right to left, shows the outlines of the legs. Where the arms remain, the left hangs by the side: the right arm is bent; the hand was held out. These five statues resemble those which were lately found in excavating the Asklêpieion at Athens, and which had doubtless been thrown down from the temenos of Artemis Brauronia on the Acropolis. The latest in date of these five, though still archaic, shows the beginnings of a more free and masterly art: it is probably not much older than 500–450 B.C.[1]

But the sixth is the most remarkable. It is a bretas, with the edges rounded, roughly marked off into three parts, for legs, torso, and head; arms are rudely indicated at the sides. On the left side it bears an inscription, saying that it was dedicated to the ἑκηβόλος ἰοχέαιρα by Nicandra, daughter of Deinodikos, a Naxian. The date of the image itself might be placed between 700 and 600 B.C., or

[1] M. Homolle, in the *Bulletin de C. h.* iii. 99. See plates i., ii., iii. published with part i. of vol. iii.

580 B.C. at latest. But the *type* which it represents is much older. Daedalus, said the legend[1], first made statues to walk and see: his name symbolizes the first effort of the artist to represent the open eyes, and to give some measure of freedom to the limbs. The art called "prae-daedalian" had left the eyes closed and the limbs sheathed, mummy-wise, in a scabbard resembling the posts of the Hermae. The ancient wooden images—such as that of the Ephesian Artemis, swaddled in her tight, stiff robe —were of prae-daedalian character. Bupalus and Athenis of Chios are said to have sculptured marble about 540 B.C., the art having been then hereditary in their house for three generations. Delos had no school of sculpture. But Naxos had eminent sculptors from about 580 B.C., and the art must have prospered there during the period at which Naxos was the first island of the Aegean, *i.e.* from about 520 to 490 B.C. The Delian Artemis is apparently an imitation of a very ancient model in wood; and, being a ruder work than even the Artemis of Ephesus, may be regarded as representing the oldest *type* of Greek sculpture hitherto known.

Another figure represents a woman in a tunic, with wings on her shoulders and feet; the left foot scarcely touched earth; she seems flying. Prof. E. Curtius has shown that this half-kneeling pose is often used in early Greek art to express hasty motion—as in the case of the Gorgons chasing Perseus[2]. This is probably a winged Artemis, per-

[1] Cp. Overbeck, *Schriftquellen*, pp. 11 f.

[2] E. Curtius, *Die knieenden Figuren der altgriech. Kunst* (1869).

haps of the 6th century B.C. M. Homolle makes a remark *à propos* of this Delian series which is a seasonable corrective to exaggerated estimates of Oriental influence on early Hellenic art. This gradual development of a plastic type which the Delian statues of Artemis present—from the rudest bretas to the comparatively finished statue—reminds us how essentially original, how patiently self-disciplined, Greek sculpture was[1].

From Delian topography and sculpture we return to epigraphy. The inscriptions have been surveyed in their historical aspect. But several of them demand particular notice, especially on philological grounds. Of these I will now speak,—beginning with the latest age, and thence remounting to the earlier.

Close as had been the relations between Rome and Delos, only two Latin inscriptions from the island had been known up to 1877, and these only through copies taken by Cyriac of Ancona (*Corp. Inscr. Lat.* iii. 484, 485). No. 484 runs thus:—

BRANDVTIVS · L · L · ARISTIPPVS
DESVOFECIT.

M. Homolle has found two fragments of this inscription, which show that on the stone it formed a single line, and that for FECIT we should read REFECIT. He has also discovered three new Latin inscriptions. One was on the plinth of a statue dedicated by "the Italians and Greeks in Delos" to

[1] *Bulletin de C. h.* iii. 107; cp. *Monuments grecs*, No. 7, p. 61.

Aulus Terentius Auli f. Varro, who in 167 B.C. was one of the ten commissioners appointed to reorganise Macedonia. Another was on the base of a statue dedicated by several Romans to Mercury and Maia: it presents the forms *magistres* (*magistri*), and *Mircurio*[1]. The third was on the base of a statue dedicated by "the Athenian people, the Italian and Greek merchants in Delos," to Lucullus, the conqueror of Mithridates. He is styled *pro quaestore*. Lucullus went as quaestor to Asia with Sulla in 88 B.C., and was in the East till 80 B.C. His quaestorship, more than once noticed by Cicero, was mentioned by only one inscription previously known (*Corp. I. L.* i. 292, xxxiv)[2]. Among the Greek inscriptions of Delos relating to Romans we note a dedication to Augustus by ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων, which (as restored by M. Homolle) styles him Αὐτοκράτορα Καίσαρα θεὸν Σεβαστὸν ἀρχιερέα μέγιστον (*i.e.* pontifex maximus). The last words show that the date is after 13 B.C. Another Greek dedication (date, a few years B.C.), also by ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων, honours Λεύκιον Αἰμύλιον Παῦλλον Παύλλου υἱὸν Λέπεδον as "benefactor and saviour." This, as M. Homolle shows, must be Lucius Aemilius Paullus, son of the Paullus Aemilius Lepidus who was consul in 34 B.C., and grandson of Lucius Aemilius Paullus (cons. 50 B.C.). The latter (brother of the Triumvir) was the first of the Lepidi who took Paullus as a *cognomen*. His son made it his *praenomen*. The grandson reverted to its use as a *cognomen*. Mommsen

[1] *Bulletin de C. h.* i. 284. [2] *Ib.* iii. 147.

has pointed out that the tendency to revive an ancient *praenomen*, or to adopt an altogether new one, is a patrician trait which coincides with the Sullan restoration: the hereditary patrician praenomina had in many cases been usurped by the new nobility. Before quitting the inscriptions concerning Romans, we may notice one in honour of Manius Aemilius Lepidus (48 42 B.C.), who is styled ἀντιταμίας (pro quaestore)[1].

Two inscriptions in the Cretan dialect, both of which had been placed in the temenos of the Delian Apollo, are of curious interest. The first[2] is certainly later than 166 B.C., and may probably be referred to 150–120 B.C. It is a decree by the magistrates (κόσμοι) and city of Cnossus in Crete, conferring the titles of proxenus and citizen on one Dioscorides of Tarsus,—a city which, during the last 150 years B.C., was one of the chief seats of literary activity[3]. "Following the example of the poet" (κατὰ τὸν ποιητάν)—*i.e.* Homer—Dioscorides, who was both an epic and a lyric writer, had composed an eulogy (ἐγκώμιον) on Cnossus, and had sent thither his pupil Myrinus—a native of Amisus in Pontus—to recite it. The emissary had performed his part with zeal,—"as was becoming," the decree remarks, "in the cause of his own teacher." A copy of the decree was to be placed in the temple of Apollo Delphidius at Cnossus: another was to be sent "to the people of Tarsus" (πορτὶ τὸν Ταρσέων δᾶμον);

[1] *Bulletin de C. h.* i. 151. [2] *Ib.* iv. 350.

[3] Cp. Strabo, xiv. 673.

while leave was to be asked from "the Athenians dwelling in Delos" to place a third copy "in the most conspicuous place" available within Apollo's temenos. The allusion to Homer's eulogy of Cnossus cannot be justified from our *Iliad*, but clearly refers to that passage of the Homeric hymn which describes how Apollo committed the service of his Pythian shrine to "Cretans from Minoan Cnossus" (*Hymn. in Apoll.* 391–544). Here, then, is a fresh proof that, about 150 B.C., this hymn was still ascribed without question to 'Homer.'

The inscription adds some valuable illustrations to the forms of the Cretan dialect. Thus we have the acc. plur. τὰς καταξίανς χαρίτανς : ἐσγόνος = ἐκγόνους : ὀσκίας = οἰκίας : θίνων = θείνων, for θείων : both τόνς and τός for τούς. Among the verbal forms, ἀκούσαντεν = ἀκούσαντες : ἴονσα = οὖσα : ποριόμενος = πορεόμενος in sense of ποριζόμενος, and similarly προαιριομένοις : τιμέονσα = τιμέουσα, as if from τιμέω, not τιμάω : ἀπήστελκε = ἀπέσταλκε : and the remarkable αἰτησάθθαι = αἰτήσασθαι. ὅπαι, with subjunctive, has the sense of ὅπως, "in order that." At the end we read, Αἰρέθη ἐπὶ τᾶς ἀναθέσιος τᾶς στάλας Μακκιάδων Θαρυμάχω καὶ Λεόντιος Κλυμενίδα. M. Homolle regards αἰρέθη as 3rd pers. plur., but remarks that we should have expected the termination in -ν, comparing διέλεγεν, *C. I. G.* 3050. I should take αἰρέθη to be 3rd pers. sing., and the construction to be like that of Lysias *in Eratosth.* § 12, ἐπιτυγχάνει Μηλόβιός τε καὶ Μνησιθείδης. In v. 18 there is a doubtful reading: M. Homolle gives

ἀκούσαντεν τὰ πεπραγματευμένα καὶ τὰν [ἄλ]λαν (?) αἵρεσιν τῶ ἀνδρὸς ἂν ἔχων τυγχάνει εἰς τὰν ἁμὰν πόλιν. Perhaps [κα]λὰν: "having heard his compositions (the poem), and those kind sentiments which he entertains towards our city" (as further evinced by a letter, ἔγγραφον, which Myrinus had read[1]).

The date of the second[2] Cretan inscription is fixed by the Athenian archonship of Sarapion, which M. Dumont places in 134 B.C. It relates to a convention between three Cretan towns, Cnossus, Olus, Lato, by which the first-named was to have the arbitration (ἐπιτροπάν) in certain issues pending between the two latter. The archaeological interest here is for the Cretan calendar. Each of the three towns had different names for the months. The second day of the month Σπέρμιος at Cnossus is the second of Ἐλευσύνιος (*sic*) at Olus, and of Θιοδαίσιος at Lato. Similarly Νεκύσιος (Cnossus) answers to Ἀπέλλαιος (Olus) and Θεσμοφόριος (Lato). The

[1] Cp. the contemporary Polybius, in a place which also illustrates the use of διάλαμψιν (= διάληψιν) in this Cretan text for "estimation"; ii. 61, τίνα γε χρὴ περὶ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ἔχειν διάληψιν;...οἳ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν Κλεομένει προεῖντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα...ἔπταισαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς αἵρεσιν, "through their attachment to the Achaean League." The phrase of our text, διαθησιόμενον (to recite) τὰ πεπραγματευμένα ὑπ' αὐτῶ, may again be illustrated by Polyb. iii. 108, ἐξ αὐτοπαθείας τοῦ Λευκίου διατιθεμένου τοὺς λόγους, "the *harangue* of L. being founded on his own experience." The phrase διατίθεσθαι ῥῆσιν, etc., was common in later Greek.

[2] *Bulletin de C. h.* iii. 290.

month Δελφίνιος (Olus) corresponds with two of which the reading is doubtful,—ἀρ[a trace of ἄρχοντος?]ωβιαρίω (Lato), and Καρ[ώ?]νιος (Cnossus). This last was certainly not Κάρνειος. As to dialect, we have the dat. πόλι—whereas πόλει had been noted by Böckh as the constant Cretan form: ἔντων as 3rd plur. imperative of εἰμί: μέστα κα, with subjunct., as = μέχρι ἄν, "until": genitive Διοκλεῖος = Διοκλέους: κριθένσι = κριθεῖσι: πορτὶ in compos. (πορτιγράψαι): αὐτοσαυτοῖς for ἑαυτοῖς (in sense of ἀλλήλοις). So in the former inscription we find τὸν αὐτὸς αὐτῶ μαθέταν = τὸν ἑαυτοῦ μ. In v. 19 there is a difficulty. The passage runs thus:—ἀποστηλάντων [*sic*] οἵ τε Κνώσιοι καὶ οἱ Λάτιοι καὶ οἱ Ὀλόντιοι πορτὶ τὸν ἐπιμελητὰν [the Athenian governor of Delos] πρειγείαν [= πρεσβείαν] καὶ γράμματα ἐν ἀμέραις τριάκοντα ὥστε στᾶσαι στάλαν ἐς ἂν ἀναγραφησ . . τὰ δεδογμένα. M. Homolle thinks (and I agree with him) that after ΑΝΑΓΡΑΦΗΣ . . there is not room for the four letters ΕΤΑΙ before ΤΑ. He says that there is room for two letters only.

Now I can suggest a restoration which gives the sense required, and which is satisfied by the insertion of just two letters, viz.: ΦΙ. I would read, ἐς ἂν ἀναγραφῇ σφι τὰ δεδογμένα, "on which they may have their resolutions recorded[1]." If the iota

[1] The epic σφι would not be at variance with the general complexion of the Cretan dialect. For the subjunct. after the relative, cp. Isocrates *Pan.* § 44, ὥστε...ἑκατέρους ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν: and *ll. cc.* in Goodwin, *Moods* § 65, 1 *n.* 3. The

subscript of *ἀναγραφῇ* is absent (as the copy indicates), this was doubtless a mere slip of the stone-cutter's. In v. 53 of this same document he has given us *προγραμμένον* instead of *προγεγραμμένον*: a Neo-Hellenic curtailment which we certainly should not find in a public document of the second century B.C.

Passing upward from the Roman to the Macedonian period, we note some points of interest in an inventory drawn up by the *hieropoioi* of the Delian temple[1]. This mentions a gift dedicated by Perseus before he was king (*i.e.* somewhere between 200 and 179 B.C.); and one of the most recent items gives the name of Lucius Hortensius, doubtless the praetor of 171 B.C. The inscription belongs, probably, to the very last years of free Delos, 171–166 B.C. It exhibits the diphthong EI used both for H and for HI: thus *ἐνειρόσια*, *ἐνεῖσαν* (=*ἐνῆσαν*): *τεῖ* as well as *τῇ*: *στήλει* as well as *στήλῃ*. The values of the objects are given in Attic terms (*εἰς Ἀττικοῦ λόγον*), but certain fractions are expressed in terms of the Delian copper currency (*Δήλιος χαλκοῦς*). The *weight* of an object is commonly denoted by the participle of *ἄγω*, or by the phrase *οὗ ὁλκή*, *κ.τ.λ.* But here we have a peculiarity,—the use of the neuter participle *ἷκον* even with a masculine noun; *e.g.* *ἄλλον* (*ῥυμὸν*?), *ἔχοντα*

Greek *ἔχομεν ὅ τι εἴπωμεν* seems to have been developed out of the negative form (where the subj. is deliberative), *οὐκ ἔχομεν ὅ τι εἴπωμεν.*

[1] *Bulletin de C. h.* ii. 570.

ἱστία, ἷκον ["weighing",] εἰς Ἀττικοῦ λόγον δραχμὰς ΗΔ, χαλκοῦς Δηλίος ἐννέα. The sign ϲ (half o) is used for the half-obol; T (τεταρτημόριον) for the quarter-obol; the sign ⟍ (perhaps from χ, initial of χαλκοῦς) for $\frac{1}{12}$ obol.

The Athenian age of Delos furnishes, first, an important bilingual inscription on which M. Ernest Renan has commented[1]. It is in Greek and Phoenician, and belongs to the fourth century B.C. The Greek text reads ...[T]ύρου καὶ Σιδῶνος...[εἰκ]όνας οἱ ἐκ Τύρου ἱεροναῦται Ἀπόλλωνι ἀνέθηκαν. In the Phoenician text M. Renan deciphers the name of "the king Abdaschtoreth" ("servant of Astarte"). This name, he adds, corresponds with the Greek name "Straton," borne by several kings of Sidon; and may here indicate Straton the Philhellene (who reigned from about 374 to 362 B.C.), or else the Straton deposed by Alexander in 332 B.C. M. Renan regrets that the fragmentary inscription does not tell us how the name of Apollo was translated in Phoenician.

A puzzle is presented by the inscription which I have already mentioned as probable evidence for the fact that, soon after 404 B.C., Sparta made a convention with Delos regarding the administration of the Delian temples.

The Greek alphabets may, with Kirchhoff, be classed geographically as Eastern and Western. The alphabets of Asia Minor, of the Aegean isles, and of Attica, belonged to the eastern group; that

[1] *Bulletin de C. h.* iv. 69.

of Laconia, to the western, which was distinguished from the eastern by these among other traits:—(i) the use of H only as the sign of the rough breathing; (ii) the use of the sign Ψ for the letter χ; (iii) the use of X or + with the value of ξ.

The first six lines of our inscription exhibit the characters of the Laconian alphabet as it was after 476 B.C.[1] The rest of the inscription is in characters of the eastern type: we have H for eta; X represents, not ξ, but (as now) χ. How are we to explain the fact that two different alphabets are used in two different parts of the same inscription? M. Homolle justly rejects the hypothesis that the inscription is a late copy of an older document. In such a case the original orthography, if not wholly altered, would have been consistently preserved.

I venture to propose a simpler explanation. This was a convention between Sparta and Delos, of which Sparta—victorious in the war—doubtless prescribed the terms. It was dated, on the one hand, by the names of the Spartan kings and ephors; on the other hand, by the names of the Delian magistrates. The first six lines of our inscription form the end of the part which prescribed the terms: these are in the Laconian alphabet. The names which mark the date are in the later Ionian alphabet. I conceive that the *terms* were framed at Sparta, and that a copy of them was sent to Delos. At Delos they were engraved on stone, to be set up in

[1] See Table II. in Kirchhoff's *Studien zur Gesch. des Griech. Alphabets* (3rd ed. 1877).

the temple; and the names marking the date were then added by the Delians, who, in making this addition, naturally used their own alphabet. Probably the authorities at Sparta did not know the names or styles of the Delian officials whom it was proper to record, and therefore, in sending the terms, merely directed that such and such Spartan names were to be added beneath; leaving the Delians to complete the task of dating the document. It may be noted that in the latter or Ionian part we find Ω for omega. This sign, as denoting omega, occurs at Miletus about 540 B.C., but not earlier.

But the interest of the new Delian inscriptions culminates in the oldest of all—that which is found on the left side of the archaic bretas representing Artemis. It consists of three hexameter verses, written *βουστροφηδόν*,—the first, from left to right. Reversing the second line, we read:—

ΝΙΚΑΝΔΡΗΜΑΝΕΘΕΚΕΝΒΚΗCΟΛΟΙΙΟΧΕΑΙΡΒΙ
ϘΟΡΗΔΕΙΝΟΔΙΚΒΟΤΟΝΑΒΣΙΟΕΒΣΟΧΟΣΑΛΒΟΝ
ΔΕΙΝΟΜΕΝΕΟΣΔΕΚΑΣΙΛΝΕΤΒΒΡΑΒΣΟΔ
ΑΛΟΧΟΣΜ

that is:

Νικάνδρη μ' ἀνέθηκεν ἑκηβόλῳ ἰοχεαίρῃ,
κούρη Δεινοδίκου τοῦ Ναξίου ἔξοχος ἄλλων,
Δεινομένεος δὲ κασιγνήτη, (Φ)ράξου (?) δ' ἄλο-
χος· μ(ε).

The sculptor's name, with *ἐποίησεν*, may have followed, as M. Homolle thinks. Hitherto the older alphabet of Naxos had been known from only

two inscriptions. 1. One was that on the base of the Naxian colossus of Apollo at Delos, first noticed by Spon, which Bentley read as an iambic trimeter (with hiatus), *ταὐτοῦ λίθου εἰμ' ἀνδριὰς καὶ τὸ σφέλας*, "I am of one stone, the image and the pedestal." The first letters are (T)OAFYTO, as if *αὐτοῦ* had been written *ἀϝυτοῦ*, a phenomenon in which Kirchhoff[1] could scarcely believe, but which M. Homolle's accurate transcript confirms. 2. The other early Naxian inscription is on a bas-relief at Rhomaïko, a village not far from Orchomenus, on the road to Chaeronea: it reads (Θ)*ελξήνωρ ἐποίησεν ὁ Νάξιος· ἀλλ' ἐσίδεσθε*.

Both these inscriptions may be referred to the end of the sixth or beginning of the fifth century B.C., say to 520–490 B.C.[2] Now the new inscription has a mark which at once distinguishes it, and affords a presumption that it is older. This is the presence of Ⲏ, with three horizontal bars, instead of H. The form Ⲏ occurs in the inscription by the mercenaries of Psammitichus at Abu-Simbel (circ. 620 B.C.), in the older inscriptions of Thera, and in others of which the date may be placed before or about 540 B.C. The later form H occurs in texts of Melos and Paros, from about 540 B.C., and in the Rhomaïko inscription from Naxos. In both its shapes—the older Ⲏ and the later H—this character is found serving a double purpose: (1) normally to denote

[1] *Studien*, p. 73.

[2] "Etwa um die Schneide des sechsten und fünften Jahrhunderts," *ib.* p. 78.

the long *e*: (2) *occasionally* to denote the rough breathing—the use for which the Western alphabets regularly reserved it.

But our inscription presents new modifications of these uses:—

(1) In ΘκηβόλῳΘ *by itself* denotes *epsilon with the rough breathing*.

(2) In ΔεινοδικΘο, for Δεινοδίκου, it perhaps serves, as M. Homolle suggests, to aspirate the κ. While koppa was in use[1], it, not kappa, was preferred before *o* and *u*. Where kappa was so placed, the need of a complementary sound may have been felt. As, however, we have ϙόρη, it is not easy to see why we have not Δεινοδιϙο. Θ does not strengthen ο to ου, for we have simply το Ναξιο for τοῦ Ναξίου.

(3) In ΝαΘσίο ἔΘσοχος, Θσ stands for ξ, which in the older inscriptions is normally expressed by χσ. Thus Θ *alone* stands for an aspirated κ, just as above for an aspirated ε.

(4) Most remarkable of all is ΑΛΘΟΝ. No one, I think, who examines the facsimile given by M. Homolle will have any doubt that the word is rightly read thus. The letters are, indeed, clear. The preceding ἔξοχος is clear also. After ἔξοχος (which must be *fem.*), in hexameter verse, ἀστῶν is the only alternative which presents itself, and the

[1] The mere presence of the koppa is a point on which it is unsafe to insist here. In Kirchhoff's opinion (*op. cit.* p. 39) the known evidence does not *compel* us to suppose that the koppa had fallen into disuse so early as about Ol. 60 (540 B.C.).

word is certainly not that. Assuming, then, that the writer meant ἄλλων, how are we to explain the spelling? If it was a mere blunder of the stone-cutter, it was at least a strange one. In the Greek ἄλλος yodh does not elsewhere appear under a vowel form: nor is it likely that Θ (originally cheth) should, among its other uses, have served for the yodh. Possibly Θ is here the aspirate; the effect of a double λ in ἄλλ-ων may have been given by writing ἄλ-*h*ων: or, if λ is in itself the archaic equivalent of λλ, the aspirate might be regarded as developed by the double letter[1].

To sum up: (1) the *form* Θ, instead of Η, points to a date earlier than about 540 B.C.; (2) the *use* of Θ is here various and (apparently) inconstant. It denotes long *e*; but long *e* is *also* denoted by Ε, as in ΚΑΣΙΓΝΕΤΗ, ΑΝΕΘΕΚΕΝ. It stands, not only for the aspirate, but also for an aspirated ε, and for an aspirated κ before σ. In specimens of the Eastern alphabets dating from about 600 to 540 B.C. Θ is already fixed to two uses, (1) as the long *e*; (2) occasionally, as the aspirate. The fluctuating and seemingly tentative employments of Θ in our inscription point to a time when the sign Θ had been newly introduced, and when its application still varied with individual or local caprice.

Combining the epigraphic evidence with that afforded by the type of the Artemis, we can scarcely be far wrong if we refer the inscription to about

[1] Another possibility which occurs is that, λ standing for λλ, η is the termination of the feminine stem.

650–600 B.C. It would thus be of approximately the same age as the writing on the colossus at Abu-Simbel, and would rank among the very oldest specimens of Greek writing known to exist. I may remark that C for beta, which this old inscription shows to have been early Naxian, had already been proved for Paros, Siphnos, Thasos, and Ceos. The form Λ for gamma had been proved for the same islands,—also as one (the latest?) of three Cretan forms, and as a form used at Athens both before and after the adoption of the matured Ionic alphabet in 403 B.C.[1]

The object of the foregoing pages has been twofold: first, to arrange the facts derived from the new researches in a general survey of Delian history; secondly, to mark the chief results in special departments, with such comments as they suggested. I have elsewhere sketched for English readers the system of the French school at Athens[2]. It is well exemplified by these labours on ground which demanded so much skill and so much perseverance. Two successive directors, M. Burnouf and M. Dumont, encouraged the efforts of two successive explorers; the work of M. Lebégue in 1873 was completed by that of M. Homolle in 1877, 1878, and 1879. An English society for the promotion of Hellenic studies has a wide field open to it. It might do good service by undertaking the photo-

[1] See Tables I. and II. in Kirchhoff's *Studien*.

[2] *Contemporary Review*, vol. 33, p. 776 (Nov. 1878).

graphic reproduction of the most important Greek manuscripts in the libraries of Europe[1]; the influence of its members might well be employed in promoting the institution of travelling studentships, or other aids to archaeological study abroad; and, without transgressing the bounds of reasonable hope, it might further contemplate the eventual establishment of an English institute at Athens. France and Germany have long possessed such institutes; Russia is now to have one; all that is needed in order to secure a similar advantage for England is the co-operation of those sympathies to which our Society appeals. The value of such a permanent station has frequently been illustrated by fruitful enterprises, but seldom, perhaps, more signally than by the French exploration of Delos.

[1] The cost of photographing the seven plays of Sophocles in the Laurentian MS. (32, 9) at Florence has been estimated at about £500. The number of subscribers (libraries or individuals) in Europe and America would probably be sufficient to warrant this or any similar undertaking.

CÆSAR: A SKETCH[1].

By J. A. Froude, M.A. London, 1879.

In one of his earliest published compositions Macaulay makes Julius Cæsar the central figure in a fragmentary story of which the scene is laid at Rome on the eve of Catiline's conspiracy. The tale opens with a conversation between two of Catiline's friends. Ligarius is strolling back from the Campus Martius to the Forum, when he overtakes Flaminius, who tells him what the political world is saying about the supper-parties at Catiline's house. Cæsar, in particular, has been indicated by Cicero as a dangerous person. Ligarius is astonished. Surely, he says, Cæsar does nothing but gamble, feast, intrigue, read Greek, and write verses. Flaminius, however, knows better. He has just lost a large sum to Cæsar at play, and Cæsar had won the game while carrying on a flirtation which preoccupied him so much that he scarcely looked at the board. "I thought," says Flaminius, "that I had him. All at once I found my counters driven into the corner. Not a piece to move. It cost me two millions of sesterces." While the friends are still talking, the

[1] *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1879.

subject of their conversation comes in sight—the elegant Cæsar, whom the gay youth of Rome take to be merely one of themselves, but whose features can be read more truly by those who have felt his easy mastery of whatever he attempts. Slight as this early production of Macaulay's is, it has always seemed to us to suggest how excellent a subject Cæsar would be for a writer who united the qualifications of an historian with imaginative force and dramatic power. Exact scholarship, laborious research, and literary skill have been abundantly devoted in recent times to the illustration of Cæsar's career; yet after all that has been done by Mommsen and by Drumann, by Merivale and by Long, by M. Victor Duruy and by the Imperial biographer who in his account of the Gallic campaigns has at least made a solid contribution to military archæology, one thing still remained for a writer of Cæsar's life to do—to give us a living picture of the man, faithful to such authentic traits as history has preserved, and lending unity to these by such touches as only a sympathetic imagination can supply. This is what Mr Froude has essayed to do. He has approached his subject not simply as a student of history, but also, and more peculiarly, in the spirit of a creative dramatist. An estimate of his work which aims at seizing that which is really distinctive of it will view it especially in the latter aspect. The book is not properly a critical study of the Fall of the Commonwealth; it is rather an artistic study—a "sketch" as Mr Froude calls it, a

portrait as it might fairly be called—of Cæsar's character and work. The defects of Mr Froude's performance arise in nearly every case from the same general cause. He has gone to the original sources, Latin and Greek, for the history of the period, and he has frequently used them with signal literary skill; but he has not always attended to the precise meaning of the texts on which he relies. The blemishes which result are of two classes. First, there is a certain number of small inaccuracies in regard to the interpretation of particular phrases, or to Roman political antiquities[1]. These inaccuracies lower the claim of the book in a critical sense, but will not, as a rule, seriously mislead the general reader, while the scholar will correct them for himself. Secondly, there are some instances of injustice,

[1] Thus there is a pervading confusion between the technical Roman sense and the ordinary modern sense of "patrician" and "plebeian," which comes out strongly when Mr Froude infers Cæsar's early lack of political ardour from the fact that he had never been a candidate for the tribuneship. Again, Mr Froude seems to think that all the *Leges Juliæ* were Julius Cæsar's. The terms of the Lex Aurelia of 70 B.C. are not accurately described (p. 110), no mention being made of the tribuni ærarii as forming one-third of the judices. The term *equites* is a stumbling-block to Mr Froude; he renders it "young lords" where it simply means "knights" (Sallust, Catil. 49) and "knights" where it means "cavalry" (Cæs. de Bell. Gall. iv. 13). "Libertini" is rendered "sons of freedmen." The "gentile name" is used as if it distinguished men of the same "cognomen" like a modern Christian name, e.g. p. 382. The young Cæsar's complexion is described as "*sallow*" (p. 68), but "candido colore" means "fair" or "pale."

springing chiefly from the same source, to the characters of the secondary personages of the drama; these faults are of a graver nature, and ought to receive the author's attention in the next edition of the work. Thus we would suggest that he should consider carefully what Professor Tyrrell urges in the Preface and Introduction to the first volume of his edition of "Cicero's Letters" regarding Cicero's relations to Cæsar, to Clodius, and to Catiline, and regarding the question of Cæsar's complicity in the Catilinarian plot[1]. The estimate of Tiberius Gracchus is hardly, we think, duly appreciative, and the verdict upon Lucullus appears to us unfairly harsh[2]. But it will not be the object of the following pages to examine the questionable points of Mr Froude's work in minute detail. This task has not been neglected by our predecessors in the criticism of the book; and having indicated the nature and bearing of these minor defects, we may therefore pass at once to the consideration of the larger questions which Mr Froude has raised. The general conception of Cæsar's place in history which the "Sketch" unfolds, apart from those merits or

[1] As Professor Tyrrell remarks (and shows in a note on Cic. Ep. I. xii. § 8), evidence is against the tradition of Cicero having defended Catiline on a charge of malversation in Africa; as it is also against the story of Cicero's intimacy with Clodia. Nor, again, is there any reason for referring *nosti marinas* in Cic. ad Att. i. 16 to an infamous adventure of Clodius.

[2] Pp. 22–24 (where, by the way, Plutarch's account of the breach between Tiberius Gracchus and Scipio Æmilianus is not accurately reproduced), pp. 104, 114, 127, &c.

flaws of workmanship which only the few can appreciate, constitutes its really distinctive interest, and it is to this that our remarks shall be chiefly directed.

The first condition for a just estimate of Cæsar's public character and work is a clear perception of the point which the downward course of the Republic had reached at the moment when he entered on his career. Mr Froude has aimed at satisfying this condition in the most complete manner, and has accordingly devoted several of his earlier chapters to a narrative of Roman affairs from the time of the Gracchi. This method has the advantage of developing his views in fuller detail, but we are inclined to think that it is injurious to the artistic effect of his sketch as a whole. Too long an interval elapses between the opening of the drama and the first appearance of the chief actor. Mr Froude is seldom more effective than in describing the tendencies and characteristics of a period which presents vivid contrasts. In this case his object would, we think, have been better attained if he had compressed his preliminary narrative into a general survey, and had not made the reader wait so long for introduction to the central figure of the story. The first part of the book might be described as a detailed proof that the Roman aristocracy had become no less incapable of governing than the Roman mob. It would not be easy to bring any new charge against the Senate of the declining Republic; but the indictment has never been laid with more rhetorical force

than by Mr Froude. In following the chief points of this indictment, it will be convenient to recognise two periods: the first, from the Gracchi to Sulla; the second, from Sulla to the first consulship of Cæsar.

"The Senate," says Mr Froude, "was the permanent Council of State, and was the real administrator of the empire. The senate had the control of the treasury, conducted the public policy, appointed from its own ranks the governors of the provinces. It was patrician in sentiment, but not necessarily patrician in composition. The members of it had virtually been elected for life by the people, and were almost entirely those who had been quæstors, ædiles, prætors, or consuls; and these offices had been open to the plebeians. It was an aristocracy, in theory a real one, but tending to become, as civilisation went forward, an aristocracy of the rich."

This account is substantially correct, though, as we shall see presently, it scarcely brings out with sufficient clearness the character which had belonged to the Senate before it began to degenerate. We proceed to trace, with Mr Froude, the process by which senatorial rule was finally discredited. "Caius Gracchus had a broader intellect than his brother, and a character considerably less noble. The land question, he perceived, was but one of many questions. The true source of the disorders of the Commonwealth was the Senate itself. The administration of the empire was in the hands of men totally unfit to be trusted with it." Accordingly, after reviving the agrarian law, Caius Gracchus transferred the judicial functions of the Senate to the knights. "How bitterly must such a measure have

been resented by the Senate, which at once robbed them of their protective and profitable privileges, handed them over to be tried by their rivals for their pleasant irregularities, and stamped them at the same time with the brand of dishonesty! How certainly must such a measure have been deserved, when neither consul nor tribune could be found to interpose his veto!" But the Senate were equal to the occasion, and acted after their kind. "Again, as ten years before, the noble lords armed their followers." Caius Gracchus was killed, and "the surviving patriots who were in any way notorious or dangerous were hunted down in legal manner and put to death or banished." From this point down to the Sullan Revolution, Mr Froude represents the Senate as merely going from bad to worse, giving more and more signal proofs, at each new crisis, of shameless selfishness and disastrous incapacity. Jugurtha bribes the senatorial commissioners sent to Africa, and then, "with contemptuous confidence," comes over to Italy, loaded with gold, and bribes the senators themselves at Rome. When the wave of Teutonic invasion comes surging down the northern plains, the prating Senate are as helpless as the howling mob, and the country is saved by Marius and the legions. When the Italians rise in the Social War, and claim the franchise, the Senate discover that they must come to terms if they would escape destruction. They yield, and so gain a breathing-space. Presently the terrible Mithridates crosses the Bosporus, and Greece is up in revolt.

As usual, the Senate are utterly unprepared, and this time there is an explosion of fury at Rome. No fleet, no army; the treasury empty; an aristocracy of millionaires and a bankrupt State; the interests of the Commonwealth sacrificed to fill the purses of the few. The panic-stricken Senate command Sulla to save the Republic. But the people remember who opened the Alps to the Germans; they know how much is to be expected from a continuance of "the accursed system." They insist on having Marius. Sulla asserts his claim by marching on Rome, and then goes away to that campaign by which, after four years, he brings Mithridates to sue for peace on his knees. No sooner is he gone than the democrats rise under Cinna. "Again, as so many times before, the supremacy of the aristocrats had been accompanied with dishonour abroad, and the lawless murder of political adversaries at home." Democracy has its bloody triumph under Marius; and then the triumph of aristocracy is signalised with still more horrible atrocities under Sulla.

The Senate now enters on a fresh phase of existence. As an administrative body, it had hopelessly broken down. Sulla gives it a new lease of life, and sends it forth on a new period of probation. The virtual effect of his reforms was to concentrate all independent power in the Senate; to give it the supreme control, legislative and executive; to make it "omnipotent and irresponsible." Once more it fails, and now the failure is final and decisive. When Cæsar was twenty-four years of age the

situation had already come to be this: the Roman dominion must suffer disruption, or the existing Constitution must be abolished. The mob manifestly could not govern, and the aristocracy had given irrefutable proof that they could not govern either. Sulla had framed for them the most favourable conditions that an absolute aristocrat could invent, and the result was universal disorder. Spain had been reduced to temporary submission only by the assassination of Sertorius. The sea was abandoned to buccaneers. "Wolves calling themselves Roman senators" preyed at will upon the wretched people of the provinces. Honest and industrious men were robbed of their hardly-earned property. Their wives and daughters were dishonoured, and protests only provoked fresh outrage. Nor was there any hope for the unhappy victims, since they were not enduring the transient calamity of rule by a bad man—they were under the indefeasible tyranny of a dead hand. The insurrection of the slaves showed how the very foundations of Roman society were heaving beneath it. It was quelled, and six thousand miserable beings were impaled along the sides of the Italian highways; but the deadly disease was not remedied, it was only inflamed, by forcible repression. As the Servile War showed what Rome had to fear from the despair of the lowest, the conspiracy of Catiline revealed the danger which menaced it from the discontents of men more highly placed. Catiline's followers were not only "the dangerous classes," the parricides, adulterers, forgers, brigands, pirates; their

ranks included ruined men of birth and dissatisfied men of wealth. The fact which gave the conspiracy a plausible significance and a dangerous cohesion was the general disrepute of the government. The trial of Clodius for sacrilege, resulting in his scandalous acquittal, brought fresh infamy on the Senate, causing Cicero, who believed that the Commonwealth had been founded anew in his own consulship, to say, "Unless some god looks favourably on us, all is lost by this single judgment." It was, in fact, the most glaring example which had yet illustrated the depravity of the law courts. The elections to the magistracies became every year more corrupt. Italy was parcelled out into vast estates cultivated by slaves. The colonists of the Gracchan system, the military settlers planted on the lands by Sulla, had alike disappeared, and the agrarian problem remained to be attacked anew. Thus in every department of the State there was a crying need of reform when Cæsar entered on his first consulship. The spirit in which he addressed himself to the task, as conceived by Mr Froude, shall be described in Mr Froude's own words (p. 171):—

"The consulship of Cæsar was the last chance for the Roman aristocracy. He was not a revolutionist. Revolutions are the last desperate remedy when all else has failed. They may create as many evils as they cure, and wise men always hate them. But if revolution was to be escaped, reform was inevitable, and it was for the Senate to choose between the alternatives. Could the noble lords have known then, in that their day, the things that belonged to their peace—could they have forgotten their fish-

ponds and their game preserves, and have remembered that, as the rulers of the civilised world, they had duties which the eternal order of nature would exact at their hands, the shaken constitution might again have regained its stability, and the forms and even the reality of the republic might have continued for another century. It was not to be. Had the Senate been capable of using the opportunity, they would long before have undertaken a reformation for themselves. Even had their eyes been opened, there were disintegrating forces at work which the highest political wisdom could do no more than arrest; and little good is really effected by prolonging artificially the lives of either constitutions or individuals beyond their natural period. From the time when Rome became an empire, mistress of provinces to which she was unable to extend her own liberties, the days of her self-government were numbered. A homogeneous and vigorous people may manage their own affairs under a popular constitution so long as their personal characters remain undegenerate. Parliaments and Senates may represent the general will of the community, and may pass laws and administer them as public sentiment approves. But such bodies can preside successfully only among subjects who are directly represented in them. They are too ignorant, too selfish, too divided, to govern others; and imperial aspirations draw after them, by obvious necessity, an imperial rule. Cæsar may have known this in his heart, yet the most far-seeing statesman will not so trust his own misgivings as to refuse to hope for the regeneration of the institutions into which he is born. He will determine that justice shall be done. Justice is the essence of government, and without justice all forms, democratic or monarchic, are tyrannies alike. But he will work with the existing methods till the inadequacy of them has been proved beyond dispute. Constitutions are never overthrown till they have pronounced sentence on themselves."

Mr Froude's view, then, is this. The Roman Constitution—the Republic with the Senate as the chief depositary of its powers—was irrevocably doomed from the moment that Rome acquired

provinces to which the liberties of the Constitution could not be imparted. But the doom was precipitated by the incapacity and the vices of the order from which the Senate was drawn. Cæsar had a loyal desire to give the Constitution a last chance. This was the motive of his legislation in his consulship. He was affirming the only principles on which the existing fabric could be sustained. The senators "groaned and foamed," but it was Cæsar who was trying to save them in spite of themselves. He did his best; but their incorrigible perversity was too much for his disinterested devotion to the task of healing the commonwealth. His effort failed; and then only one course remained.

The brilliant literary power with which Mr Froude has urged the case against the Senate would lend strength to a weak cause. It is the more impressive because, as every student of history knows, the charges which it enforces contain a large element of truth. The senators who regarded an election as an occasion for giving bribes, and a seat on the judicial bench as an opportunity for receiving them—the senators to whom a provincial government meant a boundless license of rapine, who used the highest offices of state in the unscrupulous service of party or family, who trifled with all grave matters, secular or sacred, and found the serious occupation of life in the superintendence of fish-ponds and aviaries—the senators whose habitual vices were not only those from which modern society revolts, but those which it has agreed not to name—

these "noble lords," as Mr Froude delights, with questionable taste, to call them, are by no means imaginary persons. Yet, as we follow the course of the eloquent impeachment, the impression gradually produced upon our mind resembles that described by a listener who was present in Westminster Hall when a master of invective not inferior to Cicero denounced the man who, in a distant province of our Empire, had abused responsibilities vaster than those committed to Verres. The vigour, the imagination, the fire of Burke's opening narrative enchained the audience, but when he passed from narrative to comment,—when the charges of rapacity, cruelty, tyranny were reiterated in general terms,—his declamatory vehemence broke the spell. Mr Froude's statement of the case against the Roman Senate has a similar effect upon us. He first elicits the damning eloquence of facts, and then overlays it with the rhetoric of denunciation.

It is evident that two distinct questions are involved in Mr Froude's statement of the political situation in the last years of the Roman Republic. The first question is: Was the maintenance of the Constitution essentially incompatible with the imperial position which Rome had acquired by foreign conquest? The second question is: Were the actual circumstances of the Constitution so desperate that there was nothing left for Cæsar to do but "to found the military monarchy," or, in other words, to make himself absolute?

The change made in the position of Rome by

conquests beyond the Italian peninsula consisted in the extension of Roman power over subjects who could not become citizens. The privileges of free membership in the commonwealth might possibly be imparted to all Italians; but they could not be received, still less exercised, by the heterogeneous mass of populations who successively yielded to the Roman arms. If the practical difficulties of communication imposed by distance and by language could have been overcome, more insuperable obstacles would have remained. Deeply ingrained differences of civilisation, utterly alien modes of thought, would have made it impossible for the foreign races to coalesce into a free civic body with the members of the Italian commonwealth; and, had it been otherwise, their adoption into that body would have been barred by the scorn with which the meanest of the victorious people regarded the noblest of the vanquished. So much must be fully conceded to those who maintain that the military monarchy was a necessity. The basis on which the government of the Republic rested could not have been widened in such a manner as to bring within the circle of its liberties all those around whom it had drawn the girdle of its dominion. Henceforth the self-governing Republic had also to govern dependents. The conditions for a successful performance of this latter task were mainly two—first, a thoroughly efficient military administration; secondly, a supply of provincial governors with adequate political training, and under adequate control. The

Senate, Mr Froude holds, was "too ignorant, too selfish, too divided," to satisfy these conditions. We shall come presently to the actual state of things which confronted Cæsar. We are now enquiring whether the Roman Constitution was essentially and necessarily unequal to such a work. As Mr Froude says, the Senate was "in theory" a real aristocracy. But we must remember that it had not always been so "in theory" alone. During the most brilliant period of Roman history it had been a real aristocracy in fact. Government by the Senate was the result of the struggle between patricians and plebeians; and it was the Senate that ruled Rome from the end of the Samnite wars to the conquest of Macedonia—that is, during the earlier and more arduous part of her progress from Italian supremacy to universal empire. The Senate of this period was not an oligarchy of birth or wealth, but a body of practical statesmen, representing the best popular judgment, and protected by life-tenure from servility to popular caprice. Its control of the treasury, of the magistracies, and of foreign affairs was firm enough for political stability, but not too absolute for freedom. The periodical scrutiny by the censors was not as yet a hollow form or a pedantic farce, but operated as an efficient moral check. Above all, the Senate was responsible to an intelligent public opinion, which afforded the best guarantee against reckless appointments or corrupt measures, making itself felt both as an impulse and as a restraint. Mommsen holds as decidedly as Mr Froude that

Cæsar obeyed a necessity when he overthrew the Constitution. In quoting Mommsen's description, then, of the Senate as it was at its best, we are not adducing the evidence of a too partial witness :—

"Called to power not through the empty accident of birth, but substantially through the free choice of the nation ; confirmed every five years by the stern moral judgment of the worthiest men ; holding office for life, and so not dependent on the expiration of its commission or on the varying opinion of the people ; having its ranks close and united ever after the equalisation of the orders ; embracing in it all that the people possessed of political intelligence and practical statesmanship ; absolutely disposing of all financial questions and controlling foreign policy ; having complete power over the executive by virtue of its brief duration and of the tribunitian intercession which was at the service of the Senate after the termination of the quarrels between the orders—the Roman Senate was the noblest embodiment of the nation, and in consistency and political sagacity, in unanimity and patriotism, in grasp of power and unwavering courage, the foremost political corporation of all times—an 'assembly of kings' which well knew how to combine despotic energy with republican self-devotedness."

The "despotic energy" of such a Senate was calculated to be at least as effective, for the purposes of empire over foreign subjects, as the despotic energy of a single will ; while on other grounds it was decidedly to be preferred, as not depending on the equilibrium of a single character or the term of a single life. This was proved by experiment. For more than a century and a half the Senate efficiently discharged imperial duties, duties the same in kind, though not so wide in scope, as those which were afterwards performed by the military monarchy.

The increasing compass of the Roman dominion might demand many modifications of detail, the addition of many special appliances, in the constitutional machinery. But it cannot be said that the scheme of the Constitution itself was essentially and fundamentally inadequate to imperial requirements. If the act by which Cæsar overthrew the Constitution is to be defended as a political necessity, it must be defended on the ground that the Constitution had become diseased beyond the hope of remedy.

The process of decay, which the Gracchi made the first serious effort to arrest, might be described as the break-up of an aristocratic commonwealth into two elements, an oligarchy and a rabble. The Senate was losing public spirit, and the people were becoming incapable of expressing or enforcing a public opinion. Sulla's legislation was the crisis. It does not greatly matter, for our present purpose, what precise view we are to take of Sulla's personal character and genius. The high-born voluptuary who, tearing himself away from dinner-parties and actresses, condescends to become the greatest soldier and then the greatest statesman of his age, and finally, having made these sacrifices, returns to the pursuits of his choice, has naturally exercised the imagination of literary artists. We may conceive him, if we please, as the inspired Don Juan of politics, or we may take the prosaic view, and set him down as a more ordinary compound of ability, cruelty, and lust. But at any rate there is no doubt as to the distinctive mark of his work. It was the

remodelling of an oligarchy by an oligarch. The oligarchy was almost destitute of virtues, and the oligarch was wholly exempt from illusions. To paraphrase his own saying, he built the fortress, but he could not answer for the garrison. Mr Froude thoroughly appreciates this aspect of the achievement; but it has another aspect to which, we think, he scarcely does justice. Sulla was, indeed, an aristocrat of the aristocrats; his object was to place the rule of the aristocracy on a permanent basis; but in doing this he was not merely the champion of the optimates against the democrats; he was what any clear-sighted legislator, armed with such powers, must necessarily be in such times—the vindicator of order against anarchy. Montesquieu is by no means a great admirer of Sulla; he points out various ways in which Sulla undermined the Republic, by relaxing the discipline and stimulating the avidity of the army, by setting the example of entering Rome in arms, and so violating the asylum of liberty, by those proscriptions which made men feel that there was no safety save in the camp of a faction, and thus estranged them from the common cause. But he recognises that Sulla's measures were at least calculated to restore the reign of law; and therefore, we think, Montesquieu's view of Sulla is, on the whole, fairer than Mr Froude's. The system which Sulla established could not, indeed, escape early disaster when administered by the men in whose hands he was compelled to leave it; nor, even if these administrators had been more efficient, could

it have been permanent without reform. Still, we must credit Sulla with having made the best, on his own principles, of an almost desperate situation. On the assumption that an oligarchy must bear rule by the strong hand, the first duty of legislative prudence was to construct an impregnable citadel. A less prejudiced observer might probably have seen then, as it is more easy for us moderns, wise after the event, to see now, that this assumption was fatal to the oligarchy itself, and disastrous to the commonwealth. At the moment when Sulla interposed, two courses were possible, though not equally easy. One course, that which Sulla took, was to reconstitute the oligarchy in the oligarchic sense, by a more intense concentration of powers. The other course, more difficult, but perfectly feasible for an able and resolute dictator, was to reform the oligarchy in the direction of true aristocracy, by bringing the Senate back as much as possible to the type of that Senate which had ruled Rome from the overthrow of the Samnites to the overthrow of Carthage. A man who had attempted this would have offended the ultra-oligarchs and failed to satisfy the ultra-democrats; but the Right Centre and the Left Centre would have been with him; and, with the peculiar powers of a Roman dictator, he might have left the irreconcilables to be converted by the soothing counsels of time or the sharper admonitions of self-interest. The first step towards the successful attainment of this object would have been to recruit the Senate, not, as Sulla did, exclusively from that

order of which it embodied the vices, but in a certain proportion, to be gradually increased, from the educated part of the upper middle class, or, in Roman phrase, from the best Equites. The next step would have been a Land Act, having for its object to restore the class of small farmers, and so to create a healthy nucleus for a lower middle class. When Sulla planted his military colonies, he was the Cadmus of agrarian reform; he was sowing the face of the land with dragon-seed from which armed men were to start up. The gradual disappearance of these settlements under the grinding pressure from above meant not only what the failure of the Gracchan scheme meant, the extinction of so many peasant-holders; it meant, further, that the active elements of disorder were reinforced by innumerable adventurers of military instinct and aptitude, ready for any civil war that promised to repair their fortunes. The distempers of government and society with which Sulla attempted to deal were already beyond the reach of normal legislation, which might occasionally mitigate the virulence of particular symptoms, but could not penetrate to the deeper springs of evil. A dictator, with plenary authority and of intrepid ability, was indispensable, if the progress of the disease was to be arrested. Such a dictator, acting in the temporary political vacuum caused by the suspension of ordinary forces, might replenish the failing sources of health, reinvigorate the sound parts of the Constitution, and, after the breathing-space which his own supremacy secured,

launch it on a new term of existence, in which the fortified powers of life should battle with better hope against the insidious approaches of decay and death. The decline of the Republic presents only two moments at which such a dictator appeared and such an enterprise was possible. The first moment was when Sulla stood triumphant above the prostrate democracy, and used his victory to entrench the oligarchy in the most unassailable position that he could devise. The second moment was when the end of the Civil War left Cæsar supreme over the Roman world.

The peculiar fascination of Cæsar's career for our days depends partly on the rather delusive facility with which modern society, especially perhaps English society, thinks to recognise its own features in the Roman society of Cæsar's time. The mirror is hardly flattering—certainly not when it is held up by the deft hand of Mr Froude.

"It was an age of material progress and material civilisation; an age of civil liberty and intellectual culture; an age of pamphlets and epigrams, of salons and dinner parties, of senatorial majorities and electoral corruption. The highest offices of state were open in theory to the meanest citizen; they were confined in fact to those who had the longest purses, or the most ready use of the tongue on popular platforms. Distinctions of birth had been exchanged for distinctions of wealth. The struggles between plebeians and patricians for equality of privilege were over, and a new division had been formed between the party of property and a party who desired a change in the structure of society. The free cultivators were disappearing from the soil. Italy was being absorbed into vast estates, held by a few favoured families and cultivated by slaves, while the old agricultural population was

driven off the land and was crowded into towns. The rich were extravagant, for life had ceased to have practical interest, except for its material pleasures; the occupation of the higher classes was to obtain money without labour, and to spend it in idle enjoyment. Patriotism survived on the lips, but patriotism meant the ascendency of the party which would maintain the existing order of things, or would overthrow it for a more equal distribution of the good things which alone were valued. Religion, once the foundation of the laws and rule of personal conduct, had subsided into opinion. The educated, in their hearts, disbelieved it. Temples were still built with increasing splendour; the established forms were scrupulously observed. Public men spoke conventionally of Providence, that they might throw on their opponents the odium of impiety; but of genuine belief that life had any serious meaning, there was none remaining beyond the circle of the silent, patient, ignorant multitude. The whole spiritual atmosphere was saturated with cant—cant moral, cant political, cant religious; an affectation of high principle which had ceased to touch the conduct, and flowed on in an increasing volume of insincere and unreal speech."

Social resemblances between widely different ages may be interesting and instructive even when they are little more than superficial; they become dangerous only when they are made the basis of false political parallelisms; and, unlike some writers of the day, Mr Froude has avoided this error. Yet when he says that "on the great subjects of human interest, on morals and politics, on poetry and art, even on religion itself and the speculative problems of life, men (in Cæsar's time) thought as we think, doubted where we doubt, argued as we argue, aspired and struggled after the same objects," he is surely stating an analogy too much as if it were an identity. The moral and mental history of modern

civilisation may produce fruits which, at a certain stage of growth, resemble the fruits of two thousand years ago ; but they are of a different stock, and, as their root is different, so will be their distinctive development. When Kingsley sought to show us "old friends with new faces" in the Roman Empire of the fourth century, he created one of the most powerful characters in fiction, Raphael ben Ezra ; and as surely as Raphael ben Ezra is an intelligent sceptic of the nineteenth century in ancient costume, so surely are the men of Cæsar's age, even when they come upon the stage amid scenic accessories of a modern cast, widely separated in mind and heart from our own. We are not, of course, questioning the analogy which Mr Froude has traced with such vivid effect ; but we think that it is important to guard more carefully than he has done against supposing the analogy to be something more. A literal interpretation of the infelicitous platitude that "history repeats itself" has often set students of the past on a false track, and has sometimes lent colour to political sophistries—never more signally than in our own time, and never more audaciously than when the alleged precedent has been drawn from the life of Cæsar. In Cæsar's character there is this special attraction for the modern historian or essayist, that it furnishes him with a magnificent outline which he can fill up very much as he pleases. In a conjectural biography of Shakespeare it would be desirable to avoid representing him as morosely ascetic, or as consumed by a restless solicitude

regarding the fate of his publications; and similarly there are a few cardinal errors which every well-informed biographer of Cæsar is expected to shun. Cæsar must not be drawn as an intemperate conqueror or an ambitious visionary; but when his "clemency," his self-mastery, his inexhaustible energy, and the intensely practical character of his comprehensive genius have been noted, all the subtler traits of personality, all those living touches which distinguish a man from a list of qualities, may be supplied with a large freedom of discretion.

No one has seen this more clearly than Mommsen, or has turned it with more brilliant effect into a crowning theme of passionate panegyric. This character without characteristics, he exclaims, is but a nature without deformity or defect. "As the artist can paint everything except consummate beauty, so the historian, when once in a thousand years he falls in with the perfect, can only be silent regarding it. For normality admits doubtless of being expressed, but it gives us only the negative notion of the absence of defect; the secret of nature, whereby in her most finished manifestations normality and individuality are combined, is beyond expression." And so the rapture which thus declares itself inarticulate has no resource but an enthusiastic parody of the immortal lover's words, "beati gli occhi chi la videro viva," blessed are the eyes which beheld that perfection in the flesh. Such perfection, it need not be added, would not have overturned the Roman Constitution to gratify

personal ambition, or unless this had been the best course which the loftiest human wisdom could devise. Mommsen justifies the act of Cæsar in substituting his own rule for that of the Senate by precisely the same reasoning which he employs to justify the Senate of an earlier period for superseding the rule of the people. In each case the usurpation was rendered legitimate by "exclusive ability to govern."

Now it is perfectly true that the Senate, as Cæsar found it at the end of the Civil War, had become incapable of governing. The question is whether Cæsar, armed with the powers of the dictatorship, could not have reformed the Senate on a firmer basis than that selected, at the last opportunity, by Sulla—on the basis, namely, not of oligarchy, but of true aristocracy—of the Conservative Republic; and whether, when Cæsar, instead of doing this, established "the military monarchy"—that is, made himself military autocrat—he was obeying the dictates of necessity or of ambition. For our part, we believe that, as all Cæsar's abilities united to make him a consummate impersonation of the Roman faculty of command, so the sovereign motive of his nature was the love of power. Very possibly he may have brought himself to believe that no other course was open to him than that which he adopted. Such a mental phenomenon has not been rare when supreme gifts have had to struggle with supreme temptation. But when it is asserted that there was nothing else possible for him

to do, this is an assumption which would not even be plausible were it not for Cæsar's towering eminence in practical ability, military and political, above all the other men of his day. His advocates, who usually delight in theoretic apologies for their practical hero, might almost quote Aristotle's remark that, if you can only find your god-like man, then clearly you ought to make him king.

This personal pre-eminence has in our day enlisted in Cæsar's cause three strains of sympathy, two of which are more or less respectable, while the third has had the prestige of success. The worshippers of heroic force have grovelled before him with all the humility of their strong hearts; those who believe that Providence is always to be found with the big battalions have recognised in Cæsar an instrument of Heaven; and the doctrine that a soldier of fortune is entitled to be a military autocrat, if he can, has paid Cæsar the compliment of distorting his name. Mommsen is a philosophic panegyrist of force, who appears to have the ambition of proving how completely a man of letters may be exempt from everything like weak sentiment. His adoration of victorious strength, more cynical than Carlyle's, is capable not only of idealising unscrupulous success, but also of spurning noble defeat; there is too much of *væ victis* in his way of describing the fall of the Commonwealth—the sword is hurled with too open bravado into the scale; and if his eloquent rhapsody on Cæsar has the excuse of a generous extravagance, common sense and fairness

are alike shocked when we are asked to believe that Cicero was a nonentity who could not excel even in oratory, and when Cato's epitaph is a remark on the irony of the fate which had decreed that the epilogue of a great tragedy should be spoken by the fool. But Mommsen has at least taken care that his defence of Cæsar's autocracy on the plea of "exclusive ability to govern" shall not be confounded with modern Cæsarism. History, he says, must not refuse due honour to the true Cæsar because her verdict may help false Cæsars to beguile the unwary. "History, too, is a Bible, and if she cannot any more than the Bible hinder the fool from misunderstanding and the Devil from quoting her, she, too, will be able to bear with and to requite them both."

The appeal of modern Cæsarism to the career of Julius Cæsar involves, in fact, a double fallacy. The first fallacy consists in representing Cæsar as expressing and fulfilling the will of the people by founding the military monarchy. Cæsar happened, indeed, to have been at the head of the popular party, and that fact contributed in several ways to make his assumption of supreme power more plausible; but the will which he expressed and fulfilled when he became absolute was neither that of the democracy nor that of the oligarchy; it was a more important one, namely, his own. If Pompey had conquered in the Civil War, he also might have founded a military absolutism, had his qualities been equal to the task; but modern apologists would then have found it more difficult to represent the vic-

torious leader of the oligarchy as interpreting the desire of the people. The second fallacy consists in supposing that such a crisis as that which had arrived in the Roman society of Cæsar's day could really recur in a modern society which is not based on slavery, and which possesses representative institutions. The only part of the nineteenth-century world in which such a crisis was even possible has been secured against that remote contingency by the events which saved the integrity of the American Union. A theory of imperialism which ignores these profound differences is spanning an impassable gulf with a bridge of cobwebs. Mr Froude's view of Cæsar's work has thus much in common with the two which have been noticed, that he also regards it as a work of necessity. He thus sums up the situation at the close of the Civil War (p. 435):—

"Thus bloodily ended the civil war which the Senate of Rome had undertaken against Cæsar to escape the reforms which were threatened by his second consulship. They had involuntarily rendered their country the best service which they were capable of conferring upon it, for the attempts which Cæsar would have made to amend a system too decayed to benefit by the process had been rendered for ever impossible by their persistence. The free constitution of the Republic had issued at last in elections which were a mockery of representation, in courts of law which were an insult to justice, and in the conversion of the provinces of the empire into the feeding grounds of a gluttonous aristocracy. In the army alone the Roman character and the Roman honour survived. In the imperator, therefore, as chief of the army, the care of the provinces, the direction of public policy, the sovereign authority in the last appeal, could alone thenceforward reside. The Senate might remain as a Council of State; the magistrates

might bear their old names and administer their old functions. But the authority of the executive government lay in the loyalty, the morality, and the patriotism of the legions to whom the power had been transferred. Fortunately for Rome, the change came before decay had eaten into the bone, and the genius of the empire had still a refuge from platform oratory and senatorial wrangling in the heart of her soldiers."

The flaw in the reasoning here consists in omitting to distinguish between the position occupied by Cæsar in his first consulship, before the Civil War, and the position which he occupied as dictator at the end of it. Sulla, before his decisive victory over the Marian party, might have tried in vain to carry the measures which he afterwards enforced during the period of his temporary supremacy. Cæsar, as consul in 59 B.C., may have found that the evils of the existing system could not be cured by such piecemeal remedies as the limited resources of ordinary legislation permitted. But it does not follow that a system which cannot be successfully tinkered is therefore incapable of being effectively reconstituted. As master of Rome in 45 B.C., Cæsar had an opportunity of applying such larger and more drastic measures as would have gone to the roots of the disease. He might have endeavoured, by the infusion of a sound element from the equestrian order, to make the Senate once more that which it so long was—not an oligarchy, but a real aristocracy. He might have made a vigorous attempt, for which no similar opening had presented itself since Sulla's time, to restore a healthy public opinion, as a

moderating and controlling force in the State, by an agrarian reform which should revive the rural middle class, now sunk in the gulf between the oligarchy and the rabble. If he had pursued these objects with the whole energy of his unrivalled gift for discovering means to any end which he desired, and if he had failed, then, indeed, the military monarchy would stand justified at the bar of history as the least of the evils which an inexorable necessity offered. But his armed self-reliance despaired of the Republic. The only cure which he could find for the distempers of Rome was similar to that which an observer at a safe distance once recommended for the griefs of Ireland; he plunged the forms of the Constitution beneath the flood, and when they rose again to the surface they were no longer tenanted by any living soul that could thwart him with resistance or complaint. The fact that a thing has happened is always a temptation for an ingenious mind to demonstrate that nothing else could have happened. If William III. had given us a military despotism instead of a Whig aristocracy, it would long ago have been proved that the stars in their courses were fighting against everything except that precise result. Cæsar, as we read his history, was a man of intense personal ambition, who attained his goal; having this peculiar good fortune, that when, by extraordinary gifts of character and intellect, he had reached a certain point, the circumstances of the time threw a veil over the final transformation scene of his career. A usurper, in passing from the position

of first citizen to that of despot, has usually had to force a few barricades, to strike a few foul blows, before he could pose upon the summit with a serene halo around his brow, the acknowledged saviour of society. Cæsar, once victorious in the Civil War, was stopped by no barricades; he was confronted with his own conscience. It is possible to hold, as we do, that his military absolutism probably was not a necessity, and that a defence of his usurpation which postulates that necessity rests upon an unproved assumption. But on the other hand the task of demonstrating that he could have saved the Republic is made impossible by the fact that, as dictator, he did not try. It is also his advantage that the benefits of law and order which he conferred on Rome are brought into the clearest relief by a background of terrible anarchy and misery. At such a time it is of minor importance whether the man who establishes a strong government is actuated mainly by the love of power or by a disinterested devotion to the commonweal. If he is capable of large and clear views, if he has the requisite energy and patience, he must in either case do a vast amount of good. The crimes and errors of Sulla do not prevent our recognising his merit in this sense; and Sulla can no more be compared with Cæsar than the temporary services which Sulla rendered to the cause of order can be compared with the massive stability of that protection under which Cæsar's legislation placed the life of civilised mankind.

The legend which Titian has made immortal told how, when Charles V. died, the accusing angel came before the heavenly tribunal, urging crimes which no defence could palliate, and how the Supreme Judge himself vindicated the offending soul from the Destroyer, declaring that its stern mission on the earth had been given from above. It is thus, says Mr Froude, that we are to deem of Cæsar :—

"Of Cæsar, too, it may be said that he came into the world at a special time and for a special object. The old religions were dead, from the Pillars of Hercules to the Euphrates and the Nile, and the principles on which human society had been constructed were dead also. There remained of spiritual conviction only the common and human sense of justice and morality; and out of this sense some ordered system of government had to be constructed, under which quiet men could live and labour and eat the fruit of their industry. Under a rule of this material kind, there can be no enthusiasm, no chivalry, no saintly aspirations, no patriotism of the heroic type. It was not to last for ever. A new life was about to dawn for mankind. Poetry and faith and devotion were to spring again out of the seeds which were sleeping in the heart of humanity. But the life which is to endure grows slowly; and as the soil must be prepared before the wheat can be sown, so before the kingdom of Heaven could throw up its shoots there was needed a kingdom of this world where the nations were neither torn in pieces by violence, nor were rushing after false ideals and spurious ambitions. Such a kingdom was the empire of the Cæsars—a kingdom where peaceful men could work, think, and speak as they pleased, and travel freely among provinces ruled for the most part by Gallios who protected life and property, and forbade fanatics to tear each other in pieces for their religious opinions."

This is a nobler conception of Cæsar's place in

history than that which rests on the apotheosis of intelligent force; nobler, also, and truer than the view of modern Cæsarism, which differs from Mr Froude's about as widely as a "providential man" differs from a human Providence. But Mr Froude's statement requires some modification before it can bear scrutiny in the cold light of historical fact. It is true that the establishment of imperial order, the repression of such local violence as might otherwise have been exerted by local fanaticism, was so much gained in favour of Christianity, and Mr Froude may be right in conjecturing that, if St Paul had escaped the clutches of an independent Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, he would certainly have been torn to pieces by autonomous silversmiths at Ephesus. If, however, we have any lingering doubts as to whether Cæsar was obeying a necessity when he destroyed the Roman Constitution, these doubts are hardly removed by the suggestion that Providence meant him to pave the way for Christianity; since, though the establishment of imperial order may have been in favour of nascent Christianity, there is one thing which, so far as we can see, would have been more favourable to it still—namely, the establishment of order without the loss of those healthy conditions of public and private life which political freedom tends to conserve, and which despotism sooner or later crushes. The Empire meant political order, but it meant also moral deterioration, boundless luxury and enormous sensuality, a depravity among the highest of the earth from which, even in this

age, men dare not withdraw the veil of the dead language to which its hideous secrets were committed by the biographers of emperors, an abject baseness of servility in the vulgar of every rank which can be measured only by the facilities of torture and murder belonging to the human monster whom they adored as a god and dreaded as a fiend, a wide-spread corruption of everything that distinguishes man from the lowest of the brutes, and a fierce exaggeration of every instinct that he shares with them.

If the foundation of the Empire by Cæsar is to be interpreted as a providential arrangement designed to favour the early progress of Christianity, it will be necessary to complete Mr Froude's picture of it, as a reign of law, by arguing that its moral corruption enervated qualities which might otherwise have rallied to the defence of paganism. We have no desire to enter now upon so extensive a field of controversy; but there is one aspect of the matter which the literature of Cæsar's age, and that of the age which immediately succeeded it, brings vividly before every reader. The purest and loftiest characters of the early Empire had this in common with the vilest: they were never very far from the conclusion that life had ceased to be worth living, and that it was better to die than to live. A Roman letter-writer of the first century tells how he was once sailing on Lake Como when a friend pointed out a villa on the shore with a balcony projecting over the water, and described what had lately occurred there. The master of the villa had long

suffered from an agonising disease; his wife had besought him that she might see with her own eyes the frightful ulcers that were its seat, saying that no physician would tell him so faithfully as she whether there was any hope of cure. She saw, and despaired; then she gave him her counsel—to die—and said that she would die with him; she bound him to her side, and they sprang together into the lake. The hopeless anguish of that incurable sufferer was but a type of the despair which preyed on many a Roman from whom bodily health could not avert the sickness of the spirit, whom riches could not reconcile to an existence without worthy objects of ambition, whom studious leisure could not compensate for the loss of political energy, or poetry console for the extinction of faith; the true companion who told him the worst, and, as she had helped him to bear his pain, so now exhorted him to end it with a constant mind, was the Stoic philosophy—not deserting him even on the brink of the dark lake, but nerving him with a resolution which was not his own, and yet which was not divine, to spring into the unknown depths.

Against such men, and such were the representatives of the highest moral fortitude that remained to Roman paganism, Christianity came in the strength of an enthusiastic hope, fearing death as little as the Roman feared it, but, unlike the Roman, not afraid to live. And then at last an hour arrived when the new religion was received as an indwelling spirit into the mighty fabric of the Empire, when the kingdom

of this world, secular still, became also the kingdom of Christ, when the pillars that upbore the Roman State and the paths that Rome had opened over land and sea sustained a structure and carried a message that were to remain when her dominion had fallen. "Rome alone," cries Claudian, "has taken the conquered to her bosom, and has made men to be one household with one name, and has linked far places in a bond of charity. Hers is that large loyalty to which we owe it that the stranger walks in a strange land as if it were his own, that men can change their homes, that it is a pastime to visit Thule and to explore mysteries at which once we shuddered, that we drink at will the waters of the Rhone and the Orontes, that the whole earth is one people." The benefits which Claudian describes as conferred by the Empire on the temporal intercourse of mankind were shared by the œcumenical commonwealth of the Church; and these benefits, indeed, took their origin from the military despotism which Julius Cæsar founded. But this ultimate result must not be allowed to reflect an unreal glory on the process by which that despotism was first established. Our judgment on the act by which a soldier and statesman of surpassing genius crowned a career of unparalleled success must not be confused by the fancy which would consecrate this act as a necessary part in the scheme of a beneficent Providence. To regard the special work of Cæsar as a direct preparation for the work of Christ is less extravagant, but not essentially less illogical, than it would be to

suggest that the moral influence of the Gospel had providentially prepared the Roman world to appreciate the virtues of Marcus Antoninus.

We have indicated those aspects of Cæsar's public character and achievement in which our estimate differs fundamentally from that formed by Mr Froude. But any notice of his book would be very incomplete which concluded without a cordial acknowledgment of its many excellences. A literary artist of such brilliant accomplishments as Mr Froude could scarcely have finer subjects than the Gallic campaigns and the civil war. It might be said that Mr Froude's narrative has the two merits which most conspicuously distinguished Cæsar's strategy, clearness of plan and swiftness of movement. Nothing could be better than the following statement of Cæsar's position at the beginning of the war in Gaul, and of the peculiar feature of the task which lay before him (p. 203):—

"The points in his favour were these. He was the ablest Roman then living, and he had the power of attracting and attaching the ablest men to his service. He had five years in which to look about him and to act at leisure—as much time as had been given Pompey for the East. Like Pompey, too, he was perfectly free. No senatorial officials could encumber him with orders from home. The people had given him his command, and to the people alone he was responsible. Lastly, and beyond everything, he could rely with certainty on the material with which he had to work. The Roman legionaries were no longer yeomen taken from the plough or shopkeepers from the street. They were men more completely trained in every variety of accomplishment than have perhaps ever followed a general into the field before or since. It was not enough that they could use

sword and lance. The campaign on which Cæsar was about to enter was fought with spade and pick and axe and hatchet. Corps of engineers he may have had; but if the engineers designed the work, the execution lay with the army. . . . How the legionaries acquired these various arts, whether the Italian peasantry were generally educated in such occupations, or whether on this occasion there was a special selection of the best, of this we have no information. Certain only it was that men and instruments were as excellent in their kind as honesty and skill could make them; and however degenerate the patricians and corrupt the legislature, there was sound stuff somewhere in the Roman Constitution."

A sign, we would venture to remind Mr Froude, that there was one department, at all events, in which the Senate had not been such an utter failure —the administration of the army; and also that the Constitution, sick as it might be, was perhaps not so very sick that there was nothing left for it but to receive the *coup de grâce*. Mr Froude's power of description finds admirable scope in many of the striking scenes which the campaigns present. We would instance as good examples—and there are many others hardly inferior—Cæsar's battle with the Nervii (p. 221), the battle of Pharsalia (p. 389), Cæsar's repression of the mutiny in the Tenth Legion (p. 415), and the occasion in the African campaign when he dismissed five of his officers for misconduct, after addressing them severally before the assembled tribunes and centurions (p. 422). In these and similar cases, Mr Froude has preserved much of the rapid brevity of the Commentaries, while he has skilfully added such dramatic touches

as are required to light up the picture for a modern reader.

Another merit of Mr Froude's sketch is, that he has not sacrificed the secondary characters of his history to the hero. We may occasionally differ from him as to their relative importance or the particular complexion of each, but at least there has been a disposition to do impartial justice. Mommsen set the example of offering a holocaust of reputations at the shrine of his idol, and Mommsen's treatment of Cato, still more of Cicero, is one of the glaring blots upon his work. The imperial biographer of Cæsar dealt more mildly with the dilemma arising from the theory with which he set out; but the general result was that the disreputable persons who had helped Cæsar got off rather easily, and the respectable persons who had opposed him were fortunate if they came in for a little faint praise. Mr Froude surveys the period from a higher point of view, and, if generous to Cæsar, can still afford to be just to Cæsar's contemporaries. Pompey has sometimes been described by the adorers of Cæsar as a sort of anti-Christ, a false light, a lying spirit, an incarnate opposition to the truth. Mr Froude paints him in less imposing colours, as a mock hero who did not even know that he was a sham. "His end was piteous, but scarcely tragic, for the cause to which he was sacrificed was too slightly removed from being ignominious. He was no Phœbus Apollo sinking into the ocean, surrounded with glory. He was not even a brilliant meteor. He was a weak,

good man, whom accident had thrust into a place to which he was unequal; and ignorant of himself, and unwilling to part with his imaginary greatness, he was flung down with careless cruelty by the forces which were dividing the world." We are inclined to agree with this estimate; and one reason for believing in its general correctness is, to our mind, the fact that Cicero's intimate knowledge and keen insight had led him to much the same conclusion. Mr Froude's view that Cicero's vanity estranged him from Cæsar's party, because he could not be the first man in it, is, we think, a complete misconception. Cicero had finally chosen his side long before Cæsar had become the foremost Roman: and, for that matter, it was Pompey, not Cicero, whom the Optimates regarded as their head. But, without viewing Cicero as an alarmed egotist, we may admit that no one was better qualified to appreciate the difference between the two leaders. "Cicero," says Mr Froude, "is the second great figure in the history of the time." He describes him as "a tragic combination of magnificent talents, high aspirations, and true desire to do right, with an infirmity of purpose and a latent insincerity of character which neutralised and could almost make us forget his nobler qualities."

"In Cicero Nature half made a great man and left him uncompleted. Our characters are written in our forms, and the bust of Cicero is the key to his history. The brow is broad and strong, the nose large, the lips tightly compressed, the features lean and keen from restless intellectual energy. The loose bending

figure, the neck, too weak for the weight of the head, explain the infirmity of will, the passion, the cunning, the vanity, the absence of manliness and veracity. He was born into an age of violence with which he was too feeble to contend. The gratitude of mankind for his literary excellence will for ever preserve his memory from too harsh a judgment."

We sincerely hope that it may; but we think of Dr Mommsen, and our confidence is abated. Immoderate disparagement usually, indeed, corrects itself; and we hail Mr Froude's judgment as a symptom that it is still possible for a modern writer to speak of Cicero in other tones than those of absolute contempt. There is one peculiarity of Cicero's position in history which is so obvious that it would not deserve mention if it were not so constantly forgotten. We have the "Letters," to which he confided every one of those weaknesses which a public man usually aims at concealing from all but his most intimate friends. Every trait of personal vanity, every passing impulse of self-interest, every momentary vacillation of purpose is laid bare before us, to be studied with the same leisurely attention which we devote to Cæsar's modest narrative of his mighty exploits. The modern world is Cicero's valet. Let us suppose that the younger Pliny had been a prominent actor in a great political drama. What detrimental inferences might not a writer with a robust scorn for little infirmities have drawn from the ten books of epistles in which Pliny unfolds how candid friends slowly persuaded him that he was an execrable reader of poetry, and

consults one of them as to whether it would be advisable for him to accompany the reading of his freedman with dumb show; or celebrates the praises of his own oratory; or relates how a provincial, hearing that an eminent literary man was at table, exclaimed, "It must be Tacitus or Pliny!" Even Mr Froude, we think, has not made sufficient allowance for the terrible disadvantage which Cicero sustains, relatively to his greatest contemporaries, by being known to us as he was known to his own innermost circle. The character of Cato is less complex, so far as history reveals it, but not, perhaps, less difficult to judge fairly. Mr Froude says—as we think, with good reason—that Cato's animosity to Cæsar "had been originally the natural antipathy which a man of narrow understanding instinctively feels for a man of genius. It had been converted by perpetual disappointment into a monomania, and Cæsar had become to him the incarnation of every quality and every principle which he most abhorred." Much of the truth, though not the whole truth, is told in these words:—

> "*Ultimus Romanorum* has been the epitaph which posterity has written on the tomb of Cato. Nobler Romans than he lived after him; and a genuine son of the old Republic would never have consented to surrender an imperial province to a barbarian prince. But at least he was an open enemy. He would not, like his nephew Brutus, have pretended to be Cæsar's friend, that he might the more conveniently drive a dagger into his side."

This is not Cato's highest praise. His understanding was, indeed, narrow; his political animosities

were usually perverse and sometimes malevolent; the programme of the party which he supported could not have saved the Commonwealth, and he himself had not the qualities of a political leader. But the moral cause which he identified with his politics—the cause of honesty and purity in public and private life—was represented by the Republicans whose forlorn hope he led, or it was destitute of representatives in Rome. His "virtue" may have been illiberal, it may often have been impracticable; such as it was, however, it was the only extant antithesis to unblushing corruption and triumphant violence.

We would fain have parted from Mr Froude with a simple record of the pleasure which his "Sketch" has given us, and of the admiration which we feel for the literary power with which it has been executed, widely as we dissent from the conception of Cæsar's career upon which it rests. But we cannot conclude without a word of remark on the resemblance—"strange and startling" indeed, as Mr Froude calls it—which the last lines of the book briefly suggest between the founder of the kingdom of this world and the Founder of a kingdom not of this world. To say that the work of Cæsar was designed by Providence to prepare the work of Christ is a different proposition; that we have already discussed. Here we find the suggestion of a parallel between the personal life of Cæsar and the personal life of Christ. Mr Froude has abstained from developing this paradox, and we shall imitate his reticence, merely expressing our belief that, if it would be easy

to compare Cæsar with Christ, it would be still more easy, and considerably more true, to draw the most absolute contrast between them. The tendency to exalt great characters by suggesting the likeness at which Mr Froude hints is alarmingly on the increase in the literature of the day, and we look forward with apprehension to a time when no "tribute" to an imperial policy will be considered complete unless the wreath is inwoven with some delicate allusion of this nature, however distasteful such a comparison might be to the intended recipient. Neither the heavenly nor the earthly king is honoured by rendering to Cæsar that which is not Cæsar's.

ERASMUS[1].

Desiderius Erasmus was born at Rotterdam on the 27th of October, 1467. His father, Gerhard de Praet, belonged to a respectable family at Gouda, a small town of South Holland, not far from Rotterdam: his mother, Margaret, was the daughter of a physician at Sevenberg in Brabant. Gerhard's parents were resolved that he should become a monk. Meanwhile he was secretly betrothed to Margaret. His family succeeded in preventing their marriage, but not their union. After the birth of a son—the elder and only brother of Erasmus—Gerhard fled to Rome. A false rumour of Margaret's death there induced him, in his despair, to enter the priesthood. On returning to Holland, he found Margaret living at Gouda with his two boys. He was true to the irrevocable vows which parted him from her. After a few years, during which the supervision of their children's education had been a common solace, she died, while still young; and Gerhard, broken-hearted, soon followed her to the grave.

The boy afterwards so famous had been given his father's Christian name, Gerhard, meaning "beloved." Desiderius is barbarous Latin for that,

[1] The Rede Lecture, delivered in the Senate-House at Cambridge on June 11, 1890. Reprinted from the second edition, 1897.

and Erasmus is barbarous Greek for it. If the great scholar devised those appellations for himself, it must have been at an early age. Afterwards, when he stood godfather to the son of his friend Froben the printer, he gave the boy the correct form of his own second name,—viz., Erasmius. The combination, Desiderius Erasmus, is probably due to the fact that he had been known as Gerhard Gerhardson. It was a singular fortune for a master of literary style to be designated by two words which mean the same thing, and are both incorrect.

He was sent to school at Gouda when he was four years old. Here it was perceived that he had a fine voice ; and so he was taken to Utrecht, and placed in the Cathedral choir. But he had no gift for music. At nine years of age he was removed from Utrecht to a good school at Deventer. His precocious genius soon showed itself, and his future eminence was predicted by the famous Rudolph Agricola—one of the first men who brought the new learning across the Alps.

Erasmus was only thirteen when he lost both parents, and was left to the care of three guardians. They wished him to become a monk : it was the simplest way to dispose of a ward. The boy loathed the idea ; he knew his father's story ; and now it seemed as if the same shadow was to fall on his own life also. However, the guardians sent him to a monastic seminary at Hertogenbosch, where the brethren undertook to prepare youth for the cloister. The three years which he spent there—*i.e.*, from

thirteen to sixteen—were wholly wasted and miserable: he learned nothing, and his health, never strong, was injured by cruel severities. "The plan of these men," he said afterwards, "when they see a boy of high and lively spirit, is to break and humble it by stripes, by threats, by reproaches, and various other means." The struggle with the monks and his guardians was a long one; when menaces failed, they tried blandishments,—especially they promised him a paradise of literary leisure. At last he gave in. When he was about eighteen, he took the vows of a Canon Regular of the order of St Augustine. Looking back afterwards on the arts by which he had been won, he asks, "What is kidnapping, if this is not?"

The next five years—till he was twenty-three—were spent in his monastery at Stein, near Gouda. The general life of the place was odious to him; but he found one friend, named William Hermann. They used to read the Latin classics together—secretly, for such studies were viewed with some suspicion. It was then that he laid the basis of his Latin style, and became thoroughly familiar with some of the best Latin authors.

In 1491 he left the monastery, having been invited by the Bishop of Cambray, Henry de Bergis, to reside with him as his secretary. Soon afterwards he took orders; and the Bishop subsequently enabled him to enter the University of Paris, for the purpose of studying theology. He was then, perhaps, about twenty-seven years of age.

At this point we may attempt,—aided by Holbein, and by tradition—to form some idea of his personal appearance. Erasmus was a rather small man, slight, but well-built; he had, as became a Teuton, blue eyes, yellowish or light brown hair, and a fair complexion. The face is a remarkable one. It has two chief characteristics,—quiet, watchful sagacity,—and humour, half playful, half sarcastic. The eyes are calm, critical, steadily observant, with a half-latent twinkle in them; the nose is straight, rather long, and pointed; the rippling curves of the large mouth indicate a certain energetic vivacity of temperament, and tenacity of purpose; while the pose of the head suggests vigilant caution, almost timidity. As we continue to study the features, they speak more and more clearly of insight and refinement; of a worldly yet very gentle shrewdness; of cheerful self-mastery; and of a mind which has its weapons ready at every instant. But there is no suggestion of enthusiasm,—unless it be the literary enthusiasm of a student. It is difficult to imagine those cool eyes kindled by any glow of passion, or that genial serenity broken by a spiritual struggle. This man, we feel, would be an intellectual champion of truth and reason; his wit might be as the spear of Ithuriel, and his satire as the sword of Gideon; but he has not the face of a hero or a martyr.

On entering the University of Paris, Erasmus took up his residence at the Montaigu College. It was on the south side of the Seine, not far from the Sorbonne, and is said to have stood on the site now

occupied by the Library of St Geneviève. The Rector of the College was a man of estimable character; but he believed in extreme privation—which he had himself endured in youth—as the best school for students of theology. Erasmus has described the life there. The work imposed on the students was excessively severe. They were also half starved; meat was proscribed altogether; eggs, usually the reverse of fresh, formed the staple of food; the inmates had to fetch their drinking water from a polluted well. When wine was allowed, it was such as implied by the nickname "Vinegar College" (a Latin pun on Montaigu). Many of the sleeping-rooms were on a ground-floor where the plaster was mouldering on the damp walls, and in such a neighbourhood that the air breathed by the sleepers—when they could sleep—was pestilential. One year's experience of this place—these are the words of Erasmus—doomed many youths of the brightest gifts and promise either to death, or to blindness, or to madness, or to leprosy; "some of these," he says, "I knew myself,—and assuredly every one of us ran the danger." Similar testimony is given by his younger contemporary, Rabelais:—"The unhappy creatures at that College are treated worse than galley-slaves among the Moors and Tartars, or than murderers in a criminal prison."

No wonder Erasmus, a delicate man at the best, soon fell ill; indeed, his constitution was permanently impaired. He went back to the Bishop at Cambray. Then, after a short visit to Holland, he returned to

Paris—but not to the Montaigu College. He rented a one-room lodging, and resolved to support himself during his University course by taking private pupils. It was a hard struggle that he went through then; but better days were at hand. He had already become known in Paris as a scholar of brilliant promise, and especially as an admirable Latinist. Latin was then the general language, not only of learning, but of polite intercourse between persons of different nationalities; and to speak Latin with fluent grace—an art in which Erasmus was already pre-eminent—was the best passport to cultivated society in Paris, whose University attracted students from all countries. Then he had a bright and nimble fancy, a keen sense of humour, a frank manner, and also rare tact; in short, he was a delightful companion, without ever seeking to dominate his company. One of his pupils was a young Englishman, William Blunt, Lord Mountjoy, who was studying at Paris. Mountjoy settled an annual pension of a hundred crowns on Erasmus, and presently persuaded him to visit England.

This was in 1498. Erasmus was now thirty-one. For eighteen years—ever since he left the school at Deventer—his life had been a hard one. The coarse rigours of Hertogenbosch, the midnight oil of Stein, the miseries of the Montaigu College, the later battle with poverty in Paris—all these had left their marks on that slight form, and that keen, calm face. Men who met him in England must have found it difficult to believe that he was so young. The

sallow cheeks, the sunken eyes, the bent shoulders, the worn air of the whole man seemed to speak of a more advanced age. But neither then, nor at any later time, was he other than youthful in buoyant vivacity of spirit, in restless activity of mind, in untiring capacity for work.

And now a new world opened before him. In England he was not only an honoured guest, but, for the first time, perhaps, since he left school, he found himself among men from whom he had something to learn. He went to Oxford, with a letter of introduction to Richard Charnock, Prior of a house of his own order, the Canons Regular of St Augustine, and was hospitably received by him in the College of St Mary the Virgin. At that time the scholastic theology and philosophy still held the field in both the English Universities—as everywhere else, north of the Alps. But at Oxford there were a few eminent men who had studied the new learning in Italy, and had brought the love for it home with them. Erasmus was just too late to see William Selling of All Souls College, who died in 1495,—one of the first Englishmen who endeavoured to introduce Greek studies in this country. And he was too early to meet William Lilly, who was still abroad then. But he met some other scholars, who were among the earliest teachers or advocates of Greek at Oxford,—William Grocyn, William Latimer, and Thomas Linacre;—the last-named, who became Founder of the Royal College of Physicians, had studied at Florence under Politian

and Chalcondyles. Erasmus speaks with especial praise of Grocyn's comprehensive learning, and of Linacre's finished taste. It is certain that his intercourse with the Oxford Hellenists must have been both instructive and stimulating to him; we can see, too, that it strengthened his desire to visit Italy. On the other hand, his letters show that when he left Oxford in 1500, he had not advanced far in the study of Greek. The years from 1500 to 1505, during which he worked intensely hard at Greek by himself in Paris, were those in which his knowledge of that language was chiefly built up.

The two Oxonians with whom Erasmus formed the closest friendship were John Colet and Thomas More. Colet was just a year his senior, and was then lecturing on St Paul's Epistles in what was quite a new way,—endeavouring to bring out their meaning historically and practically. He was not a Greek scholar; but it was he who, more than anyone else, encouraged Erasmus to print the New Testament in the original tongue. Thomas More, who was then a youth of twenty, had left Oxford, and was reading law in London, where Erasmus first met him. The story that they met at dinner, and that, before an introduction, each recognised the other by his wit, is perhaps apocryphal. At any rate, it expresses the truth that such perfectly congenial minds would be drawn to each other at once.

In the winter of 1499 Erasmus visited Lord Mountjoy at Greenwich. It would seem, too, that he had a glimpse of Henry VII.'s Court. He writes

that he has become "a better horseman, and a tolerable courtier." In January, 1500, just before Erasmus left England, Thomas More went down from London to Greenwich, to say farewell,—bringing with him another young lawyer named Arnold. More proposed a walk, and took his friends to call at a large house in the neighbouring village of Eltham. They were shown into a hall where some children were at play: it was, in fact, the royal nursery. The eldest, a boy of nine years old, was the future Henry VIII.; he was not then Prince of Wales, but Duke of York, his brother Arthur being still alive. The tutor in charge of the children was John Skelton, the poet. Three days afterwards, in fulfilment of a promise, Erasmus sent the little Prince a Latin poem; it is in praise of England, and of Henry VII. There is no doubt that the praise of England came from his heart: his letters show that.

At the end of January, 1500, he sailed from Dover for France. A serious mishap befell him just before he went on board. He carried with him a considerable sum of money, contributed by friends for the purpose of enabling him to visit Italy. The custom-house officers at Dover deprived him of nearly the whole, on plea of a law forbidding the exportation of gold coin of the realm above a certain amount. His friends at court afterwards tried to recover it for him,—but in vain. On reaching Paris, he fell ill. When he recovered, he set hard to work. The next five years were spent chiefly at Paris, with occasional visits to Orleans or the Netherlands.

They form a quiet yet memorable period of his life. In 1500 he published his first collection of proverbial sayings from the classics,—the *Adagia*,—which, in its enlarged form, afterwards brought him so much fame. And during these years his incessant labour at Greek gradually qualified him for yet greater tasks. He had no teacher in Paris; and, though not absolutely in want, he had difficulty in buying all the books that he required.

Towards the end of 1505 Erasmus paid a second visit to England,—staying only about six months. On this occasion he visited Cambridge. The Grace Book of our University shows that permission was given to Desiderius Erasmus to take the degrees of B.D. and D.D. by accumulation. It would seem, however, that he took the degree of B.D. only; so Dr John Caius says, and he must be right, if it is true that in the doctor's diploma which Erasmus received at Turin in 1506 he was described as a bachelor of theology. Had he possessed the higher degree, it would have been mentioned in the Turin document. During this second visit he saw a good deal of More and other old acquaintances. Grocyn took him to Lambeth, and introduced him to Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor of England,—who, in the sequel, was one of his best friends.

He had now become able to realise the dream of his youth—to visit Italy. It was arranged that he should accompany the two sons of Dr Baptista Boyer, chief physician to Henry VII., who were

going to Genoa; a royal courier was to escort them as far as Bologna[1]. The party left Dover in the spring of 1506, and were tossed about for four days in the Channel. After a rest at Paris, they set out on horseback for Turin. Erasmus has vividly described the squalid German inns, which he contrasts with those of France. Another discomfort of the journey was that the tutor and the courier quarrelled a good deal. At Turin—his companions having left him—he stayed several weeks, and received from the University the degree of Doctor in Theology.

The stay of Erasmus in Italy lasted three years —from the summer of 1506 to that of 1509. It is well to remember what was the general state of things in Italy at that time,—for the impressions which Erasmus received there had a strong and lasting effect upon his mind. In literature the humanistic revival had now passed its zenith, and was declining into that frivolous pedantry which Erasmus afterwards satirised in the "Ciceronian." Architecture, sculpture and painting were indeed active; Bramante, Michael Angelo and Raphael were at work. But the fact which chiefly arrested the attention of Erasmus was that Italian soil was the common ground on which the princes of Europe were prosecuting their intricate ambitions, and that the Pope had unsheathed the sword in pursuit of temporal advantage. Julius II. was already an elderly man, but full of military ardour. Venice

[1] *Sic* (A. W. V.).

seemed to be his ulterior object; meanwhile, in the autumn of 1506, he had reduced Perugia and Bologna. Erasmus was in Bologna when the Pope entered in November, and the late roses of that strangely mild autumn were strewn in his path by the shouting multitudes who hailed him as a warrior equal to his Roman namesake of old, the conqueror of Gaul. Erasmus was at Rome, too, in the following March, when the Pope celebrated his triumph with a martial pomp which no Caesar could have surpassed. Then came the revolt of Genoa from France,—the futile war of Maximilian, "Emperor Elect," against Venice,—and lastly the iniquitous League of Cambray, by which Maximilian, the Pope, Louis XII. and Ferdinand of Spain banded themselves together for the spoliation of the Venetian Republic. Such things as these sank deep into the heart of Erasmus. "When princes purpose to exhaust a commonwealth"—he wrote afterwards—"they speak of a just war; when they unite for that object, they call it peace."

But there was a bright side also to his years in Italy; in many places he enjoyed intercourse with learned men; and he formed some enduring friendships. At Venice he spent several months with Aldus in 1508, and saw an enlarged edition of the *Adagia* through his famous press. The kind of reputation which he had now won may be seen from his own account of his visit to Cardinal Grimani at Rome, in 1509: it is a characteristic little story, and ought to be told in his own words. "There was no

one to be seen in the courtyard of the Cardinal's palace," he says, "or in the entrance-hall...I went upstairs alone. I passed through the first, the second, the third room;—still no one to be seen, and not a door shut; I could not help wondering at the solitude. Coming to the last room, I there found only one person,—a Greek, I thought,—a physician,—with his head shaved, standing at the open door. I asked him if I could see the Cardinal; he replied that he was in an inner room, with some visitors. As I said no more, he asked me my business. I replied, 'I wished to pay my respects to him, if it had been convenient, but as he is engaged, I will call again.' I was just going away, but paused at a window to look at the view; the Greek came back to me, and asked if I wished to leave any message. 'You need not disturb him,' I said,—'I will call again soon.' Then he asked my name, and I told him. The instant he heard it, before I could stop him, he hurried into the inner room, and quickly returning, begged me not to go—I should be admitted directly. The Cardinal received me, not as a man of his high degree might have received one of my humble condition, but like an equal: a chair was placed for me, and we conversed for more than two hours. He would not even allow me to be uncovered,—a wonderful condescension in a man of his rank." Grimani pressed Erasmus to stay permanently at Rome. But he replied that he had just received a summons to England, which left him no choice.

In the April of that year, 1509, the little boy whom Erasmus had seen in the nursery at Eltham had become Henry VIII.; and in May, Mountjoy had written to his old tutor, urging him to return. Erasmus reached England early in the summer of 1510. Soon afterwards, in More's house at Bucklersbury, he rapidly wrote his famous satire, the *Encomium Moriae*, or "Praise of Folly," in which Folly celebrates her own praises as the great source of human pleasures. He had been meditating this piece on the long journey from Rome; it is a kaleidoscope of his experiences in Italy, and of earlier memories. As to the title, *Moria*, the Greek word for "folly," was a playful allusion, of course, to the name of his wise and witty host. This "Praise of Folly" is a satire, not only in the modern but in the original sense of that word,—a medley. All classes, all callings, are sportively viewed on the weak side. But in relation to the author's own life and times, the most important topics are the various abuses in the Church, the pedantries of the schoolmen, and the selfish wars of kings. If this eloquent Folly, as Erasmus presents her, most often wears the mocking smile of Lucian or Voltaire, there are moments also when she wields the terrible lash of Juvenal or of Swift. The popularity of the satire, throughout Europe, was boundless. The mask of jest which it wore was its safeguard; how undignified, how absurd it would have been for a Pope or a King to care what was said by Folly! And, just for that reason, the *Encomium Moriae* must be

reckoned among the forces which prepared the Reformation.

Where was Erasmus to settle now? That was the great question for him. He decided it by going to Cambridge, on the invitation of Fisher, the Bishop of Rochester, who was then Chancellor of the University. Rooms were assigned to him in Queens' College, of which Fisher had been President a few years before. In that beautiful old cloister at Queens', where the spirit of the fifteenth century seems to linger, an entrance at the south-east corner gives access to a small court which is known as the court of Erasmus. His lodgings were in a square turret of red brick at the south-east angle of the court. His study was probably a good-sized room which is now used as a lecture room; on the floor above this was his bedroom, with an adjoining attic for his servant. From the south windows of these rooms—looking on the modern Silver Street—he had a wide view over what was then open country, interspersed with cornfields; the windings of the river could be seen as far as the Trumpington woods. The walk on the west side of the Cam, which is called the walk of Erasmus, was not laid out till 1684: in his time it was open ground, with probably no trees upon it. His first letter from Cambridge is dated Dec. 1510, and this date must be right, or nearly so. He says himself that he taught Greek here before he lectured on theology; and also that, after his arrival, the commencement of his Greek teaching was delayed by ill-health. Now he

was elected to the Lady Margaret Professorship of Divinity in 1511, and in those days the election was ordered to take place on the last day of term before the Long Vacation. His residence, then, can hardly have begun later than the early part of 1511.

It is interesting to think of him—now a man of forty-four, but prematurely old in appearance—moving about the narrow streets or quiet courts of that medieval Cambridge which was just about to become the modern—a transformation due, in no small measure, to the influence of his own labours. Eleven of our colleges existed. Peterhouse was in the third century of its life; others also were of a venerable age. Erasmus would have heard the rumour that a house of his own order, the Hospital of the Brethren of St John, was about to be merged in a new and more splendid foundation, the College of St John the Evangelist. Where Trinity College now stands, he would have seen the separate institutions which, after another generation, were to be united by Henry VIII.; he would have seen a hostel of the Benedictines where Magdalene College was soon to arise; the Franciscans on the site of Sidney Sussex, and the Dominicans on the site of Emmanuel. North of Queens' College, he would have found the convent of the Carmelites; and then, rising in lonely majesty—with no other College buildings as yet on its south side—the chapel of King's, completed as to the walls, but not yet roofed.

When Erasmus began his Greek lectures in his

rooms at Queens', his text-book was the elementary grammar of Manuel Chrysoloras, entitled the "Questions,"—which had been the standard book all through the fifteenth century. He next took up the larger and more advanced grammar of Theodorus Gaza, published in 1495,—which he afterwards translated into Latin. We have a specimen of his own Greek composition at this period. In 1511 he went from Cambridge to visit the celebrated shrine of the Virgin at Walsingham in Norfolk—the same where, two years later, Queen Catherine gave thanks after the battle of Flodden. As a votive offering, he hung up on the wall a short set of Greek iambics, which are extant: they are to the effect that, while others bring rich gifts and crave worldly blessings, he asks only for a pure heart. There are some faults of metre, but the diction is classical and idiomatic: probably no one in Europe at that time, unless it were Budaeus, could have written better. When Erasmus revisited Walsingham a little later, he found that these verses had sorely puzzled the monks and their friends; there had been much wiping of eye-glasses; and opinions differed as to whether the characters were Arabic, or purely arbitrary. Erasmus did not get many hearers for his Greek lectures, and was rather disappointed; but some, at least, of his pupils were ardent; thus he describes Henry Bullock of Queens'—the "Bovillus" of his letters—as "working hard at Greek." And the impulse which he gave can be judged from the rapid progress of the new learning at Cambridge.

Writing to him in 1516—three years after he had left—Bullock says, "people here are devoting themselves eagerly to Greek literature." In a letter to Everard, the Stadtholder of Holland, in 1520, Erasmus says:—"Theology is flourishing at Paris and at Cambridge as nowhere else: and why? Because they are adapting themselves to the tendencies of the age; because the new studies, which are ready, if need be, to storm an entrance, are not repelled by them as foes, but received as welcome guests." In another letter he remarks that, while Greek studies have been instituted in both the English Universities, at Cambridge they are pursued peacefully (*tranquille*),—owing, he says, to Fisher's influence. He is alluding to those struggles at Oxford between the adherents of the schoolmen and the new learning which came to a head in the "Trojan" and "Grecian" riots of 1519, and led to Wolsey's founding the readership of Greek. Oxford had been, in England, the great theological University of the middle ages, and the scholastic system died hardest there.

Erasmus taught Greek without any formal appointment, so far as we know, from the University; though Fisher, the Chancellor, may have arranged that he should receive a stipend. The first man formally appointed Greek reader was Richard Croke in 1519; who speaks, indeed, of Erasmus as having been "professor of Greek," but probably means simply lecturer. The official status of Erasmus was that of Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity. The

election to the Chair was then biennial. At the end of his term—*i.e.*, in the summer of 1513—Erasmus was re-elected. This is a noteworthy fact. The electing body comprised the whole Faculty of Theology, regulars as well as seculars. The "Praise of Folly" must by that time have been well-known here. If Erasmus was not universally acceptable to the schoolmen or to the monks of Cambridge, at any rate the general respect for his character and attainments carried the day.

When we try to imagine him in his rooms at Queens', we are not to picture him as a popular teacher, with the youth of the university crowding to learn from him; his life here was that of a recluse student, in weak health, whose surroundings were in some respects uncongenial to him, but who had a group of devoted pupils, and some chosen older friends. From 1508 to the end of his life he suffered from a painful organic disease, which obliged him to be careful of his diet. When he dined in the old College hall at Queens', above the west cloister—now part of the President's Lodge—the ghosts of the College benefactors, whose heads are carved on the oak wainscoting, would have been grieved if they could have known what he thought of Cambridge beverages; he writes to his Italian friend Ammonius—afterwards Latin Secretary to Henry VIII.—begging for a cask of Greek wine. His favourite exercise was riding; and he made frequent excursions. Meanwhile he accomplished a surprising amount of work. He was busy with the text of

Seneca, with translations from Basil, with Latin manuals for St Paul's School, just founded by his friend Colet—and with much else. It was here that he began revising the text of Jerome's works. "My mind is in such a glow over Jerome," he writes, "that I could fancy myself actually inspired." But there is one labour above all that entitles those rooms in the old tower at Queens' to be reckoned among the sacred places of literature. It was there in 1512 that the Lady Margaret Professor completed a collation of the Greek Text of the New Testament. Four years later, his edition—the first ever published—appeared at Basle.

In 1513 Cambridge was visited by the plague, and nearly every one fled from it. During some months of the autumn, Erasmus had scarcely heard a foot-fall in the cloister beneath his rooms. At the end of the year, he finally left the University. Some of his reasons for going can be conjectured from his letters. They express disappointment with England; and they speak of poverty. It is well to observe the sense in which these complaints are to be understood. After 1510 Erasmus was never actually indigent. Archbishop Warham had offered him the Rectory of Aldington in Kent; Erasmus declined it, because he could not speak English—he never learned any modern language, and besides his own vernacular, spoke Latin only: then Warham gave him a pension from the benefice. Fisher and Mountjoy were also liberal. At Cambridge, with these resources, and the stipend of his Chair, it has

been computed that his income must have been equivalent to about £700 at the present day. But his mode of living, though not profuse, was not frugal. Thus he himself enumerates the following heads of his expenditure ;—servants ("*famulorum*") —the aid of amanuenses—the cost of keeping a horse, or horses (ἱπποτροφία)—frequent journeys—and social or charitable obligations : he disliked, he says, to be penurious ("*hic animus abhorrens a sordibus*"). The fact seems to be that he had formed exaggerated hopes of what Henry VIII. would do for him. His immediate motive for departure, however, was probably the desire to supervise the printing of the Greek Testament. There was then no English press where such a work could be done so well as abroad. He had heard that Froben, the famous printer at Basle, was about to publish the works of Jerome ; and to Basle he went. Another circumstance helped to decide him. Prince Charles,—afterwards the Emperor Charles V., —had offered him the post of honorary privy-councillor, with a pension,—and this without binding him to live in the Netherlands. At this time Erasmus would have been welcomed in any country of Europe ; Cardinal Canossa, the Papal legate, was anxious to secure him for Rome. At a later period, when his fame stood yet higher, Henry VIII. would have been glad to lure him back ; but it was then too late.

So, in 1514, Erasmus left England—not to return, except for a few months in the following

year. He was now forty-seven. Twenty-two years of life remained to him. The history of these years is essentially that of his untiring and astonishing literary activity. In his external life there is little to record beyond changes of residence,—from Basle to the University of Louvain in Brabant,—from Louvain back to Basle,—from Basle to Freiburg,—and once more to Basle, where, in 1536, he died. The clue to this later period is given by two threads, which are indeed but strands of a single cord,—his influence on the revival of learning, and his attitude towards the Reformation.

In the younger days of Erasmus the Italian cultivation of classical literature had attained its highest point, and was already verging towards decline. More than a century had passed since Petrarch had kindled the first enthusiasm. It requires some effort of the imagination for us to realise what that movement meant. The men of the fourteenth century lived under a Church which claimed the surrender of the reason, not only in matters of faith, but in all knowledge: philosophy and science could speak only by the doctors whom she sanctioned. When the fourteenth century began to study the classics, the first feeling was one of joy in the newly revealed dignity of the human mind; it was a strange and delightful thing, as they gradually came to know the great writers of ancient Greece and Rome, to see the reason moving freely, exploring, speculating, discussing, without restraint. And then those children of the middle age were

surprised and charmed by the forms of classical expression,—so different from anything that had been familiar to them. Borrowing an old Latin word, they called this new learning *humanity*; for them, however, the phrase had a depth of meaning undreamt of by Cicero. Now, for the first time, they felt that they had entered into full possession of themselves; nothing is more characteristic of the Italian renaissance than the self-asserting individuality of the chief actors; each strives to throw the work of his own spirit into relief; the common life falls into the back-ground; the history of that age is the history of men rather than of communities.

In the progress of this Italian humanism three chief phases may be roughly distinguished. The first closes with the end of the fourteenth century,—the time of Petrarch and his immediate followers,—the morning-time of discovery. Then, in the first half of the fifteenth century, the discovered materials were classified, and organised in great libraries; Greek manuscripts, too, were translated into Latin,—not that the versions might be taken as substitutes for the original, but to aid the study of Greek itself. The men of this second period were gathered around Cosmo de' Medici at Florence, or Nicholas V. at Rome. The third stage was that in which criticism, both of form and of matter, was carried to a higher level, chiefly by the joint efforts of scholars grouped in select societies or academies, such as the Platonic academy at Florence, of which Ficino was the

centre. The greatest man of this time,—the greatest genius of the literary renaissance in Italy,—was Angelo Poliziano; he died in 1494, when Erasmus was twenty-seven.

With Erasmus a new period opens. Two things broadly distinguish him, as a scholar, from the men before and after him. First, he was not only a refined humanist, writing for the fastidious few, and prizing no judgment but theirs; he took the most profitable authors of antiquity,—profitable in a moral as well as a literary sense,—chose out the best things in them,—and sought to make these things widely known,—applying their wisdom or wit to the circumstances of his own day. Secondly, in all his work he had an educational aim,—and this of the largest kind. The evils of his age,—in Church, in State, in the daily lives of men,—seemed to him to have their roots in ignorance,—ignorance of what Christianity meant,—ignorance of what the Bible taught,—ignorance of what the noblest and most gifted minds of the past, whether Christian or pagan, had contributed to the instruction of the human race. Let true knowledge only spread, and under its enlightening and humanising influence a purer religion and a better morality will gradually prevail. Erasmus was a man of the world; but with his keen intellect, so quickly susceptible to all impressions, he made the mistake, not uncommon for such temperaments, of overrating the rapidity with which intellectual influences permeate the masses of mankind. However, no one was ever more per-

sistently or brilliantly true to an idea than Erasmus was to his; and it is wonderful how much he achieved.

His services to the new learning took various forms. He wrote school-books, bringing out his view that boys were kept too long over grammar, and ought to begin reading some good author as soon as possible. His own *Colloquies* were meant partly as models of colloquial Latin; the book was long a standard one in education. These lively dialogues are prose idylls with an ethical purpose,—the dramatic expression of the writer's views on the life of the day. Thus the dialogue between the Learned Lady and the Abbot depicts monastic illiteracy; that between the Soldier and the Carthusian brings out the seamy side of the military calling. Lucian has influenced the form; but the dramatic skill which blends earnestness with humour is the author's own; there are touches here and there which might fairly be called Shakspearian. Then he made collections of striking thoughts and fine passages in the classics. His chief book of this kind was the *Adagia*. Many of the classical proverbs are made texts for little essays on the affairs of the day. Thus he takes up a Latin proverb, "The beetle pursues the eagle"—based on the fable of the beetle avenging itself for an insult by destroying the eagle's eggs—the moral being that the most exalted wrong-doer is never safe from the vengeance of the humblest victim. This suggests to him an ingenious satire on the

misdeeds of great princes—typified by the eagle—and their results. Later in life, he brought out the *Apophthegms*—a collection of good sayings, chiefly from Plutarch. His editions of classical authors were numerous: the best was that of Terence,—his favourite poet; the next best was that of Seneca. His principal editions of Greek authors belong to the last five years of his life, and were less important. Speaking of these editions generally, we may say that they were valuable in two ways,—by making the authors themselves more accessible, and by furnishing improved texts. Then he made many Latin translations from Greek poetry and prose. Mention is due also to his dialogue on the pronunciation of Greek and Latin,—published in 1528. It was especially a protest against the confusion of the vowels in the modern Greek pronunciation, and against the modern disregard of quantity in favour of the stress accent. His views ultimately fixed the continental pronunciation of Greek, which is still known in Greece by his name (ἡ Ἐράσμου προφορά). At Cambridge it was introduced a little later by Thomas Smith and John Cheke. Along with this dialogue appeared another,—the amusing *Ciceronian*. It is an appeal to common-sense against an absurd affectation which marked the dotage of Italian humanism. Bembo and his disciples would not use a single word or phrase which did not occur in Cicero. Their purism moreover rejected all modern terms: a Cardinal became an "augur," a nun a "vestal," the Papal tiara was "the fillet of Romulus."

Most ludicrous of all, because Cicero was a statesman, the modern Ciceronian, writing to his friends from the profound seclusion of his study, deemed it a stylistic duty to imply that he lived in a vortex of politics. The gist of what Erasmus says is merely that other ancients besides Cicero wrote good Latin, and that a true Ciceronianism would adjust itself to its surroundings. No one, it should be added, had a more intelligent admiration for Cicero than Erasmus himself.

We see, then, the peculiar place which he holds in the history of the new learning. It may be allowed that, if the study of classical antiquity be viewed as a progressive science, he did much less to advance it than was done by some other great scholars of a later period. He did not enlarge the boundaries of knowledge in that field as they were afterwards enlarged by the special labours of Joseph Scaliger, of Isaac Casaubon, or of Richard Bentley. But the work which Erasmus did was one which, at that time, was of the first necessity for the northern nations. In his genial, popular way he made them feel the value and charm of the classics as literature; he himself was, in fact, a learned man of letters rather than a critical specialist. Let us remember what the state of northern Europe, as regards literature, was in his boyhood. It was sunk,—to use his own words,—in utter barbarism. To know Greek was the next thing to heresy. "I did my best," he says, "to deliver the rising generation from this slough of ignorance, and to inspire them with a

taste for better studies. I wrote, not for Italy, but for Germany and the Netherlands."

The circulation of his more popular writings, all over Europe, was so enormous that one can compare it only to that of some widely-read modern journal, or of some extraordinarily popular novel. For instance, a Paris bookseller once heard, or invented, a rumour that the Sorbonne was going to condemn the *Colloquies* of Erasmus as heretical; and, being a shrewd man, he instantly printed a new edition of 24,000 copies. A moral treatise by Erasmus, called the *Enchiridion* ("the Christian Soldier's Dagger"), which was a favourite alike with Catholics and with Protestants, was translated into every language of Europe. A Spanish ecclesiastic, writing in 1527, declares that a version of it was in the hands of all classes throughout Spain,—even the smallest country inn could usually show a copy. It may be doubted whether any author's works were ever so frequently reprinted within his life-time as were those of Erasmus. And wherever his books went, they carried with them the influence of his spirit,—his love of good literature, his loyalty to reason, his quiet common-sense, his hatred of war, his versatile wit, nourished by varied observation of life,—wit which could play gracefully around the slightest theme, or strike with a keen edge at falsehood an wrong,—his desire to make it felt that a good life is not an affair of formal observance, but must begin in the heart.

The works which entitle Erasmus to be called

the parent of Biblical criticism are connected with his secular studies by a closer tie than might appear at first sight. His principal concern was always with literature as such; he was, moreover, a practical moralist, anxious to aid in correcting the evils of his time: but he was not distinctively a theologian; and towards dogmatic theology, in particular, he had little inclination. Now, in pursuing his paramount aim—to make the world better by the humanising influences of literature—the enemy with which he had to do battle was the scholastic philosophy. Hear his words when he is asking how Christians are to convert Turks:—"Shall we put into their hands an Occam, a Durandus, a Scotus, a Gabriel, or an Alvarus? What will they think of us, when they hear of our perplexed subtleties about Instants, Formalities, Quiddities, and Relations?" This was the dreary wilderness of pedantry that had hitherto passed for knowledge. And the scholastic philosophy was securely entrenched behind the scholastic theology. The weapons of that theology were Biblical texts, isolated from their context, and artificially interpreted: the one way to disarm it was to make men know what the Bible really said and meant. Therefore Erasmus felt that his first duty, both as a moralist and as a man of letters, was to promote a knowledge of the Bible. He was not a Hebrew scholar, and could do nothing at first hand with the Old Testament; that province was left to Reuchlin. But in 1516 he published the Greek Testament,—the first edition which had appeared;

for the Complutensian edition, though printed two years earlier, was not issued till 1522. He also wrote a new Latin version of the New Testament, endeavouring to make it more exact than the Vulgate; and added notes. Further, he wrote a series of Latin Paraphrases on all the books of the New Testament except Revelation. These were intended to exhibit the substance and thought of the several books in a more modern form, and so to bring them home more directly to the ordinary reader's mind. The paraphrases were presently translated into English, and every Parish Church in England was furnished with a copy. In the remarkable "Exhortation" prefixed to his Greek Testament, Erasmus observes that, while the disciples of every other philosophy derive it from the fountain-head, the Christian doctrine alone is not studied at its source. He would like to see the Scriptures translated into every language, and put into the hands of all. "I long," he says, "that the husbandman should sing them to himself as he follows the plough, that the weaver should hum them to the tune of his shuttle, that the traveller should beguile with them the weariness of his journey." Then, as to interpretation,—from the medieval expositors, the schoolmen, he appealed to the primitive interpreters, the Fathers of the early Church, who stood nearer to those documents alike in time and in spirit. And first of all to Jerome; for Jerome had essayed, in the fourth century, a work analogous to that which Erasmus was attempting in the sixteenth. Thus it was fitting that

his edition of Jerome should appear almost simultaneously with his Greek Testament. He afterwards edited other Latin Fathers; and it was through his translations from the Greek Fathers, especially Chrysostom and Athanasius, that their writings first became better known in the West.

So far, all that Erasmus had said and done was in accord with that general movement of thought which led up to the Reformation. When Luther came forward, it was expected by many that Erasmus would place himself at his side. But Erasmus never departed an inch from his allegiance to Rome; and in the year before his death Paul III., in appointing him Provost of Deventer, formally acknowledged the services which he had rendered in combating the new opinions. It is important to see as clearly as possible what his position was.

Luther made his protest at Wittenberg in 1517. For four years after that, Erasmus hoped that the matter might be peaceably adjusted. Luther was personally a stranger to him, but had a great admiration for his work, and wrote to him, as to an intellectual leader of whose sympathy he hoped that he might feel sure; Erasmus wrote back kindly, but guardedly, urging counsels of moderation. When Frederick of Saxony consulted him, he spoke in Luther's favour. But after 1521 all hopes of conciliation were at an end: peace between Rome and Luther was thenceforth impossible. And now both sides began to press Erasmus. The Romanists cried, "This is all your doing; as the monks say, you laid

the egg, and Luther has hatched it: you must now lose no time in speaking out, and making it clear that you are loyal to the Church of which you are a priest." The Lutherans said: "You know that you agree with us in your heart; you yourself have made a scathing exposure of the very abuses which we are attacking; be true to yourself, and take your place among our leaders." Erasmus suffered, but remained silent. At last he decided to write against Luther, and in 1524 published his treatise on Free Will. Luther held that, owing to original sin, divine grace alone can turn man's will to good; Erasmus defended the doctrine of the Church, that, while grace is the indispensable and principal agent, the will is so far free as to allow for some human merit in preferring good to evil. Luther replied, and Erasmus rejoined. Thenceforth the Lutherans regarded Erasmus as an opponent;—some of them, as a traitor; while his own side felt that he had not done them much good. For the question handled by him, however important in itself, was not the question of the hour. And indeed many will feel that this particular controversy was the greatest mistake in the life of Erasmus. Not because he entered the lists against Luther—it is intelligible that he should have felt himself constrained to do so—but because, having decided to fight, he did not raise the main issue. That issue was,—Which is the greater evil,—to endure the corruptions, or to rebel? It was open to him to contend that rebellion was the greater: but, if he was not prepared to

enter on that ground, then it would have been better to keep silence.

What were the trains of thought and feeling which determined his course at that great crisis? A careful study of his own utterances will show that the considerations which swayed him were of three distinct kinds; we might describe them as ecclesiastical, intellectual, and personal.

In the first place, it is apparent that Erasmus regarded the prospect of schism, not only from a churchman's point of view, but also as a danger to social order. He thinks of the Roman Church under the image of a temporal State. Grave abuses have indeed crept into the constitution, but the State contains within itself the only legitimate agencies for reform. A citizen is entitled to lift up his voice against the abuses; but his loyalty to the head of the State must remain intact; if that head delays or declines to interfere, the citizen must be patient. And, even in denouncing evils, he must consider whether there is not a point at which denunciation, as tending to excite turbulence, may not do more harm than good. Such a view was the more natural in an age when men's minds had so long been familiar with the conception which was the basis of the Holy Roman Empire. No faults in any grade of the ecclesiastical hierarchy could do away with the feeling that Pope and Emperor were, by divine appointment, the joint guardians of human welfare, and that a revolt against the authority of the Church was an assault on the framework which held society

together. The peculiar attitude of Erasmus,—his reluctance to take part in the conflict, and the attacks made on him from both sides,—gave to his conduct the appearance of greater irresolution than can justly be laid to his charge. About one thing—this should be distinctly remembered—he never wavered. He never at any moment contemplated rebellion against the authority of Rome; he was as remote from that as were the two English friends whose views as to the abuses in the Church most nearly agreed with his own, John Colet and Thomas More. The real source of his embarrassment was that he approved, in a large measure, of Luther's objects, while he strongly disapproved of his methods.

Further, he disliked the Lutheran movement as threatening to impede the quiet progress of literature, and this in two ways,—first, by creating a general turmoil,—secondly, by giving the schoolmen and the monks a pretext for saying that the new learning was a source of social disorder. There is a striking letter of his, written to Alberto Pio, Prince of Carpi, in 1525. He points out that the foes of the new learning had been most anxious to identify it with the Lutheran cause, in order to damage two enemies at once. Then, further,—he disliked all appeals to passion, or blind partisanship; his hope for the world was in the growing sway of reason. Two hundred and fifty years afterwards, another gifted mind, in looking back, took much the same view that Erasmus had taken in looking forward. Goethe deplored Luther's violence. But Luther might have

quoted Ajax. To dream that such evils could be cured by the gentle magic of literature was indeed to chant incantations over a malady that craved the surgeon's knife.

As might have been expected, some critics of Erasmus ascribed his attitude to worldly motives; but this was unjust, as many details of his life show. When Paul III. wished to make him a Cardinal, and to provide him with the necessary income, he declined. He was ambitious of praise, but not of wealth or rank. Personal considerations influenced him only in this sense, that he knew his own unfitness for the part of a leader or a combatant at such a time. His right place was in his study, and he grudged every hour lost to his proper work. "I would rather work for a month at expounding St Paul," he said to a correspondent, "than waste a day in quarrelling." In character and temperament he was the most perfect contrast to Luther. We remember the story of Luther being awakened in the night by a noise in his room; he lit a candle, but could find nothing; he then became certain that the invisible Enemy of his soul was present in that room,—and yet he lay down, and went calmly to sleep. There is the essence of the man—the intensely vivid sense of the supernatural, and the instinctive recourse to it as an explanation—and the absolute faith. Erasmus was once in a town where a powder-magazine exploded, and destroyed a house which had harboured evil-doers; some one remarked that this showed the divine anger against guilt;

Erasmus quietly answered that, if such anger was indeed there, it was rather against the folly which had built a powder-magazine so near a town. The man who said that could never have fought at Luther's side.

Erasmus was a great literary precursor of the Reformation; he armed the hands of the Lutherans: but to call him, as some have done, a Reformer before the Reformation, seems hardly an appropriate description. If, in our own day, those who are denominated Old Catholics had confined themselves to urging the advisability of certain reforms, without disputing the authority of the Pope or proposing to secede from communion with Rome, their position would have been analogous to that of Erasmus. Viewed as a whole, his conduct was essentially consistent and independent.

His imperishable claim to the gratitude of the world, and especially of the Teutonic peoples, rests on the part which he sustained in a contest of even larger scope than that waged by Luther,—in the great preliminary conflict between the old and the new conception of knowledge, between the bondage and the enfranchisement of the human mind, between a lifeless formalism in religion and the spirit of practical Christianity. From youth to old age, through many trials, he worked with indomitable energy in the cause of light; and it was his great reward, that, before he died, he saw the dawn of a new age beginning for the nations of the north,—not without clouds and storm, but with the assurance that the reign of darkness was past.

THE SPEECHES OF THUCYDIDES[1]*.

§ 1. The famous phrase in which Thucydides claims a lasting value for his work has had the fate of many striking expressions: it is often quoted apart from the words which explain it. "A possession for ever," not "the rhetorical triumph of an hour": taken by itself this has a ring of exultation, noble perhaps, yet personal, as if the grave self-mastery of the historian had permitted this one utterance in the tone of the Roman poet's confident retrospect or the English poet's loftier hope, speaking of a monument more enduring than brass, of things so written that men should not willingly let them die. It is the context that reduces the meaning to a passionless precision. "The absence of fable in the History," he says, "will perhaps make it less attractive to hearers; but it will be enough if it is found profitable by those who desire an exact knowledge of the past as a key to the future, which in all human probability will repeat or resemble the past. The work is meant to be a possession for ever, not

[1] A table of the Speeches will be found at the end of the Essay.

* Reprinted from *Hellenica, A collection of Essays on Greek Poetry, Philosophy, History, and Religion; Edited by Evelyn Abbott* (Rivingtons 1880).

the rhetorical triumph of an hour[1]." That the intention of Thucydides has been fulfilled in his own sense is due largely to the speeches which form between a fourth and fifth of the whole work. It is chiefly by these that the facts of the Peloponnesian war are transformed into typical examples of universal laws and illuminated with a practical significance for the students of politics in every age and country. The scope of the speeches is seen best if we consider what the History would be without them. The narrative would remain, with a few brief comments on great characters or events, and those two passages in which Thucydides describes the moral effects of pestilence and of party-strife. But there would be little or no light on the inner workings of the Greek political mind, on the courses of reasoning which determined the action, on the whole play of feeling and opinion which lay behind the facts.

§ 2. The introduction of speeches became a regular part of ancient historiography, and came in again at the revival of literature, not quite going out, in Italy and France at least, till the end of the last century. But the followers of Thucydides were obeying an established tradition; he was the writer who had done most to establish it; indeed, he might properly be called its founder. The place of the

[1] i. 22. The τε after κτῆμα in the original marks the connection of the thought: "and *so*." Cp. i. 4, Μίνως . . . ἐκράτησε . . . τό τε ληστικόν, ὡς εἰκός, καθῆρει: so 5, τό τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι: 6, ἐγυμνώθησάν τε: 9, Ἀγαμέμνων τε.

speeches in his design was due to special influences of the age as well as to the peculiar bent of his mind; we have to consider what had been done before him, and the plan on which he went to work.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war a Greek prose literature scarcely yet existed. The Ionian prose-writers before Herodotus, or contemporary with him, are known to us only from scanty fragments. But the Augustan age possessed all, or nearly all, their writings; and Dionysius of Halicarnassus has described their general characteristics, comparing them collectively with Herodotus and Thucydides[1]. These Ionian writers, he says, treat the annals of cities and people separately[2],—not combining them into a large picture, as Herodotus does. Their common object was to diffuse a knowledge of the legends which lived in oral tradition (ὅσαι διεσώζοντο μνῆμαι), and of the written records (γραφαί) preserved in temples or state-

[1] Dionys. *de Thuc.* c. 5. Dionysius concedes the more dignified name of συγγραφεῖς to the Ionian logographers. He names, (1) as anterior to the age of Thucydides,—Eugaeon of Samos, Deiochos of Proconnesos, Eudemos of Paros, Democles of Phigaleia, Hecataeus of Miletus, Acusilaus of Argos, Charon of Lampsacus, Amelesagoras of Chalcedon; (2) as elder contemporaries of Thucydides,—Hellanicus of Lesbos, Damastes of Sigeion, Xenomedes of Chios, Xanthos of Lydia. His words imply that these, "and many more" (ἄλλοι συχνοί), were then extant.

[2] *Ib.* οὐ συνάπτοντες ἀλλήλαις (τὰς ἱστορίας), ἀλλὰ κατ' ἔθνη καὶ κατὰ πόλεις διαιροῦντες: whereas Herodotus is said πολλὰς καὶ διαφόρους πράξεις ἐς μίαν περιγραφὴν πραγματείας ἀγαγεῖν.

archives; and to publish these "such as they received them," without adding anything, and on the other hand without omitting "myths" and "theatrical episodes" which appear childish to a more critical age[1]. As to style, it is much the same for all of them,—plain, concise, "strictly to the point[2]," without artificial display; but with a certain freshness, he adds, and some degree of charm, which has been the secret of their survival. The meagre fragments which remain, such as those of Xanthus and Charon, Hecataeus and Hellanicus, consist chiefly of short, jerky sentences, strung together in the baldest possible fashion[3]. If these Ionian writers introduced dialogues or speeches—as the example of

[1] Dionys. *de Thuc.* c. 5, ἐν αἷς καὶ μῦθοί τινες ἐνῆσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ πεπιστευμένοι χρόνου (cp. Thuc. i. 21, of the stories told by the logographers, ὑπὸ χρόνου . . . ἐπὶ τὸ μυθώδες ἐκνενικηκότα) καὶ θεατρικαί τινες περιπέτειαι, πολὺ τὸ ἠλίθιον ἔχειν τοῖς νῦν δοκοῦσαι.

[2] *Ib.* τοῖς πράγμασι προσφυῆ. In Herodotus (i. 27, etc.) προσφυέως λέγειν is simply "to speak pertinently." But the phrase of Dionysius seems to mean, not merely "adapted to the subject," but *closely adhering to the facts of the story* (whether mythical or not), without attempt at *verbal* embellishment. It is illustrated by the dry and absolutely matter-of-fact style of the extant fragments.

[3] Müller, *Fragm. Histor. Graec.* i. 1—68. The longest fragment of Hecataeus may serve as a specimen:—"Orestheus, son of Deucalion, arrived in Aetolia in search of a kingdom; and a dog produced him a green plant; and he ordered the dog to be buried in the earth; and from it sprang a vine fertile in grapes. Wherefore he called his son Phytius. Now the son of Phytius was Oeneus, so named after the vine-plant; for the ancient Greeks called the vine Oena: and the son of Oeneus was Aetolus." (*Frag.* 341, p. 26.)

the epic poets might have led them to do—it may be conjectured that these were of the simplest kind. There is one, indeed, who has left proof that he could write dialogue with the ease and grace of Herodotus himself[1]. But Ion of Chios was a poet as well as a chronicler; he knew the Athens of Pericles; and his memoirs, with their sprightly gossip, must have been very unlike the normal type of Ionian chronicle.

Herodotus is distinguished from his predecessors, first of all, by an epic unity of plan. It is hard to say exactly how far he was superior to them in his method of verifying facts; his diligence and his honesty are both unquestionable, and we know that he attempted—not very scientifically, perhaps—to decide between conflicting versions of the same story. But in the dramatic element of his narrative he shows the true freedom of an epic poet. In his History, as in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the author seldom speaks when there is a fair pretext for making the characters speak. The habitual use of "direct speech," or easy dialogue, is evidently a different thing from the insertion of set speeches: there is nothing necessarily rhetorical about it. It is merely the vivid way of describing thought and motive, the way natural to a simple age; and in the

[1] The story of the poet Sophocles defending the phrase ἐπὶ πορφυρέαις παρῇσιν against the criticisms of a learned guest at a supper-party in Chios. (Müller, *Fragm. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 46.) The Ἐπιδημίαι, in which it occurred, seem to have been Ion's account of his own "visits" to Athens and other cities. (*Ibid.* p. 45.)

case of a work meant to be heard rather than to be read, like the early Greek prose works, it has the obvious recommendation of helping to keep the attention alive. Even the longer speeches in Herodotus have usually the conversational tone rather than the rhetorical[1]. On the other hand, there are a few which may be considered as properly rhetorical, that is, as efforts by Herodotus to work up a vague tradition in the most effective form. The debate in the Persian cabinet on the invasion of Greece[2] is a case in point. The speeches of Xerxes, Mardonius, and Artabanus have been carefully elaborated, and have the elementary dramatic merit of expressing views which Persian speakers could conceivably have taken. Another example is the debate of the Persian conspirators after the death of the false Smerdis. Otanes argues for democracy,

[1] *E.g.* the speech in which Aristagoras of Miletus appeals for aid to Cleomenes, king of Sparta (Herod. v. 49), and that of Sosicles at Sparta (v. 92), which is simply a plain sketch of the Corinthian tyrannies, put into the mouth of a Corinthian speaker.

[2] Her. vii. 8—11. The council is called *σύλλογος ἐπίκλητος Περσέων τῶν ἀρίστων*: as in viii. 101 Xerxes *ἐβουλεύετο ἅμα Περσέων τοῖσι ἐπικλήτοισι*: *i.e.* with his "privy-councillors." Later writers went at least as far as Herodotus in reporting speeches made on occasions which presuppose privacy; as when Dionysius, Livy, and Plutarch give the expostulations of Veturia (or Volumnia) with Coriolanus,—when Sallust is present in imagination at a debate of Catiline's conspirators,—or when Livy transcribes the brilliant, but domestic, remonstrances of Pacuvius Calavius with his son Perolla, offered with a view of dissuading the young man from murdering Hannibal at Capua. Thucydides never violates dramatic probability in this particular way.

Megabyzus for oligarchy, Darius for monarchy; but here the points of view seem purely Hellenic[1]. Herodotus prefaces his report of the discussion by saying, "Speeches were made which some of the Greeks refuse to credit; but made they were[2]": and elsewhere[3] he remarks with triumph that "those Greeks who do not believe" in Otanes having advocated democracy will be surprised to hear that Mardonius established democracies in the Ionian cities. The ground of this dramatic episode, then, was a story current among the Greeks of Ionia, but rejected by some of them as manifestly inconsistent with Persian ideas. The spirit of rhetorical dialectic may be traced again very clearly in the conversation between Solon and Croesus, where Solon refines on the distinction between wealth, good fortune, and happiness[4]. Still, it cannot be said that Herodotus

[1] Her. iii. 80—82. Similarly in Her. iii. 36 the Lydian Croesus utters Hellenic thoughts.

[2] Her. iii. 80, *ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἄπιστοι μὲν ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δ' ὦν.*

[3] Her. vi. 43, *ἐνθαῦτα μέγιστον θῶυμα ἐρέω τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι Ἑλλήνων Περσέων τοῖσι ἑπτὰ Ὀτάνεα γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ὡς χρεὼν εἴη δημοκρατέεσθαι Πέρσας*: where *μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι* implies more than *μὴ πιστεύουσι* would have implied,—viz. that the statement was offered for acceptance, not simply by Herodotus himself, but by a widely-spread rumour.

[4] Her. i. 32. The question of Croesus to Solon had been—*τίνα ἤδη πάντων εἶδες ὀλβιώτατον;* Solon answers, in effect, that *πλοῦτος* is certainly an element of *ὄλβος*, but that complete *ὄλβος* requires *εὐτυχία* also, and that a man's life cannot be called *εὐτυχής* unreservedly until we have seen it to the end. Dean Blakesley observes (on Her. i. 32), that this "might have proceeded from the mouth of Protagoras, or Hippias, or any other of the *μεριμνηταὶ*

had much love for set rhetorical display: his taste was for conversation—lively, ingenious, argumentative it might be, but still mainly in the colloquial key[1]. A good instance of the way in which he passes by an opportunity for oratory is his brief notice of the speech made by Themistocles just before the battle of Salamis[2]: "His theme was the contrast between all that is worthy and all that is base. He exhorted them to choose the better part in all that men's nature and condition permit; and then, having wound up his discourse, he ordered them to embark." The true rhetorician would have developed the topic which Herodotus barely indicates[3]. It may be noticed, too, that the ornament

λόγων alluded to by Euripides" (in *Medea* 1225 f.). If it has not the matured subtlety of the rhetorical dialectic, it may certainly be said to anticipate its spirit.

[1] Dionysius says most truly of Herodotus that he has almost all the excellences of style except the ἐναγώνιοι ἀρεταί—the combative excellences,—such as were afterwards developed by strenuous controversy, political or forensic. οὐδὲ γὰρ δημηγορίαις πολλαῖς ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐδ' ἐναγωνίοις κέχρηται λόγοις, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ παθαίνειν καὶ δεινοποιεῖν τὰ πράγματα τὴν ἀλκὴν ἔχει (*de Thuc.* c. 23).

[2] Her. viii. 83, τὰ δὲ ἔπεα ἦν πάντα κρέσσω τοῖσι ἔσσουσι ἀντιτιθέμενα. ὅσα δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσι καὶ καταστάσι ἐγγίνεται, παραινέσας δὴ τούτων τὰ κρέσσω αἱρέεσθαι καὶ καταπλέξας τὴν ῥῆσιν ἐσβαίνειν ἐκέλευε ἐς τὰς νῆας.

[3] Cp. Plato, *Hippias Major*, p. 286, where the sophist Hippias tells Socrates that he has composed "an admirable discourse" on the theme of a question supposed to be put by Neoptolemus to Nestor after the taking of Troy—What are καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα? The phrase of Herodotus, καταπλέξας τὴν ῥῆσιν, reminds us of the tone in which the speakers of Thucydides sometimes decline to develop commonplaces.

of the speeches in Herodotus is sometimes distinctly Homeric—illustrating his nearer affinity to epos than to rhetoric. Thus the Corinthian Sosicles, in the debate at Sparta, begins with truly epic force: "Verily now the sky shall be under the earth, and the earth shall hang above the sky, men shall have their pastures in the sea, and fish upon land," if Spartans become the friends of tyranny[1].

§ 3. Thucydides has stated the general principles on which he composed the speeches in his History. The precise interpretation of that statement depends, however, partly on the question—How far is it probable that Thucydides is there instituting a tacit comparison between his own method and that of Herodotus? So far as we know, the work of Herodotus was the only prose work in which Thucydides could have found a precedent for dramatic treatment applied to history. If Thucydides knew that work, it would naturally be present to his mind at the moment when he was stating the rules of his own practice. It can be shown almost certainly that a period of at least twenty years must have elapsed between the time at which Herodotus ceased to write and the time at which the History of

[1] Her. v. 92, ἦ δὴ ὅ τε οὐρανὸς ἔσται ἔνερθε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἡ γῆ μετέωρος ὑπὲρ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι νομὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ ἕξουσι καὶ οἱ ἰχθύες τὸν πρότερον ἄνθρωποι, ὅτε γε ὑμεῖς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἰσοκρατίας καταλύοντες τυραννίδας ἐς τὰς πόλις κατάγειν παρασκευάζεσθε. Compare the epic phrase which closes the spirited oration of Dareius in the debate of the conspirators—οὐ γὰρ ἄμεινον (Her. iii. 83; *Iliad* xxiv. 52, οὐ μήν οἱ τό γε κάλλιον οὐδέ τ' ἄμεινον, etc.).

Thucydides received the form in which it has come down to us[1]. It was possible, then, for Thucydides to know the work of Herodotus; that he actually knew it, and that he pointedly alludes to it in

[1] Herodotus alludes to no event later than 425 B.C., the latest mark of time being a *doubtful* reference to the death of Artaxerxes in 425 (vi. 98). And there are instances in which his silence affords presumptive proof that later events were unknown to him. (1) In 437 B.C. Athenian colonists founded a city on the spot formerly called Ennea Hodoi, and their leader Hagnon named it Amphipolis, because the Strymon flowed on both sides of it. Herodotus mentions Ennea Hodoi (vii. 114), but nowhere speaks of Amphipolis. Had he been writing after the new colony had become important, he would naturally have mentioned it in this connection; he could scarcely have failed to do so after the battle of Amphipolis in 422 B.C. had made the place famous. (2) Demaratus tells Xerxes that Spartans never yield: it is their fixed law to conquer or die (Her. vii. 104; cf. 209). This passage would have been singularly infelicitous if it had been written after the surrender of the Lacedaemonians at Pylos in 425 B.C., when 120 Spartan prisoners were brought to Athens; an event which, as Thucydides expressly says (iv. 40), astounded the Greeks, precisely because their belief had been that which Herodotus expresses. (3) Demaratus advises Xerxes to detach 200 ships from his fleet, for the purpose of occupying the island of Cythera, and quotes the saying of Cheilon, that it would be well for Sparta if Cythera were sunk in the sea (Her. vii. 235). Xerxes neglected the advice. But in 424 B.C. the Athenians actually occupied Cythera, and the damage thence inflicted on Laconia was one of the causes which disposed the Spartans to conclude peace. Herodotus would not have omitted, if he had known, so forcible an illustration of Cheilon's saying. And there are indications that Herodotus did not live to give the last touches to his work: thus a promise made in vii. 213 is left unfulfilled. [The revolt of the Medes "from Dareius" (Her. i. 130), which Dahlmann identified with the revolt of 408 B.C. (Xen. *H.* i. 2. 19), has been shown

several places, cannot be doubted by any one who weighs the whole evidence[1].

In the view of Thucydides there had hitherto been two classes of writers concerned with the

by the Behistun inscription to belong to the reign of Dareius Hystaspes.]

F. W. Ullrich (*Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides;* Hamburg, 1846) has ingeniously argued that Thucydides composed his first three Books, and Book iv. as far as ch. 48, in exile (about 421–413 B.C.): and the rest of the work, as a continuation, after the final close of the war. This view rests mainly on the alleged existence of passages in Books i.—iv. 48 which imply ignorance of later events. Classen has examined these passages in detail (*Einleitung*, xxxii.—liv.), and has, I think, shown that they are insufficient to support the theory built upon them. My opinion has not been altered by reading a learned essay in favour of Ullrich's hypothesis, which has appeared since Classen's Introduction was published (*Ueber die successive Entstehung des Thucydideischen Geschichtswerkes*, by Julius Helmbold; Colmar, 1876). But for the present purpose it is enough to assume, what even the supporters of Ullrich's view would allow, viz. that the whole work was at least revised by Thucydides after the end of the war. (See Thuc. i. 13. 18; ii. 65.) The probable influence of Herodotus is here being estimated in relation to those parts of the work of Thucydides which would have been the last to receive his finishing touches—the speeches.

[1] That Thucydides knew the work of Herodotus is assumed by Lucian (*de cons. hist.* § 42), Marcellinus (*vit. Thuc.* 54), Suidas s.v. ὀργᾶν), Photius (*cod.* 60), and the Scholiast on Thuc. i. 22, etc. In modern times it has been denied or questioned by F. C. Dahlmann (*Herodot.* p. 214), K. O. Müller (*Hist. Gk. Lit.* c. xxxiv. § 2, and *Dorians*, ii. 98, § 2), by J. C. F. Bähr (in his edition of Herodotus), and in an essay *De plurimis Thuc. Herodotique locis*, by H. Fütterer (Heiligenstadt, 1843). The proofs that Thucydides knew the works of Herodotus have been brought together by Mure (*Hist.*

recording of events. First, there were the poets, especially the epic poets, of whom Homer is the type, whose characteristic tendency, in the eyes of Thucydides, is to exaggerate the greatness or splendour of things past[1]. Secondly, there were the prose writers whom he calls chroniclers (λογογράφοι); and these he characterises by saying that they

Gk. Lit. Bk. iv. ch. 8), and more recently by H. Lemcke, in an essay entitled *Hat Thuc. das Werk des Herod. gekannt?* (Stettin, 1873). The crucial texts are (1) Thuc. i. 20, on the common errors regarding the vote of the Spartan kings and the Pitanate company, compared with Her. vi. 57 and ix. 53; (2) Thuc. ii. 97, on the Thracians and Scythians—tacitly correcting what Herodotus says of the Thracians (v. 3) and of the Scythians (iv. 46); (3) Thuc. i. 126, on Cylon's conspiracy, compared with Her. v. 71; Thuc. vi. 4 on Zankle (Messene) compared with Her. vi. 23; Thuc. ii. 8, on the earthquake at Delos (cf. i. 23) compared with Her. vi. 98. In view of all these passages, it seems impossible to doubt that in i. 97 Thucydides includes or specially designates Herodotus among those who ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικὰ ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά.

I must add a word on the vexed interpretation of Her. vi. 57, τοὺς μάλιστά σφι τῶν γερόντων προσήκοντας ἔχειν τὰ τῶν βασιλέων γέρεα, δύο ψήφους τιθεμένους, τρίτην δὲ τὴν ἑωυτῶν. The question is, Does Herodotus mean τιθεμένους δύο ψήφους ἑκάτερον, τρίτην δὲ τὴν ἑωυτοῦ? Shilleto (Thuc. i. 20) thinks that this is not *certain*, suggesting that τοὺς προσήκοντας might mean τὸν ἀεὶ προσήκοντα, and comparing Her. iv. 62, τοῖσδε = τῷ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀρχηΐῳ, but he sees the difficulty of supposing the same person to be nearest of kin to both kings. Failing this resource, we must surely allow that Herodotus means δύο ψήφους ἑκάτερον, for else how could he possibly have written τρίτην δὲ τὴν ἑωυτῶν? Would he not have written δευτέρας δὲ τὰς ἑωυτῶν?

[1] Thuc. i. 10, εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσμῆσαι: 21, ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασιν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες.

"compiled[1]" their works with a view to attracting audiences at a recitation, rather than to truth; dealing largely, as they did, with traditions which could no longer be verified, but had passed into the region of myth. Now with such chroniclers Herodotus was undoubtedly classed by Thucydides. The traits common to Herodotus and the other chroniclers, as Thucydides viewed them, were (1) the omission of really accurate research—the tendency to take what lay ready to the writer's hand (*τὰ ἑτοῖμα*, i. 20); (2) the mixture of a fabulous element with history; (3) the pursuit of effect in the first place, and of truth only in the second. Probably Thucydides would have said that Herodotus was more critically painstaking and less indiscriminately tolerant of fable than most of the other chroniclers, but that his study of effect was more systematic and more ambitious. The imaginary dialogues and speeches in Herodotus would be the most conspicuous illustrations of this desire for effect. If they were not absolute novelties in the chronicler's art, at least we may be sure that they had never before been used in such large measure, or with such success.

The first aim of Thucydides in his introduction is to show that the Peloponnesian war is more important than any event of which the Greeks have record. He then states the principles on which his History of the War has been composed. "As to the various speeches made on the eve of the war, or

[1] Thuc. i. 21, *ξυνέθεσαν*, as again 97, *ξυνετίθεσαν*, implying a process more external and mechanical than *ξυγγράφειν*.

in its course, I have found it difficult to retain a memory of the precise words which I had heard spoken; and so it was with those who brought me reports. But I have made the persons say what it seemed to me most opportune for them to say in view of each situation; at the same time, I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. As to the deeds done in the war, I have not thought myself at liberty to record them on hearsay from the first informant, or on arbitrary conjecture. My account rests either on personal knowledge, or on the closest possible scrutiny of each statement made by others. The process of research was laborious, because conflicting accounts were given by those who had witnessed the several events, as partiality swayed or memory served them[1]."

The phenomena of the war, then, as materials for history, are classed by Thucydides under two heads —λόγοι, things said, and ἔργα, things done. These are the two elements of human agency[2]. As regards the ἔργα, the deeds, he is evidently contrasting his own practice with that of the chroniclers generally. He has not taken his facts, as they did, without careful sifting (ἀβασανίστως): he had formed a higher conception of his task (ἠξίωσα). In regard

[1] Thuc. i. 22.

[2] Shilleto remarks (on i. 21 § 2): "τὰ δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων is a somewhat bold expression for τὰ δ' ἔργα τὰ πραχθέντα." It may be added that the phrase has the special effect of bringing out the antithesis between *facts of speech* and *facts of action*.

to the words, the λόγοι, he is tacitly contrasting his own practice with that of Herodotus, the only conspicuous example in this department. If his statement were developed in this light, it might be paraphrased thus:—Thucydides says: (1) I have not introduced a speech except when I had reason to know that a speech was actually made: unlike Herodotus, when he reports the conversation between Croesus and Solon, the debate of the Persian conspirators, the discussion in the cabinet of Xerxes. (2) I do not pretend to give the exact form of the speeches made: as a writer implies that he does when, without warning the reader, he introduces a speech with the formula, "He said these things" (ἔλεγε τάδε)[1], instead of "He spoke to this effect" (ἔλεγε τοιάδε). (3) On the other hand, I have faithfully reproduced the speaker's general line of argument, the purport and substance of his speech, so far as it could be ascertained. Herodotus disregards this principle when he makes Otanes,

[1] Cp. Her. iii. 80, where the speeches of Otanes, Megabyzus and Dareius are introduced by λέγων τάδε . . . λέγων τάδε . . . ἔλεξε τάδε: so v. 91, ἔλεγον τάδε . . . εἶπον ταῦτα: 92, ἔλεξε τάδε (Sosicles): vii. 8, ἔλεξε Ξέρξης τάδε: and so usually. Thucydides nearly always has ἔλεξαν or ἔλεγον τοιάδε, with τοιαῦτα (or τοσαῦτα) at the end. In i. 85 (of Sthenelaidas), ἔλεξεν ὧδε ("in this manner," not = τάδε). In i. 58 the speech of Hermocrates is introduced by τοιούτους δὴ λόγους εἶπεν, where δή appears to mean "as we may presume"; *i.e.* he spoke "to this general effect"—the phrase intimating somewhat more plainly than the usual τοιάδε that Thucydides had only a very general notion of the ξύμπασα γνώμη.

Megabyzus and Dareius support democracy, oligarchy and monarchy by arguments which no Persian could have used. And in filling up such outlines, my aim has been to make the speaker say what, under the circumstances, seemed most opportune (*τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα*).

The last phrase is noticeable as marking a limit of dramatic purpose. According to the regular usage of the words[1] (*τὰ δέοντα*) in Thucydides, it can mean only "what the occasion required"—not necessarily what was most suitable to the character of the speaker. The latter idea would have been expressed by a different phrase (*τὰ προσήκοντα*). That is, in filling up the framework supplied by the reported "general sense" of a speech, Thucydides has freely exercised his own judgment on the situation. Suppose a report to have reached him in this shape: "Hermocrates spoke in the congress at Gela, urging the Sicilian cities to lay aside their feuds and unite against Athens." In composing on this theme, the first thought of Thucydides would be, "What were the best arguments available?" rather than, "What arguments would Hermocrates have used?" This general rule would, of course, be liable to various degrees of modification in cases where the speaker was well known to the historian as having marked traits of character, opinion or style.

[1] Thuc. i. 70, *τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι*: 138, *αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα*: ii. 43, *γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα*: ii. 60, *γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα.*

§ 4. "Set speeches," says Voltaire, "are a sort of oratorical lie, which the historian used to allow himself in old times. He used to make his heroes say what they might have said....At the present day these fictions are no longer tolerated. If one put into the mouth of a prince a speech which he had never made, the historian would be regarded as a rhetorician[1]." How did it happen that Thucydides allowed himself this "oratorical lie,"—Thucydides, whose strongest characteristic is devotion to the truth, impatience of every inroad which fiction makes into the province of history, laborious persistence in the task of separating fact from fable; Thucydides, who was not constrained, like later writers of the old world, by an established literary tradition; who had no Greek predecessors in the field of history, except those chroniclers whom he despised precisely because they sacrificed truth to effect? Thucydides might rather have been expected to express himself on this wise: "The chroniclers have sometimes pleased their hearers by reporting the very words spoken. But, as I could not give the words, I have been content to give the substance, when I could learn it."

In order to find the point of view at which Thucydides stood, we must remember, first of all, the power which epic poetry had then for centuries exercised over the Greek mind. The same love of the concrete and comprehensible which moved the early Greeks to clothe abstract conceptions of a

[1] Preface to the *Hist. of Russia*, § 7.

superhuman power in the forms of men and women, "strangers to death and old age for ever," led them also to represent the energy of the human spirit as much as possible in the form of speech. The Homeric ideal of excellence is the man of brave deeds and wise words. The Homeric debates are not merely brilliant, but also thoroughly dramatic in their way of characterising the speakers[1]. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* accustomed the Greeks to expect two elements in every vivid presentation of an action —first, the proofs of bodily prowess, the account of what men did; and then, as the image of their minds, a report of what they said. Political causes strengthened this feeling. Public speech played a much larger part in the affairs of States than it now does. Envoys spoke before an assembly or a council on business which would now be transacted by the written correspondence of statesmen or diplomatists. Every adult citizen of a Greek democracy had his vote in the assembly which finally decided great issues. To such a citizen the written history of political events would appear strangely insipid if it did not give at least some image of those debates which imparted the chief zest to civic life and by which political events were chiefly controlled. He was one who (in modern

[1] Sir G. C. Lewis, in illustrating this point, instances the embassies from Corcyra and Corinth to Athens (Thuc. i. 68), from Mitylene to Olympia (iii. 9), and from the Athenians and Syracusans to Camarina (vi. 76). (*Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, vol. i. p. 232.)

phrase) had held a safe seat in Parliament from the time when he came of age; who had lived in the atmosphere of political debate until it had become to him an almost indispensable excitement; and who would feel comparatively little interest in hearing the result of a Parliamentary division unless he was enabled to form some idea of the process by which the result had been reached. Such a man would not have been satisfied with the meagre information that the Athenian Ecclesia had discussed the fate of Mitylene, that Cleon had advocated a massacre, that Diodotus had opposed it, and that the view of Diodotus had prevailed by a narrow majority. His imagination would at once transport him to the scene of the parliamentary combat. He would listen in fancy, as he had so often listened in reality, to the eloquence of antagonistic orators, he would balance the possible arguments for severity or clemency, he would conceive himself present at the moment when one uplifted hand might incline the scale of life or death, and he would feel the thrill of relief with which those who supported Diodotus found that Athens was saved at the eleventh hour—saved, if the bearers of the respite, rowing night and day, could reach Lesbos in time—from the infamy of devoting a population to the sword. When Thucydides gave in full the speeches made by Cleon and Diodotus, he was helping his reader, the average citizen of a Greek republic, to do on more accurate lines that which the reader would otherwise have tried to do for himself. Thucydides was

writing for men who knew Greek politics from within, and he knew that, if they were to follow him with satisfied attention, he must place them at their accustomed point of view. The literary influences of the age set in the same direction. At the beginning of the war the Attic drama had been in vigour for more than forty years. The fame of Aeschylus was a youthful memory to men who had passed middle life; Sophocles was sixty-four, Euripides was forty-nine. Each had given great works to Athens, and was yet to give more. An age of vivid energy had found the poetry most congenial to it in the noblest type of tragedy, and this, in turn, fed the Greek desire to know character through deed and word. In the hands of Euripides tragedy further became the vehicle of dialectical subtleties and the dramatic mirror of public debate. At the same time Attic oratory was being prepared by two currents of influence which converged on Athens—the practical culture of Ionia, represented by the Sophists, and the Sicilian art of rhetoric[1].

§ 5. If the speeches in Thucydides were brought under a technical classification, the Funeral Oration would be the only example of the "panegyrical" or epideictic class; the pleading of the Plataeans and Thebans before the Spartan Commissioners might possibly be called "forensic"; and all the other

[1] The early history of Greek oratory, and the various influences which contributed to mould it during the fifth century B.C., have been traced by the writer in the *Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos*, vol. i. Introduction, pp. xciii—cxxxvii.

speeches would be in some sense "deliberative[1]." But such a classification, besides being rather forced, does not correspond to any real differences of structure or form. If the speeches are to be viewed in their literary relation to the History, it is enough to observe that the addresses of leaders to their troops may be regarded as practically forming a class apart[2].

The right of an adult citizen to attend the debates of the Ecclesia must have been acquired by Thucydides many years[3] before the war began. From its very commencement, as he says, he had formed the purpose of writing its history. There is every probability that he had heard most or all of the important discussions which took place in the Ecclesia between 433 and 424 B.C. It was in 423 B.C., or at the end of the year before, that his exile of twenty years from Athens began. Thence we can name some at least of the speeches to which he probably refers as heard by himself (*αὐτὸς ἤκουσα*), and not merely reported to him. Such would be the addresses of the Corcyrean and Corinthian envoys, when they were rival suitors for the Athenian alliance in 433 B.C.; the speeches of Pericles; the debate on Mitylene in 427 B.C.; and

[1] *I.e.* in the largest sense of *συμβουλευτικοί*, under which the addresses of leaders to troops would be included as *προτρεπτικοί*—the speeches in political debate being *δημηγορίαι* in the proper sense.

[2] See the table at the end; and below § 7.

[3] Probably from 451 B.C., if his birth may be placed in 471 B.C. Cp. K. F. Hermann, *Antiq.* i. § 121; Xen. *Mem. Socr.* iii. 6. 1.

the speech of the Lacedaemonian envoys in 425 B.C., making overtures of peace to Athens. If he was not present on all these occasions, still, as a resident citizen, he would have exceptional facilities for obtaining a full and accurate account. Taking this group of speeches first, then, we may consider how far they are apparently historical in substance, or show traces of artificial treatment.

After giving the addresses of the envoys from Corcyra and Corinth in 433 B.C., Thucydides notices the course of the debate in the Ecclesia. Two sittings were held. At the first, he says, the Athenians inclined to the arguments of the Corcyreans, and were disposed to conclude an alliance both offensive and defensive; at the second they repented of this, but decided to conclude a defensive alliance. The considerations which prevailed with them were, that war was unavoidable in any case; that the Corcyrean navy must not be allowed to pass into the hands of the Corinthians; and that Corcyra was a useful station for coasting voyages[1]. These three arguments are just those on which the Corcyrean speech, as given by Thucydides, chiefly turns[2]. The circumstantial account of the debate in the Ecclesia cannot be treated as fictitious. Either, then, Thucydides has given the substance of the arguments really used by the Corcyreans, or he has ascribed to them arguments used on their side by Athenian speakers in the Ecclesia. Now the speech of the Corinthian envoys has at least one mark of

[1] Thuc. i. 44. [2] i. 32—36.

substantial authenticity: the references to benefits conferred on Athens by Corinth in the matters of Samos and Aegina[1] would certainly have occurred to a Corinthian envoy more readily than to an Athenian writer. In both the Corcyrean and the Corinthian speech it seems probable that Thucydides has given the substance of what was really said, though he may have added touches from his recollections of the subsequent debate in the assembly. Similar is the case of the speech made by the Lacedaemonian envoys at Athens in 425 B.C.[2] The historian's comment on it is as follows: "The Lacedaemonians spoke at such length[3] [*i.e.* for Spartans], in the belief that the Athenians had previously desired a truce, and had been hindered only by Spartan opposition; so that, when peace was offered, they would gladly accept it, and restore the men." This clearly implies that the speech ascribed to the envoys—which Thucydides may well have heard—is historical in substance.

The Thucydidean speeches of Pericles raise three distinct questions:—How far do they preserve the form and style of the statesman's oratory? how far do they express the ruling ideas of his policy? and how far do they severally represent what he said on the several occasions?

[1] i. 42. [2] Thuc. iv. 17—20.

[3] By τοσαῦτα in such a context Thucydides usually means "*only* thus much," as ii. 72, τοσαῦτα εἰπόντων Πλαταιῶν. But in iv. 21, τοσαῦτα εἶπον refers back to iv. 17 § 2, τοὺς δὲ λόγους μακροτέρους οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς μηκυνοῦμεν.

As Thucydides must have repeatedly heard Pericles[1]—whom he describes as the first of Athenians, most powerful in action and in speech[2],—it would be strange if he had not endeavoured to give at least some traits of the eloquence which so uniquely impressed contemporaries. Pericles is said to have left nothing written[3]: but Aristotle and Plutarch have preserved a few of the bold images or striking phrases which tradition attributed to him[4]. Several examples of such bold imagery occur in the Thucydidean speeches of Pericles[5], and it can hardly be doubted that they are phrases which have lived in the historian's memory. But the echo is not heard in single phrases only. Every reader of the

[1] See *e.g.* ii. 13, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἷάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς.

[2] i. 139.

[3] Plutarch, *Pericl.* c. 8: ἔγγραφον μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπολέλοιπε πλὴν τῶν ψηφισμάτων, ἀπομνημονεύεται δὲ ὀλίγα παντάπασιν.

[4] Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 10 § 7: ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλοι: *ib.* τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε τὴν λήμην τοῦ Πειραιέως. Plut. *Per.* 8 § 5 quotes his saying, τὸν πόλεμον ἤδη καθορᾶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου προσφερόμενον: and of those who fell at Samos, ἐγκωμιάζων ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος ἀθανάτους ἔλεγε γεγονέναι καθάπερ τοὺς θεούς· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνους αὐτοὺς ὁρῶμεν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς τιμαῖς ἃς ἔχουσι καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἃ παρέχουσιν ἀθανάτους εἶναι τεκμαιρόμεθα.

[5] *E.g.* ii. 43, τὸν ἀγῆρων ἔπαινον κάλλιστον ἔρανον προϊέμενοι . . . : 41, μνημεῖα κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀΐδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες . . . : 43, ἀνδρῶν ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος . . . , and others *passim* in the ἐπιτάφιος: in ii. 62, κηπίον καὶ ἐγκαλλώπισμα πλούτου, and many more. Bold imagery of this kind was characteristic of the elder school of oratory, and generally of what Dionysius calls the αὐστηρὰ ἁρμονία: cp. *Attic Orators*, vol. i. p. 27.

Funeral Oration must be aware of a majesty in the rhythm of the whole, a certain union of impetuous movement with lofty grandeur, which Thucydides has given to Pericles alone. There is a large alloy, doubtless, of rhetorical ornament in the new manner of overstrained antithesis[1]: but the voice of the Olympian[2] Pericles is not wholly lost in it. There can be no question, again, that the speeches of Pericles in the Ecclesia accurately represent the characteristic features of his policy at the time[3]. But how far do they severally represent what Pericles said on the several occasions? Thucydides makes Pericles use different topics of encouragement at three successive stages.

In 432 B.C. Pericles emboldens the Athenians to

[1] The most glaring example is the reiterated contrast of "word" and "deed," which occurs some eighteen times in the Funeral Oration, and is parodied (as Mr H. M. Wilkins observes, *Introduction to the Speeches*, p. xxv) in the Platonic *Menexenus* [*Menex.* p. 236 D, Ἔργῳ μὲν ἡμῖν οἵδε ἔχουσι τὰ προσήκοντα σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὧν τυχόντες πορεύονται τὴν εἰμαρμένην πορείαν, προπεμφθέντες κοινῇ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων· λόγῳ δὲ δή, κ.τ.λ. And immediately afterwards, ἔργων εὖ πραχθέντων . . . λόγῳ καλῶς ῥηθέντι.]

[2] Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος, Ar. *Acharn.* 530. Eupolis notices the *rapidity*, the charm, and the *sting* of his eloquence (Δῆμοι, *Frag. Com.* i. 162); cp. *Attic Orators*, i. p. cxxx.

[3] Viz., to make no derogatory concessions, but to accept the war; to wage it, however, mainly on the defensive, allowing the enemy to ravage their lands, but guarding their possession of the city and the sea; to rely chiefly on their navy, and to retain a firm hold upon the allies, whose tribute gave the financial superiority to Athens.

reject the Peloponnesian demands by a general comparison of the resources and prospects on either side[1]. In 431 B.C., when Archidamus is about to invade Attica, Pericles repeats his former exhortations, but supplements them by a detailed exposition of Athenian resources, financial and military[2]. In 430 B.C., after the second invasion of Attica, when the land had been devastated and while the plague was raging, Pericles convened a special meeting of the Ecclesia[3], with the twofold purpose of reassuring his countrymen and of allaying their resentment against himself. "As to the prospects of the war, you may rest satisfied," he says, "with the arguments by which I have proved to you on many other occasions that you have no cause of uneasiness. But I must notice a special advantage which the scale of your empire confers,—one, I think, which has never occurred to you,—which I have not mentioned in addressing you before, and which I should not have noticed now—as the claim implied might seem too arrogant—did I not see you unreasonably dejected. You think that you rule your allies alone. I tell you that of the two fields open to human action, land and sea, the latter is under your absolute dominion, not merely to the extent of your actual empire, but as much further as you please. While you hold the sea in your present naval strength, you

[1] i. 140—144. [2] ii. 13.

[3] ii. 59, *ξύλλογον ποιήσας, i.e. ξύγκλητον ἐκκλησίαν*, which Pericles could convene as one of the Ten Generals (*ἔτι δ' ἐστρατήγει*).

cannot be resisted by the Persian king, or by any nation on earth[1]." Thus, as the pressure on the Athenian spirit becomes more and more severe, the exhortations of Pericles go on from strength to strength, until, at the darkest hour of all, they culminate in a triumphant avowal that the naval empire of Athens is not relative but absolute, is not an empire over a limited confederacy but a boundless supremacy on the sea. If this ascending scale, so fitly graduated, was due to the invention or arrangement of Thucydides, it was a dramatic conception. But it seems more probable that the topics really used by Pericles on these three occasions were substantially those given by the historian. It is difficult otherwise to justify the emphatic clearness with which the special theme of the second speech is distinguished from that of the first, and that of the third, again, from both[2]. On the other hand, the first speech of Pericles betrays some remarkable traces of manipulation by the writer. Earlier in the same year the Corinthian envoy at the Peloponnesian congress had given several reasons for believing that the Peloponnesians were likely to prevail in the war. With help from the sacred treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, he had said, they might lure away the foreign seamen of Athens by offering

[1] ii. 62 § 2.

[2] Compare ii. 13 § 2, *παρήνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον* (referring to i. 140—144) . . . *θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε*, κ.τ.λ. (introducing the special subject of the second speech), with ii. 62 § 1, introducing the special subject of the third.

higher pay. They could acquire naval skill by practice. And among the possibilities of the war he suggests the occupation of a fortress in the enemy's country[1]. The speech of Pericles answers these arguments point by point. But the correspondence is not merely in the topics. The very phrases of the Corinthian speech are repeated by Pericles in his reply[2]. Similar parallelisms may be traced between the Corinthian speech and that delivered by the Spartan Archidamus on the occasion of the former congress: one with which the Corinthians cannot be supposed to be acquainted in detail, since it was made to the Spartans only, after strangers had withdrawn[3]. The fact is that the eight[4] speeches recorded by Thucydides as delivered at Athens or Sparta before the commencement of the war form, for his purpose, a group by themselves. In these he has worked up the chief arguments and calculations which were current on either side. Collectively, they are his dramatic presentation of the motives at work, the grievances on each side, the hopes and fears, based on a comparison of resources, with

[1] i. 121 §§ 3—4; 122 § 1.

[2] Compare (1) Pericles, i. 143 § 1, *εἴ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῷ μείζονι . . . ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν*, with the Corinthian speech, i. 121 § 3, *ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων . . . ὑπολαβεῖν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας*: (2) Pericles, i. 142 § 6, with Corinthian, i. 121 § 4; (3) Pericles, i. 142 § 2, with Corinthian, i. 122 § 1.

[3] Compare i. 120—4 with i. 80—85.

[4] See the Table at the end of the Essay; cp. i. 21, *ὅσα εἶπον μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν.*

which the combatants entered on the struggle. At the end of his first speech Pericles says: "I have many other reasons to give for hoping that we shall prevail; but these shall be given hereafter as the events arise (ἅμα τοῖς ἔργοις)"—thus foreshadowing the speech of which an abstract is given on a subsequent occasion[1]. In this particular case, as we have seen, the disposition of topics may well be authentic in the main. But the composer's phrase is significant. It suggests the habit of selecting from a certain stock of available material and disposing the extracts with something of a dramatist's freedom.

In the Funeral Oration there is nothing, apart from the diction, which distinctly shows the invention of Thucydides. At first sight there is some plausibility in the view that such an oration would probably have contained allusions to the heroic legends of Attica, and that the mind of Thucydides is to be traced in their suppression[2]. But the argument may be turned the other way. The very absence of mythical embellishment, it might be urged, is rather a proof of the fidelity with which

[1] i. 144 § 2, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἅμα τοῖς ἔργοις δηλωθήσεται. The promise is fulfilled by the speech of which an abstract is given in ii. 13, and by that reported in the direct form in ii. 60—64.

[2] The suggestion of F. C. Dahlmann (*Hist. Forschungen*, i. 23), to which Grote justly opposes the μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω (Thuc. ii. 36). The analogy of similar extant pieces (the *Menexenus*, the ἐπιτάφιοι falsely ascribed to Lysias and Demosthenes, the *Panathenaicus* of Isocrates, etc.) justifies Dahlmann's major premiss, but does not support his conclusion.

Thucydides has reported a speaker who, regardless of the vulgar taste, was resolved to treat a well-worn theme in a new and higher strain. One or two passages, indeed, have been supposed to hint at the moral deterioration of the Athenian democracy in the years which followed the death of Pericles[1]; but the supposition seems gratuitous.

It remains to notice the debate in the Ecclesia on the punishment of Mitylene. Cleon urges a massacre, Diodotus opposes it. "These views," says Thucydides, "having been stated with nearly balanced effect, the assembly came after all to a division; and on a show of hands the parties proved nearly equal, but the view of Diodotus prevailed." The words can only mean that, in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus, Thucydides has given the real substance of the arguments which were found to be so "nearly balanced," and which led to so close a division. Cleon's speech has one striking characteristic. In several places it echoes phrases which occur in the speeches of Pericles[2]. But, with these

[1] Viz. (1) ii. 37 § 3, the reference to a restraining δέος, and to those laws, ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσι: (2) 40 § 1, φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας. I cannot assume the allusions which Classen finds here to a subsequent and opposite state of society.

[2] Compare (1) Cleon, iii. 37 § 2, τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν, with Pericles, ii. 63 § 2, ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν: (2) Cleon, iii. 40 § 4, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι, with Pericles, ii. 63 § 2, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται: (3) Cleon, iii. 38 § 1, ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ, with Pericles, ii. 61 § 2, καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι. Compare also Cleon's notice (iii. 37 § 2) of τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεές in

verbal parallelisms, there is a pointed contrast of spirit. As Pericles describes the good side of the intellectual Athenian nature, Cleon brings out its weak side. As Pericles insists on the Athenian combination of intelligence with courage, Cleon declares that this intelligence leads men to despise the laws, and prefers ignorance combined with moderation[1]. Pericles is gone: Cleon echoes the words of the statesman as whose successor he poses, at the very moment when he is contradicting his principles. It may be observed that when Thucydides reports the speech of the Syracusan demagogue Athenagoras, he marks his manner by a certain violence of expression[2]. Cleon, whom Thucydides calls "most violent," has no violence of expression. Probably this abstention from vehemence of the

Athenian life, with what Pericles says of *τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδεύματα*, ii. 37 § 2.

[1] Cleon, iii. 37 § 3, *ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας*, κ.τ.λ., contrasted with Pericles, ii. 40 § 2, *οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι*, κ.τ.λ., and ii. 62 § 5, *τὴν τόλμαν . . . ἡ ξύνεσις . . . ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται*.

[2] *E.g.* vi. 40, *ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ὦ πάντων ἀξυνετώτατοι, εἰ μὴ μανθάνετε κακὰ σπεύδοντες, ἢ ἀμαθέστατοί ἐστε ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα Ἑλλήνων, ἢ ἀδικώτατοι, εἰ εἰδότες τολμᾶτε*.

In a *Mémoire sur Thucydide*, by M. Meierotto (in the Memoirs of the Berlin Academy for 1790–91, p. 530), the writer observes, with reference to the discrimination of character in the speeches: "Cléon et Athénagore parlent ordinairement d'un ton dur, offensant et grossier, dont pourtant ils s'écartent quelquefois." We have only one speech of Cleon and one of Athenagoras; so far as these go, however, the striking thing, it seems to me, is not the resemblance, but the contrast.

demagogic type, this superficial imitation of Pericles, are traits in which the Cleon of Thucydides is historical.

This closes the series of those seven speeches, delivered at Athens, for which Thucydides probably derived the "general sense" either from his own recollection or from the sources accessible to a resident citizen. The only one of these which exhibits distinct traces of artificial dealing with subject-matter is the first speech of Pericles. And in this the only traces are, first, a certain adjustment of the language to that of the Corinthian speech made earlier in the same year[1]; and, secondly, a phrase by which the composer prepares the reader for a subsequent speech of Pericles.

§ 6. We now come to the speeches made elsewhere than at Athens from 432 B.C. onwards, or made at Athens later than 424 B.C. In regard to all or most of these, Thucydides must have relied on reports of the "general sense" brought to him by others (*τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν*)[2]. The

[1] As the Corinthian speech contains a prophecy (after the event) of the occupation of Deceleia (*ἐπιτειχισμός*, i. 122 § 1), so the corresponding passage of Pericles contains what *may* be a reference to the Athenian occupation of Pylos and of Cythera (i. 140 § 3, *ἐπιτειχίζειν . . . πλεύσαντας ἐς τὴν ἐκείνων*).

[2] Thuc. v. 26: "It befell me to live in exile for twenty years [423–403 B.C., or nearly so] after my command at Amphipolis. I thus became conversant with both parties—indeed, as an exile, I saw most of the Peloponnesians—and was enabled to study the events more at my leisure." The phrase here—*καὶ γενομένῳ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πράγμασι*—certainly implies more than that

first general characteristic which claims notice is the occurrence of passages certainly, or almost certainly, written with a consciousness of later events. These passages may be cast into three groups, according as they relate to (I) the affairs of Sicily, (II) the Deceleian war, (III) the final defeat of Athens[1].

Thucydides was *in the countries* which were the theatre of the war. It implies that he was *in intercourse with the actors*. The words *καθ' ἡσυχίαν* denote the "ease" or "leisure" of one who had no official status, political or military. Hitherto Thucydides had been himself an actor in the war (in the Ecclesia or as *στρατηγός*); *now* he was only a thoughtful spectator. During his exile Thucydides certainly spent some time in Italy and Sicily. Marcellinus quotes (§ 25) the statement *ὡς φυγὼν ᾤκησεν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ*, and there was even a tradition of his burial there (§ 33). There are traces, I think, of Thucydides' personal knowledge of Sicily in the speech of Alcibiades (vi. 17 § 3). Niebuhr conjectured, and E. Wölfflin has shown (*Antiochus v. Syrakus u. Coelius Antipater*, Winterthur, 1872), that Thucydides (vi. 2 ff.) used the *Σικελιῶτις συγγραφή* which Antiochus of Syracuse brought down to 424 B.C. These are the chief data for conjecturing the general nature of the materials which Thucydides may have had for the speeches subsequent to 425 B.C. In many cases, probably, he had good sources of information, though it is hardly likely that the words *ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα* can include any speeches except those made at Athens before his exile.

[1] In the list of nine passages noticed here, I have not included any in which the suggestion of acquaintance with subsequent events did not seem to me tolerably strong and clear. Thus I have purposely omitted the passage in which Archidamus says (432 B.C.) of the war, *δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν* (i. 81 § 6), in which some find a knowledge of its actual duration; a passage in vi. 11 (in the speech of Nicias), which might possibly be regarded as foreshadowing the aid actually lent by Sicily to Sparta at a later time (viii. 26); and

(I) 1. Speaking in the congress at Gela in 424 B.C., Hermocrates warns his hearers against the designs of Athens. The Athenians, he says, are now on our coast with a few ships; but some day they will come with a larger fleet, and endeavour to reduce the whole island[1]. The Athenian fleet on the Sicilian coast at this time must have numbered some fifty or sixty triremes[2]. Hermocrates, speaking in 424 B.C., certainly would not have spoken of these as "a few ships," least of all when it was his object to show that Athens was formidable[3]. But Thucydides, when he composed the speech, had in view the vast fleet—at least thrice as numerous[4]—sent to Sicily in 415 B.C.

2. Nicias, in his second speech dissuading the Athenians from the expedition to Sicily, says that the only Sicilian cities likely to join the invaders are Naxos and Catana[5]. Both Naxos and Catana did, in fact, join the Athenians. But the Athenians, when they opened the campaign in Sicily, had hopes

a reference by Hermocrates to future feuds and reconciliations between the Sicilian cities (iv. 64).

Five of these passages have been noticed by previous writers, viz. Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 9; the others—Nos. 2, 3, 4, 8—have not, to my knowledge, been considered in this light before.

[1] iv. 60, ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες . . . πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας.

[2] Twenty triremes had been sent in 427 B.C. under Laches (iii. 88), whom Pythodorus had superseded; forty more were afterwards sent under Eurymedon (iii. 115), and these had now joined the first detachment (iv. 48).

[3] As Grote remarks, vii. 189, *n.*

[4] Thuc. vi. 31.

[5] vi. 20.

of other cities also. The alliance of Messene[1] was solicited by Alcibiades, though without success. Both Athenian and Syracusan envoys were sent to Camarina, and it was not without much hesitation that Camarina resolved to remain neutral[2]. The precision of the forecast made by Nicias betrays knowledge of the event.

3. Again, when the Athenian attack on Sicily is imminent, Hermocrates, in his speech at Syracuse, gives reasons for thinking that it will fail. Numerous as the Athenians are, he says, they cannot outnumber the united forces of Sicily. "And if they should fail from want of supplies in a foreign country, they will still leave glory to those against whom their design was laid, even though they should be ruined mainly by their own errors[3]." Thucydides elsewhere expresses his own view of the Sicilian disaster. The primary cause of the failure was not, he thinks, a miscalculation of forces, but rather the neglect of the Athenians at home—distracted as they were by faction—to support the army in Sicily, a neglect which blunted the zeal of those engaged in the campaign[4]. The words ascribed to Hermocrates were written by Thucydides in retrospective view of the Athenian errors which had led to the Athenian defeat.

4. The speech of Euphemus, the Athenian envoy at Camarina, offers another example. Urging the people of Camarina to join the Athenians rather

[1] vi. 50. [2] vi. 88.
[3] vi. 33. [4] ii. 65.

than the Syracusans, he reminds them that they will not often have an opportunity of securing such powerful auxiliaries. And if, he says, you dismiss them now, "one day yet you will long to see even the least part of them, when their succour can no more avail you[1]." A few years later (405 B.C.), the Carthaginians, already victorious over Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, advanced against Gela and Camarina. Dionysius, who had become tyrant of Syracuse, failed to relieve Gela. The inhabitants of Camarina, like those of Gela, were forced to abandon their city; and when the conclusion of peace between Dionysius and the invaders allowed them to return, they returned as tributaries of Carthage[2]. The protection of Syracuse, in which Camarina had trusted, proved a broken reed. Thucydides must have been at work on his History for some years after the end of the Peloponnesian war, perhaps as late as 396 B.C.[3] When he put that

[1] vi. 86, *ἦν εἰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ ἦ ἄπρακτον ἐάσετε ἀπελθεῖν ἢ καὶ σφαλεῖσαν, ἔτι βουλήσεσθε καὶ πολλοστὸν μόριον αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔτι περανεῖ παραγενόμενον ὑμῖν.* (For *ἔτι* thus used in menace or presage, cf. Soph. *El.* 471. In Aesch. *Eum.* 812, Shilleto conjectured *ὑμεῖς δ' ἔτ'* [for *ἐς*] *ἀλλόφυλον ἐλθοῦσαι χθόνα | γῆς τῆσδ' ἐρασθήσεσθε.*)

[2] Diod. xiii. 108—114; Xen. *Hellen.* ii. 3.

[3] Thucydides mentions an eruption of Aetna in 426 B.C. as the third on record (iii. 116)—implying ignorance of that in 396 B.C., noticed by Diodorus, xiv. 59. On the probability that Thucydides was at work on his History for at least some years after 403, cp. Classen, *Einl.* xxx. I cannot, however, accept Ullrich's ingenious suggestion that the reference to Antiphon—*ἄριστα τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος* (viii. 68)—

emphatic menace into the mouth of Euphemus, the fate which actually overtook Camarina soon afterwards was surely present to his mind.

(II) 5. The Corinthian speaker at Sparta in 432 B.C. alludes to the establishment of a fort in Attica as one of the possibilities of the war[1]; and Pericles, in the parallel passage of his first speech, admits that the construction of a hostile fort might do harm by facilitating raids and by tempting slaves to desert[2].

6. Alcibiades, speaking at Sparta in 415 B.C., urges the occupation of Decelcia. "It will benefit you," he says, "and will embarrass the enemy in many ways. I will briefly notice the chief of these. Most of the property in the country will become yours by capture or surrender. The Athenians will forthwith lose their revenues from the silver mines of Laurium, and all their present gains from the land and the law-courts. Above all, they will suffer by the irregular transmission of tribute from their allies, who, when satisfied that you are making war in earnest, will slight their demands[3]." These predictions accurately correspond with the effects of the occupation as afterwards described in the historian's

points to a tacit comparison with the defence of Socrates (399 B.C.).

[1] Thuc. i. 122 § 1. [2] i. 142 § 2.

[3] vi. 91 § 7. In the sentence, *οἷς . . . ἡ χώρα κατασκεύασται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὰ μὲν ληφθέντα, τὰ δ' αὐτόματα ἥξει*, the word *αὐτόματα*, as commentators have seen, refers to the desertion of slaves, included in the *κατασκευαί* as household chattels or "live stock."

own words[1]. The temporary presence of the invading enemy had not hitherto hindered the Athenians from reaping the fruits of the soil; but now "they were deprived of their whole land"—including, of course, the mines at Laurium. "More than twenty thousand slaves had deserted to the enemy." All their sheep and oxen were lost. The whole number of adult male citizens was required for military duty on the walls or in the field, a necessity which would suspend the sitting of the law-courts and, as Alcibiades foretold, close that source of profit[2]. The expenses of the State were heavily increased, its revenues were perishing. Alcibiades might easily have foreseen the importance of occupying Deceleia. But the minute correspondence between the special results which he is made to predict and those which Thucydides relates in his own person indicates that the prophecy followed the event.

(III) 7. The Athenian speaker at Sparta in 432 B.C. says to the Spartans: "If you were to

[1] vii. 27—28. On the *αὐτομολίαι* of slaves, cf. viii. 40.

[2] The reference of Alcibiades in the words *ὅσα . . . ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστηρίων νῦν ὠφελοῦνται* is to the income which the State derived from court-fees of various kinds, especially the deposits (*πρυτανεῖα*) made by parties to a law-suit, as well as from pecuniary fines, confiscations, etc. Böckh (*Publ. Econ.* i. 461) understands the passage thus, following the scholiast. Meineke (*Hermes* iii. 359) and Madvig (*Adv.* i. 328) conjecture *δεκατευτηρίων*, "places where public tithes and taxes were taken"—objecting, as against the vulgate, that it does not appear why even a virtual state of siege should suspend the sitting of the law-courts. Thucydides, vii. 28 § 2, gives the plain answer—all the citizens were required for military duty.

overthrow our empire and establish your own, you would soon alienate the good-will which you have gained because we are feared,—if you are to continue the policy of which you gave a specimen during your brief leadership of Greece against Persia. The usages of your community preclude intercourse with others, and moreover a Spartan citizen on foreign service observes these usages as little as those of Hellas at large[1]." There is a manifest reference here to the period after the close of the war, when the Spartan promises of "liberating Greece" were falsified. And the reference to the misconduct of the Spartan citizen abroad was certainly not suggested by the case of Pausanias alone. The war had furnished two signal instances. Gylippus had been convicted by the Ephors of appropriating part of the treasure taken after the capture of Athens[2]. Lysander—the first Greek who received divine honours from Greeks—had surpassed the arrogance of Pausanias[3].

8. The striking speech of Brasidas to the Acanthians (424 B.C.) deserves to be considered in this connection. It is throughout an emphatic assertion that the cause in which Sparta fights is the cause of Greek liberty. "I have not come," he says, "to support a party. I do not consider that I should be bringing you freedom in any real sense if I should disregard your constitution, and enslave the

[1] Thuc. i. 77 § 6.

[2] Plut. *Lys.* 16—17, *Nic.* 28, cf. Diod. xiii. 106.

[3] With Plut. *Lys.* 18 cf. Paus. vi. 3 §§ 14—15, Athen. xv. 696.

many to the few, or the few to the many. Such freedom would be harder than a foreign yoke: and we, the Lacedaemonians, should reap no thanks for our pains, but rather blame instead of honour and renown[1]." Now, what Brasidas protests that Sparta will not do, is precisely what Sparta actually did at the end of the war, with the result which he anticipates. Oligarchies of the narrowest type—boards of ten—were established by Lysander in most of the cities, with a Spartan governor and garrison in each to repress the popular party[2]. The many were literally enslaved to the few, and they found the freedom which Sparta had given them harder indeed than any foreign rule. It can scarcely be doubted that this speech of Brasidas—composed by Thucydides after the close of the war—was inserted by him here, just at the moment when Sparta was making the first advances to the democratic cities of Northern Greece, for the purpose of bringing out the glaring contrast between Spartan promise and Spartan performance.

9. In the conference between the Athenian and

[1] Thuc. iv. 86 § 3. In § 4 there is no doubt to my mind that οὐδ' ἂν σαφῆ [for οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ] is the right reading, ἂν ἐπιφέρειν being the oblique of ἂν ἐπιφέροιμι.

[2] See Isocr. *Panegyricus*, §§ 110—114, where he denounces the partisans of the narrow Lacedaemonian oligarchies in the several States—οἱ τῶν δεκαρχιῶν κοινωνήσαντες—and speaks of the miseries which they inflicted on their own cities by "choosing to be enslaved to a Helot" (*i.e.* to the μόθαξ Lysander: ἠροῦντο δὲ τῶν Εἱλώτων ἑνὶ δουλεύειν). The passage is a striking commentary on the Acanthian speech of Brasidas.

Melian negotiators, the Athenians remark that, in the event of Athens being vanquished, they would have less to fear from the vengeance of Sparta than from the vindictiveness of smaller States[1]. The reference here is unmistakable. After the surrender of Athens in 404 B.C., a congress was held at Sparta in which the destruction of the defeated city was advocated, according to Xenophon, "by the Corinthians and Thebans chiefly, but by many other Greeks too." It was by the Spartan vote that Athens was saved[2].

The effect of such touches as these—suggested by a knowledge of occurrences subsequent to the dramatic date—may be compared with that produced in a Greek tragedy when one of the persons unconsciously utters a word or phrase which foreshadows the catastrophe. The spectator who knows the destined end of the drama is affected in the same manner as the reader who knows the sequel of the history. In using such touches, however, Thucydides was probably thinking more of logical than of artistic effect. His mind, with its strong concentration, grasped the whole series of arguments or illustrations which the experience of the war could yield; and he brought the most forcible of these to bear on his point without caring whether the facts which suggested them were earlier or later than the supposed date.

§ 7. It has already been remarked that the ad-

[1] Thuc. v. 91.

[2] Xen. *Hellen.* ii. 2, §§ 19—20.

dresses of leaders to their troops may be considered as forming a class apart from the rest. These military harangues, of which there are twelve in all, are usually short. The object is always the same—to bring out vividly the essential points of a strategical situation; and the historian has been less uniformly attentive here to the details of dramatic probability[1]. A modern writer would have attained the object by comments prefixed or added to his narrative of the operations. Thus Archidamus, addressing the Peloponnesian officers before the first invasion of Attica, dwells on the certainty of the Athenians being stung into giving battle when they see their lands ravaged[2]. This serves to heighten the reader's

[1] Thus (1) the harangue is sometimes ascribed to several leaders collectively; *e.g.* vii. 65, *παρεκελεύσαντο ἐκείνοις οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.* So ii. 86, *ὁ Κνῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατηγοί . . παρεκελεύσαντο καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.* In the case of the political speeches, the only similar instance is when a single speech is given as made by the two spokesmen of the Plataeans (*προτάξαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν Ἀστύμαχόν τε . . καὶ Λάκωνα*). It is obviously a different case when a speech is assigned to envoys collectively (i. 32, *οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἔλεξαν τοιάδε*, etc.), when one would speak for the rest. (2) The military harangue is sometimes introduced in words which imply that it was made several times over; thus iv. 91 (Pagondas), *προσκαλῶν ἑκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ ἀθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὅπλα, ἔπειθε . . λέγων τοιάδε.* Cf. vi 68 (Nicias), *κατά τε ἔθνη ἐπιπαριὼν ἕκαστα καὶ ξύμπασι τοιάδε παρεκελεύετο.* (Cf. *ἐπιπαριὼν τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεκελεύετο*, iv. 94.) In vii. 76 Nicias *ἐπιπαριὼν ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο, βοῇ τε χρώμενος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἑκάστοις καθ' οὓς γίγνοιτο, καὶ βουλόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον γεγωνίσκων ὠφελεῖν.*

[2] Thuc. ii. 11.

sense of the provocation offered, and of the difficulty which Pericles must have had in restraining his fellow-citizens[1]. Sometimes the speech of the general on one side is as distinctly a reply to the general on the other as if it had been delivered in debate. The Peloponnesian captains, exhorting their men before the action in the Corinthian Gulf, tell them that, though naval skill is much, it cannot avail against courage[2]. Phormio, exhorting the Athenian crews, tells them, as if in retort, that though courage is invaluable, their decisive advantage is in their naval skill[3]. Pagondas, before the battle of Delium, tells the Boeotians that they must fight, even beyond their own border, for the safety of Boeotia, and reminds them that their fathers secured it for a time by defeating the Athenians at Coroneia[4]. Demosthenes tells the Athenians that they must fight, even on Boeotian ground, to protect Attica, and reminds them of the Athenian victory over the Boeotians at Oenophyta[5]. The speech of Brasidas to his men on his Illyrian expedition is intended to bring out the contrast between Hellenic and barbarian warfare[6]; his speech at Amphipolis serves to explain his tactics[7]. The harangue of Nicias before the last sea-fight at Syracuse marks the peculiar character of the action as "a land-battle on board ship" (*πεζομαχία ἀπὸ νεῶν*), and at the same time sums up for the reader the whole meaning of that

[1] ii. 59 f. [2] ii. 87. [3] ii. 89.
[4] iv. 92. [5] iv. 95. [6] iv. 126.
[7] *τὴν ἐπίνοιαν φράσαι*, v. 9.

supreme crisis, when, as Nicias reminds the men about to embark, the fleet is all that remains of Athens and her great name[1]. This, and the corresponding speech of Gylippus on the Syracusan side[2], are in a high degree powerful and pathetic; so, above all, is the last speech of Nicias before the retreat[3]. Nowhere else, perhaps, has Thucydides given so free a scope to his own rhetorical power; yet even here it is strictly subordinated to his primary purpose—that of faithfully presenting the cardinal facts of the situation as he conceived them.

§ 8. The expression of character in the Thucydidean speeches has the same kind of limitation which was generally observed in Attic tragedy. It is rather typical than individual. Thucydides seizes the broad and essential characteristics of the speaker, and is content with marking these. We are sometimes reminded of the direct simplicity with which the epic or tragic heroes introduce themselves: "I am Odysseus, the marvel of men for all wiles, and my fame goes up to heaven." "I am pious Aeneas, renowned above the stars[4]." "You voted for war," says Pericles, "and now you are angry with me,—a man who deems himself second to none in discerning

[1] vii. 61—64, ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

[2] vii. 65.

[3] vii. 76. The two last military speeches of Nicias take something of the political character from the fact that, as he says in both, the army *is* now the city: ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις—a striking illustration of Sophocles, *Oed. Tyr.* 56.

[4] *Od.* ix. 19; *Aen.* i. 379; cf. Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 8, αὐτὸς ὧδ' ἐλήλυθα, | ὁ πᾶσι κλεινὸς Οἰδίπους καλούμενος.

and expounding the right course,—a man devoted to his country and proof against corruption[1]." These were salient points in the public character of Pericles as conceived by the historian[2], and accordingly Pericles is made to say so. The fate of Nicias seemed to Thucydides a signal example of unmerited misfortune, since Nicias had been remarkable throughout life for the practice of orthodox virtue[3]. And so, in his speech before the retreat from Syracuse, Nicias says, "The tenor of my life has been loyal to the gods, just and without offence among men[4]." In the debate at Athens on the Sicilian expedition Alcibiades is introduced by a prefatory sketch of his position and character. Thucydides notices his ambition, his magnificence,

[1] Thuc. ii. 60. [2] ii. 65.

[3] vii. 86, *ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν*: *i.e.* lit., his whole course of life, regulated by law and tradition (*νενομισμένη*) in the direction of virtue. The *ἀρετή* of Nicias was that which consists in fidelity to the established observances of religion and to received notions of duty—as distinguished from the *ἀρετή*, less in conformity with popular conceptions, which Thucydides can still recognise in such a man as Antiphon (viii. 68).

[4] Thuc. vii. 77, *πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα*. As to the Letter of Nicias (vii. 11—15), its *substantial* genuineness might perhaps be argued from the fact that, while it dwells on the wear and tear of the armament, there is no attempt to excuse his own delay and his failure to prepare for the coming of Gylippus; but the manner of its introduction (*δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε*) seems to indicate the *composition* of Thucydides.

especially in the matter of horses and chariots, the licence of his private life, his insolence, his public efficiency, his personal unpopularity[1]. Then Alcibiades speaks, and begins by saying in so many words that he has a better right than others to high command; he boasts of having entered seven chariots at Olympia; he avows that he does not regard his fellow-citizens as his equals; he asks whether his personal unpopularity interferes with his administrative capacity[2]. The speech is merely the sketch developed. It is the character of Alcibiades, as Thucydides saw its salient points, condensed in a dramatic form; but it is not such a speech as Alcibiades could conceivably have made on this occasion, or indeed on any. Thucydides has given us distinct portraits of the chief actors in the Peloponnesian war, but these portraits are to be found in the clearly narrated actions of the men; the words ascribed to them rarely do more than mark the stronger lines of character; they seldom reveal new traits of a subtler kind. The tendency of Thucydides was less to analyse individual character than to study human nature in its general or typical phenomena. His observation was directed, first, towards motives and passions which may be considered, in regard to practical politics, as universal influences[3]: next, towards the collective attributes which distinguish whole communities from each

[1] vi. 15. [2] vi. 16.

[3] iii. 82 § 2, *γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενα ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾖ.*

other. Thus the normal Spartan character is exhibited in its merits and its defects[1]. The political character of the Athenians is arraigned and defended[2]; their intellectual character is illustrated in its strength and its weakness[3]. And Thucydides shows a desire to comprehend these conceptions of national character in formulas, which he gives as epigrams to his speakers. The Spartan disposition, says an Athenian, might be described as one which regards everything that is pleasant as honourable, and everything that is expedient as just[4]. The Athenians, says a Corinthian, are, in brief, men who will neither rest nor allow others to rest[5]. Athens, says Pericles, might be described as the school of Greece, and the Athenian nature as the most gracefully versatile in the world[6].

§ 9. Those cases in which Thucydides gives merely a brief summary[7] of a speech or debate suggest how slight the materials may often have

[1] i. 68—72, 80—85. [2] i. 68—72, 73—78.
[3] ii. 37 f.; iii. 37—40.
[4] v. 105. [5] i. 70.
[6] ii. 41. I regard the Melian dialogue as neither less nor more historical than those speeches in which Thucydides had to rely on a slight knowledge of the *ξύμπασα γνώμη*. I cannot suppose, with Classen, that Thucydides had any written documents to go upon. The frankness of the Athenians, which Grote finds startling, is Thucydidean: his wish to portray ruling motives is stronger than his regard for dramatic nicety.

[7] *E.g.* i. 72 (where the general lines of the discourse in 73—78 are indicated); iv. 21 (the general sense of Cleon's answer to the Spartan envoys); iv. 58 and vi. 32 (debates at Gela and Syracuse); viii. 53 (debate at Athens in 411 B.C.), etc.

been which he worked up in the oratorical form. The political or ethical reflections with which the meagre outlines were filled up were doubtless supplied in large measure by Thucydides himself. The speeches, taken altogether, are pervaded by certain general conceptions, expressed in formulas more or less constant, which indicate unity of authorship. But it cannot be said, in the same sense, that they bear the stamp of one mind. They do, indeed, suggest certain intellectual habits, but it is seldom possible to distinguish between opinions or modes of thought which were in the air, and such as may have been proper to Thucydides. Nor would much be gained if we could. The real interest of the speeches in this aspect is something more than biographical; it is their interest as a contribution to the intellectual history of a transitional period in an age of singular mental energy. The age of faith was passing by, and a rational basis for ethics—which were then included in politics—was only in process of being sought. Thucydides is here the representative of a time which, for the most part, could no longer believe with Herodotus, but which had not yet learned to bring a Socratic method to bear on generalisations. He appears—so far as he is revealed at all—as a thinker of intense earnestness, with a firm and subtle apprehension of his chosen subject, alike in its widest bearings and in its minutest details; and of profound sensibility in regard to the larger practical aspects, that is the political aspects, of human destiny. He has

neither a dogmatic religion nor a system of ethics. He cleaves to positive fact; his generalisations rarely involve a speculative element, but are usually confined to registering the aggregate results of observation upon human conduct in given circumstances. In the spirit of a sceptical age he makes his speakers debate questions of political or personal morality to which no definite answer is offered. In Plato's *Gorgias* Callicles distinguishes between "natural" and "conventional" justice, contending that "natural justice" entitles the strong to oppress the weak, and that "conventional justice" is merely a device of the weak for their own protection[1]. In the *Republic* Thrasymachus defends a similar doctrine, namely, that "justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker[2]." The sophist Hippias, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, argues in a like strain that justice and law are merely arbitrary and conventional[3]. This, no doubt, was one of the commonplaces of sophistical dialectic in the time of Thucydides. The Athenian speakers in his History defend the aggressive policy of Athens by arguments which rest on substantially the same basis as those of the Platonic Callicles and Thrasymachus[4]. But the historian is content to state their case from their own point of view; he does not challenge the doctrine—as the Platonic Socrates

[1] Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 482, c. 38.
[2] *Rep.* p. 367 c.
[3] Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 14.
[4] Thuc. v. 105; vi. 82—87.

does—by comments of his own. The victims of aggression, indeed, the Plataeans or Melians, appeal to a higher justice than the right of might, and Thucydides hints that his sympathies are with them[1]; but that is all. The abstention is characteristic. On the whole, it may be said that he evinces a personal liking for moral nobleness[2], but refrains from delivering moral judgments[3], as if these would imply laws which he was not prepared to affirm or deny. But he insists on discovering a rational basis for action. If a man or a State pursues a certain line of policy, there must be some intelligible reasons, he feels, which can be urged for it. This desire to enter into the mind of the actors—to find the motive behind the deed, and to state it with all possible logical force—is the mainspring of the oratory in Thucydides, in so far as this is his own creation. It is an element of dramatic vividness; sometimes also of dramatic untruth, when the reasonings supplied by the historian to his actors are subtler than would probably have occurred to the speakers or commended themselves to the

[1] Not expressly, but by the naked repulsiveness in which he exhibits the "right of might."

[2] As Professor Sellar says ("Characteristics of Thucydides," *Oxford Essays*, 1857): "His own feeling shines out in such expressions as this,—'Simple-mindedness, which is mostly an ingredient in noble natures' (iii. 83). The speeches attributed to Pericles are especially expressive of generous ideas of man."

[3] It is enough to instance the manner in which he relates without comment the treachery of Paches to Hippias (iii. 54), and the assassination of two thousand Helots by the Spartans (iv. 80).

hearers. Thucydides is a philosophical historian, in the sense that he wishes to record the exact truth, in a form which may be serviceable for the political instruction of mankind. But he has not, in the sense of Plato or Aristotle, a theory of ethics or politics. Thucydides groups the observed facts of practical politics, but without attempting to analyse their ultimate laws. It might be possible to piece together Thucydidean texts and, by filling up a few gaps, to form a tolerably coherent system of doctrine; but the process would be artificial and delusive. Possibly a Shakespeare might re-create Thucydides from the fragments of his personal thought, but the breath of life would be the poet's gift; the broken lights are all that really remain. The paradoxes of one age are said to be the truisms of the next, but the violent contrast suggested by the epigram is hardly the important point to seize if we desire to trace the growth of opinion. There was a moment when the so-called paradoxes were neither paradoxes nor as yet truisms, but only rather new and intelligent opinions, seen to be such against the foil of notions which were decaying, but had not quite gone out. For instance, when Thucydides makes his speakers say, as he so often does, that the future is uncertain[1], we do more justice to the originality of the remark if we remember that in the time of Thucydides

[1] *E.g.* iv. 62, τὸ ἀστάθμητον τοῦ μέλλοντος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κρατεῖ: vi. 9, περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων κινδυνεύειν: ii. 42, τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ κατορθώματος: ii. 87, νομίσαι ταῖς τύχαις ἐνδέχεσθαι σφάλλεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, etc.

there were those who thought that the future was very frequently indicated, at great moments, by signs from the gods. Herodotus, for example, would have disputed the statement that the future is uncertain, if it had been placed before him as an unlimited proposition covering such crises as the Peloponnesian war[1]. The same consideration applies to many of the political or moral aphorisms, which may be regarded as those of Thucydides himself. They are in silent controversy with some unexpressed dissidence of contemporaries. The principle of tacit contrast pervades the whole History, as in the Funeral Oration the picture of Athens requires to be supplemented by a mental picture of the Sparta to which it is opposed[2]. This was of the inmost nature of Thucydides: the reluctance "to speak at superfluous length[3]" was deep in him. His general views must be measured both by the credulity and by the higher scepticism of a naïve age; so gauged, they are never commonplaces, but, at the least, hints for a part of the history which he has not told in words, because he did not distinctly conceive that it could ever need to be told. "Fortune," *τύχη*, is the name by which he usually designates the incalculable element in human life; but this

[1] See *e.g.* Her. i. 45, *θεῶν τίς μοι . . . προεσήμαινε τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι*: vi. 37, *φιλέει δέ κως προσημαίνειν ὁ θεός*, κ.τ.λ. On the omens, prodigies, dreams, etc., in Herodotus, see Mure, Bk. iv. ch. 6, § 3, and Rawlinson, i. 71 f.

[2] Esp. ii. 37 and 39.

[3] *μακρηγορεῖν*: i. 68, ii. 36, iv. 59.

"fortune" is no blind chance; it is, as he once explains it, "the fortune given by heaven" (ἡ τύχη ἐκ τοῦ θείου), the inscrutable dispensation of a divine Providence[1]. The course of this fortune not only baffles prediction, but is sometimes directly opposed to the reasonable beliefs of men concerning the source which dispenses it. Thrice only in the long tragedy of the war, as Thucydides unfolds it, do men appeal expressly to the gods, invoking the name of religion, in their agony, against tyrannous strength; thrice the power behind the veil is deaf, thrice the hand of the avenger is withheld, and the miserable suppliant is struck down by the secure malignity of man. The Plataeans appeal to the altars which had witnessed the consecration of Greek liberty[2], and the Spartans kill them in cold blood. The Melians are confident against the Athenians as the righteous against the unjust[3]; their city is sacked, their men are slain, their women and children enslaved. Nicias, after the great defeat at Syracuse, believes that the jealousy of the gods must now be exhausted, and has a firm hope, based on a good life, for himself and his followers[4]; but the wretched remnant of his defeated army are in great part butchered as they slake their thirst with the bloody water of the Assinarus; he himself is put to death lest he should tell tales under torture, and the

[1] v. 104.

[2] iii. 59 § 2.

[3] v. 104, ὅσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους.

[4] vii. 77 § 4, καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἠπιώτερα ἔξειν. οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου.

survivors pass into a horrible slavery. Thucydides feels that the ways of Heaven are hard to understand, but he does not complain of them ; they are matters not for reasoning but for resignation[1]. He regards the fear of the gods as a potent check on the bad impulses of men, and notices the loss of this fear[2] as a grave symptom of moral anarchy. As to omens, oracles, and similar modes of seeking miraculous light or aid, he nowhere denies the possibility of such light or aid being occasionally given, though his contempt is excited by the frequency of imposture[3]; this, however, he would affirm—that such resources are not to be tried until all resources within human control have been tried in vain[4]. There is one way only, Thucydides holds, by which man can certainly influence his own destiny, and that is by bringing an intelligent judgment (*γνώμη*) to bear on facts. Some have traced the influence of Anaxagoras in the prominence which Thucydides gives to the intellectual principle ; but no such prompting was needed by a strong understanding of sceptical bent, and it may be observed that Thucydides has at least not adopted the language of Anaxagoras[5]. It is the peculiar merit

[1] ii. 64, *φέρειν τε χρὴ τά τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείως.*

[2] ii. 53; iii. 82.

[3] *E.g.* ii. 21; v. 26, 103; vii. 50 (of Nicias), *ἦν καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος.*

[4] v. 103.

[5] *νοῦς*, in Thucydides, occurs only in the phrases *ἐν νῷ ἔχειν* (to intend), *τὸν νοῦν ἔχειν πρός τι*, or *προσέχειν*, and *κατὰ νοῦν*, "to

of the Athenian character, as portrayed in Thucydides, to recognise intelligence as the true basis of action and the true root of courage[1], instead of regarding mental culture as adverse to civic loyalty and warlike spirit[2]. If soothsayers cannot give us prescience, reason well used can enable such a man as Themistocles at least to conjecture the future[3]. In a trial of human forces the chances baffle prediction, but superiority in ideas (*διάνοιαι*) is a sure ground of confidence[4]. Yet the man of sound judgment will not presume on this confidence, for he will remember that the other element, "fortune," is beyond his control[5]. Justice, rightly understood, is the "common good[6]," and is identical with true self-interest[7]. As the remorseless exaction of an extreme penalty, "justice" may be opposed to "equity[8]"; or as a moral standard, it may be opposed to "self-interest" in the lower sense[9]. And self-interest, when thus opposed to justice, can appeal to "the immemorial usage[10]," believed to obtain among the gods, and so certainly established

one's mind." The general term for the power of the intellect is *γνώμη*, with which *διάνοια* and *σύνεσις* are sometimes nearly synonymous.

[1] ii. 40 § 2; 62 § 5.

[2] As Archidamus does (i. 84), and Cleon (iii. 37).

[3] i. 138, *τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής.*

[4] i. 84 § 3; vi. 11 § 6.

[5] iv. 64.

[6] *τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν*, v. 90.

[7] i. 41.

[8] iii. 40; iv. 19.

[9] i. 76, 79; iii. 56; v. 90; iv. 61.

[10] i. 76, *τὸ ἀεὶ καθεστός.*

among men that it may plausibly be called a sort of natural necessity[1],—that the stronger shall rule the weaker. No speaker in Thucydides goes quite so far as Callicles in the *Gorgias*, or proclaims this to be "natural" as distinguished from "conventional" justice. It is not said to be just, but only natural and not unreasonable[2]. The argument against capital punishment, which is put into the mouth of Diodotus, rests on the observation that no restraints have yet been devised which can be trusted to keep human passions in check. Legislators have gone through the whole list of possible penalties, and even the prospect of death is found insufficient to deter those who are goaded by want or ambition, and tempted by opportunity[3]. The friendship of men and of communities must be founded in the first place on a persuasion of mutual benevolence, and on some congeniality of character[4]; but in the long-run the only sure bond between States is identity of interests[5]. The Peloponnesian league is loose just because the interests diverge[6]. In default of a common interest, the only guarantee for an alliance is balanced fear[7]. Similarly, in the relation of the citizen to the State, patriotism is enforced by the dependence of private on public welfare[8]. Pericles even says that no fair

[1] v. 105, *ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν.* Cf. iv. 61, vi. 87. [2] vi. 85, *οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι καὶ ξυμφέρον.*

[3] iii. 45 § 3. [4] iii. 10. [5] i. 124.

[6] i. 141. [7] *τὸ ἀντίπαλον δέος*, iii. 11; cf. iv. 92.

[8] ii. 60.

or just legislation can be expected from citizens who have not such a stake in the country as is represented by the lives of children[1]. The distinctive merits of an oligarchy—always provided that it is constitutional, and not of the narrow type which Thucydides calls a "dynasty[2]"—are fairly recognised in the History. Archidamus and Brasidas claim stability, moderation and disciplined loyalty for the Spartan State[3]. A true democracy is pictured as one in which three elements work together for the common good: the rich are the guardians of property, the able men offer counsel, and the mass of the citizens decide on the opinions laid before them[4]. Democracy was the form of government under which Athens had been greatest and most free[5]: and the best phase of the Athenian democracy in his recollection, Thucydides says, was just after the Revolution of the Four Hundred, since then the oligarchic and popular elements were judiciously tempered[6]. Destiny may alter the part which a State is called upon to perform, and its institutions may require to be modified accordingly. Thus the Corinthians say to the Spartans, "Your system is out of date if you are to cope with Athens. In politics, as in art,

[1] ii. 44.

[2] The *δυναστεία* (*οὐ μετὰ νόμων*, unconstitutional) of Thebes in the Persian wars is opposed to the later *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος*, iii. 62.

[3] i. 84; iv. 126 § 4.

[4] vi. 39 (Hermocrates); cf. ii. 37 (Pericles). It is only Alcibiades (at Sparta) who uses *δημοκρατία* in a narrow and bad sense, as a synonym for *ἀκολασία πλήθους* (vi. 89).

[5] vi. 89 § 6. [6] viii. 97.

improvements must prevail. Fixed institutions are best for a city at peace. But the call to manifold enterprise imposes the need of manifold development. Hence—owing to their varied experience—the Athenians have been greater innovators than you[1]." The analogy suggested here between politics and a progressive art[2] is the more significant when it is remembered what the historian's age had seen accomplished in sculpture, architecture and drama. It is also worthy of remark that the only unqualified censures of democracy which occur in Thucydides, and the only protests against change as such, are ascribed to the "violent" Cleon and the "licentious" Alcibiades[3].

§ 10. The choice of moments for the introduction of speeches is not, with Thucydides, a matter of rhetorical caprice, but has an intelligible relation to the general plan of his work. A speech or debate reported in the direct form always signalises a noteworthy point in the inner or mental history of the war, as distinguished from the narrative of its external facts: it announces thoughts and arguments which exercised an important influence, and which therefore require to be apprehended with the utmost possible distinctness. The event which furnishes

[1] i. 71.

[2] "Among early inquirers into the nature of human action the arts helped to fill up the void of speculation." (Prof. Jowett, Introduction to *Plato's Republic*.)

[3] iii. 37 § 3; vi. 18 § 7. Thucydides speaks of the *οὐ δημοτικὴ παρανομία* of Alcibiades in vi. 28; cf. vi. 15, where the same term is applied to him as in i. 132 to Pausanias.

the occasion for inserting a speech need not be of first-rate importance in itself, if only it is typical of its kind, and therefore suitable for the dramatic exhibition of reasonings which applied to several similar cases. The destruction of Plataea by Sparta was an impressive event; but its effect on the general course of the war would scarcely have warranted the amount of space devoted to the Plataean and Theban pleadings[1], if the occasion had not been a typical illustration of Spartan and Theban policy. Such, again, is the case of Mitylene, viewed as exemplifying the relation between Athens and her subject allies; and the dramatic form is given accordingly, not merely to the Athenian debate on Mitylene, but also to the appeal of the Mityleneans at Olympia[2]. The speech of Brasidas at Acanthus is given in the direct form as a specimen of his persuasive diplomacy in dealing with the cities of the Chalcidic peninsula[3]. The rival overtures of Athens and Syracuse to Camarina have a similarly representative character in relation to the wavering neutrality of the Sicilian cities, and accordingly the direct form is given to the arguments of Euphemus and of Hermocrates[4]. The absence of speeches in the Eighth Book has been reckoned among the proofs that this book had not received the author's last touches. There can be no doubt that Thucydides was prevented by death from completing or revising

[1] iii. 53—59, 61—67.
[2] iii. 9—14.
[3] iv. 85—87.
[4] v. 76—80; 82—86.

the Eighth Book[1]: but if his general practice is considered, the argument from the absence of speeches will appear questionable. Much of the Eighth Book is occupied with negotiations, either clandestine or indecisive, or both; and in a period of similar character which fills the greater part of the Fifth Book Thucydides nowhere employs the dramatic form[2]. It cannot surprise us that Thucydides has not given a dramatic emphasis to the mere misrepresentations by which Alcibiades and Chalcideus prevailed on the Chians to revolt[3]. The Revolution of the Four Hundred certainly afforded opportunities for the insertion of speeches made in debate. But that Revolution was primarily concerned with the

[1] Classen examines the evidence in his *Vorbemerkungen* to Book viii., with these results:— (1) Book viii. was left unrevised, owing to the author's death while he was engaged upon it, and hence several inaccuracies of expression or statement remain [cf. *e.g.* c. 8 § 3—4: the notice of the *βραχεῖα ναυμαχία* in c. 80, compared with c. 102: c. 89 § 2 (*τῶν πάνυ στρατηγῶν*, κ.τ.λ.): c. 90 § 1, where *σφῶν* recurs four times in a few lines: c. 101 § 3, where the geographical details are obscure]. (2) Such defects of the text were early recognised, but for a long time no attempt was made to remedy them. (3) In the Alexandrian or Roman age a recension of the whole History was made, of which codex Vaticanus 126 is the representative. For Books i.—vi. the cases in which the codex Vaticanus *alone* has the true reading are not numerous: in vii. they are more so: in viii. they are so frequent that here the Vaticanus, as compared with all the other MSS., assumes the character of a revised text.

[2] Thuc. v. 14—83 (422—416 B.C.). In Book v. the direct form of speech occurs only in the harangue of Brasidas (v. 9) and the Melian dialogue (85—116).

[3] viii. 14.

form of the Athenian constitution; its special importance for the history of the war lay in the use which Alcibiades was making of it to procure his own recall. This is perhaps the only point in the extant part of the Eighth Book at which the usual practice of Thucydides would lead us to expect the dramatic emphasis; and just here it is found. Peisander brings his opponents to admit that the case of Athens is desperate without the help of Persia. "This, then," he says, "we cannot get, unless we adopt a more temperate policy, and concentrate the administration in fewer hands, so as to secure the confidence of the king, . . . and recall Alcibiades, the only man living who can gain our end[1]." In a revision of the book Thucydides would possibly have worked up the speech of Peisander at greater length[2].

§ 11. As regards the language of the speeches, Thucydides plainly avows that it is chiefly or wholly his own[3]. The dramatic truth, so far as it goes, is in the matter, not in the form. He may sometimes indicate such broad characteristics as the curt blunt-

[1] viii. 53.

[2] The absence of military harangues, too, in Book viii. is sufficiently explained by the absence of any good occasion for them. The sea-fights at Euboea (95) and Cyzicus were hardly such: and the narrative breaks off before the more decisive actions of Cynossema and Aegospotami. The question has been discussed lately in an essay, *De Thucydidei Operis Libri viii. indole ac natura*, by Paul Hellwig (Halle, 1876).

[3] i. 22, where the *ἀκρίβεια αὐτὴ τῶν λεχθέντων* is opposed to the *ξύμπασα γνώμη*.

ness of the ephor Sthenelaidas[1] or the insolent vehemence of Alcibiades[2]. But, as a rule, there is little discrimination of style. In all that concerns expression, the speeches are essentially the oratorical essays of the historian himself. At the end of the war, when he composed or revised them, the art of Rhetoric was thoroughly established at Athens. The popular dialectic of the Sophists had been combined with lessons in the minute proprieties of language. Protagoras taught correctness in grammatical forms[3], Prodicus in the use of synonyms[4]. The Sicilian Rhetoric had familiarised Athenian speakers with principles of division and arrangement[5]. Gorgias, with his brilliant gift of expression[6], had for a while set the fashion of strained antithesis and tawdry splendour. It might have been expected from the character of his mind that Thucydides would be keenly alive to what was hollow and false in the new rhetoric. Several touches in the History show that

[1] i. 86, *τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ γιγνώσκω*, κ.τ.λ.

[2] vi. 18 § 3, *ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν*: § 4, *στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα*, etc., where the scholiast remarks that this is the harshest (*σκληρότατον*) of the metaphors in Thucydides, *ἀλλὰ κατὰ Ἀλκιβιάδην*.

[3] *ὀρθοέπεια*, Plat. *Phaedr.* 267 C.

[4] *ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων*, Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 277 E.

[5] The two things which the early Sicilian Rhetoric most sought to teach were skill in marshalling facts and skill in arguing probabilities: cp. *Attic Orators*, vol. i. p. cxviii f.

[6] Cp. *ib.* i. cxxiii. Gorgias was not properly either a student of technical rhetoric or a sophist.

he was so. Citizens in grave debate are contrasted with men who play audience to the empty displays of sophists[1]. A contempt for rhetorical commonplace is frequently indicated. Thus Pericles declines to dilate on the legendary glories of Athens[2] or on the advantages of patriotic fortitude[3], and Hermocrates begs to be excused from enlarging on the hardships of war[4] or the blessings of peace[5]. On the technical side, however, Thucydides shows the influence of the new art. This often appears in his method of marshalling topics and in his organisation of the more elaborate speeches[6]. It is seen still more clearly if his style is compared with that of the orator Antiphon. The extant work of Antiphon as a writer of speeches for the law-courts falls in the

[1] Thuc. iii. 38 § 7. σοφιστῶν [the word only here in Thuc.] θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις. Cf. § 5, μετὰ καινότητος λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι. Thucydides thrice uses ἐπίδειξις, but only once in reference to oratory, and then in a general, not in a technical sense (iii. 42). The regular speakers in the Ecclesia are thrice spoken of as ῥήτορες, and always in a more or less unfavourable tone (iii. 40; vi. 29; viii. 1).

[2] ii. 36. [3] ii. 43. [4] iv. 59.

[5] iv. 62. Compare what Alcibiades says at Sparta in declining to dwell on the evils of democracy—ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο.

[6] As in the Plataean and Theban speeches to the Spartan judges (iii. 53—59, 61—67), in the speeches of Hermocrates and Athenagoras to the Syracusan assembly (vi. 33—34, 36—40), and in the Funeral Oration. We can recognise a conscious partition, more or less complete, into προοίμιον, πρόθεσις (or προκατασκευή), διήγησις, πίστεις, ἐπίλογος. Cp. *Attic Orators*, vol. i. pp. 36, 181; ii. 422.

years 421—411 B.C.[1] The warmth of the terms in which Thucydides describes him as "a master of device and of expression[2]"—a phase identical with that which is ascribed, as a definition of statesman-like ability, to Pericles—testifies at least to an intellectual sympathy. There is, however, no evidence for the ancient tradition that the historian was the pupil of the orator[3]. Thucydides and Antiphon belong to the same rhetorical school, and represent the same early stage in the development of Attic prose. Both writers admit words of an antique or a decidedly poetical cast[4]. Both delight in verbal contrasts, pointed by insisting on the precise difference between terms of similar import[5]. Both use

[1] Of his extant works, *Or.* v., *περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόνου*, may be referred to about 417 B.C., and *Or.* vi., *περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ*, to about 412 B.C. Cp. *Attic Orators*, i. 34, 58, 63.

[2] viii. 68, *κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι . . . καὶ ἃ γνοίη εἰπεῖν.* Cf. ii. 60, *ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἧσσων εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα.*

[3] Caecilius of Calacte, in the Augustan age, conjectured that Thucydides had been the pupil of Antiphon (*Vitt. x. Oratt.*); Hermogenes (*περὶ ἰδ.* ii. 497) notices the belief as current, but rejects it. It seems to have been a mere guess, resting on resemblance of style. See *Attic Orators*, i. p. 4.

[4] *E.g.* Antiphon: *ἀλιτήριος—ποινή—προστρόπαιος—ἐνθύμιος—ἀσπαίρω* (ii. δ. 5)—*ἀνθρώπινον φῦλον* (iv. α. 2)—*εὐδία* (ii. β. 1)—*χωροφιλεῖν* (v. 78)—*φιλοθύτης* (ii. β. 12). Thucydides: *περιωπή* (= *σκοπία*, iv. 86)—*ἀχθηδών* (ii. 37)—*ναυβάτης* (i. 121; cf. Pollux i. 95, *τὸ ναυβάτας ὀνομάζειν (τοὺς ναύτας) τραγικώτερον*—*ἐσθήματα* (iii. 58)—*ἐσσαμένων* (= *ἱδρυσαμένων*, *ib.*)—*κεκμηῶτες* (iii. 59)—*περίρρυτος* (iv. 64)—*φυλοκρινεῖν* (vi. 18)—*ἐπηλυγάζεσθαι* (vi. 36), and many more.

[5] *E.g.* Antiphon: *γνωρισταί—δικασταί—δοξασταί—κριταί* (v.

metaphors rather bolder than Greek prose easily tolerated in its riper age[1]. On the other hand, there are three respects in which the composition of Thucydides may be contrasted with that of Antiphon. First, Thucydides has a pregnant brevity which would not have been possible in such measure for a practical orator, since no ordinary hearer could have followed his meaning with full comprehension[2]. Secondly, Thucydides often departs not only from the natural but from the rhetorical order of words, in

94): the *πράκτορες τῶν ἀκουσίων* distinguished from the *αἴτιοι τῶν παθημάτων* (ii. *β.* § 6): *τὰ παρῳχημένα σημείοις πιστῶσαι, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα τεκμηρίοις* (*ap.* Ammon. 127). Thucydides: *αἰτία—κατηγορία* (i. 68): *φρόνημα—καταφρόνημα—αὔχημα—καταφρόνησις* (ii. 62): *ἐπανέστησαν—ἀπέστησαν* (iii. 39)—*οὐκ ἀξυνετωτέρου, κακοξυνετωτέρου δέ* (vi. 76): *κατοικίσαι—ἐξοικίσαι* (*ib.*)—*παραίνεσις—ἀξίωσις* (i. 41)—*δοκοῦσα—φαινομένη* (i. 32)—*προεπιβουλεύειν—ἀντεπιβουλεύειν* (i. 33): *δικασταί . . . σωφρονισταί* (vi. 87).

[1] *E.g.* Antiphon: *τὰ ἴχνη τῆς ὑπωψίας εἰς τοῦτον φέροντα* (ii. *γ.* 10): *ἰατροὺς τῆς ἀτυχίας* (ii. *β.* 13); cf. i. *γ.* 1 and ii. *β.* 10. Thucydides: *ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐγγηράσεται* (vi. 18)—*ἰατρὸς τῆς πόλεως* (vi. 14)—*δουλοῖ τὸ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον* (ii. 61)—*πόλεμος βίαιος διδάσκαλος* (iii. 82)—*ἐπικλασθῆναι* (iii. 59), etc.

[2] This brevity appears (1) in such constructions as *γυναικείας ἀρετῆς, ὅσαι . . . ἔσονται* (ii. 45), or *τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι* (sc. *ἄρχειν*, i. 124); (2) in the suppression of a clause which can be supplied mentally, as often before a sentence introduced by *γάρ* (cf. i. 120 *ad init.*): (3) in the pregnant use of words, as vi. 11, *ὅπερ ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβοῦσι* (= *ἐκφοβοῦντες λέγουσι*). Cic. *de Orat.* ii. 22, sententiis magis abundat quam verbis . . . ; 13, ita verbis aptus et pressus est, etc. Quint. x. 1, densus et brevis et semper sibi instans. Dionys., p. 792, says that it belongs to Thucydides *πειρᾶσθαι δι' ἐλαχίστων ὀνομάτων πλεῖστα σημαίνειν*, and Marcellinus, § 50, speaks of his *θαυμασταὶ βραχύτητες*.

order to throw a stronger emphasis on the word which is the key-note to the thought; and in this again he is seen to be writing for readers, not for hearers[1]. Thirdly, the strings of clauses, forming periods of a somewhat loose and inartistic kind, are longer with Thucydides than with Antiphon, and this because Thucydides is striving to express ideas of a more complex nature[2]. The originality and the striking interest of the historian's style consists, in fact, in this, that we see a vigorous mind in the very act of struggling to mould a language of magnificent but immature capabilities. Sometimes the direction of the thought changes in the moment that it is being uttered[3]. Then arise obscurities which have their source in the intense effort of Thucydides to be clear at each successive moment—to say exactly what he means at that moment. The strong consciousness of logical coherence then makes him heedless of formal coherence. The student of

[1] *E.g.* iii. 39, μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων ἡμᾶς στάντες διαφθεῖραι: i. 33, γενήσεται δὲ . . . καλὴ ἡ ξυντυχία κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας χρείας: vi. 82, οὓς ξυγγενεῖς φασιν ὄντας ἡμᾶς Συρακόσιοι δεδουλῶσθαι: v. 91, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ νῦν τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως.

[2] *E.g.* such a sentence as that in Antiphon v. 21, ἡ μὲν πρόφασις ἑκατέρῳ—ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἡρώδην, may be compared in general structure with Thuc. vi. 82, ἡμεῖς γὰρ Ἴωνες ὄντες . . . Συρακόσιοι δεδουλῶσθαι, but the latter has a much longer series of clauses. In Thucydides the transition from a simple string of clauses to a period properly so called is commonly made by the insertion of explanatory parentheses introduced with γάρ.

[3] *E.g.* vii. 42, τοῖς Συρακουσίοις . . . κατάπληξις ἐγένετο . . . ὁρῶντες, κ.τ.λ. Cp. iii. 36, vi. 24, iv. 108, etc.

Thucydides has one consolation which is not always present to the student of a difficult writer. He knows that he is not engaged in the hopeless or thankless task of unravelling a mere rhetorical tangle. Every new light on the thought is sure to be a new light on the words[1].

§ 12. The practice of introducing speeches was continued through the whole series of Greek and Roman historians, and, owing to its classical prestige, even maintained itself for a time in modern literature. But it is curious to trace the process by which it was gradually estranged from the spirit and significance of its origin. For Xenophon, the idea of portraying character in deed and in word was as natural as for Thucydides. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, with all their differences, alike belong to an age in which the historian draws from life and for life, setting forth what has been done and said, but rarely theorising or commenting. In the political life which Thucydides and Xenophon represent, public speech

[1] Jelf (following Kühner) rightly classes Thucydides with those writers who, "engrossed with the subject, were overpowered by their flow of thought, and endeavouring to concentrate these notions in all their fulness in as few words as possible, passed from thought to thought, without taking much care that the several parts of the whole sentence should be connected together with a strict grammatical accuracy." The constructions of Thucydides, he adds, "in spite of, or perhaps because of, their grammatical inaccuracy, have a power and depth of expression which perhaps no other prose writer ever attained." (*Greek Grammar*, ii. 593.)—Thucydides wishes his *thought* to be what Aristotle requires in the period (*Rhet.* iii. 9)—εὐσύνοπτον. Cp. *Attic Orators*, i. 35.

wielded the decisive force; but while the main purpose of Thucydides is political, that of Xenophon is rather ethical. Xenophon introduces direct speech or dialogue chiefly to enforce the moral lessons of individual character. The colloquial tone prevails even in political debate[1], and there is rarely any attempt at condensed reasoning of the Thucydidean type. In the course of the fourth century B.C. the school of Isocrates developed a normal literary prose, and such writers as Ephorus and Theopompus applied a rhetoric more florid than their master's to the misplaced embellishment of history[2]. At the same time the political life of Greece was decaying, and with it the instinct which in earlier days would have been offended by the obtrusion of false ornament on a narrative of civic action. Then came the age of the Alexandrian erudition, and history was made a province of learned research. Polybius is a learned historian with a theory, but he is also a practical statesman and soldier. He is utterly opposed to the rhetorical treatment of historical subjects. He expressly condemns the sensational writers who confound the scope of history with that of tragedy. Tragedy, he says, may stir the emotions by any fiction which is not too improbable: the part of

[1] See *e.g.* the speeches of Critias and Theramenes in Xen. *Hellen.* ii. 3. This colloquial tone is one element of the quality in Xenophon which Quintilian (x. 1) calls "iucunditas inaffectata."

[2] On the rhetorical historians of the Isocratic school, see *Attic Orators*, ii. 48 and 427.

history is to teach lessons of permanent worth "by means of real deeds and words[1]." At the same time, he is keenly alive to the power of oratory. He observes how a single weighty speaker may turn the tide at a crisis[2], and he apparently feels bound to make some attempt at representing oratorical effect. When he makes his persons speak, he does so much in the spirit of Thucydides, though less elaborately: that is, he has some definite points or arguments which he wishes to present in the most vivid form at a critical moment. Like Thucydides, he sometimes balances the harangues of generals on opposite sides[3]. Sometimes he begins to give merely the purport of what was said, and then passes from the oblique to direct speech[4], as Thucydides occasionally does. And it may be concluded that, like Thucydides, he gave the "general sense" faithfully whenever it could be ascertained[5]. But Polybius stands alone in this respect among the historical writers after Xenophon. In the period between

[1] Polyb. ii. 56: ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ (*i.e.* in Tragedy) δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπλῆξαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δὲ (in History) διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας.

[2] Polyb. xi. 10: οὕτως εἷς λόγος, εὐκαίρως ῥηθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου, πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἀποτρέπει τῶν χειρίστων ἀλλὰ καὶ παρορμᾷ πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

[3] *E.g.* of Hannibal and Scipio, Polyb. iii. 108—111.

[4] Polyb. xi. 28; xxii. 14.

[5] See Polyb. xxx. 4: ἦν δ' ὁ νοῦς τῆς ἀποκρίσεως τοιοῦτος,—the ξύμπασα γνώμη of Thuc. i. 22.

Alexander and Augustus the rhetorical school of history prevailed. Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus[1] are both rhetoricians, the rhetoric of Diodorus being combined with a quasi-philosophical bent, and that of Dionysius with æsthetic criticism. Diodorus, indeed, has some quaintly judicious remarks on the introduction of long speeches into history. They interrupt the story, he says, and distract the reader: writers who wish to show their eloquence should do so somewhere else. A history should be an organic whole; a speech which is inserted amiss cannot have vital grace[2]. Still, speeches are sometimes desirable, Diodorus adds, for the sake of variety (ποικιλία). When circumstances require that an envoy or senator should speak, the historian must gallantly accompany his personages into the arena of debate[3]. Diodorus appears to recognise, as he certainly used, the free licence of invention[4]. His view is substantially that

[1] I have purposely abstained from examining the criticisms of Dionysius on the speeches in Thucydides, since he regards them exclusively from the point of view of contemporary rhetoric, not at all from the historian's. His criticisms on Thucydides are, for this very reason, immeasurably inferior to those in his excellent essays on the orators. The lengthy speech of Veturia to Coriolanus (Dionys. *Ant. Rom.* viii. 46—53) is a fair specimen of his own practice in the rhetorical embellishment of history.

[2] ἐστέρηται τῆς ψυχικῆς χάριτος, Diod. xx. 2.

[3] Diod. xx. 2, ὁ μὴ τεθαρρηκότως συγκαταβαίνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀγῶνας καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπαίτιος ἂν εἴη.

[4] Thus he says, *ib.*, μεγάλων καὶ λαμπρῶν τῶν ὑποθέσεων οὐσῶν, οὐ περιορατέον ἐλάττονα τῶν ἔργων φανῆναι τὸν λόγον.

of Plutarch[1] and Lucian[2]. They demand that the speech shall be appropriate to the speaker and to the occasion, but the same conditions are equally binding on an epic poet. Among the Roman historians of the first rank, Livy is the one who has made the largest use of this freedom. He once says, in reference to a speech of Cato's, that, as the real text is extant in Cato's *Origines*, he will not give the reader a pale copy of that rich eloquence[3]. It might have been inferred that Livy was careful in his speeches to represent individual character and manner[4]. But the inference is scarcely supported by the extant portion of his work, though it is possible that his portraits may have become more accurate in this respect as he came to later times and ampler materials. The speeches are sometimes of great power and beauty, but the rhetorical colour is uniform, and there is sometimes an absolute

[1] Plut., *praecept. ger. Reipubl.* 6, where he objects to long speeches before battles as out of place. The speeches, often happily dramatic, in his own biographies are the best comment on his remark (*de glor. Athen.* p. 346), τῶν ἱστορικῶν κράτιστος ὁ τὴν διήγησιν ὥσπερ γραφὴν πάθεσι καὶ προσώποις εἰδωλοποιήσας.

[2] Lucian, *de conscrib. hist.* 58, ἢν δέ ποτε . . . δεινότητα: "And if it should ever be necessary to introduce a person speaking, first of all let the speech be suitable to the person and the matter; next let it be as clear as possible: then, however, you are at liberty to declaim (ῥητορεῦσαι) and to show your oratorical power."

[3] "Simulacrum viri copiosi," Liv. xlv. 25.

[4] As Quintilian says of Livy, "ita dicuntur omnia, cum rebus tum personis accommodata," x. 1.

disregard of dramatic probability[1]. Sallust has higher merit in this department. The war of Jugurtha and the conspiracy of Catiline were, when Sallust wrote, events of recent memory, and each had been illustrated by striking contrasts of character. According to Plutarch, the employment of shorthand writers[2] to report debates in the Roman Senate began in 63 B.C.; it was certainly well established in the closing years of the Republic. Sallust had some advantages for the presentation of character in a manner at once dramatic and historical, and he seems to have used them well. There is no reason to doubt that Caesar's speech in the debate on the punishment of the conspirators was substantially such as Sallust reports[3]; and his way of introducing a discourse of Memmius in the Jugurthine War implies that it is true not only to

[1] *E.g.* Liv. ii. 40; xxiii. 8, 9. Livy seems sometimes to have taken hints from Polybius or Thucydides; cp. xxx. 30 with Polyb. xv. 6, and vii. 30 with Thuc. i. 32.

[2] Plut. (*Cat. min.* 23) says that the speech of Cato in the debate on the conspiracy of Catiline is believed to be the only one of his preserved—Cicero having taught some of the most rapid writers the use of a shorthand (*σημεῖα προδιδάξαντος ἐν μικροῖς καὶ βραχέσι τύποις πολλῶν γραμμάτων ἔχοντα δύναμιν*), and having distributed these writers through the Senate-house. For the Romans, Plutarch adds, did not yet possess *τοὺς καλουμένους σημειογράφους*: this was the beginning of it. Suetonius mentions a speech of Julius Cæsar which, Augustus thought, must have been imperfectly taken down by the *actuarii* (*Caes.* 55). The usual Roman word was *notarius*. Martial has an epigram on a shorthand writer, xiv. 208.

[3] Sallust, *Catil.* 51, 52.

the substance but to the manner[1]. Tacitus uses the dramatic form more variously than Sallust, but with a stricter historical conscience than Livy. He resembles Thucydides and Polybius in never introducing a speech merely for oratorical effect, but always for the purpose of illustrating a political situation or character[2]. There is a well-known instance—the only one in ancient literature—in which the discourse given by the historian can be compared with an official record of the discourse really delivered. In the Eleventh Book of the *Annals* the Emperor Claudius addresses the Senate in support of a proposal for imparting the Roman franchise to the provincials of Gallia Comata[3]. The bronze tablets found at Lyons in the sixteenth century, and now in the Museum there, give what purports to be the real speech of Claudius on this occasion. Tacitus and the tablets disagree hopelessly in language and in nearly all the detail, but agree in the general line of argument[4]. Knowing

[1] *Bellum Jugurth.* 31—a striking illustration of the Roman feeling that oratory, for its own sake, deserved a place in history.

[2] Ulrici, indeed (*Charakteristik der antiken Historiographie*, p. 148), regards some of the speeches in Tacitus as inserted merely for dramatic ornament; *e.g. Ann.* i. 17, 22, 42, 43, 58, 59; ii. 14, 45, 46; iii. 16, 61; iv. 34, 35; xii. 10. But in all such cases, I think, it will be found that a more serious motive is also present.

[3] Tac. *Ann.* xi. 24.

[4] The text of the two bronze tablets, found in 1524, has been edited by A. de Boissieu in his *Inscriptions antiques de Lyon.* It is printed in Orelli's edition of Tacitus at the end of Book xi. of the *Annals*, p. 342.

the antiquarian turn of Claudius, Tacitus might easily have concluded that the Emperor's speech would dwell largely on historical precedents; but it seems more likely that he knew, from oral or written report, the substance of what Claudius had said, and worked up this in his own way. Here, then, is a rough gauge of the approximation which might be made to the truth by a historian who composed a speech based on "the general sense of what was really said." Thucydides and Polybius, Sallust and Tacitus, are widely removed from writers who introduce harangues merely as opportunities of display[1]. The latter tendency prevailed in what Gibbon calls "the elaborate and often empty speeches of the Byzantine historians[2]." The Latin chroniclers of the middle ages rarely ventured on such ambitious efforts. But at the revival of letters the classical practice of inserting speeches was revived by historical writers, whether they wrote in Latin[3]

[1] As they are introduced, for example, by Quintus Curtius, who gives the speech of the Scythian ambassadors to Alexander (vii. 8), and an impossible harangue of Dareius to his army before the battle of Arbelà (iv. 14).

[2] *Decline and Fall*, ch. 43. It is difficult to believe, with Gibbon, that the speech of Attila to his soldiers before the battle of Chalons—as given in Cassiodorus—can rest on any basis of fact (ch. 35); however it may be with the letter of Belisarius to Justinian given by Procopius, which Gibbon thinks "genuine and original" (ch. 43).

[3] *E.g.* Paulus Aemilius, Strada Mariana, Buchanan, Grotius, De Thou.

or in their vernacular[1]. M. Daunou[2] quotes some curious examples from the French literature of the three centuries before our own. Thus Vertot, in his *Révolutions romaines*, entered into competition with Dionysius, Livy and Plutarch, by inventing a fourth version of the appeal made to Coriolanus by his mother in the Volscian camp. Mézerai could make Joan of Arc address her executioners in a harangue full of violent invective and sinister prediction; and this when the contemporary record of her trial existed, with its notice of the rare and broken utterances which belonged to her last hours[3]. By degrees a controversy arose on the question whether a historian is entitled to invent speeches for his persons, and the literary world was long divided upon it. Isaac Voss[4] and Mably[5] were among the more distinguished champions of the oratorical licence; among its opponents were Voltaire—whose

[1] *E.g.* Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Mézerai.

[2] *Cours d'Études Historiques*, vol. vii. p. 466 ff.

[3] As M. Daunou gravely observes: "La plus simple réflexion suffit pour concevoir que les Anglais, tenant en leur pouvoir la malheureuse Jeanne, ne lui auraient pas permis, à sa dernière heure, de débiter publiquement toutes ces sottises" (p. 476). The authentic records of her trial and execution are contained, he adds, in vol. iii. of the *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*. It is an extraordinary example of the rhetorical taste of the age that Mézerai should have preferred to declaim, when he might have told a true story of the deepest pathos.

[4] *Ars Historica*, 20.

[5] *De la manière d'écrire l'Histoire*, Works, vol. xii. 452—461.

opinion has been quoted already—and D'Alembert. The latter declared, in 1761, that a historian who filled his work with speeches would be sent back to college[1]. But the practice lingered on a little longer, being commonly defended by the plea that it was enlivening, and that it could not be really deceptive[2]. The spirit of scientific criticism has now banished it for ever from history, and has relegated it to its proper sphere in the province of historical romance.

§ 13. Thucydides set the first great example of making historical persons say what they might have said. The basis of his conception was common to the whole ancient world: it was the sovereign im-

[1] "Tranchons le mot, aujourd'hui l'on renverrait aux amplifications de collége un historien qui remplirait son ouvrage de harangues": quoted by Daunou (vii. 472) from a paper on the art of writing history, read by D'Alembert to the French Academy (*ib.* p. 115).

[2] Thus Gaillard, in his History of Francis I., published in 1766, answers the charge of a "petite infidélité" by saying: "Je réponds que je ne puis voir une infidélité réelle où d'un côté personne ne veut tromper, et où d'un autre côté personne ne peut être trompé" (Daunou, p. 458). This is much the same as the apology for Livy's speeches made by Crevier in the preface to his edition: "Quasi vero cuiquam innocens ille dolus imponat." Botta's History of Italy from 1780 to 1814 contains one of the latest examples, perhaps, of the licence, when he gives (Book iii.) the speeches of Pesaro and Vallaresso in the debate of the Venetian Senate on the French invasion of Italy (1793), and (Book v.) a debate in the Piedmontese Council. The practice was thoroughly suited to the Italian genius, and maintained itself longest in Italy.

portance of speech in political and civic life. But in Thucydides the use of the licence is dramatic—that is, conducive to the truthful and vivid presentment of action. In most of the later Greek and Roman historians it is either rhetorical—that is, subservient to the display of the writer's style—or partly dramatic and partly rhetorical. The art of rhetoric passed through two stages of educational significance in the ancient world. In the first stage, with which Thucydides was contemporary, rhetoric meant a training for real debate in the assembly or the law-courts. Then, as Greek political life died down, rhetoric came to mean the art of writing or declaiming[1]. The speeches in Thucydides have the dramatic spirit, and not the rhetorical, because, although the art of rhetoric has helped to make them, they are in direct relation with real action and real life. The rhetorical historians of the ancient world represent the second stage of rhetoric: their speeches are only more or less possible declamations. The modern writers who attempted to revive the practice were in a lower deep still, since for them rhetoric was not even a living element of culture[2]. But it may be well to consider a little more closely

[1] The process of this change has been sketched in the *Attic Orators*, vol. ii. ch. xxiv.

[2] The Roman historical writers of the Empire were under the influence of the recitations (cp. Mayor on Juvenal iii.; and Heitland and Raven, in the Introduction to their extracts from Quintus Curtius, in the Pitt Press Series, p. 12). Prejudicial to history as this influence was, it yet gave a special interest to the speeches, regarded as exercises in a familiar art.

how far and in what sense Thucydides can be called dramatic. The epithet "dramatic" is sometimes applied to narrative when no more is apparently meant than that it is vivid or graphic. In the proper sense, however, a narrative is dramatic only when it elicits the inherent eloquence of facts. Thucydides is dramatic, for instance, when he places the Melian dialogue[1] immediately before the Sicilian expedition. The simple juxtaposition of insolence and ruin is more effective than comment. The bare recital, thus ordered, makes the same kind of impression which the actions themselves would have made if one had immediately succeeded the other before our eyes. It might not be difficult, with a little adroitness, to represent Thucydides as a conscious dramatic artist throughout his work; and an ingenious writer has actually shown how his History may be conceived as a tragedy cast into five acts[2]. But it would perhaps

[1] In the remarkable speech of the Athenian envoy Euphemus at Camarina (vi. 82—86, 415 B.C.), the dramatic purpose of the Melian dialogue is continued and completed. The plain avowal of Athenian motives is reiterated, and their bearing on the Sicilian expedition is explicitly stated. See vi. 83, *τήν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν* (in Greece) *εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε* (in Sicily) *διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥκειν μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀσφαλῶς καταστησόμενοι.* 85, *ὥστε καὶ τἀνθάδε εἰκὸς πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελοῦν καί, ὃ λέγομεν, ἐς Συρακοσίους δέος καθίστασθαι.*

[2] Ulrici, *Charakteristik der antiken Historiographie*, p. 313. Book i. is a prologue, he says, which acquaints the reader with the immediate antecedents of the drama and the relative positions of the chief actors. The First Act comprises the plague at Athens, the supreme efforts of Pericles and his death, the destruction of Plataea by Sparta, the overthrow of Mitylene by

be truer to say that the war itself presented striking contrasts, analogous to those which a dramatic poet contrives: the dullest writer could not have wholly missed these contrasts; and if Diodorus had been the historian, his work, too, might have revealed the five acts; but Thucydides was peculiarly well fitted to bring out these contrasts with the most complete effect. He was so, because he felt the whole moment and pathos of the events themselves; because he saw them with the distinctness of intense concentration; and because, partly under the influence of language[1], he had even more than the ordinary Greek love of antithesis. It is obvious that the Peloponnesian war, as a subject for history, may be

Athens (ii. 1—iii. 68). The Second Act presents the typical party-strife at Corcyra; fortune wavers; the Athenians are defeated by the Aetolians, but blockade the Spartans in Sphacteria (iii. 69—iv. 36). The Third Act opens with the surrender of the Spartans; the Athenians occupy Cythera; both sides are weary of the struggle, and at length a peace is concluded. But there are signs that it cannot last, and now Alcibiades comes forward to advocate the Sicilian expedition (iv. 37—vi. 23). The Fourth Act is the crisis—the Sicilian expedition, ending in the Athenian defeat (vi. 24—vii.). In the Fifth Act the catastrophe is delayed for a moment by the recall of Alcibiades. He brings back a gleam of prosperity with him. But he is again dismissed; and then comes the final ruin of Athens (viii.).

[1] The Greek instinct for symmetry and just measure sharpened the perception of contrast, and the desire of vividly expressing contrast helped to mould the language. Thus when it is said of Antigone, *πασῶν γυναικῶν ὡς ἀναξιωτάτη | κάκιστ' ἀπ' ἔργων εὐκλεεστάτων φθίνει* (694), it is the keenly felt opposition of things that is striving to utter itself in the forcible opposition of words. Then Rhetoric arose, with its opposition of words even where

said to have dramatic unity in the sense that it is a single great action: as, by an analogous metaphor, the subject of Herodotus may be said to have epic unity, because the various parts, though they cannot be brought within the compass of one action[1], can be brought within the compass of one narrative. And, apart from this rudimentary dramatic unity, the Peloponnesian war has a further analogy to a drama in presenting a definite moment at which the cardinal situation is decisively reversed—as it is reversed in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, for instance, when the king discovers that he is an incestuous parricide. That moment is the Sicilian expedition. The supreme test of "dramatic" quality in a history of the Peloponnesian war must be the power with which the historian has marked the significance of the Sicilian expedition as the tragic "revolution" (*peripeteia*), the climax of pity and terror, the decisive reversal. Thucydides has devoted the whole of his Sixth and Seventh Books to the events of those two years, thus at once marking the significance of the expedition as the turning-point of the war. And every reader knows with what tremendous effect he has traced its course, from the moment when the whole population of Athens was gathered at the

there was no commensurate opposition of things. Thucydides was partly under this influence of Rhetoric: witness his ἔργον and λόγος, etc.; but, by a reversal of the natural process, the very habit of verbal antithesis tended to quicken the observation of opportunities for its effective employment.

[1] *I.e.* no drama on the Persian wars could have included (*e.g.*) the Egyptian and Scythian episodes of Herodotus.

Peiraeus in the early midsummer morning to see the splendid fleet sail for Sicily, and the trumpet commanded silence while the whole multitude joined in prayer, and wine was poured from vessels of silver and gold as the pæan[1] arose, down to that overthrow of which he writes that they were destroyed with utter destruction, and that few out of many came home[2]. Here, at the point in his story which supplies the crucial test, Thucydides shows that he possesses true dramatic power. By the direct presentment of the facts, not by reflections upon them, he makes us feel all that is tragic in the Sicilian disaster itself, and also all that it means in relation to the larger tragedy of the war. The same power is seen in many particular episodes of the History: for example, in the self-restrained majesty of Pericles, the great protagonist of the opening war, whose courage, amidst havoc and pestilence, ever rises as the Athenian courage declines; or in the first appearance of Alcibiades on the scene, with his brilliant versatility and his profound lack of loyalty, with his unmeasured possibilities for good or evil, just when the Sicilian project is trembling in the balance. Without pressing the parallel between the History and a work of dramatic art to any fanciful length, it may be said with a definite meaning that Thucydides has not merely the inspiration of action, but often also the spirit of the noblest tragic drama.

It is natural to regret his silence in regard to the

[1] vi. 30. [2] vii. 87.

social and intellectual life of his age[1]. The simplest explanation of it is that he did not conceive such details as requisite for the illustration of his purely political subject. The art and poetry of the day, the philosophy and the society, were perhaps in his view merely the decorations of the theatre in which the great tragedy of the war was being played. Though he wrote for all time, he did not conceive of an audience who would have to reconstruct this theatre before they could fully comprehend his drama[2]. No writer has ever been at once so

[1] The names of Aeschylus, Sophocles (the poet), Euripides (the poet), Aristophanes, Pheidias, Ictinus, Anaxagoras, Socrates, are among those which Thucydides nowhere mentions. In addition to Helen (i. 9) and Procne (ii. 29), only four women are named in the whole History, and not one of them has the slightest human interest in reference to the war—Chrysis and Phaeinis, successively priestesses of the Argive Hera (ii. 1, iv. 133); Stratonice, the sister of Perdiccas (ii. 101); and Archedice, the daughter of Hippias (vi. 59). The Parthenon is alluded to as a treasury; and the Propylaea are noticed—as a work which had reduced the balance in it (ii. 13 § 3, where *ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει* = *ἐν τῷ ὀπισθοδόμῳ*).

[2] Thucydides can, indeed, imagine a time when Sparta shall be desolate, and only the ruins of Athens shall remain; i. 10 § 2, *Λακεδαιμονίων γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθείη . . . Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων*, κ.τ.λ. But he has no conception of a time when the Hellenic civilisation that he knew should have passed away. Thus Pericles says that Athens (unlike Troy or Mycenae, he means) needs no Homer to persuade posterity of her greatness: she has established on every shore *imperishable monuments* of her power for evil or good, where the *ἀΐδια μνημεῖα* are the Athenian settlements on conquered or on friendly soil. Cf. ii. 64, *ἣν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε . . . μνήμη καταλελείψεται*, κ.τ.λ.—where the *μνήμη* assumes a purely Hellenic standard.

anxiously careful and so haughtily improvident of the future. His characteristic dislike of superfluous detail seems to have been allied with a certain hardness of temperament, such as is indicated by the tone of his reference to the poets[1]. His banishment may also have infused something of bitterness[2] into his recollections of the Athenian life, with all its gracious surroundings, with all its social and intellectual delights, from which he was suddenly cut off, so that he should know them no more until he came back in his old age and found them changed.

[1] He cites them simply as authorities for facts, whose statements often require to be modified: i. 21 § 1. Thus he makes a sort of apology for quoting so equivocal an authority as Homer respecting the power of Agamemnon (i. 9 § 4), and the size of the Greek fleet (10 § 3). His extracts from the fine passage in the Hymn to the Delian Apollo are the briefest which could establish his two points—that there *was* an Ionian festival at Delos, and that it included a musical contest (iii. 104).

[2] There is a singular suggestiveness in the speech which the exile Thucydides attributes to the exile Alcibiades (at Sparta in 415 B.C., vi. 92). It is the historian's way of showing how the pain which he himself had known might work in a disloyal character. "My patriotism," says Alcibiades, "is not for a country that wrongs me; it was given to a country that protected my rights . . . The true patriot is not he who abstains from moving against the country from which he has been unjustly banished, but he who, in his passionate love for her, strives by all means to regain her."

May not these words—καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ—have a reference to Thrasybulus and the patriotic exiles who marched from Phyle upon Athens? Just after the restoration of the democracy the point would have been peculiarly effective.

No one can tell now how the memories of early sympathies may have grouped themselves in his mind as he looked out in later years from his home in Thrace on the sea over which he had sailed on the long-past day when he failed to save Amphipolis; but at least there is a twofold suggestiveness in those passages[1] which touch on the glories of Athens. There is the feeling of the man who has never lost his love and admiration for the Athenian ideal; and there is also a certain reluctance to translate this ideal into concrete images[2], as if, in the words of Oedipus after his ruin, it were sweet for thought to dwell beyond the sphere of griefs[3]. Perhaps in this very reticence the modern world may find a gain

[1] Most striking of all these, perhaps, is one in the speech of Nicias to the army before the retreat from Syracuse (vii. 63 § 3), where, addressing the *non*-Athenians, he reminds them of the pleasure (*ἡδονή*) which they have derived from *passing for* Athenians—through their knowledge of the Attic dialect, and their imitation of Attic manners—and so being admired throughout Greece: *Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες . . . τῆς τε φωνῆς ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα.* Among Peloponnesians, Italians or Siceliots, the Athenian exile had ever carried about with him the consciousness of belonging to that city which was the *παίδευσις Ἑλλάδος*.

[2] Even in the Funeral Oration—that splendid monument of his grave enthusiasm for Athens—Thucydides has been restrained, whether by fidelity to the original or by his own feeling, from exceeding the limit of such abstract expressions as *τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδεύματα, πόνων ἀναπαύλαι, ἀγῶνες, θυσίαι, φιλοκαλεῖν, φιλοσοφεῖν.*

[3] *τὸ γὰρ | τὴν φροντίδ' ἔξω τῶν κακῶν οἰκεῖν γλυκύ, Oed. Tyr.* 1390.

when it views his work from the artistic side. Thucydides must always hold his fame by a double right; not only as a thinker who, in an age of transitional scepticism, clearly apprehended the value of disciplined intelligence as a permanent force in practical politics, but also as a writer who knew how to make great events tell their own story greatly; and the dramatic power of the immortal History is heightened by its dramatic reserve.

TABLE OF THE SPEECHES.

[Asterisks mark those delivered at Athens before the exile of Thucydides.]

Book.		Date B.C.		
I.	32–36	433	Corcyrean	Envoys to the Athenian Ecclesia.*
„	37–43	„	Corinthian	
„	68–72	432	Corinthian	Envoys in the first Congress at Sparta.
„	73–78	„	Athenian	
„	80–85	„	King Archidamus	to the Spartan Assembly.
„	86	„	The Ephor Sthenelaidas	
„	120–24	„	Corinthian Envoys in the second Congress at Sparta.	
„	140–44	„	Pericles to the Athenian Ecclesia.*	
II.	35–46	431	Funeral Oration of Pericles.*	
„	60–64	430	Pericles to the Athenian Ecclesia.*	
III.	9–14	428	Mitylenean Envoys to the Peloponnesians at Olympia.	
„	37–40	427	Cleon	to the Athenian Ecclesia.*
„	42–48	„	Diodotus	
„	53–59	„	Plataeans	to the Spartan Judges.
„	61–67	„	Thebans	

Book.		Date B.C.	
IV.	17–20	425	Lacedaemonian Envoys to the Athenian Ecclesia.*
,,	59–64	424	Hermocrates in the Sicilian Congress at Gela.
,,	85–87	,,	Brasidas to the Acanthians.
V.	85–116	416	Conference between Athenian and Melian negotiators.
VI.	9–14	415	Nicias } to the Athenian Ecclesia.
,,	16–18	,,	Alcibiades } to the Athenian Ecclesia.
,,	20–23	,,	Nicias } to the Athenian Ecclesia.
,,	33–34	,,	Hermocrates } to the Syracusan Assembly.
,,	36–40	,,	Athenagoras } to the Syracusan Assembly.
,,	41	,,	A Syracusan General } to the Syracusan Assembly.
,,	76–80	,,	Hermocrates as Envoy of Syracuse } at Camarina.
,,	82–86	,,	Euphemus as Envoy of Athens } at Camarina.
,,	89–92	,,	Alcibiades at Sparta.

Military Harangues.

II.	11	431	Archidamus to the Peloponnesian Officers before invading Attica.
,,	87	429	Peloponnesian Commanders to their crews } before an action in the Corinthian Gulf.
,,	89	,,	Phormio to the men of the Athenian Fleet } before an action in the Corinthian Gulf.
IV.	10	425	Demosthenes to his troops at Pylos.
,,	92	424	Pagondas to the Boeotian troops } before the battle of Delium.
,,	95	,,	Hippocrates to the Athenian troops } before the battle of Delium.
,,	126	423	Brasidas to his troops on the campaign against Arrhibaeus.
V.	9	422	Brasidas to his troops before the battle at Amphipolis.
VI.	68	415	Nicias to his troops before the first battle at Syracuse.

Book.		Date B.C.	
VII.	61–64	413	Nicias to the Athenian troops } before the last
„	66–68	„	Gylippus to the Syracusan troops } sea-fight.
„	77	„	Nicias to his troops before the retreat from Syracuse.

The short speech of the Elean Teutiaplus to Alcidas and the Peloponnesian leaders at Embaton (iii. 30, 427 B.C.) is virtually of this class.

From the set speeches are to be distinguished a few shorter utterances in the direct form, but of a more colloquial character, viz. the dialogue between Archidamus and the Plataeans (ii. 71–74, 429 B.C.); the conversation with the Ambracian herald and an Athenian (iii. 113, 426 B.C.); and the words of Peisander in the Athenian Ecclesia (viii. 53, 411 B.C.). The letter of Nicias (vii. 11–15, 414 B.C.) would be classed by some with the speeches composed by Thucydides, by others as an authentic document. Cp. p. 403, note 4.

SUIDAS
ON THE CHANGE ASCRIBED TO SOPHOCLES IN REGARD TO TRILOGIES[1].

THE passage of Suidas which I have taken as my subject follows his notice of two other modifications which Sophocles had introduced into the form of Attic Tragedy,—the increase in the number of the actors from two to three; and the increase in the number of the Chorus from twelve to fifteen. Then Suidas continues, "And he himself began the practice of play contending against play, and not tetralogy"—against tetralogy[2]. The grammatical construction claims a brief comment. I take the accusatives δρᾶμα and τετραλογίαν as subjects to the infinitive ἀγωνίζεσθαι. Compare Arist. *Poetics*, ch. 7, εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλέψυδραν ἂν ἠγωνίζοντο: "for if it had been necessary that a hundred tragedies should compete, they would have competed under a limit of time for each." The alternative is to take δρᾶμα and τετρα-

[1] This 'Exposition' was delivered by the author, as candidate for the Regius Professorship of Greek in the University of Cambridge, in the Arts School before the Council of the Senate on May 24, 1889.

[2] καὶ αὐτὸς ἦρξε τοῦ δρᾶμα πρὸς δρᾶμα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τετραλογίαν.

λογίαν as cognate accusatives, and to suppose that the subject to the infinitive is the poet; "he began the practice of (the poet) competing *with* play against play," etc. We might then compare Herod. 5. 22 ἀγωνιζόμενος στάδιον, contending *in* a foot-race. Thus δρᾶμα would be equivalent to δραματικὸν ἀγῶνα, and τετραλογίαν to τετραλογικὸν ἀγῶνα. But δρᾶμα and τετραλογία are opposed to each other, merely as different instruments of the same contest; and therefore, if the poet were the subject to the infinitive, we should rather have expected the dative, δράματι, τετραλογίᾳ. It is true that Aristides (ii. 422) has the phrase Σοφοκλῆς...ἡττᾶτο τὸν Οἰδίπουν, "Sophocles was defeated with his Oedipus"; but there the accusative seems rather analogous to the cognate accusative in such phrases as νικᾶν μάχην. It will appear bye and bye that, although the general sense of the passage is not affected by the question as to the subject of the infinitive, yet this point is perhaps not wholly without significance.

I propose to discuss the interpretations which have been placed upon the statement of Suidas, and then to offer my own[1].

[1] Since the literature bearing on this passage is a somewhat large one, it may be well to give at the outset a chronological list of the writings which have been chiefly used for this paper.

1819. G. Hermann, On the Composition of Tetralogies.

1824. Welcker, The Aeschylean Trilogy Prometheus.

1839. A. Schöll, Contributions to the History of Greek Poetry; also his "Full Exposition of the Tetralogy" (1859).

1839. Heinrich Bode, History of Greek Dramatic Poetry.

As a preliminary, it is necessary to consider the origin of the tetralogy in Greek drama, and the evidence regarding the period of time during which tetralogy was in use.

Among the deities of ancient Greece, it was peculiar to the young Dionysus,—that latest comer from the East,—that, according to legend, he had not been permitted to assume his place in the pantheon without resistance at the hands of men. His entrance into Hellas had been opposed; his worshippers had been harassed; in his own person he had endured contumely, even bonds: but in the end he prevailed: the frowardness which thwarted the enthusiasm of his votaries was turned by him into a darker ecstasy of madness and self-destruction.

1841. Boeckh, An Essay to show "That single plays also were exhibited by the Greek Tragedians."

1857. Bergk, A Commentary on the Art of Sophocles.

1858. C. F. Hermann, *Greek Antiquities*, vol. ii. § 59, n. 23, 2nd ed.: where he says that his view of the passage in Suidas was first expounded in the *Jahrbuch für Wissenschaftliche Kritik* for 1843, vol. ii. p. 834.

1877. H. Richards, "Some Doubts as to the performance of Trilogies or Tetralogies at Athens," in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. vii. p. 279.

1885. A. T. S. Goodrick, "On certain Difficulties with regard to the Greek Tetralogy," in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. xiv. p. 133.

1885. G. Günther, Principles of the Tragic Art.

1886. A. E. Haigh, "On the Trilogy and Tetralogy in the Greek Drama," in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. xv. p. 257.

1886. Albert Müller, Handbook of Greek Scenic Antiquities.

He alone was at once a god and a hero; comparable in might with Zeus; one who had striven and suffered like Achilles. The people who kept festival in his honour, and who danced round his altar, would sing of his sufferings and his triumphs. Then, as such festivals became more systematic, a certain number of persons was set apart from the general body of worshippers, for the purpose of conducting the dance in a more regular manner. These chosen persons were called the Chorus; a circular dancing-place (*orchestra*) was marked out for them, with the altar of Dionysus at its centre; and, since they danced round the altar, they were called a circular or "cyclic" Chorus. Only three years ago (1886) the German explorers of the Dionysiac theatre at Athens traced parts of the enclosure of the old circular orchestra,—the orchestra of the great Attic dramatists,—close to the site of the older temple in the precinct of Dionysus. In the theatre at Epidaurus—the clearest illustration of the classical Greek period—the complete circle of the orchestra is marked out by a ring of flat stones in the ground; and one result of the explorations made there and elsewhere since 1883 has been to establish that down to the Roman age the complete circle of the orchestra was always left clear in front of the place where the actors stood.

From the primitive Chorus, dancing round the altar of Dionysus, drama was developed, so far as we know, by three steps. (1) First, it became usual for a member of the Chorus to vary the dance

and song by recitation. Originally, the subject of the recitation would be some adventure of Dionysus. But as early as about 600 B.C. it would appear that themes might be taken from the legends of the *heroes*, while the choral dance and song were still purely Dionysiac. It does not seem that any other *god* was ever made the subject of the recitation; a fact which illustrates the peculiar character of Dionysus, as noticed above. (2) The second step is that attributed to Thespis, when the reciter was no longer merely one of the dancers, but was made a person distinct from them, and in a manner contrasted with them; one who replied to their dance and song with his recitation, and was thence called the answerer, ὑποκριτής. This change would naturally lead to a higher organisation of the performance. The Chorus still remained the essential and dominant element. But the part of the reciter would now be adjusted to the choral parts in such a way as to give unity to the whole. We may suppose, too, that the choral songs, while continuing to make Dionysus prominent, were no longer restricted to that theme, but might refer also to the subject of the recitation. And the reciter doubtless used imitative action. Such a performance contained at least the germ of drama proper; and that name was perhaps already given to it. The word δρᾶμα, as describing a composition, occurs first in Herod. 6. 21, with reference to the piece by Phrynichus, called "The Capture of Miletus". Miletus was taken in 494 B.C., and the play cannot

have been much later. In 494 Aeschylus was only thirty-one; he had been only about fourteen or fifteen when Phrynichus began to exhibit, and when, therefore, there was still only one actor. The first tragic victory of Aeschylus was not gained till 484 B.C., though he is said to have competed as early as 500 B.C. It is very probable, then, that in the "Capture of Miletus" there was only one actor. If so, we have to imagine a narrative of the capture, diversified by the choral expressions of anxiety or sorrow; such a play as the *Persae* of Aeschylus would be, if, in addition to the Chorus of Persian elders, the only person in it were the messenger who describes the battle of Salamis and the retreat of Xerxes.

(3) The third step in the development was taken when Aeschylus added the second actor, and so made it possible to have a properly dramatic action. The date of the change is uncertain; but it was not later than 472 B.C., and probably some years earlier than 484 B.C. This change evidently required that the audience should be placed in the manner known from later times. While there was only one actor, the spectators could still stand round in a complete circle, as of old; the actor could address himself to different points at different moments. But with two actors it became necessary that the acting should be turned, as a rule, towards some one quarter; and therefore that the spectators should be arranged in something like a semicircle. We do not know how early this was done; but at any rate the old legend

(given by Suidas *s.v.* Pratinas), that a stone theatre was begun at Athens soon after 500 B.C., is now decidedly rejected by the experts who have lately examined the remains of the Dionysiac theatre at Athens. No permanent scene-building of any kind, they say, can have existed at Athens before about 330 B.C.; nor were there any permanent seats for the audience before that time. There was simply the circular orchestra, and such temporary wooden structures, for actors and for audience, as may have been put up for each occasion. Further, architectural evidence from the fourth century B.C., and later, is held to prove that no raised stage (λογεῖον, *pulpitum*) for the actors existed before the Roman age; in the Dionysiac theatre, there was no such stage before Nero's reign; the actors were on the same level with the Chorus. The writer on architecture, Vitruvius (*c.* 20 B.C.), in his account of the Greek theatre, was misled by Greek theatres modified under Roman influence; and gave as the front line of a raised stage what was really the line of the proscenium. The evidence of the ancient dramatic texts is of little avail against the modern architects; there are a few passages, indeed, which seem to imply a raised stage, but these are not conclusive; and there are other passages which imply the opposite. It is well, for our present purpose, to remember this; because, if the architects are right, then we see that, in regard to externals, the matured Attic drama of the fifth century stood in a nearer relation with the archaic Dionysia of the

earlier period than has generally been supposed; and that the feeling adverse to change in the traditional methods of the exhibition is likely to have been so far more influential.

The form in which Aeschylus produced his tragedies—at least during the later part of his career—was that of the trilogy, or group of three. To these was appended a fourth play, a satyr-drama, so called because in it the Chorus consisted of satyrs attendant on Dionysus; the object being to preserve a memory of that mingled seriousness and mirth which had been at the heart of the early Dionysiac festivals. Tragedy represented one side of the old Dionysiac mood, Comedy the other; but the satyr-drama—historically true to its purpose in that it was much nearer to Tragedy than to Comedy—represented both; and was therefore described by the rhetorician Demetrius[1] (*περὶ ἑρμηνείας*) as *παίζουσα τραγῳδία*, "Tragedy with mirth in it". The tragic trilogy, with the satyr-drama added, made up the tetralogy. It is not known that Aeschylus himself, or any of the dramatists, used the word *τριλογία* or *τετραλογία*. The earliest date to which the word *τριλογία* can be traced back is about 200 B.C.; this is obtained from the scholium on Ar. *Ran.* 1124, which shows that *τριλογία* was used, in reference to tragedies, by Apollonius Rhodius and Aristarchus. It has been inferred from the same scholium that Aristotle used the word *τετραλογία* in his *διδασκαλίαι*: but the

[1] Demetrius, *De Elocut.* § 169.

inference seems unwarranted; however, it is plain from scholia that τετραλογία, as well as τριλογία, was a current term with the Alexandrian scholars; and in the second century A.D. Diogenes Laertius uses the phrase, τὴν τραγικὴν τετραλογίαν (3. 56)[1] in a way which shows that it had long been familiar. Welcker[2], indeed, assumed that a poet of the Old Comedy, Nicomachus, had written a piece called Τριλογία—in ridicule of the tragic practice; but Meineke has cleared this up (*Frag. Com.* 1. 496 ff.), by showing that, in the passage of Suidas on which Welcker relied, τριλογία is not the name of a comedy, but refers to the names of three tragedies which follow it, indicating that they formed a trilogy. So we are left without any certain evidence for the *words* τριλογία and τετραλογία before 200 B.C. It is quite possible that, as Mr H. Richards has suggested, the earlier use of τετραλογία was in reference to a group of four speeches (such as Antiphon's tetralogies), and that the Alexandrian scholars transferred it to groups of plays. In any case, it is certain that Aeschylus composed in these forms, whether he did or did not use these terms. Wagner, too, composed what we call a tetralogy, yet he did not call it so, but simply a *Bühnenfestspiel.*

Was Aeschylus the inventor of the trilogy? It is nowhere stated, and cannot be proved; but it

[1] Θρασύλος δέ φησι καὶ κατὰ τὴν τραγικὴν τετραλογίαν ἐκδοῦναι αὐτὸν (Plato) τοὺς διαλόγους.

[2] *Aesch. Tril.* p. 500.

is very probable; Phrynichus seems less likely, and no third name has been suggested. We may next ask, what was the motive which first prompted such a grouping of three tragedies? Welcker finds it in a custom (which he supposes) that the single actor of the earlier period should speak thrice between the choral parts; each such deliverance being a λόγος, and the whole a τριλογία. This is to assume a good deal; besides, if, as Welcker holds, the primitive τριλογία answered to the single τραγῳδία of later days, then three τραγῳδίαι ought to have been called an ἐννεαλογία. The true motive of trilogy—so far as Aeschylus, at least, is concerned—is certainly deeper than any mere accident of tradition; it is rather to be sought in the nature of the epic material which he used, and in his relation, as a dramatist, to that material;—a relation which no one has appreciated better than Welcker himself. As Homer was the chief authority for the heroic legends, so epic narrative was the form of poetry which was chiefly associated with them. In the rudimentary drama—if it may be so called—of the days before Aeschylus, the single actor's parts probably bore some resemblance to the messenger's speeches in matured tragedy—in this respect, at least, that they were mainly occupied with narration. Thus when Aeschylus first came forward, all the influences of past and present favoured the tendency to combine a dramatic form with an epic spirit. Whether Aeschylus really said that his tragedies were only "morsels from the great feasts

of Homer[1]," we cannot tell; but the saying has point when it is interpreted by his way of treating his subject-matter.

Take, for instance, the story of Agamemnon. The conqueror of Troy dies at home by the hand of his wife; his son, a young boy at the time, grows up in exile; returns in early manhood; slays the murderess, his mother; is pursued by the Furies; is tried at Athens, and is acquitted. We are not concerned now with any details in which Aeschylus departed from the epic version; we have only to observe that, from an epic point of view, this story is a single whole; the poet who tells how Agamemnon was killed would naturally go on to tell how Orestes avenged him, and what happened to Orestes afterwards. And this epic point of view was that from which Aeschylus approached dramatic composition. But it is manifest that the whole story could not be effectively treated in a single tragedy. Therefore he treated it in three tragedies, forming three successive chapters of the story: the *Agamemnon*, with the murder; the *Choephoroe*, with the revenge; and the *Eumenides*, with the acquittal. The fact that this trilogy was known as the *Oresteia* (a name certainly not restricted to the last two plays) illustrates the fact that, in a trilogy where the plays were thus connected, the second play regularly marked the tragic climax. It has been much discussed whether the plays of an Aeschylean

[1] Athen. p. 348, ὃς τὰς αὑτοῦ τραγῳδίας τεμάχη εἶναι ἔλεγε τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων.

trilogy were always connected; and whether he always produced his plays in trilogies, or sometimes also singly. Welcker thinks that, during his earliest period—down to perhaps about 490 B.C.—Aeschylus may sometimes have exhibited single plays; but that, after he had once adopted the trilogical form, he always connected the three plays, either by story (as in the case of the *Oresteia*), or by some pervading idea. Thus Welcker ingeniously supposes that, in the trilogy to which the *Persae* belonged, the connecting idea was Hellenic victory over the barbarian; the first play, called the *Phineus*, related to the Argonauts; next came the *Persae*; and in the third piece, the *Glaucus*, the sea-deity of that name described the victory of the Sicilian Greeks over the Carthaginians at Himera in 480 B.C. Where the supposed link between the pieces is merely of this ideal kind, the group has been called a *theme*-trilogy; where the link is one of story (as in the *Oresteia*), a *fable*-trilogy. The doctrine of the theme-trilogy has been developed to the utmost extent by Adolf Schöll, in his *Gründlicher Unterricht über die Trilogie* (1859). He maintains that the law of inner unity in the trilogy was as strictly observed by the tragic poets after Aeschylus as, according to Welcker, it was by Aeschylus himself; and he attempts to show how the extant or recorded plays of Sophocles and Euripides can be grouped either by fable or by theme. More recently, G. Günther, in a work entitled *Principles of the Tragic Art* (1885) has advocated a view which

seems far more probable. He points out—what, indeed, is evident—that there is something frigid, and foreign to the spirit of classical Greek poetry, in the notion of grouping three tragedies under an abstract idea. And he justly remarks that the conjectural reconstruction of theme-trilogies is apt to become a highly arbitrary process. Aeschylus, he thinks, often linked his three plays by fable—as in the *Oresteia*—but did not invariably do so. Sophocles and Euripides inherited that freedom of choice; with them, probably, the linking of the three plays by story was less frequent than it had been with Aeschylus; this inference is warranted by the extant evidence of their plays and fragments. In cases where the three plays were not linked by fable, we are still at liberty, Günther says, to suppose that the poet chose their subjects with some regard to artistic effects of harmony or contrast. While concurring generally in this view, I think that it requires to be qualified by some further remarks. (1) First, though Welcker's attempt to reconstruct the Aeschylean trilogies, by links of fable or of idea, involves a very large measure of uncertainty—as he himself fully admits,—still he may be said to have proved thus much, that the trilogy in which the plays were linked by fable was the characteristically Aeschylean form of composition. Aeschylus did not always use it; but it was the form distinctively associated with his name. (2) Secondly, the trilogy in which the plays were *not* linked by fable was characteristically Sophoclean—the form best suited

to the dramatic concentration which marked his art; the form which he was the first to make popular by excellent illustrations, and which he continued to prefer. As to the comparative prevalence of the two forms in the whole tragedy-literature of the fifth century, the evidence is too scanty to warrant any precise estimate. Towards the end of the century we meet with two certain instances of the Aeschylean form, the *Pandionis* of Philocles in 429, and the *Oedipodeia* of Meletus in 405. On the other hand, the relatively small number of such fable-trilogies which can safely be inferred from the extant documents, and the fact that in 340 B.C. the trilogical form itself had ceased to be imperative —as is shown by an inscription published in the *Transactions of the German Institute at Athens* for 1878—would lead us to believe that, after Aeschylus, the general tendency was in favour of the trilogy with unconnected plays. (3) Thirdly, we may observe that there seems no ground for an assumption which has been made, or implied, in some writings on this question—viz. that a trilogy would have appeared defective as a work of art if the three tragedies had not been in some way related to each other. We saw that Günther, while giving up the theme-trilogy, suggests that the author of three plays not linked by fable may still have studied some general effect of harmony or contrast between his pieces. The poet may, of course, have sometimes done so, and with good result; but it seems unlikely that either poet or

audience would have felt this to be necessary. Drama at the Dionysia was an act of religious worship. The honour of Dionysus was the central idea of the festival. The thing primarily required by Athenian feeling was not that the tragedies should be connected with each other, but that each should be worthy of the god. The unity of the tetralogy in this paramount aspect—viz., as a religious tribute—was symbolised by the number of the tragic Chorus. With Aeschylus, at least in his earlier period, the number was twelve; Sophocles raised it to fifteen by adding a coryphaeus (whose duties had formerly been taken by one of the ordinary choreutae) and two leaders of hemichoria; *i.e.* when the Chorus had to act in two equal divisions (as it does in a passage of the *Ajax*), these two men respectively led the two divisions. Both the older twelve and the later fifteen roughly represented one quarter of the old cyclic Chorus; and thus, though (so far as we know) the same twelve or fifteen men formed the Chorus in all the four pieces of a tetralogy, their number itself expressed the feeling that the tetralogy was a single performance.

Tetralogies continued to be exhibited throughout the fifth century B.C. The evidence for this rests ultimately on the basis of contemporary Athenian records. In the fifth century it was customary for the archon, after each occasion on which dramas had been performed, to draw up a list of the competing poets, the choregi, the plays, and the

chief actors, with a notice of the order in which the judges had placed the competitors. This record was preserved in the public archives. Towards the middle or latter part of the fifth century, it became usual to engrave such a record on a stone tablet, and to set it up in or near the Dionysiac theatre. Further, the choregus whose poet gained the prize received a tripod from the State, which he erected, with an inscription, in the same neighbourhood. In the fourth century, about sixty years after the deaths of Sophocles and Euripides, Aristotle compiled a work called Διδασκαλίαι, "Dramatic performances," being a list of the tragedies and comedies produced in each year. For this work his materials were the written or engraved records just mentioned. The book has perished, but its nature is known from citations of it which occur in the Greek Arguments to some plays, in scholia, and in late writers. There are altogether thirteen such citations; five of these say, "Aristotle in the Διδασκαλίαι": the other eight quote simply the Διδασκαλίαι, without the author's name. They are collected in the Berlin Aristotle, v. 1572. About 260 B.C. the Alexandrian poet Callimachus compiled another work of the same kind, Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κατὰ χρόνους ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένων διδασκαλιῶν, "A Table and Record of Dramatic Performances in chronological order, from the earliest times." He made a careful use of Aristotle's Διδασκαλίαι, as appears from the scholium on Ar. *Nub.* 552. Works of a similar kind were written by Aristophanes of

Byzantium (*c.* 200 B.C.)—who, like Callimachus, was at the head of the Alexandrian Library—and by other scholars of Alexandria and of Pergamum. Several of these writings were extant as late, at least, as the end of the second century after Christ. Athenaeus shows this. He had met with a mention of a play, ascribed to a poet of the fourth century B.C., of which the title was new to him. It has not been registered, he says, either by Callimachus, or by Aristophanes, or by the authors of the Pergamene records (p. 336 c). Among the last-named was Carystius of Pergamum (110 B.C.), who wrote a book Περὶ Διδασκαλιῶν. The notices which have come down to us from these sources enable us to trace fourteen tetralogies. Four are by Aeschylus, the earliest which can be dated being the *Persae* tetralogy in 472 B.C.: the next the *Theban* in 467, and then the *Oresteia* in 458; the fourth tetralogy is the Λυκουργία. Five are by Euripides, belonging to the years 438, 431, 415, 411 (?), and 405 (?) B.C. Of the remaining five, one is by Aristias, son of Pratinas, in 467 B.C., and another by Polyphradmon, in the same year; the third is by Philocles, nephew of Aeschylus, in 429; the fourth by Xenocles, who defeated Euripides with it in 415; and the fifth by Meletus in 405. The citations of the last two from the Διδασκαλίαι are among those five citations of that work which have Aristotle's name added. To this list we may add a tetralogy by Nicomachus, a contemporary of Euripides, on the strength of Suidas *s.v.* Νικόμαχος, as explained

by Meineke. The dramatic career of Sophocles began in 468, and he died in 406 or 405 B.C. Thus all through his active life as a poet tetralogies were being produced by other poets.

We are now in a position to estimate the various explanations which have been given of the statement in Suidas—that Sophocles began the practice of play contending against play, and not tetralogy against tetralogy. *πρῶτος τρισὶν ἐχρήσατο ὑποκριταῖς—καὶ πρῶτος τὸν χορὸν κ.τ.λ.—καὶ αὐτὸς ἦρξε τοῦ δρᾶμα πρὸς δρᾶμα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τετραλογίαν.*

(1) Godfrey Hermann, in his work on the Composition of Tetralogies (1819), takes the meaning to be that Sophocles abandoned tetralogy altogether, and exhibited only a single tragedy on each occasion. Stress is laid on the fact that no extant notice records a tetralogy by Sophocles. But against this negative evidence—the importance of which is very greatly diminished by the scantiness of the notices which we possess—we have to set this fact, that on at least two occasions when Sophocles competed for the tragic prize, he is known to have competed against a tetralogy. This was the case in 438 B.C., when Euripides produced the *Alcestis* in place of a satyr-drama. The argument to that play says:—"Sophocles was first; Euripides was second, with the *Cressae*, *Alcmaeon in Psophis*, *Telephus*, and *Alcestis*." It was the case again in 431 B.C., when Euripides brought out the *Medea*. The argument says: "Euphorion

was first; Sophocles second; Euripides third, with *Medea*, *Philoctetes*, *Dictys*, and the *Reapers* for satyr-play." Euphorion, the son of Aeschylus, was not likely to have abandoned the use of tetralogy; and we cannot reasonably doubt that Sophocles, too, produced four plays. To have competed at the Dionysia with a single tragedy against a tetralogy might well have exposed an Athenian poet to the imputation of sterility or of arrogance; and there is no evidence that, after the institution of tetralogy, either Sophocles or any other fifth century poet ever did so; while all the presumptive evidence is the other way. The year 340 B.C. is the earliest in which it is proved[1] that the tragic poets exhibited less than three plays each; and in that year they produced two each. It may be added that in the fifth century B.C. a poet who offered only one tragedy at the great festival would not merely have courted defeat in the contest, but would further have seemed to render an incomplete and grudging homage to the god. It was only by a tetralogy that the old Dionysiac Chorus was fully represented. We may decide, then, I think, against the view that Sophocles abandoned tetralogy.

(2) Boeckh modifies that view. He supposes that Sophocles continued to produce tetralogies at the Great Dionysia, but set the example of producing single tragedies at the Lenaea. There is nothing to support this conjecture. What is known

[1] By a contemporary inscription. *C. I. A.* ii. 973 (M. 323 n. 2, H. 324.)

about drama at the Lenaea amounts to this. In the earlier times, the Rural Dionysia in December was the only festival with Dionysiac choral performances. It was probably under Peisistratus, about 550 B.C., that the festival of the Lenaea, held in January, was instituted. The Lenaea then became the chief occasion for producing the choruses. It was at the Lenaea that Thespis exhibited, in the later years of Peisistratus; it was the Lenaea that witnessed the performances of Choerilus and Pratinas, and the earlier works of Aeschylus. The institution of the Great Dionysia, held in March, may probably be placed about 478 B.C.[1] The Great Dionysia then became the chief occasion for Tragedy, and seems to have been the only festival at which Tragedy was produced down to about 430 B.C., when the Lenaea—which had meanwhile been monopolised by Comedy—began once more to be used for Tragedy also, though perhaps not, at first, every year. But the Tragic contest at the Great Dionysia always continued to be the principal one, just as the Lenaea continued to be peculiarly the festival of Comedy. If, then, the innovation made by Sophocles concerned only the Lenaea, it would not have been of much significance; nor could it have been made at all before the later period of his career. There is equally little probability in Bergk's suggestion that the Rural Dionysia was the festival at which Sophocles produced single plays, while producing tetralogies at the Great Dionysia and at the Lenaea.

[1] A. Müller, p. 311.

(3) Another explanation is that proposed by Mr A. T. S. Goodrick (*Journ. of Philology*, vol. xiv., pp. 137 f., 1885). Sophocles, he thinks, began his career with tetralogies, following the example of Aeschylus. But, some years later, we find each of the ten Attic tribes furnishing a choregus, and so we must conclude that at that period no fewer than ten tragic poets were wont to compete on the same occasion. Sophocles then introduced the rule that each poet should *exhibit* at the festival only one play of the tetralogy which he had composed for it. After the festival, the other three plays were published along with the play which had been acted, and thus became known to the public; probably, too, they were acted in other theatres at less important festivals. (1) The first objection to this hypothesis concerns the assumption that as many as ten tragic poets ever competed at the same Dionysia. That Mr Goodrick means ten tragic poets, and not five tragic and five comic, is shown by his speaking of ten tetralogies (p. 138); for Comedies were always produced singly. In the fifth century the number of tragic poets at the Great Dionysia was regularly three only; the old belief that it was five had no better ground than the supposition that, when the Didascaliae name the three competing poets in order, these are the winners of a first, second, and third prize, and that the whole number of competitors must have been larger. But there was only one prize. As to the supposed ten choregi, a choregus from each

tribe was not appointed every year; but the ten tribes in rotation nominated choregi, from among whom the archon chose as many as were required for the festival; *i.e.*, at the Great Dionysia in the fifth century, usually three for Tragedy and three for Comedy. The evidence on these points will be found in Albert Müller's recent work on *Greek Scenic Antiquities*, pp. 320 f. and 331, 1886. (2) The second objection to Mr Goodrick's hypothesis is that the three unacted plays of each tetralogy would not have been recorded in the Didascaliae, which, as their name denotes, were lists, not of plays written merely, but of plays performed. Thus the scholium on Eur. *Andromache* 446 says that the date of that play is not on record, because it was never acted at Athens. The same limit to the contents of the Didascaliae is expressly stated by the scholium on Ar. *Nub.* 552 (=553 Dindorf).

(4) C. F. Hermann (*Greek Ant.* ii. § 59, n. 23) approaches the problem from a different side. He grants that Sophocles continued to exhibit tetralogies, but supposes that he altered the mode of procedure. Hitherto the four plays of each tetralogy had been acted one after another. But Sophocles, says C. F. Hermann, arranged that the first play of the first tetralogy should be immediately followed by the first play of the second tetralogy, this by the first play of the third, and so on; so that each of the three poets appeared four several times. Here the first objection is that such a

system would utterly mar the effect of a tetralogy in which the tragedies were linked by story. Let us imagine, for example, a performance in which the *Agamemnon* was followed by two plays wholly unrelated to it and to each other; then the *Choephoroe*; next, two more plays on other subjects; and then the *Eumenides*. It is manifest that the impressiveness of the *Oresteia* as a whole would be destroyed; the unity of the poet's large design would be broken up; his work, as now presented, would be no longer the work which he had planned. But we have seen that tetralogies of the *Oresteia* type continued to be exhibited, at least occasionally, down to the end of the fifth century. Take, for instance, the year 429 B.C., when Philocles brought out his tetralogy, the *Pandionis*, and suppose that on the same occasion two other poets offered tetralogies *not* linked by story. Are we to suppose that the sandwich-system, as it might be called, was applied to all three? If so, then manifestly Philocles was placed at a serious disadvantage as compared with his two competitors. Or are we rather to assume that Philocles was allowed to have his *Pandionis* performed as a whole, and that only the other two tetralogies were interfused? In that case, we have two different systems in operation at the same festival, to the detriment of its symmetry. There would have been small inducement to institute the new plan, when, besides being complicated and troublesome in itself, it was one which could not be uniformly enforced; or, if uniformly, then

at the expense of fairness towards one class of admissible compositions. I cannot, therefore, think that C. F. Hermann's theory is a probable one.

(5) Welcker's interpretation is simpler. He, we remember, holds that, in the tetralogies of Aeschylus, the three tragedies were always linked by story or by idea, and that Sophocles was the first to dispense with such a link. He understands the statement of Suidas as referring merely to this change. When Suidas says that Sophocles "began the practice of play contending against play, and not tetralogy against tetralogy," he means that a Sophoclean group of four plays was not a tetralogy in the same sense as an Aeschylean group; *i.e.*, it had no inner unity[1]. Here, then, the issue is narrowed to a question of language. Welcker supposes that Suidas limited the use of the word τετραλογία to the case in which the plays were linked. The critic has been led to this supposition by his own view as to the proper use of the word τριλογία. That word, he thinks, should be restricted to the Aeschylean linked trilogy; in the case of Sophocles, he recognises no 'trilogy,' but only a group of three tragedies. Now, even if we granted, for the sake of argument, that Welcker was right about the word trilogy, the construction which he puts on Suidas would still be untenable. For Welcker allows that, in the Aeschylean tetralogy no

[1] So Haigh, p. 21, n. 1.

less than in the Sophoclean, the fourth piece, the satyr-play, had, as a rule, no link of story or of idea with the trilogy. If, therefore, Suidas had intended to draw the distinction between Aeschylus and Sophocles which Welcker attributes to him, he ought not to have said τετραλογίαν: he ought to have said τριλογίαν. And further, Welcker candidly admits that, so far as the usage of the term τετραλογία can be traced elsewhere, that usage affords no warrant for the restriction which he imagines Suidas to have placed upon it. Further, if Suidas meant merely to distinguish between groups of *connected* and of *unconnected* plays, he has expressed his whole thought very obscurely: δρᾶμα πρὸς δρᾶμα does not suit this. We may add that, as nothing more than the external unity of consecutive exhibition was necessarily denoted by τετραλογία, there is just as little reason for supposing that anything more was denoted by τριλογία. And so Welcker's interpretation fails.

We have now considered five explanations: (1) that of Godfrey Hermann—Sophocles gave up tetralogy altogether; (2) that of Boeckh and Bergk—he exhibited single plays at the Lenaea, or at the Rural Dionysia, while retaining tetralogy at the Great Dionysia; (3) that of Mr Goodrick—he composed tetralogies, but caused only one play of the group to be *acted* at the Great Dionysia; (4) that of C. F. Hermann—he arranged that, in the performance of three competing tetralogies, one play from the first should be followed by one play

from the second and one from the third, till all twelve plays had been given ; (5) that of Welcker—Suidas means simply that Sophocles dispensed with an inner connection in the trilogy.

Seeing that no one of these interpretations appears tenable, are we then reduced to the conclusion which has been adopted by Adolf Schöll, and more lately by Günther—that the statement of Suidas is in irreconcileable conflict with the other extant evidence? Are we to suppose that, using some more ancient authority, the lexicographer of the eleventh century has not only misunderstood it, but has so transformed the sense that the real meaning of the original statement can no longer be divined?

It is only in the last resort that such a conclusion would be justified ; and I cannot but think that the words of Suidas are susceptible of an explanation which, so far as I know, has not yet been suggested. In the first place, it seems beyond all reasonable doubt that Sophocles continued the Aeschylean practice by composing tetralogies—a practice which we have found in use down to the end of the fifth century ; we know that he competed against the tetralogies of other poets. It also seems clear that, as the linked trilogy was characteristic of Aeschylus, the unconnected trilogy was characteristic of Sophocles, though we cannot assume that the general rule was observed without exception in either case. Now let us consider a matter which, in previous discussions of this question, seems

scarcely to have received the attention which it deserves; *viz.*, the nature of the task imposed on the ten judges, who, after the performance of the tragedies, had to arrange the three contending poets in order of merit. In the case of a trilogy like the *Oresteia*, where the three plays formed an artistic unit, the task of judging would be comparatively easy; the poet came before the judges with what was essentially a single work. But it would be otherwise when a poet offered four plays, unrelated in subject, appealing to different ranges of thought or sentiment, marked by incommensurable beauties and dissimilar faults. If this poet's two competitors also offered four unconnected plays each, the judges would have before them three groups of independent compositions. We may assume that, at the Great Dionysia, the aspirants to the Tragic prize would, as a rule, be fairly well matched against each other in respect of general dramatic calibre; such an inference is made reasonable by the fact that those great dramatists, from whom a few plays have come down to us, were occasionally defeated—even when exhibiting works which in our eyes are supreme masterpieces—by other dramatists whose works have perished. It is not permissible, then, to suppose that the task of the judges would often be simplified by a clear pre-eminence in one poet. And, given a well-matched trio, the kind of difficulty which would confront the judges may best be imagined, perhaps, by taking an illustration from English literature. Let us suppose a contest

between three groups of Shakespeare's plays—since "none but himself can be his parallel." The first group, or tetralogy, might consist, for instance, of *Lear*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Cymbeline*, *Twelfth Night*; the second, of *Hamlet*, *Merchant of Venice*, *Winter's Tale*, *As You Like It*; the third, of *Othello*, *Julius Cæsar*, *Tempest*, *Much Ado About Nothing*. A reader of the plays, with leisure for study and reflection, might not perhaps find it very difficult to decide which group, on the whole, he placed first, second, or third; though he would probably feel that, at best, the result of such an attempt must be unsatisfactory. But for a body of judges in a theatre, compelled to give their award soon after hearing the tetralogies once acted, the choice would be still more perplexing. It would not be strange if they sought refuge from this embarrassment by raising a question which could be determined with comparative ease—*viz.*, which one play was the best of all. The author of the tetralogy which contained that play would then be placed first; and the second place would be decided by the best play in the two other sets. If a linked trilogy like the *Oresteia* was exhibited by one or two of the competitors, but not by all three, then the tetralogy containing it could be viewed either as a unit, or as a group, at the discretion of the judges.

While general probabilities thus countenance the belief that the fate of a tetralogy may often have turned on one play, it may be observed that this

belief does not depend on general probabilities alone. In ancient literary references to the Attic drama of the fifth century B.C., we sometimes find that the name of a single tragedy is associated with a poet's victory or defeat. For example, (1) the Argument to the *Philoctetes* says: "It was performed in the archonship of Glaucippus. Sophocles was first." (2) In an Argument to the *Antigone* we read: "They say that Sophocles was appointed to the strategia which he held at Samos, because he had distinguished himself by the production of the *Antigone*." (3) The Argument to the *Hippolytus* says: "It was performed in the archonship of Epameinon. Euripides was first." (4) Plato, in the *Symposium* (p. 173 A), speaks of the occasion when "Agathon conquered with his first *tragedy*." (5) Aristides (ii. 256) expresses his surprise that Philocles won the prize against the *Oedipus Tyrannus*; and thus implies that this play alone might well have ensured success. Such passages have been cited in support of the view that these plays were produced singly. (6) But Aristophanes, in the *Ranae*, makes Aeschylus speak of having composed the *Seven against Thebes* (1021), and of having exhibited the *Persae* (1026); it is known, however, that in each case the play formed part of a tetralogy. It was natural for Aristophanes to write thus, because the *Seven against Thebes* and the *Persae* stood out before his mind as the most striking plays in their respective tetralogies. And so, when the custom of unconnected tragedies had

been made popular by Sophocles, it is still easier to understand why a play should be mentioned alone, if it had been the bright particular star of its own constellation, and if its brilliancy had been recognised by popular report as the primary cause of the poet's triumph.

This, then, I think, is the probable basis of fact on which the statement of Suidas rests:—when groups of unconnected plays competed, the difficulty of comparing the groups, as such, often led to the prize being decided by a comparison of the single plays; and as Sophocles was peculiarly associated in tradition with the trilogy of unconnected tragedies, so he was also associated with its practical result, *viz.*, a method of award under which the single play became the usual gauge of merit. When, however, we have assigned our reasons for believing that this was the basis of fact underlying the statement of Suidas, another and entirely distinct question remains:—Is this the meaning which Suidas intended his statement to convey? Undoubtedly his words perfectly fit that meaning. As we saw at the outset, δρᾶμα and τετραλογίαν are the subjects to ἀγωνίζεσθαι. Play contends with play, not group with group, when the judges compare single plays and not whole groups. If the verb had been διδάσκεσθαι instead of ἀγωνίζεσθαι, the plain sense would have been that the poet *exhibited* his plays singly. Some weight must therefore be allowed to the fact that the verb actually used, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, is just the verb which suits the other sense. But we

must look at the whole context. Suidas has just been speaking of two changes made by Sophocles in the external form of Tragedy—the addition of a third actor, and the enlargement of the Chorus. It is natural, then, to suppose that here also he is thinking of some definite change in the form or method of exhibition. And this inference is strengthened by the emphasis of the word αὐτός, which seems to lay stress on the personal initiative of the poet. On the whole, I am disposed to surmise—though I do not feel sure—that Suidas himself intended his words in the sense put on them by G. Hermann—that Sophocles forsook tetralogy altogether, and produced only single plays. This, we can now assert with some confidence, Sophocles did *not* do. Is it, then, a pure accident that Suidas has employed a form of words which, without forcing, yield a different sense, and one quite in accord with all the ancient evidence? I can hardly think so. His article on Sophocles is apparently a string of statements epitomised from older sources. It is not improbable that, in one of the Alexandrian or Pergamene writers on the Attic drama, he had found a passage to the effect that the Sophoclean type of trilogy led practically to play being pitted against play for the prize, instead of tetralogy against tetralogy, as in the earlier period. For the sake of illustration, I may suggest a form of Greek words, as close as possible to those used by Suidas, yet which would express that meaning with rather less ambiguity:—δράματος ἤδη πρὸς δρᾶμα ὁ ἀγὼν

ἐγίγνετο, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τετραλογίας—the contest (*i.e.* the tussle for the prize) now came to be one of play against play, not of tetralogy against tetralogy. Meeting with such a statement, Suidas might easily have taken ὁ ἀγών to mean, not the issue between the competitors, but the dramatic exhibition. I put this case merely to show how possible it is that his paraphrase is verbally faithful to an authority which he did not accurately comprehend, and that this may be the reason why it remains susceptible of the right sense, as well as of that wrong sense which he may have intended.

In concluding this endeavour to assist in the elucidation of a much-discussed passage, I would only add that the question with which it is concerned may be said to have a somewhat larger scope than that of a mere detail in the history of an ancient festival. Pindar stands between epos and drama, when he gives us such pictures—worthy of the man accustomed to see beautiful forms in vivid action—as the coming of Jason to Pelias, the meeting of Apollo and Cheiron, the episode of Castor and Polydeuces, the entertainment of Heracles by Telamon: Aeschylus is the great dramatist whose framework is still epic: but it is only when the single tragedy has become the measure of dramatic art, that drama reigns in its own right. We turn to Aristotle's Treatise on Poetry, and we are amazed to find that the author of the Didascaliae, the first annalist of trilogy and tetralogy, drops not one hint—in the text as we have it, at least—that tragedies had ever been

produced otherwise than singly. Once or twice he refers—in one place (c. 18) with undisguised censure —to the epic scale of tragedy in the Aeschylean period. But no one could have gathered from Aristotle that it had so long been the custom to exhibit plays in groups. Where he speaks of the number of tragedies set for one hearing (c. 24), nothing forbids us to suppose as many poets as pieces. So exclusively is his attention directed to the single drama. It is to the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, not to the *Oresteia*, that his canons of criticism are adapted. His attitude of mind in this respect may leave room for regret; it may seem to us strange indeed that he should apparently fail to appreciate at all the greatness of Aeschylus; but his justification lies in the distinction between poetical grandeur and the excellence proper to drama as such. In the passage which we have been considering today, if the interpretation which I have suggested for it may be accepted, Sophocles comes before us as the poet whose distinctive method first concentrated the attention of Athenians on the essence of that art which he illustrated.

SAMUEL JOHNSON[1].

Samuel Johnson was born at Lichfield on September 18, 1709, and died in London on December 13, 1784, in his 76th year. The time of his eminence begins shortly after the middle of the century, and covers about thirty years. Behind him lies the age of Pope and Swift, of Addison and Berkeley. After him comes the age of Wordsworth and Coleridge, of Walter Scott and Byron. In the interval he stands out, if not as the greatest writer, at least as the greatest literary personality.

Nothing about Johnson is more singular than the relation of his writings to his permanent fame. In 1755 he published his *Dictionary*, after seven years of labour; and was thenceforth regarded as the foremost literary man of his day. He was then only forty-six years of age. *Before* that time, he had written much, but always under stress of the direst poverty, and much of what he then did was mere hack-work. Among the best productions of this earlier period were his two poems in imitation of Juvenal,—viz. "London," written when he was twenty-nine, and "The Vanity of Human Wishes,"

[1] A Lecture given at Newnham College, Cambridge, March 3, 1894.

when he was thirty-five. The *Rambler*, a series of more than two hundred essays, belongs to the years 1750–2. But *after* the appearance of the *Dictionary*, he wrote little. He had no longer the stimulus of necessity. In 1760, on George the Third's accession, Johnson was offered, and accepted, a pension of £300 a year. When Johnson called on Lord Bute to express his acknowledgments for this mark of royal favour, the Minister said, "It is not given to you for what you are to do, but for what you have done";—a sly glance, possibly, at Johnson's own definition of a pension in his *Dictionary* as "generally understood to mean pay given to a State hireling for treason to his country." The pension placed Johnson in easy circumstances. Then he was constitutionally indolent. It was only because he happened to need a small sum for an urgent purpose, that he wrote, in 1759, the most successful of his minor works, the story of Rasselas, that young prince who, with his sister, and the sage Imlac, sets forth from the happy valley in Abyssinia to survey the world, and returns to his valley, convinced that, outside of it, all is vanity. The evenings of a single week sufficed for the composition of *Rasselas*, which has been translated, as Mr Birkbeck Hill tells us, into ten languages. After *Rasselas*, his chief productions were the edition of Shakespeare in 1765 (which does not seem to have cost severe labour); the *Tour in the Hebrides*, published ten years later; and the *Lives of the Poets*, in 1779–81. The last-named work is far

the most considerable achieved by him after 1755. The series of poets treated in it begins with Cowley, who died in 1667, and ends with George, Lord Lyttelton, who died in 1773. Notwithstanding some eccentricities in poetical criticism, it is, of all Johnson's writings, the work which can still be read with most sustained interest. The short biographies are full of the keenest insight into character and human nature. If any one of them were to be singled out, we might mention the sketch of that erratic and unhappy genius, Richard Savage, which Macaulay—long after his essay on Croker's Boswell in the *Edinburgh Review*—justly recognised as a masterpiece. As Boswell records, "a friend once observed to Dr Johnson that, in his opinion, the Doctor's literary strength lay in writing biography, in which he infinitely exceeded all his contemporaries. 'Sir,' said Dr Johnson, 'I believe that is true. The dogs don't know how to write trifles with dignity.'" Judged by the standards of our own day, Johnson is more successful as a biographer than as an essayist or a critic; partly because biography gives just the right scope for his powers of observation; and partly because the tendency of his style to be heavy and pompous, especially in abstract discussion, is held in check by the story itself; he may "write trifles with dignity," but at any rate he *has* to write them. Next to the *Lives of the Poets*, the writings of Johnson which are least neglected at the present day are probably the *Tour in the Hebrides*, and the two satires, "London," and "The Vanity of Human

Wishes"; after these, perhaps, but at an interval, *Rasselas*. We know and estimate Johnson much less by his writings than by his talk; when we turn to his writings, it is rather to supplement our knowledge of the mind seen in his talk; to win further light, if possible, on the sources of that extraordinary influence which he undoubtedly wielded over the best of his contemporaries.

And then we are met by that curious phenomenon in English prose, Johnson's literary style. The first thing which strikes one about it is that it is so inferior, as a rule, to his best utterances in conversation; it frequently lacks their terseness, their point and vigour; it is generally ponderous, often involved, artificial, tedious—though, like his talk, it is invariably clear. The most obvious and frequent fault is the see-saw of long words, in balanced clauses; thus, where it would be enough to say, "from childhood to old age," Johnson says (in *Rasselas*), "from the sprightliness of infancy to the despondency of decrepitude"; or he speaks of "that levity and cheerfulness which disencumber all minds from awe and solicitude, invite the modest to freedom, and exalt the timorous to confidence." This style is of course least happy when it is too grand for the subject; as when, after criticising the windows in some Scotch houses, he apologises for noticing such trifles:—"These diminutive observations seem to take away something from the dignity of writing, and are never communicated but with hesitation, and a little fear of abasement and contempt." It is

at its best when he is strongly moved: "That man is little to be envied whose patriotism would not gain force upon the plain of Marathon, or whose piety would not grow warmer among the ruins of Iona." Or take the first paragraph of his letter to Mr Macpherson, the author of *Ossian*, who had threatened him with summary vengeance:—"Mr James Macpherson, I received your foolish and impudent letter. Any violence offered me I shall do my best to repel; and what I cannot do for myself, the law shall do for me. I hope I shall never be deterred from detecting what I think a cheat by the menaces of a ruffian." It is a great mistake, however, to suppose that Johnson always wrote what is known as Johnsonese, or that the faults which we associate with Johnsonese do much to spoil the best things that he has written. It is not difficult to see that the worse side of his style answers to a physical infirmity of his nature, just as its better side answers to his mental strength. He had a powerful and clear mind, richly stored with knowledge; a high spirit; extraordinary depth and tenderness of feeling; and a sense, which his early miseries had only strengthened by touching his pride, that the vocation of literature is a high and noble one. Such a nature craved stately and ample utterance; he must be allowed to *enforce* each thought as it arises, to expand it, and to clothe it in language both exact and decorous. But then that powerful mind was subject to a lethargy against which he could not always strive successfully; it

was part of his constitution. He was often sunk in reveries, when the expression of his face, we are told, was almost imbecile. The commonest faults of his style are largely to be explained by this lethargy; they indicate that, for the moment, the working of his mind is not really brisk, but painful, and half-mechanical. He himself gives us a glimpse of the labour which composition often cost him. "It is one of the common distresses of a writer," he says (in the *Adventurer*), "to be within a word of a happy period, to want only a single epithet to give amplification its full force, to require only a correspondent term in order to finish a paragraph with elegance, and make one of its members answer to the other: but these deficiencies cannot always be supplied; and after a long study and vexation, the passage is turned anew, and the web unwoven that was so nearly finished." There we see the grinding out of a cumbrous sentence. But when any one challenged Johnson to talk, especially by saying something with which he did not agree, the lethargy vanished; his mind was at once alert; the thoughts rolled forth without check, vigorous, incisive, set off with abundance of apt illustration; and in this respect his best talk had a great advantage over his average writing.

Johnson's literary style must also be considered in its relation to the English predecessors by whom he had been influenced. In his invariable clearness, and in the strict propriety which marks his use of words, we see the influence of the literary generation

which came next before his own, the writers who were the standards of style in the reigns of Anne and George I.—such as Addison and Pope. That period had been characterised by a revolt from the pedantries of scholasticism, and the revolt had run to the other extreme; common sense was the new divinity; and everything that common sense could not explain, everything that savoured of a mystic profundity, was suspected of imposture, or at least of mental confusion. In style the great virtue was elegant correctness—the appropriate garb for penetrating and polished common sense. If we wished to illustrate this ideal by the opposite extreme, we might turn to Carlyle, hurling his amorphous language into space, and tormenting human speech in a struggle to body forth the Immensities. Johnson's age was remote enough from Carlyle's ways of thinking, but at least it was in process of outgrowing the deification of common sense and correctness; it was beginning to feel that there were more things in heaven and earth than had been comprehended by the literary law-givers of the age before it. This perception necessarily re-acted upon style; in Johnson's own ponderous sentences we can occasionally see that, like Thucydides, he labours under the difficulty that the things which he wishes to express are rather too complex for his instrument, in the form which recent usage had given to it, and that he must strive to draw some new tones out of that instrument in his own way. Compare Johnson with Addison, for instance. Addison had

lived from earliest manhood in a polite world; the tone of the drawing-room and the coffee-house came naturally to him; it suited his gifts, and they, in their turn, raised and adorned it. Everything that Addison wished to say, grave or lively, could be said in this tone. As Johnson finely says of him, Addison "taught a succession of writers to bring elegance and gaiety to the aid of goodness." But Johnson had grown up to middle-life, a poor and recluse student struggling with adversity; "toil, envy, want, the patron, and the gaol"—he had known all of them except the last; and during the long years before the dweller in Grub Street became the oracle of society, his brooding mind had communed deeply with a scholar's natural friends, the great prose-writers of the preceding century. He used to say that Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* was the only book which ever got him out of bed two hours earlier than usual; another of his favourites was Sir Thomas Browne. These studies could not but affect his style; they furnished to it an element which tempers the tradition of Addison and Pope; we see it in the lofty diction, the ampler periods, and, generally, in that tone which suggests the study rather than the drawing-room. To make this clearer, let us place side by side a short passage from Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, and a like specimen of Addison. Here is Burton:—"Every man knows his own but not others' defects and miseries; and 'tis the nature of all men still to reflect upon themselves and their own misfortunes,

not to examine or consider other men's, not to confer themselves with others: to recount their miseries, but not the good gifts, fortunes, benefits, which they have; to ruminate on their adversity, but not once to think on their prosperity, not what they have, but what they want; to look still on them that go before, but not on those infinite numbers that come after; whereas many a man would think himself in heaven, a petty prince, if he had but the least part of that fortune which thou so much repinest at, abhorrest, and accountest a most vile and wretched estate." Here is Addison, dealing with a similar subject, in *The Mountain of Miseries*:—"It is a celebrated thought of Socrates, that if all the misfortunes of mankind were cast into a public stock, in order to be equally distributed among the whole species, those who now think themselves the most unhappy would prefer the share they are already possessed of, before that which would fall to them by such a division. Horace has carried this thought a great deal further (*Sat.* i. 1, ver. 1), which implies that the hardships or misfortunes we lie under are more easy to us than those of any other person would be, in case we could change conditions with him."

There we have types of the two manners which mainly contributed to mould Johnson's style; the one, such as Burton's, learned, ample, diffuse; the other, like Addison's, pitched in the key of good conversation, correct, neat, transparently clear; but of these two manners, that which Burton represents

was to Johnson by far the more congenial. Indeed, when Johnson enters upon the ground where the best writers of the preceding age were so peculiarly happy—the graceful treatment of light social themes—he is painfully elephantine; for instance, the defence of masquerades in the *Rambler*, in a letter addressed by a man of fashion to the lively Flirtilla, is an awful warning against ponderous levity. Nevertheless, Johnson is sometimes really good, even in a light vein, where he can bring his strong, though not very subtle, sense of humour to bear on some phase of life or character that he knows. Take, for instance, this description of "Tom Steady" in the *Idler*:—

"Tom Steady was a vehement assertor of uncontroverted truth; and by keeping himself out of the reach of contradiction, had acquired all the confidence which the consciousness of irresistible abilities could have given. I was once mentioning a man of eminence, and after having recounted his virtues, endeavoured to represent him fully, by mentioning his faults. 'Sir,' said Mr Steady, 'that he has faults I can easily believe, for who is without them? No man, Sir, is now alive, among the innumerable multitudes that swarm upon the earth, however wise, or however good, who has not, in some degree, his failings and his faults. If there be any man faultless, bring him forth into public view, shew him openly, and let him be known; but I will venture to affirm, and, until the contrary be plainly shewn, shall always maintain, that no

such man is to be found. Tell not me, Sir, of impeccability and perfection; such talk is for those that are strangers in the world: I have seen several nations, and conversed with all ranks of people: I have known the great and the mean, the learned and the ignorant, the old and the young, the clerical and the lay; but I have never found a man without a fault; and I suppose shall die in the opinion that to be human is to be frail.' To all this nothing could be opposed. I listened with a hanging head; Mr Steady looked round on the hearers with triumph, and saw every eye congratulating his victory."

Before passing from Johnson's literary style, let me give one or two other examples of it, which, like the last, show him in an unfamiliar light. We know how devoted he was to the town: "A man who is tired of London," he said, "is tired of life"; again, he said, "No wise man will go to live in the country unless he has something to do which can be better done in the country. For instance: if he is to shut himself up for a year to study a science, it is better to look out to the fields than to an opposite wall. Then, if a man walks out in the country, there is nobody to keep him from walking in again; but if a man walks out in London he is not sure when he shall walk in again." The estimate of rural nature implied here was not very promising for the *Tour in the Hebrides*; and it is all the more interesting to find, in his record of that journey, such passages as these:—

He is in a valley in the Highlands:—"I sat

down on a bank, such as a writer of romance might have delighted to feign. I had, indeed, no trees to whisper over my head, but a clear rivulet streamed at my feet. The day was calm, the air was soft, and all was rudeness, silence, and solitude. Before me, and on either side, were high hills, which, by hindering the eye from ranging, forced the mind to find entertainment for itself. Whether I spent the hour well, I know not; for here I first conceived the thought of this narration."—Remark here, in passing, the notes of the eighteenth century; first, the reference of nature to a standard of art, when the bank is said to be worthy of a romance, and the writer feels that trees *ought* to be whispering over his head; secondly, the word "rudeness," used to describe wild scenery, implying the contrast with nature as improved by art—what Johnson would have called civility.

It was Edmund Burke who said, "Boswell's *Life* is a greater monument to Johnson's fame than all his writings put together." Johnson himself could not be expected to foresee this. "Sir," he once said, "the good I can do by my conversation bears the same proportion to the good I can do by my writings that the practice of a physician, retired to a small town, does to his practice in a great city." But *we* know that Burke was right; it is by his spoken wisdom, far more than by the written, that Johnson lives. Let us remember, however, that this result would not have been attained by a mere record of Johnson's talk, however faithful.

Boswell—whom Macaulay unduly depreciated as an abject toady, and whom Carlyle unduly exalted as a martyr to hero-worship—was a consummate artist in biography. The triumph of his art is that it eludes notice; but take a typical instance—take his account of the dinner-party at Mr Dilly's, the bookseller in the Poultry, where Johnson, by Boswell's ingenious diplomacy, was brought to meet John Wilkes, whom he detested, and had handled severely in his political pamphlets, called *The False Alarm* and *The Patriot*; the description shows Boswell's dramatic gift; and it is only one of a hundred scenes which do so. When Johnson and Boswell entered Mr Dilly's drawing-room, and Johnson found that the gentleman in lace was Mr John Wilkes, he took up a book; but he was ashamed to let Boswell see that he was disconcerted, and had recovered his composure by the time dinner was announced. Boswell must tell the rest in his own words. "Mr Wilkes found himself next to Dr Johnson, and behaved to him with so much attention and politeness that he gained upon him insensibly. No man eat more heartily than Johnson, or loved better what was nice and delicate. Mr Wilkes was very assiduous in helping him to some fine veal. 'Pray give me leave, sir—it is better here—a little of the brown—some fat, sir—a little of the stuffing, some gravy.—Let me have the pleasure of giving you some butter.—Allow me to recommend a squeeze of this orange; or the lemon perhaps may have more zest.'—'Sir, sir, I am

obliged to you, sir,' cried Johnson, bowing and turning his head to him with a look for some time of 'surly virtue,' but in a short while of complacency."—It is by this dramatic power that Boswell gives us, not Johnson's talk merely, but Johnson himself; thanks to Boswell, we know Johnson, not as we know the subject of many another biography, but rather as we know some of the characters whom fiction has made to live for us—as we know Falstaff, or Don Quixote, for instance. Now, Johnson's talk itself profits somewhat, no doubt, in effect by Boswell's setting; this skilful dramatist nearly always contrives that the curtain shall fall on a victory of the hero. We cannot always repress a suspicion that Johnson is allowed to score rather easily, and that a fairly good antagonist might have made a better fight of it; the bowling seems to collapse before his batting. However, there is no doubt at all as to his extraordinary impressiveness for his contemporaries. There are many other contemporary witnesses besides Boswell. Probably no one except Johnson was ever the recipient of a round-robin signed by four names of such varied lustre as those of Burke, Joshua Reynolds, Gibbon, and Sheridan. It was a small incident perhaps in itself, but what a position it implies for Johnson, what a command of admiring affection from the strongest and brightest minds of that day! And this position, though the result partly of his writings and partly of his character, was principally due to the impression of sagacity

and power which his associates were daily receiving from his talk.

In Johnson's talk we seem to distinguish two leading aspects, which imply essentially different qualities; though of course the two are sometimes combined, or melt into each other. The first of these is controversial, or at least competitive; the other is didactic. When Johnson describes the delight of dining with friends at an inn, he says: "I dogmatise and am contradicted; and in this conflict of opinions and sentiments I find delight." So elsewhere he says: "That people should endeavour to excel in conversation I do not wonder, because in conversation praise is instantly reverberated." Johnson was usually able to produce, on the spur of the moment, some argument to which no one present saw the answer; some argument which, whether quite valid or not, sufficed for victory; and in a conversing age, like his, this was a fertile source of renown. Indeed, it will always be a source of some reputation; for good debaters will always be rare. The other aspect of Johnson's talk may again be described in his own words: "that is the happiest conversation where there is no competition, no vanity, but a calm quiet interchange of sentiments." The elements of permanent interest and value in Johnson's talk generally occur under this latter condition; when, instead of being busy with thrust and parry, he has leisure to unfold his practical wisdom.

Johnson, in his latter years, when we hear him

talk, was indeed rich in the wisdom of life; he had gone through much and known all sorts of people; he had, in Rousseau's phrase, "that rarest kind of philosophy which consists in observing what we see every day"; moreover, his nature was keenly sensitive and profoundly kind; a quality which is a better ally for common sense than is always supposed. It has been said, not without justice, that he sometimes abuses the moralist's privilege of being commonplace; still—imbedded, it may sometimes be, in commonplace—the searcher will find many an acute remark, so pithily or forcibly worded as to be well worthy of remembrance. This is ground on which his writings and his talk come into a single view; both alike exemplify this practical wisdom, and both must be laid under contribution, if we would appreciate its scope.

Many of his shrewdest sayings concern social intercourse. Thus he observes that there are excellent people who have never done any wrong to their neighbours, and who cannot understand why they are not more popular; the reason being, as he puts it, that "they neglect all those arts by which men are endeared to one another." "They wrap themselves up in their innocence, and enjoy the congratulations of their own hearts, without knowing or suspecting that they are every day deservedly incurring resentments by withholding from those with whom they converse that *regard*, or *appearance of regard*, to which every one is entitled by the customs of the world." Observe his phrase;

it reminds us of another saying of his, that "politeness is fictitious benevolence." Nor has he failed to observe that his countrymen sometimes forget this principle. "Sir," he says, "two men of any other nation who are shown into a room together at a house where they are both visitors will immediately find some conversation. But two Englishmen will probably go each to a different window, and remain in obstinate silence. Sir, we as yet do not enough understand *the common rights of humanity.*" Is it not sad to think that this was said a century and a quarter ago, and that it is generally as true—by the consent of all foreigners—to-day, as it was then? After this reproof, let us take a little crumb of comfort: Johnson defends—magnificently defends—our good old custom of talking about the weather; a custom which may languish, but which, we must earnestly hope, will never disappear. After pointing out the interesting uncertainty of our climate, and referring to some other available topics, such as gossip, the state of the stock-market, and continental wars, Johnson concludes:—"The weather is a nobler and more interesting subject; it is the present state of the skies and of the earth, on which plenty and famine are suspended, on which millions depend for the necessaries of life."—For persons who affect singularity of behaviour, Johnson has a useful hint: "Singularity, as it implies a contempt of the general practice, is a kind of defiance which justly provokes the hostility of ridicule; he therefore who indulges peculiar habits is worse than others

if he be not better." And how admirably does Johnson demolish that fallacy to which English people are peculiarly prone—that a person of rough manners is *therefore* more likely to be honest—in this terse sentence:—"Honesty is not greater where elegance is less." "The difference between a well-bred and ill-bred man," he says, "is this; one immediately attracts your liking, the other your aversion. You love the one till you find reason to hate him; you hate the other till you find reason to love him." Johnson well knew how much of the happiness of life depends upon friendship, and all young people would do well to remember one of his counsels on this subject. "In youth," he says, "we are apt to be too rigorous in our expectations, and to suppose that the duties of life are to be performed with unfailing exactness and regularity; but in our progress through life we are forced to abate much of our demands, and to take friends such as we can find them, not as we would make them." "Every wise man,...when he remembers how often he fails in the observance of a cultivation of his best friends, is willing to suppose that his friends may in their turn neglect him without any intention to offend him." And so, when Boswell was hurt because Johnson had not lately written to him, Johnson says: "Do not fancy that an intermission of writing is a decay of kindness. No man is always in a disposition to write; nor has any man at all times something to say." Distrust of friends, he adds, is not only foolish; it is criminal, because it impairs

one's fitness for one's duties. It is in home-life that Johnson places the true centre of happiness. "To be happy at home," he says, "is the ultimate result of all ambition, the end to which every enterprise and labour tends, and of which every desire prompts the prosecution."

Johnson was an expert in that very difficult part of life, the management of one's own mind. He knew, with his constitutional melancholy, what it was to be ridden by the nightmare of mental trouble. "A man so afflicted," he said, "must *divert* distressing thoughts, and not combat with them." *Boswell.* "May he not think them down, Sir?" *Johnson.* "No, Sir. The attempt to think them down is madness." So it is that he says, in the *Rambler*: "The safe and general antidote against sorrow is employment. It is commonly observed that, among soldiers and seamen, though there is much kindness, there is little grief: they see their friend fall without any of that lamentation which is indulged in security and idleness, because they have no leisure to spare from the care of themselves." He reminds us, too, that there are some troubles on which we ought to be silent. Talking of Dryden's open resentment of hostile criticism, he remarks, "The writer who thinks his works formed for duration mistakes his interest when he mentions his enemies." And elsewhere he comments on the unwise outcry of some writers whom Pope had pilloried in the *Dunciad.* "No man," he remarks, "sympathises with the sorrows of vanity."

Many of Johnson's thoughts on conduct and character are epigrammatic in form, and felicitous. For example: "Gratitude is a species of Justice." "Want of tenderness is want of parts, and is no less a proof of stupidity than depravity." "Men are wrong for want of sense; but they are wrong by halves for want of spirit." When he is excusing the eulogists of Halifax's poetry, he observes that unmerited praise is not necessarily flattery, since it may be swayed by affection, and neatly puts the case thus:—"Very near to admiration is the wish to admire." It befell Johnson, in the course of his long dictatorship, to administer many a rebuff, and some of these rebuffs have no more to do with wit than a knock-down blow with skill on the violin; but some of them are of a finer order. There was a pertinacious visitor, of little education, who harassed Johnson, and a friend ventured to plead that this gentleman was at least desirous of amending his ignorance. "Sir," said Johnson, "his ignorance is so great that I am afraid to show him the bottom of it." Then there is a story preserved, not by Boswell, but by Hannah More. Mrs Brooke, a novelist and dramatist, had written a tragedy called the *Siege of Sinope*, and pressed Johnson to look over it. After some evasion, and finally a refusal, he suggested that she herself was entirely competent to revise it. "But, Sir," said the lady, "I have no time: I have *already* so many irons in the fire." "Why, then, Madam," said Johnson, "the best thing I can advise you to do is to put your tragedy along with your irons."

As a literary critic, Johnson is not highly rated at the present day. The main reason of this is that he is known chiefly as a critic of poetry; and the school of criticism which he represents tried poetry by rules which are no longer accepted. It is not to be expected that Johnson's reputation in this respect should now experience much change, and yet I venture to think that it deserves to stand somewhat higher. The great fault of his school was that they judged poetry too much by its moral value and its logical coherence, and too little by its qualities as a work of art. For instance, Johnson is exceedingly severe on Gray's odes; and in summing up against one of them, *The Bard*, he delivers himself as follows:—"I do not see that *The Bard* promotes any truth, moral or political." But in the same essay he does justice to the *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*, because the *sentiments* are those to which, as he says, "every bosom returns an echo." "Had Gray written often thus," he adds, "it had been vain to blame, and useless to praise him." For Milton he had the highest veneration; he has even described him as "that poet whose works may possibly be read when every other monument of British greatness shall be obliterated"; yet he grotesquely disparages *Lycidas*, because it wears the garb of classical allegory, and he even proceeds to this strange generalisation:—"Milton never learned the art of doing little things with grace." It would have been truer to say that Milton's short poems were seldom little. Then he wishes that *Paradise*

Lost had been written in rhyming heroic couplet; "The variety of pauses," he says, "so much boasted by the lovers of blank verse, changes the measures of an English poet to the periods of a declaimer." But then turn to his criticism on those poets whose theory of poetry agreed with his own—such as Pope and Dryden—and you will find that it is excellent; so just, so acute, and so discriminating that it will always repay study. And even when his criticism of a writer is unfavourably biased—as it is in the case of Swift—he sometimes ends by laying his finger on some distinctive merit; as when, in concluding his estimate of Swift, he says, "perhaps no writer can easily be found that has borrowed so little, or that, in all his excellencies and all his defects, has so well maintained his claim to be considered original." His judgments on Shakespeare sometimes seem to us inadequate; but it would be hard to find a more penetrating criticism on Shakespeare's prose dialogue than is contained in the following passage—one less known than it deserves to be. He has just been saying that every nation has a style of its own which never dies out—a mode of speech so native to the language that it survives all changes of fashion; and this lives on in the mouths of *the people*. "The polite," he continues, "are always catching modish innovations, and the learned depart from established forms of speech, in hope of finding or making better; those who wish for distinction forsake the vulgar when the vulgar is right; but there is a conversation *above grossness*

and below refinement where propriety resides, and where this poet (Shakespeare) seems to have gathered his comic dialogue. He is therefore more agreeable to the ears of the present age than any other author equally remote, and among his other excellencies deserves to be studied as one of the original masters of our language."

All Johnson's criticism has one great merit; it is thoroughly independent. It is also marked, almost everywhere, by strong good sense; and though good sense does not necessarily mean good taste, at any rate there can be no good taste without it.

His character was a noble one—generous, brave, unswervingly honest, and, above all, wonderfully kind. He had no patience for people grumbling about petty or sentimental troubles; but where there was real trouble, his bounty and his self-sacrifice were signal. Two thirds of his income went in charity. His dependents were numerous. In his later years his own house was full of permanent inmates who were either partly or wholly supported by him. Johnson describes, in a letter to Mrs Thrale, how his guests got on with each other; "Williams," he says, "hates everybody; Levett hates Desmoulins, and does not love Williams; Desmoulins hates them both; Poll (Miss Carmichael) loves none of them." Then Frank Barber resented the authority of Miss Williams, and she complained of Barber's insubordination. And in this circle Johnson voluntarily made his home for years. His acts of goodness to the outcasts of society, to the

most forlorn waifs and strays of humanity, were past counting. "A decent provision for the poor," he said, "is the true test of civility"; and he regarded it as the chief distinction of his own age that it had given new examples of charity. Among such examples, others may have been more conspicuous in men's eyes, and more often on their lips; but assuredly few can have been nobler. The eighteenth century had not come to see what the more prosperous classes can and ought to do towards making the lives of the poor brighter; but the feeling which moved Johnson when he met with misery in the London streets was as keen as stirs any worker at the East End to-day, and his benevolence, if less systematic and less refined, was as practical in spirit. Johnson's large sympathies are seen again in his warm appreciation of his friends. Men of the most diverse characters and abilities have received from him a tribute of praise which sets forth some shining quality in each of them. Thus he pronounced David Garrick "the first man in the world for sprightly conversation"; and, in referring to the great actor's death, wrote that it had "eclipsed the gaiety of nations, and diminished the public stock of harmless pleasures." His estimate of the novelist Richardson, whom he somewhat unduly preferred to Fielding, appears in his saying that "Fielding can tell the hour by looking at the clock, whilst Richardson knows how the clock was made." It was through Johnson's good offices that the *Vicar of Wakefield* passed

from manuscript into print; and intimately though he knew the foibles of Goldsmith's character, he did the amplest justice to his peculiar literary genius. "Goldsmith," he said, "was a man who, whatever he wrote, always did it better than any other man could do"—a judgment which stands in the Latin of his famous epitaph on Goldsmith as *nihil tetigit quod non ornavit*, "he touched nothing which he did not adorn." Horace Walpole described Johnson as "the representative in epitome of all the contradictions in human nature." This gives a rather superficial view of him. No doubt there was sometimes an odd disproportion in his likings and dislikes; it might seem strange, for instance, that he could not tolerate the mention of a man so estimable as Joseph Priestley, and yet be ready to dine at the table of the sedition-monger Jack Wilkes. Macaulay dwells on the contrast between Johnson's reluctance to credit the account of the Lisbon earthquake, and his readiness to believe in the Cock-Lane ghost. But Macaulay puts the case here in a somewhat misleading perspective. Johnson was slow to credit reports of extraordinary incidents in the ordinary course of nature, when he had no means of verifying such reports, because he was keenly alive to the various sources of falsehood in human life. In regard to alleged supernatural occurrences, he was *not* weakly credulous; it was he, for example, who demolished this very Cock-Lane ghost in the *Gentleman's Magazine*; but he wished to keep his mind open. Believing firmly in the

existence of the soul after death, he was not prepared to *deny* the possibility of such communications from the unseen world. Once more, there was sometimes, no doubt, an odd contrast between his pursuits and his associates; it might seem incongruous that the great lexicographer should spend the small hours of the morning in brewing a bowl of bishop at a tavern with such young men as the elegant Mr Bennet Langton and the gay Mr Topham Beauclerc, and in helping them to surprise the early fruiterers in Covent Garden; but we may remember that all history attests the magnetic attraction of bright mind for bright mind —however different their bodily dwellings—from the days when Socrates fascinated Alcibiades, and at cock-crow, after the night-long banquet, was still trying to convince the drowsy Aristophanes that Comedy is of the same essence as Tragedy. Johnson was a great man to his contemporaries, and, if we judge soundly, he must appear a great man to us; although we estimate in a somewhat different proportion the elements which constitute his greatness. To us he is no longer the literary oracle or the profound sage; he is rather a man of singularly robust intellect; a most keen and sane observer of character; a man wise in the wisdom of life, who knew the evil and the misery that must be always in the world, but never wasted in idle repining the strength that should be reserved for combating and, so far as possible, alleviating them; a man to be honoured for his intellectual gifts, but

who deserves at least equal honour for his moral qualities and his goodness. We in England have him all to ourselves. The best biography in all English literature has never been translated into any foreign language. An eminent French writer, who has shown a power, unusual in his countrymen, of comprehending England,—Monsieur Taine,—is obliged to confess that he cannot understand the English love of Johnson. And yet we shall continue to love him.

HUMANISM IN EDUCATION[1].

Humanism of the early Renaissance.

PETRARCH was born in 1304, when Dante was thirty-nine years old, and died in 1374. That great movement in which he was a pioneer, and which we call the Renaissance, had its central inspiration in the belief that the classical literatures, which were being gradually recovered, were the supreme products of the human mind; that they were the best means of self-culture; that there alone one could see the human reason moving freely, the moral nature clearly expressed, in a word, the dignity of man, as a rational being, fully displayed. All this is implied in humanism, when we speak of humanism as the direction in which the Renaissance chiefly tended. It is larger than the Roman idea of *humanitas*; the scope of which is well illustrated by Cicero when he says in one of his letters that Roman officials ought to treat Greeks with "humanitas" (gentleness), since it is from Greece that Italy first received "humanitas,"—i.e., as the context explains, the refining influences of literature and art.

It is difficult adequately to realize now the whole meaning of humanism for the early Renais-

[1] The Romanes Lecture, delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre at Oxford, June 7, 1899.

sance, because we cannot quite place ourselves within the mental horizon of the middle ages. We know, in a general way, what was the intellectual background of the Renaissance; the dominance of the scholastic philosophy in the thirteenth century; the prominent position held by the studies of Law and Medicine; the comparative poverty and inefficiency of the higher literary studies; for, though portions of the best Latin classics continued to be read throughout the middle ages, they were read, as a rule, in a spirit remote from the classical, or even contrary to it; and the West had lost Greek altogether. But such facts do not help us far towards entering into the heart of the early Renaissance. Perhaps there are two men who, more than any others, assist the effort to do so; Dante, standing in the borderland between the darker ages and the revival, when he shows us a keen intellect and a sublime imagination moving within the limits, and obedient to the forms, of medieval thought; and, at the further verge of the Renaissance, Erasmus, the lifelong antagonist of the schoolmen, who makes so vivid to us the contrast between the intellectual atmosphere of scholasticism and that which the humane letters had created.

Petrarch opens an era, because he was the first man in medieval Europe, not perhaps who possessed, but who was able effectively and impressively to manifest, a strong native affinity with the genius of the classical Latin writers; the first who succeeded in making large numbers of people feel that he had

Petrarch.

studied those writers with intelligent enthusiasm, and that they were to him living persons. Resembling Goethe in his steadfast pursuit of a complete self-culture, Petrarch proclaimed that the classics supply the best, the unique, instrument for that purpose. He enjoyed in Italy an immense popularity and renown; his Latin epic poem, "Africa," though often tame, won scarcely less applause than his Italian lyrics; and his Latin prose-writings were widely read. He was also the first man of great eminence who showed zeal in collecting books, manuscripts, and coins. He did not know Greek; yet, with a sure instinct, he apprehended its significance, and was eager that the knowledge of it should be restored. The age must have been ready for the movement; but it was the powerful and famous personality of Petrarch which gave the initial impulse. His devoted disciple, who died only one year later (in 1375), the gentle and diligent Boccaccio, earliest of Italian Hellenists, propagated and diffused Petrarch's influence; and so, before the close of the fourteenth century, the full tide of the humanistic revival had set in.

Persistence of his ideal.

Petrarch's ideal of humanism, as a discipline which aims at drawing out all the mental and moral faculties of man, pervades the whole course of the Italian Renaissance. Often, indeed, that ideal was obscured by affectations or puerilities; not seldom it was belied by evil living; but nevertheless it was a real force, which comes out more or less in all the greater and nobler of the humanists. The enthusiasm

and the versatile energy which animated the Italian Renaissance for two centuries sprang from a deep and earnest conviction that the recovered literatures were not only models of style, but treasure-houses of wisdom, guides of life, witnesses to a civilisation higher than any which could then be found upon the earth. Even in the early years of the sixteenth century, when the best energies of the movement had in Italy been spent, and when Italian humanism was being narrowed down from the ample scholarship of Politian to the Ciceronian purism of Bembo, this fundamental belief remained unaltered.

One illustration may be cited. In the year 1508, a manuscript containing the first six (or, as then constituted, the first five) books of the Annals of Tacitus, said to have been found in the Westphalian monastery of Corbey, was brought to Rome, and was acquired by Giovanni de' Medici, who, five years later, became Leo X. It is the only manuscript of those books which exists, and is now in the Laurentian Library at Florence. One of Leo's earliest acts, after he became Pope, was to entrust the printing of this codex to a scholar of note, Filippo Beroaldo the younger, whose edition was published at Rome in 1515. As a reward to the editor, Leo conferred upon him a privilege for the sale and reprinting of the work. In the brief which grants this privilege, and which is prefixed to the edition, Leo expresses his estimate of humanistic studies. "We have been accustomed," he says, "even from our early years, to think that nothing

Leo X. on humanism

more excellent or more useful has been given by the Creator to mankind, if we except only the knowledge and true worship of Himself, than these studies, which not only lead to the ornament and guidance of human life, but are applicable and useful to every particular situation; in adversity consolatory, in prosperity pleasing and honourable; insomuch, that without them we should be deprived of all the grace of life and all the polish of social intercourse." He goes on to say that "the security and extension of these studies" seem to depend chiefly on two things, —"the number of men of learning, and the ample supply of excellent authors." As to the first, it has always been his earnest desire to encourage men of letters; and as to the acquisition of books, he rejoices when an opportunity is afforded him of thus "promoting the advantage of mankind." It would be a mistake to discount such language as conventional. Whatever else in the literary fashions of that time may have been hollow, this feeling, at least, as to the value of the classics, was thoroughly real.

Stylistic side of humanism.

I have insisted on this larger scope of the Renaissance humanism, because we are naturally apt to think of it as having been primarily a cult of style and form, an effort to imitate and reproduce the excellence of the ancient models. And of course this was one of its chief aims,—nay, perhaps, the most characteristic of the special activities which the revival called forth. But we should be in danger of taking this *imitatio veterum* for something less significant than it really was, if we did

not remember the point of view from which the Italian humanists approached it. They regarded the ancient Romans as their forefathers, and Latin as their ancestral speech. During the dark ages, the old civilisation had been effaced, the language had been barbarized: if they could not restore the civilisation, they wished at least to regain the language which attested it. Medieval Italy had many dialects; the literary Tuscan had only a limited currency, while Latin was the universal language. Not long after Dante's death in 1321, the "Divine Comedy" was translated into Latin. The eminent humanist Francesco Filelfo, who died in 1481 at the age of eighty-three, could still say, "Tuscan is hardly known to all Italians, while Latin is spread far and wide throughout the whole world." Thus, in the effort to purify and elevate Latin style, patriotic sentiment and practical convenience conspired with the newborn zeal of scholarship.

During the interval between the middle of the fourteenth century and the earlier part of the sixteenth, a long series of humanists cultivated Latin prose-writing in every branch,—oratory, philosophical discourse, diplomatic or official correspondence, familiar letter-writing. The stress laid on the niceties of the art is shown by the reputation which Lorenzo Valla, best known as the translator of Thucydides, owed to his work called *Elegantiae*, published in 1432—1436. In the generation after his, Politian wrote Latin like a living language. Then the dictatorship passed to Bembo, prince of

Latin prose-writing.

those Ciceronians whom Erasmus derides. It is easy to make light of such work, but it is better and more important to remember what it was that the humanists achieved in this way. One of our poets has described Dante's immortal poem as "The first words Italy had said"; and if Dante was the first who found a voice for Italian literature, medieval Latin had altogether failed to preserve the clearness or beauty of classical expression. When Petrarch's contemporaries compared themselves with their Roman predecessors, they felt that they were inarticulate. To write their ancestral tongue with clearness, in the first place, and then with some measure of grace or beauty,—this became to them an object of ardent desire. Gradually, and by painful efforts, they attained it. And thereby they bequeathed to Europe a tradition which the middle ages had lost,—namely, that prose, in whatever language it may be written, should aim at those qualities which the best classical models exhibit. This is the permanently valuable result of the humanistic Latin prose-writing.

Latin verse.

As to their copious Latin verse, if there is not much of it which deserves to live, unquestionably it served to cultivate in many men a genuine poetical gift; it was the vehicle of much graceful fancy and much fine perception; and it conduced to a closer study of the best Latin poets. In force and spontaneity, though not in delicacy or finish, Politian is the most remarkable of the Renaissance versifiers. He was only forty when he died in

1494, and a still youthful fire breathes in his impetuous hexameters. When he was lecturing at Florence, he sometimes began by reciting a Latin poem of his own, as an introduction to the classical author. Some of these poems, in hexameter verse, remain. One of them rapidly surveys the history of poetry from Homer to Boccaccio; another is a prelude to the "Iliad" and "Odyssey"; a third, to the bucolic poets, especially Hesiod and Virgil. In these, as in much other Latin verse of the Renaissance, despite some blemishes which modern scholarship would have avoided, one can see how thoroughly the writer was imbued with the style and diction of his models. A fine ear is a frequent Italian gift, and some of these Renaissance versifiers have been singularly successful in catching the rhythms of the best Latin poets, especially those of Virgil and of Ovid.

The Italian humanists' desire of fame:

Verse and rhetoric were, indeed, modes of self-expression irresistibly attractive to men whose ambition was fired by the example of their Italian ancestors, and who felt that motive so characteristic of the Renaissance,—the passionate desire of the individual to make his own powers stand out, clear-cut and brilliant, before the world,—the longing for fame in his life-time, and for the praise of posterity. Italy had no political unity, no common aims in respect to national life. Humanism proposed what to many men, and coteries, and cities took, in a way, the place of that,—the dream that the glories of ancient Rome and Italy were being renewed in

its national aspect.

another golden age of letters and art. That vision dawned upon Petrarch in a peaceful time, when, in his poem "Africa," he predicted that the new love for the Muses would rival the old; and it continued to cheer students amidst all the foreign invasions and intestine troubles which crowded upon Italy two centuries later. After the sack of Rome in 1527, and when the condition of Italy on every side was deplorable, an accomplished scholar, Marcantonio Flaminio, sent to his patron, Alessandro Farnese, a collection of Latin poems by natives of Lombardy, which was then the region in which letters chiefly flourished. In some verses which accompanied this gift, he cries: "Happy, too happy, are our days, which have given birth to a Catullus, a Tibullus, a Horace, and a Virgil of their own!"

The Italian humanists' cult of style was thus connected with a larger aim, that of regaining a lost culture, regarded as ancestral; and it did a work of lasting value for European literature. But we owe to them much more than that. We owe to them, for instance, that conception, ever present to the stronger men in their ranks, of classical antiquity as a whole. The outlook of the greater humanists was a wide one. Filelfo, already mentioned, was a typical scholar of the fifteenth century: when he was professor at Florence, about 1428, he lectured in the morning on Cicero, then on Livy, or Homer: in the afternoon, on Terence, followed by Thucydides. Meanwhile, among other private labours, he translated into Latin Aristotle's "Rhetoric," some

Their wide range.

speeches of Lysias, extracts from Xenophon, and some of Plutarch's "Lives." Politian edited Catullus in his youth, and the Pandects of Justinian in his riper age: published notes on Ovid and Statius, on Suetonius, the younger Pliny, Quintilian and other Latin authors; made Latin translations from Hippocrates, Plato, Herodian, and Galen. Erasmus became to northern Europe the prophet of this comprehensive humanism in its educational and also in its more popular aspects. Such largeness of range and view, albeit obtained at some sacrifice of other qualities, is, in its own way, an intellectual gain.

To another service of the humanists, one which is more apt to be forgotten, it must suffice to allude in passing,—I mean what they did for erudition, as distinguished from literary scholarship. Their commentaries, their works on antiquities of every kind, have mostly been absorbed or superseded; but in these provinces also the later learning must acknowledge a vast debt. Flavio Biondo, who died in 1463, deserves to be remembered as one of the chief founders of Roman archæology, in virtue of his threefold work, "Roma Instaurata," "Roma Triumphans," and "Italia Illustrata." The study of Latin epigraphy, again, received a notable benefit from Jacopo Mazochi and his collaborator Albertini, who, building partly on earlier collections, published in 1521 their "Inscriptions of Rome." It was under the direct influence of humanism that the first Roman Museums of antiquities and

Their erudite work.

art were formed,—those of the Capitol and of the Vatican.

Humanism spread a liberal spirit.

But Italian humanism has a claim on our gratitude even larger and higher than its work for scholarship and for erudition, great and varied as that work was. Europe owes to humanism the creation of a new atmosphere, the diffusion of a new spirit, the initiation of forces hostile to obscurantism, pedantry and superstition, forces making for intellectual light, for the advance of knowledge in every field, and not merely for freedom, but for something without which freedom itself may be a burden or a curse, the power to comprehend its right limits and to employ it for worthy ends. Take a particular instance. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the so-called science of Astrology held an exceedingly strong position. Universities endowed it with Chairs; kings and princes consulted the stars in crises of State; a general in the field was not seldom accompanied by his astrologer; cities and citizens had recourse to horoscopes in countless affairs of municipal or private life. But from Petrarch onwards the humanists made open war on this flourishing imposture. Or take another illustration of a somewhat different kind. That vigorous and versatile humanist, Poggio, was at the Council of Constance in 1416, and heard Jerome of Prague recant his recantation. Poggio was then, and had been for many years, a lay secretary in the Papal Chancery. But he does not think of Jerome as of a

heretic at bay. With a detachment which would have been scarcely possible for a medieval spectator of similar antecedents, Poggio is able to contemplate Jerome simply as a man who is evincing heroic fortitude—and thus describes him in a letter to Lionardo Bruni:—"There he stood, undismayed, unfaltering, not merely indifferent to death, but ready to welcome it,—another Cato."

Humanistic education.

It was impossible that men penetrated by this new spirit, and for whom the new learning was the revelation of a new life, should not soon apply their ideas to the training of the young. Within fifty years after the death of Petrarch, we find a type of education developed which, in contrast with the medieval, may be called the humanistic. It is, in its essentials, a type which satisfied the western world for four hundred years; the generation has not yet passed away which first saw its claims seriously challenged; and its origins must always have for us more than an ordinary measure of historical interest. Among the great teachers of the earlier Renaissance, there is one who has a pre-eminent right to be regarded as the founder of this education, and of him a few words must be said here; I refer to Vittorino da Feltre.

Vittorino da Feltre.

Born in 1378 at Feltre, a small town in Venetia, he went at eighteen to the University of Padua, then second in Italy only to Bologna, and sharing with Pavia the distinction, still rare at that time in Universities, of being comparatively favourable to humanism. He there studied Latin under

two eminent masters in succession, Giovanni da Ravenna, and Gasparino Barzizza,—the latter a great Ciceronian scholar, but exempt from the narrow purism of a later time. Another Paduan teacher whose influence Vittorino must have felt was Vergerius, already celebrated for his essay on the formation of character ("De Ingenuis Moribus"),—the earliest and most lucid statement of the principles on which humanistic training rested; an essay which, amidst the throng of Renaissance treatises on education, remained a classic for two centuries, going through some forty editions before the year 1600. Vittorino, after holding a chair of Rhetoric at Padua, and then teaching privately at Venice, was invited by Gian Francesco Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua, to undertake the tuition of his children. A villa was assigned to him at Mantua, where he was to reside with his pupils. He settled there in 1425, and remained till his death in 1446. The villa had been of the most luxurious kind, and was known as the "House of Pleasure" ("La Gioiosa"); Vittorino, by a slight but meaning change, named it the "Pleasant House" ("La Giocosa"); banished the luxury which had environed the young Gonzagas; and turned the place into a seat of plain living and regular study. But he was a thorough believer in bright surroundings as conducive to mental and moral health. The house was cheerful and beautiful; it stood in large grounds, fringed by a river; there was ample space and provision for every kind of outdoor

exercise or sport. Youths were sent from several of the Italian Courts to be educated with the Mantuan princes. But Vittorino was resolved that the school should be open to any boy who was fitted to profit by it, and maintained at his own cost a large number of poor scholars, for whom lodgings were found near the villa. The rules of life and study were the same for all.

Vittorino's aim in education was to develope and train the whole nature of his pupil, intellectual, moral and physical; and to do this, not with a view to any special calling, but so as to form good citizens, useful members of society, men capable of bearing their part with credit in public and private life. This being his general aim, let us see how his methods differed from those which had prevailed in the middle ages, and in what sense they may be described as humanistic. In the pre-Renaissance schools for boys, the dominant influence was ecclesiastical. In teaching grammar and rhetoric, portions of the Latin classics were used; but the method of teaching them was encumbered with fantastic pedantry,—such, for instance, as the doctrine that a passage may have four meanings, literal, metaphorical, allegorical, and mystical,—which went far to annul their value and meaning as literature. For that value and that meaning an enthusiastic appreciation came in with the humanistic revival; to the humanist, the great writers of antiquity were living men, into whose mind and soul he was striving to penetrate by sympathetic study. That

Vittorino's aim.

His use of the classics;

was the spirit in which Vittorino took the Latin classics, and made them the basis of intellectual training. Poetry, oratory, history, the ethics of Roman Stoicism, were studied in the best Latin writers. And, if not at first, yet before he had been many years at Mantua, Vittorino introduced some Greek classics also. His own knowledge of that language was chiefly due to his contemporary, the other great schoolmaster of the time, Guarino of Verona. Guarino had studied Greek at Constantinople, and shares with Vittorino the honour of having established Greek as a regular part of liberal education in schools. Vittorino's scholars were constantly practised in Greek and Latin composition, as well as in recitation and reading aloud.

and of other subjects.

But, while classical literature was thus the basis of Vittorino's system, it was by no means his only subject. Aided by resident tutors, he taught mathematics, including geometry (a subject which the humanists preferred to the schoolmen's logic) and arithmetic, with rudiments of astronomy; also, it seems, some elements of what then passed for Natural Philosophy and Natural History. Music and singing also found a place, though under conditions which Plato and Aristotle would have approved; the standard of attainment aimed at was to be that of the amateur, not of the professional; and the music was to be chosen with regard to its moral effect. Nor was social education neglected: Vittorino inculcated a noble tone of manners, and desired that his pupils should have

such accomplishments as would enable them to grace social life.

As to physical training, he provided instructors in military exercises, in riding, and in swimming, while he encouraged every form of healthy outdoor activity. In all this he was the typical humanist. The ecclesiastical schoolmaster of the middle ages was not concerned to encourage physical training; the opinion was rather that the body was something to be despised and mortified. The medieval provision for such training was not in schools but in the households of princes or nobles, where riding, tilting, the chase, and other martial or courtly exercises were practised. On the physical and the social sides of his scheme Vittorino was in some sort continuing this old court training; many of his pupils, indeed, were nobles destined to the profession of arms. But the idea which dominated his whole system was the classical, originally Greek, idea of an education in which mind and body should be harmoniously developed. No antique idea appealed with greater force to the humanists, since none presented a stronger contrast to medieval theory and practice. When we give the name of humanistic to the type of education established by Vittorino and his contemporaries, it is not simply or chiefly because the intellectual part of it was based on Greek and Latin, but, in a more important sense, because the education was at once intellectual, moral, and physical.

Physical training.

Dominant idea of humanistic education.

With reference to moral teaching, it should be

said that Vittorino, unlike many of the humanists, was an orthodox, even a devout, Churchman, an earnestly religious man, whose precepts were enforced by his practice. Like almost all the great humanist teachers, he was a layman, engaged in creating a type of education which might be contrasted with the ecclesiastical type that had preceded it: but there was no tinge of paganism in his view of religion or of ethics: he was one of those men who, like Pico della Mirandola, recognised the unity of knowledge,—separated the gold of the new treasure-trove from the dross,—and neither felt nor sought any conflict between the classical and the Christian ideal.

Early humanism in English schools.

It is interesting for Englishmen to remember that Winchester College was built in Vittorino's boyhood, and that the Mantuan public school was at its zenith when Henry VI. founded Eton. Both those illustrious foundations, since so distinguished as seats of humanistic training, arose before humanism had come to England, and were originally of the ecclesiastical type. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, a few Oxford scholars, who had visited Italy,—William Selling, Grocyn, William Latimer, Thomas Linacre,—brought the taste for humane letters to England, where it was presently quickened by the visits of Erasmus. St Paul's School, founded by the friend of Erasmus, Dean Colet, is the oldest in England which was humanistic from its origin. Its first High Master, William Lily, of Magdalen College, appointed by the founder

in 1512, is best remembered as a Latin grammarian, but had also studied Greek at Rhodes and afterwards at Rome. It might almost be said that the relation in which St Paul's School stood to the influence of the earliest Oxford humanists resembled that in which Vittorino's school at Mantua stood to the early humanism of Florence.

The statutes of St Paul's, dated 1518, prescribe that the High Master shall be "learned in good and clean Latin, and also in Greek, if such may be gotten." The proviso is significant. Several great public schools were founded, or re-founded, in or near London, during the century which followed; —Christ's Hospital in 1533, Westminster in 1560, Merchant Taylor's in 1561, Charterhouse in 1611; and in all of these, as in many smaller grammar-schools founded at the same period, the basis was humanistic. But it was probably not much before 1560 that Greek was thoroughly established among English school studies. The statutes of Harrow School, dated 1590, contain directions for the teaching of some Greek orators and historians, and of Hesiod. This seems to be one of the earliest English examples of detailed regulations, as distinguished from merely general prescription, concerning the school study of Greek.

Classical learning since the Renaissance.

The resources of humanism as an instrument of education have been expanded and enriched by the manifold development of the higher classical learning in the centuries since the Renaissance. After the age of Petrarch, of Politian, of Erasmus,

came Joseph Scaliger, akin, on the literary side of his work, to the Italian scholars, but more characteristically occupied in the endeavour to frame a critical chronology of the ancient world; Casaubon, the first who popularized a connected knowledge of ancient life and manners; Bentley, active primarily in the emendation of texts, but also in the higher criticism of classical history and literature; then a long series of eminent names, too long to enumerate, which extends from the days of Porson and Elmsley, of Hermann and Lachmann, to those of Mommsen. Within the last fifty years, many special branches of classical study have either sprung into existence, or become more methodical; comparative philology; epigraphy; palæography; archæology in all its departments. In quite recent times, the exploration of ancient sites, stimulated by, and in turn stimulating, archæological research, has yielded results of fascinating interest. All these developments have lent new life and freshness to classical studies generally: they have given a more vivid reality to antiquity. The ideal of humanism has thus been reinforced in a manner which brings back to us something of the spirit which animated the Renaissance when it was largest and most vigorous. For the enthusiasm of the Renaissance was nourished by the monuments of classical art scarcely less than by the masterpieces of literature. Each statue that was disinterred from Italian soil, every stone or coin or gem that could help to illustrate the past, became a source of delight

to men whose strenuous aim was to apprehend classical antiquity as a whole.

Humanism and specialization.

But the very progress made in recent times has brought us to a point at which the larger educational benefits of humanism become more difficult to harmonise with the new standards of special knowledge. A full comprehension of the Greek and Latin literatures demands at least *some* study of ancient thought, ancient history, archæology, art. But each of the latter subjects is now, in itself, an organized and complex discipline; to become an expert in any one of them is a work of years. Hence much can be said in favour of a plan by which the University student, who is to devote a course of three or four years to the humane letters, confines himself, during the earlier stage of it, to the languages and literatures; then turns away from these, viewed in their wider range, and concentrates himself, for the rest of his time, on one or two important aspects of classical antiquity, such as philosophy and history, to the exclusion of the rest.

The younger student, in the highest form of a school where the classics are taught, has not yet reached the moment at which the need of specializing begins to be felt. We will suppose that he has an aptitude and taste for literary studies; and the number of such boys is always very considerable—immensely larger, for instance, than the number of those who are fitted to excel in Greek or Latin composition. When he first attains to some appreciation of the best classical poetry and prose, he

goes through a little Renaissance of his own; he feels the stimulus of discovery; he perceives, in some measure, a beauty of form unlike anything that he has found elsewhere; there is much in the thoughts of those great writers, much of their charm, much of their music, that fixes itself in his memory, and becomes part of his consciousness. However dimly and imperfectly, there lives before him a world very distinct from that in which he moves, and yet, as he can already feel, by no means wholly alien from it; though perhaps he does not yet understand with any clearness the nature of the links which bind that past to the present. This, as many masters and pupils could testify, is an experience not confined to the school-boy of exceptional temperament or gifts; it is one common to a fairly large proportion of boys who have no more than a good average capacity for literary studies in general. And it is an experience which is not forgotten afterwards. Whatever the man's work may be in after years, if ever he looks back and tries to date epochs in his mental history, he will recur to that early time as a season which made the buds unfold and the leaves grow, which gave him new elements of intellectual life and interest. *Ver illud erat.*

But the conditions under which that early experience was gained are modified when the student passes to the University. It may be that he works under a system which permits him to devote the whole of his academic course to the classical

languages and literatures; if so, the humanistic training begun at school is carried to a certain maturity; but it remains exclusively literary. If, on the other hand, he turns, at a certain point, from the general study of the languages and literatures to one or two special subjects, such as ancient philosophy and history, then he is expected to aim at the standards set by modern specialists in those subjects. That through these subjects he can receive an admirable intellectual training, is not disputed. But his range of view is necessarily contracted. The particular educational merits which belong to humanistic studies of a larger scope are different in kind from those which can be claimed for any special department of such studies when isolated from the rest. It may be added that, when specialization has been carried far in any study of literature or art, that study tends to become technical; and then a danger arises lest the pursuit of exact method should obscure the nature of the material with which the study has to deal, namely, productions of human thought and imagination; there is a danger lest analogies drawn from studies conversant with different material should be pushed too far, and what is called the scientific spirit should cease to be duly tempered by æsthetic and literary judgment.

We remember what Gibbon so characteristically said about his early mathematical studies: "As soon as I understood the principles, I relinquished for ever the pursuit of the mathematics; nor can I

lament that I desisted before my mind was hardened by the habit of rigid demonstration, so destructive of the finer feelings of moral evidence." Might not something analogous be said about some of those ultra-technical aspects which some special departments of classical study occasionally present, when we consider these in relation to the nature and the ends of humane literature? No one will suspect me of underrating the immense services which have been rendered to classical study, in every department, by deeper and more thorough work, by rational and exact methods of research. I only say that the tendency to make those methods too technical is one of the besetting temptations of the higher and more esoteric classical study,—a fashion in which it sometimes appears even to exult, as though it were a warning to the profane to stay outside; and I say that such a tendency is adverse to the appropriate and sympathetic treatment of any subject-matter derived from literature or art. Aristotle observes in the *Rhetoric* that a speaker unconsciously but inevitably passes out of the province of that art if he begins to reason in the technical terms of a particular science; and one feels that the modern specialist, in certain branches of classical study, may come perilously near to passing out of the province of humanism.

At any rate, I suppose it would be generally agreed that one of the chief problems which we have to face in classical studies at the present day is this:—How are the characteristic and essential

benefits of humanism to be reconciled with the learned and intellectual demand for specialization? It would not be my desire, even if the occasion permitted, to attempt a detailed criticism of any particular answer to that question which has taken shape and is now operative in this country. But one is tempted to ask whether the advance of knowledge and the subdivision of the field have really made it impossible to obtain, in the education of University students, something nearer to that more comprehensive survey of classical antiquity at which the earlier humanists aimed. It may be a dream, but it is an interesting subject of speculation. Evidently we have to reckon, at the outset, with a prepossession which the growth of high specializing has strengthened; namely, that the only intellectually valuable knowledge of a subject is such as is possessed by the specialist, the expert, in that subject; and that the acquisition of knowledge which is not, in that sense, thorough can be of little or no worth, either as a discipline or as a result.

Now, the most general recommendation of all classical study is the supreme and varied excellence of the classical literatures; these illustrate, and are illustrated by, all the activities of classical thought and life. A conceivable ideal of humanistic study under modern conditions—whether it be practicable or not, I do not venture to pronounce, though I am not convinced that it is impracticable—would be one which took those literatures as the basis throughout,

but also exacted some measure of acquaintance with each of the more important among the other subjects of classical study. Take, for example, the subject of classical art, which means primarily and chiefly Greek art. Even a limited knowledge of that subject is obviously of the greatest value to a student of classical literature; not merely, of course, as a key to allusions, but often in a far deeper sense, as throwing light on the spirit which animates both monuments and books. I repeat, even a limited knowledge of classical art has that use,—a knowledge which stops far short of the equipment requisite for a specialist in the subject. But, because it is limited, must it therefore be superficial or unsound? It is difficult to see why it must be so. The teacher to whom students of the classical literatures would have recourse in this matter would be the specialist in classical art. Would he not be competent to decide what parts of his own subject are the most essential for such students to know? And would he not be competent to secure that, in those selected parts, and within the limits which he himself had traced, the knowledge should not be unsound or superficial? Like considerations apply to other special departments.

I must be content to have asked this question, and leave the judgment upon it to others. I turn now to the brief consideration of a larger question. What is the general position of the humane letters in this country at the present day, and what are their prospects of retaining that position? The

most salient feature in the intellectual development of this century has been the progress of science. And this century is the first since the revival of learning in which a serious challenge has been thrown down to the defenders of the humanistic tradition. But I think it will be found that the position of humanism in this country at the close of the century is much stronger than it was at the beginning.

English humanism in this century.

In the earlier part of the century, the classics still held a virtual monopoly, so far as literary studies were concerned, in the public schools and Universities. And they had no cause to be ashamed of their record. The culture which they supplied, while limited in the sphere of its operation, had long been an efficient and vital influence, not only in forming men of letters and learning, but in training men who afterwards gained distinction in public life and in various active careers. There can be no better proof that such a discipline has penetrated the mind, and has been assimilated, than if, in the crises of life, a man recurs to the great thoughts and images of the literature in which he has been trained, and finds there what braces and fortifies him, a comfort, an inspiration, an utterance for his deeper feelings. Robert Wood, in his "Essay on the Original Genius of Homer" (1769), relates a story which will illustrate what I mean. In 1762, at the end of the Seven Years' War, Wood, being then an Under-Secretary of State, took the preliminary articles of the Treaty of Paris to the

President of the Council, Lord Granville; who was then ill, and had, indeed, but a few days to live. Seeing what his condition was, Wood proposed to withdraw; but the statesman replied that it could not prolong his life to neglect his duty, and then quoted in Greek from the "Iliad," the words of Sarpedon to Glaucus:—"Ah, friend, if, once escaped from this battle, we were for ever to be ageless and immortal, I would not myself fight in the foremost ranks, nor would I send thee into the war that giveth men renown; but now,—since ten thousand fates of death beset us every way, and these no mortal may escape or avoid,—*now let us go forward.*" He repeated the last word, ἴομεν, "let us go forward," several times, says Wood, "with a calm and determinate resignation"; and then, after a pause, asked to hear the Treaty read. That is what I meant by a man recurring, in a crisis of life, to the great thoughts of the literature on which he has been nourished. Or, to give one other example: what a forcible testimony to the hold which this discipline could retain on a congenial spirit is afforded by such a man as the Marquis Wellesley, when, at the close of his career, he addresses his old school in those exquisite Latin elegiacs which can be read in the Chapel of Eton College, where he lies buried,—the lines beginning,

> Fortunae rerumque vagis exercitus undis,
> In gremium redeo serus, Etona, tuum.

It was Eton, he says, which had taught him to aim

high, and to approach the bright fountains of the ancient wisdom,—*et purum antiquae lucis adire iubar*; to her he owes whatever he has achieved, and from her he asks a final resting-place.

Yes, to such men the humanities had been a true culture; but the social sphere within which they gave that culture had been, as I have said, limited. And in the earlier years of this century there arose in English letters no popular force tending to spread a recognition of the humanistic ideal. In our imaginative literature the most potent forces, those which exerted the widest influence, were then on the side of the romanticists. The genius of Walter Scott was of course essentially romantic; so, too, was that of Byron, his interest in Greece notwithstanding. Only a very limited audience was in those days commanded by the writers whose genius had a native kinship with the classical, such as Keats and Landor. But a little later came Tennyson, whose influence throughout the English-speaking world has made strongly for an appreciation of the classical spirit, not only directly, through his poems on classical themes, but also generally, by his qualities of form and style. And the influence of Matthew Arnold, both as a poet and as a critic, if less widely popular than Tennyson's, has had a not less penetrating and subtle power in making the Greek spirit, and the distinctive qualities of the best Greek achievement, understood and felt by cultivated readers. Then, in the domain of history, Grote's great work,

the work of a man of affairs, has done much, more perhaps than any other one book of the century, to invest his subject with a vivid, an almost modern interest for a world wider than the academic, and has done so all the more effectively just because his own antecedents were not academic. Again, there has been a considerable literature, the growth chiefly of the last forty years, which has sought to popularize the classical literatures in a scholarly sense, and to illustrate them from the modern,—such books as those of the late Mr Symonds and the late Professor Sellar. To these must be added translations of the higher order, such as that by which Professor Jowett has made Plato an English classic.

Further, there has been a most remarkable stimulation of interest in classical topography, archæology, and art. New facilities of travel have enabled thousands to become acquainted with the scenes of Greek and Roman life. The study of classical antiquity has been in many respects revolutionized by a series of striking discoveries in Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt. The opportunities of exploration for English students have been improved by the establishment in 1883 of a school at Athens, which may probably be followed, ere long, by the opening of a similar school at Rome. The wealth of the British Museum in classical antiquities has received frequent accessions; it was never before so attractive or so well organized as a place of classical study. The Universities have meanwhile done much to improve

their resources for the study of classical archæology and art.

In all these ways, the humanistic studies have, during this century, become wider and more real. They have gradually been drawn out of a scholastic isolation, and have been brought more and more into the general current of intellectual and literary interests. So far from losing strength or efficacy by ceasing to hold that more exclusive position which they occupied two or three generations ago, they have acquired a fresh vigour, a larger sphere of genuine activity, and a place in the higher education which is more secure, because the acceptance on which it rests is more intelligent.

The critical moment a generation ago.

There was, indeed, a moment in this century when the attack upon the humanities was somewhat formidable. It was rather more than thirty years ago, towards the end of the period during which the classics had enjoyed a virtual monopoly in literary education. The educational claims of science had been fully developed, and were being powerfully urged by champions of whom Professor Huxley was the most brilliant; but these claims had not yet been effectively recognised by adequate provision for the teaching of science in schools and Universities. Several able men, who had been trained in classical studies and had been successful in them, were discontented with the classical system, were conscious of personal needs which it had not satisfied, and felt a sort of resentment against it. In education, as in other matters, some of these men

were advanced and eager reformers, who, by their general habit of mind, apart from their particular complaints against the classics, were unlikely to feel any prejudice in favour of tradition,—were apt to be sceptical, or even scornful, of anything alleged on behalf of the humanities which appeared to them sentimental or conventional,—and were little disposed to conserve any element in education to which they could not assign a definite rational value. As a typical expression of those tendencies, one might mention the volume of "Essays on a Liberal Education," published in 1867.

In the sixties, then, considering the strength of the attack both from without and from within, the position of humane studies was certainly more seriously imperilled than it had ever been before. Not, indeed, that even then there was any danger of their being discarded at once. But there was a danger of another kind. Some influential men were saying, "Keep Latin if you like, but drop Greek, or reserve it for a few boys; and take care that the classics do not, in any case, trench upon the time which should, in all schools, be given to natural science and to modern studies." The danger was lest the powerful alliance between insurgent men of science and disaffected humanists, aided by the legions of Philistia, should force on a movement for imposing such restrictions as these in a spirit altogether favourable to the new studies, but unfriendly to the old;—with the result that classical studies might be so narrowed, so hampered, so

maimed, as to lose nearly all their distinctive educational virtue; and, after languishing for a time, might gradually die out of the schools.

That danger was sensibly increased by a further circumstance. It was the first time in England that classical education had been seriously put upon its defence; and some of its less discreet defenders made some claims on its behalf which were ill-founded or exaggerated. Thus one eminent scholar said, "If the old classical literature were swept away, the moderns would in many cases become unintelligible, and in all cases lose most of their characteristic charms." Others averred that no one could write English well who did not know Latin. One distinguished head-master even said, "It is scarcely possible to speak the English language with accuracy or precision, without a knowledge of Latin or Greek." Now claims of this kind, all containing some elements of truth, but needing to be carefully limited and defined, struck people in general as preposterous, when stated with crude exaggeration; and did all the more mischief, because, in the sixties, an apprehension of the true claims of humanism was much less widely diffused, among educated people outside of the academic world, than it is to-day. And when such people, who had no personal knowledge of humanistic study, heard claims made for it which seemed repugnant to experience and common-sense, they not unnaturally suspected that the whole case for the humanities was unsound.

Present position of humanism.

But in the last thirty years the position of the humane letters, relatively to other studies, has been altered in several important respects. The study of the natural sciences is now firmly established in schools and Universities; it can no longer be said that a haughty and exclusive humanism keeps them out of the educational field: indeed, there are not a few seats of learning where they hold a clear predominance. Modern languages and literatures have also their recognised place in the higher education; if they do not yet attract as many disciples as they deserve, the reason is not that they are neglected or discouraged by educational authorities, but rather that they are new studies, with methods and aims which are still in some measure tentative, and competing with highly equipped rivals of older standing. This establishment of the modern studies is, so far as I have seen, viewed by humanists generally with cordial satisfaction. The spirit of humanism, indeed, wherever it is not a narrow pedantry, is one which welcomes every accession to the domain of sound knowledge. Meanwhile, the claims of humanism itself, sifted by a period of controversy, and illustrated by the larger views of liberal education which now prevail, are usually stated with more discrimination than formerly, and are more willingly and more widely acknowledged.

Its permanent claims.

Now, what are the true and permanent claims of humanistic studies? They are of two kinds, the intrinsic, and the historical. The intrinsic merits of the classical literatures depend, in the first place,

on their purely literary qualities in respect to form and style. The creative literature of Greece, from Homer to Demosthenes, had a course of spontaneous and natural growth, throughout which it was in constant touch with life; and it has left a series of typical standards in prose and poetry. The excellence of these models is not a scholastic figment or a medieval superstition; it is a fact which has been recognised, through all the changes of the centuries, by the common feeling and the general consent of civilised mankind. The Roman literature, though partly imitative, is not only original in some of its types, but original throughout as a manifestation of the Latin genius in the speech which that genius moulded; and abounds in works of poetry and prose which must always rank as masterpieces. An unguarded champion of the classics once said of them that "they utterly condemn all false ornament, all tinsel, all ungraceful and unshapely work." That statement, though quite true in a general sense, is not true without exception; the classics are not perfect, any more than other human productions; they have their occasional faults or blemishes in style and taste. But it would argue a strange deficiency in the sense of proportion, a singular want of balance in literary judgment, to affirm that such faults or blemishes detract in any appreciable degree from the intellectual stimulus and the æsthetic pleasure which their great and characteristic qualities afford, or from the admiration due to the artistic harmony of their best work, when viewed as

a whole. The utility of the classical languages as subjects of study and as instruments of training depends partly on these qualities of the literatures, but also on the importance of these languages themselves for grammar and comparative philology. They afford, moreover, a discipline in nicety of judgment which is all the better because the questions of idiom and usage which they raise cannot be solved by living authority.

The intrinsic value of the classical literatures depends, further, on their contents. The claim made for them on this score at the present day is much more limited than that which was made by the humanists of the Renaissance; but, within those limits, it is as valid as ever. The observations and discoveries of the Greeks and Romans in particular sciences, such as Mathematics or Medicine, have been incorporated or transmuted in modern work, and no longer form a practical reason for studying the literatures, though still investing them with a special interest for some students who would not otherwise be drawn to them. But an universal and abiding interest belongs to another and far larger element in their contents. That element is the store of experience and observation accumulated by keen watchers of human nature and conduct through all the centuries from Homer to Justinian. And the utterance of this varied wisdom of life is precisely one of the regions in which the distinctive excellences of classical expression shine most. This is a kind of literary wealth which, as John Stuart

Mill said of it, "does not well admit of being transferred bodily" into modern books, and "has been very imperfectly transferred even piecemeal."

The historical value of the classical literatures is that which arises from their relation to the modern. No one, of course, would now maintain that a knowledge of Greek or Latin is necessary to success in writing English; such a statement could be disproved by a cloud of witnesses,—among others, by Shakespeare, De Foe, Bunyan, Byron, Carlyle, Cobbett, Charles Lamb. But it is certain that no one can comprehend the history and development of English literature, or of any literature of modern Europe, without a knowledge of the ultimate sources in ancient Greece and Italy. Without such a knowledge, the process by which the forms of modern literature have been evolved would be unintelligible. It has been urged, indeed, that for a student of a modern literature the important thing is to know the immediate antecedents of that literature, rather than the more remote; and that, if the student of English literature, for instance, studies Early English, it is needless to trouble him with Greek or Latin. It may be replied, however, that, in the study of modern literary history, the light afforded by the nearer past differs in kind from that which is given by the more distant past. The nearer past will explain details; as a study of Chaucer will give the key to some later forms or usages of the language. But it is necessary to go further back,—in the case of any European literature, it is necessary to go back to ancient Greece

and Italy, if you desire to find the points from which the main currents of literary tradition started, and from which the chief types in literature have been derived. An ordinary reader does not require to know the classics in order to appreciate and enjoy modern literature, though such knowledge will enhance his appreciation and enjoyment at many points. But, for any one who aspires to be a scholarly critic of modern literature, the knowledge is indispensable.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that classical literature affords the best, if not a necessary, preparation for the study of classical art; and that Greek art remains, in its own province, the most perfect expression of the artistic spirit.

Humanism as a safeguard of literary standards.

Such, in outline, are the principal claims that can be made for the humanities. These merits surely entitle them to keep their place in the higher literary education. I do not think that there is any exaggeration in what Mr Froude said thirteen years ago, that, if we ever lose those studies, "our national taste, and the tone of our national intellect, will suffer a serious decline." Classical studies help to preserve sound standards of literature. It is not difficult to lose such standards, even for a nation with the highest material civilisation, with abounding mental activity, and with a great literature of its own. It is peculiarly easy to do so in days when the lighter and more ephemeral kinds of writing form for many people the staple of daily reading. The fashions of the hour may start a movement, not in the best direction, which may go on until the path is

difficult to retrace. The humanities, if they cannot prevent such a movement, can do something to temper and counteract it; because they appeal to permanent things, to the instinct for beauty in human nature, and to the emotions; and in any one who is at all susceptible to their influence they develope a literary conscience. Nor is this all. Their power in the higher education will affect the quality of the literary teaching lower down. Every one can see how vitally important it is for us, in this country and at this moment, to maintain, in our general education, a proper balance of subjects, and to secure that, while scientific and technical studies have full scope, a due efficacy shall be given also to the studies of literature and history.

We have no Academy of Letters in England, and, for my part, I am with those who hope that we never shall have one. But no doubt we must desire to have what Mr Matthew Arnold called "a public force of correct literary opinion, possessing within certain limits a clear sense of what is right and wrong, sound and unsound." In concluding this lecture, I would venture to say that such a force of correct literary opinion is just what an intelligent humanism should contribute to supply; not, as an Academy does, in a public or corporate form, but through the influence and example of individuals. Humanism can do that, if it is loyal to its best self; if it avoids a needless excess of technicality in the treatment of literature; if it cultivates sanity of judgment, and is careful that the exercise of

ingenuity shall be controlled by the literary sense. Discoveries of a signal kind, such as mark the progress of the new sciences, can seldom now be expected in the province of humanism. In humanism the genuine originality must now consist, for the most part, in applying, by patient work, a more accurate knowledge and a more delicate perception at a number of particular points, in the hope of enabling each successive generation of students to apprehend classical antiquity in a more fruitful manner, with a greater distinctness and with a nearer approach to truth.

It has been a great privilege for me to address such an audience on this subject. I am well aware how little I have had to say that can be new to many of my hearers; but it may be good sometimes, in the case of studies which are so important for the intellectual well-being of the nation, to pause and think what they mean and where they stand; to look back and to look forward. The endeavour to do so, however defective the result may be, is at least one which cannot be foreign to the traditions or the genius of the place in which I have had the honour to speak.

ON PRESENT TENDENCIES IN CLASSICAL STUDIES[1].

The institution of a Section of Philology in the Philosophical Society of Glasgow may justly be regarded as an event of some interest, even in the history of a Society so distinguished and so useful as this has been. I am bound to say at the outset that I have no claim to even the least share in the merit of having promoted this addition to the fields of work which the Society comprehends; that credit belongs, I believe I may say, to Dr Colville, Mr James Morison, and other gentlemen who have co-operated with them; and when they did me the honour—one which I appreciate highly—of inviting me to become President of the Section, I felt considerable hesitation in occupying a place which ought rather, as it seemed to me, to have been filled by one of them. I am not a comparative philologist; and if Philology, in relation to this Section, was to bear the specific sense which is sometimes attached to it in this country, then I had assuredly no title to become President of it. But I was reassured on this point by learning that

[1] The author's Inaugural Address as President of the Philological Section in the Philosophical Society of Glasgow: Feb. 20, 1889.

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Philology, as the subject of this Section, was intended to be taken in that larger and undoubtedly fitter sense of the word which it bears in other countries, and to which the usage of scholars ought certainly to fix it in our own—that is to say, the study of language and of literature without distinction between ancient and modern, and without exclusion of anything which is needed for the full comprehension and illustration of either. By permitting the establishment of this new Section, the Philosophical Society of Glasgow gives a proof that it interprets the word philosophy in its oldest and widest sense—the love of *knowledge*.

The remarks which I have the honour of addressing to you this evening are intended to be in the nature of an inaugural address for the Section; so, in selecting my subject, I was obedient to two conditions, both of them somewhat difficult to fulfil: first, that the subject must have somewhat of a general character; next, that it must belong to that part of the wide domain of Philology with which I was in some degree conversant.

If we wish to comprehend the forces which are at work in the classical studies of the present day, it is well first to glance backward for a moment and to see how those forces have been prepared. Some four centuries have now elapsed since the interest in classical antiquity was revived, after the neglect or oblivion of the middle ages.

The general course of classical scholarship since that time has shown certain successive tendencies,

and they are those which might naturally have been expected. The first century or so after the revival —the period from about 1450 to 1550—was one in which men were chiefly occupied with the beauty of classical expression. The form so far excelled anything with which they had been familiar that it fascinated them; their first ambition was to reproduce something of this beauty in their own writing. This is the period of the Latin stylists, occupied with the *imitatio veterum*, and best represented by the name of Erasmus; though he, of course, was much more than a stylist.

Erasmus was 31 years old at the death of Savonarola, the hero of George Eliot's "Romola," a novel which helps one to realise the intellectual and social atmosphere of that time in Italy. Then, when the first novelty of classical style had worn off a little, came the desire to grasp the *matter* contained in the classical books. Between 1550 and 1650 we have Joseph Scaliger, with his great effort, at once erudite and brilliant, to frame a critical chronology of the ancient world; and Casaubon, with his indefatigable labours in the study of ancient manners. Thus, within the first two centuries after the revival of letters, we find curiosity drawn successively towards the two most obvious aspects of the rediscovered treasure—the beauty of its form, and next, the wealth of its contents. But now a third phase sets in, represented by Bentley, in the late 17th and early 18th century. He was struck by the fact that the

classical texts, which had hitherto been accepted with comparatively little criticism, have come down to us in a very corrupt state. He was as much interested as Scaliger and Casaubon in the *realien* of classical study; but he felt that, before we could make further progress in a sound way, we must be sure of the ground under our feet—we must purify the texts.

Bentley died in 1742. For about a century after his death we may say, speaking broadly, that no new and distinct tendency manifested itself in classical studies; none, that is to say, which was more than a continuation of lines marked out by such men as Erasmus, Scaliger, Casaubon, and, above all, by Bentley, who is peculiarly remarkable for the fecundity of his work in germs or hints, which successors developed. In his own country his successors followed him mainly in the track of textual criticism; but in Holland and Germany he has always been recognised also as the maker of an epoch in historical and literary criticism (as represented especially by his Letter to Mill, and his "Dissertation on Phalaris"), so that Bunsen could say—"historical philology is the discovery of Bentley—the heritage and glory of German learning."

The new tendency which has come into classical studies during the last forty or fifty years might be described, for the sake of brevity, as the spirit of science. I wish to explain, as clearly as possible, exactly what I mean by this statement.

If we consider the first three centuries after the revival—the time from Erasmus to Bentley—we see that the general characteristic in the history of classical scholarship was the predominance of the individual genius. A man of powerful personality would arise and make an epoch. The work which he did was emphatically his own ; he was bound by no rules or methods, except such as he might have framed for his own guidance ; if he resorted to conjecture, he employed it with entire freedom, making his own sense of fitness the ultimate test. Bentley is, of course, the strongest example of this, and he is also the most apposite for our purpose, since his influence was so strongly felt by succeeding scholars. Thus, in the preface to his Horace, he says—" I give more things on conjecture than by the help of manuscripts. . . . Shake off the exclusive reverence for scribes. Dare to have a mind of your own." This attitude was natural in pioneers like Bentley and the men before him. It was, indeed, the only possible one at that period. But before the middle of the present century had been reached, several causes had contributed to modify the classical scholar's view of his relation to his materials. First of all, many generations had now been busied with the work of illustrating classical antiquity. A large literature of criticism and comment had been accumulated. In studying this literature an intelligent reader could not fail to be struck with the fact that every critic had done that which was right in his own eyes. Individual insight and taste had had the freest scope,

and had accomplished wonders; but was it not time to see whether an agreement was possible on some general principles? To take two provinces of classical learning in which this need had long been apparent —etymologies of a purely conjectural and sometimes absurd nature were often given to Greek or Latin words; and in textual criticism conjectures were often propounded, and even received, without any reference to the manuscripts, but simply because they struck the critic as good in themselves. Another defect in the treatment of classical antiquity had hitherto been the absence of any systematic attempt to bring the evidence of the literature into relation with the evidence of the monuments,—the buildings, statues, stones, vases, coins, inscriptions, and other relics of the civilisation to which the literature belonged.

Under the influence of such perceptions as these, new branches of special knowledge were gradually developed. Within the last half-century a science of language has been created by the application of the comparative method to linguistic study. The old haphazard etymologising has been banished for ever; derivations which satisfied Plato, and which could not have been disproved by Bentley, can now be refuted by every possessor of an elementary text-book. The study of manuscripts, as such, has become the science of palæography; and if any one desires to realise what arduous labour it has enlisted, it is enough to look at the well-known work of Gardthausen, published ten years ago, which is

devoted exclusively to Greek palæography. Textual criticism, aided, in some respects, by scientific palæography, and in others by the progress of linguistic research, has lost very much of the vague and arbitrary character which belonged to it in old days. The degree in which it has now approximated to the condition of a science may be seen, for example, in the chapter on "Methods of Textual Criticism," in Drs Westcott and Hort's "Introduction to the New Testament." Again, the systematic study of inscriptions has opened up a vast field, which has demanded, and still demands, the best work of many minds; and this new science of epigraphy has shed abundant light on every other department of antiquarian study. It is enough to allude to a single example—Mommsen's "History of Rome." But a passing notice is also due to the fact that, in the case of classical Greek, the body of evidence which has now been collected from Attic inscriptions is so large that it enables us to correct spellings of Greek words which have hitherto been taken on the faith of our relatively late manuscripts. Meisterhans, in his "Grammar of Attic Inscriptions," has lately presented this evidence in a compact and lucid form. As to the study of monuments, whatever their form or their material—monuments of art or of handicraft,—this vast domain has now so many provinces, and each province has been so laboriously cultivated, that to be an expert of first-rate authority in any one of them requires not only natural gifts, but the devotion of a lifetime. Excavations in the classical lands are from time to time revealing objects

which have an importance for others besides the specialist to whose branch they belong; sometimes they compel the literary scholar to reconsider some of the views which a long tradition had sanctioned. For instance, quite lately an archæological architect has affirmed, as the result of a close inspection, that the Dionysiac Theatre at Athens had no permanent stage before at least the second half of the 4th century B.C., and that in the days of the great dramatists the actors stood on the same level with the chorus. As you are aware, I have not exhausted the list of those special studies connected with classical scholarship which have had their birth, or found their maturity within the last half-century; for instance, we might add Comparative Mythology and Comparative Syntax; but this imperfect outline is enough for our present purpose.

The spirit represented by these new special studies is the spirit of science; that is to say, in each department the aim is to ascertain the facts as correctly as possible, and, when the range of facts has become large enough to warrant generalisation, to deduce general rules or principles, with a view to making the further study of the subject a methodical and, as far as possible, an exact study. In every one of the special branches to which I have referred there are now certain propositions which are accepted as axiomatic; if a man's work conforms to these, it is allowed as scientific—he is advancing on the true path; if it does not, his work may be clever, interesting, even brilliant, but it is not scientific. A single

illustration may serve to point the contrast in this respect between the present time and even thirty-five years ago. It was about then that a very clever and very laborious Englishman published a work on which he had spent years. It was called "The One Primeval Language," and was intended to show that the inscription on the Sinaitic Rocks could be translated back into this one primeval language by means of a correspondence with the Arabic alphabet, which the author had devised on purely hypothetical grounds. One, at least, of the acutest judicial minds of that day—the late Lord Lyndhurst—was quite convinced by this process. On the other hand, M. Renan has described it as a *mystification anglaise.* It would not be possible now for a clever and learned man, as this man was, to produce such a work: the scientific feeling in linguistic matters has become too widely diffused.

Surely, you will say, it is a matter for rejoicing that the scientific spirit has thus entered the domain of scholarship, and has thus changed the reign of caprice to the reign of law. Of course it is so in the main: without that spirit the gains of the last fifty years could not have been won. But there is another aspect of the matter on which I should like to say a few words, for it is too often forgotten. It cannot be doubted that the analogy of the natural sciences has indirectly helped the tendency towards a scientific rigour in the provinces of scholarship at which we have glanced. The whole atmosphere of our century has been charged with the influences of science—

the science which has made this age so memorable in the history of material progress; the very associations of our word *science* press this analogy on the mind; we have no neutral-tinted word like *Wissenschaft*, applicable to thorough knowledge of any kind, and not suggestive of one kind rather than another. In our colloquial language "scientific" has become a favourite substitute for "accurate," "thorough," "skilful"; we speak familiarly of scientific cricket, scientific whist, and what not. In special provinces of scholarly research this bent shows itself in a desire for exact methods, precise formulas, everything, in short, that can increase the resemblance to the processes of the natural sciences. The resulting tendency is to make each of these special branches of learned research highly technical, and to render it more and more a mystery reserved for initiated experts. But, it may be asked, is not this inevitable? Is it not an inseparable condition of advanced research? Doubtless, to a great extent; but the point which I desire to suggest is that the prevalent intellectual bent of the age often pushes the love of technicality, regarded as a sign of superior knowledge, unnecessarily far, and that the consequence is to isolate each special department from all the others a good deal more than is either requisite or desirable. Another cause contributes: the better minds usually desire to be thorough in what they do; the vastness of the field of scholarship —of Philology in the large sense—makes them feel that thoroughness is impossible unless they restrict

themselves to one plot of ground; when they have chosen it, their interest becomes concentrated on it and on those who are doing the same special work, and they soon cease to care much whether they are understood by others.

We gladly recognise that such specialists are doing invaluable service, in their several lines, to the cause of knowledge; but we may also wish that the desire to be scientific was more uniformly tempered by a regard for the nature of the materials with which all scholarship has to deal. Those materials are the creations of the human intellect, whether as seen in the evolution of language, or of literature, or of art. When principles, determined with a scientific precision, have assured the student of language that a kinship is *possible* between two words, one of the elements in the probability which he may have to consider is the precise *usage* of these words, as attested by literature; and here it is no longer enough to be logically exact; it is necessary to possess also that delicate instinct for expression which is called the literary sense. The textual critic who is seeking to amend a corrupt passage may have full command of everything that palæography can tell him, and of all the particular facts concerning the MSS. of his author; he may also be a perfect grammarian; but what will these things avail him unless he has also an adequate sympathy with his author's mind, and unless his procedure is controlled by the literary taste which such an insight bestows? We remember the legendary emendation in *As You*

Like It—whether it is more than legendary I do not know—by which the words—

> "*books* in the running brooks,
> Sermons in *stones*,"

were corrected into

> "*stones* in the running brooks,
> Sermons in *books*."

It is no exaggeration to say that emendations like this—yes, and worse—have repeatedly been proposed in the texts of Greek poets by excellent scholars who, on the "scientific" side of their work, leave nothing to be desired. Or turn to the study of history—Mr Freeman will not permit us to call it "ancient"—the history of Greece or Rome. It frequently happens that our estimate of character or motive, our view of a political situation, or our conception of a social phase, must depend on something beyond the mere power to construe our classical author's words according to the rules of grammar; it must be effected, further, by our perception of the tone which his form of expression conveys. In Archæology, again, take what branch of it we will, the literary evidence is often important in its bearing on the monuments, and often depends on nice points of interpretation. Nor can any aid to the comprehension of Greek art be more valuable than that which is given by a true sympathy with the spirit of Greek literature; for the same mind is in both.

If, then, classical studies are to be cultivated with the best result, it is not enough that the spirit and the ardour of scientific research should animate

every department of them; it is also essential that in every department the spirit of science should be associated with the literary and artistic sense; a sense which will not only invest the specialist's own work with a higher value, but will also quicken his appreciation of the place which his special work holds in relation to other provinces of scholarship. There is a passage in Gibbon's memoir of his own life where the historian speaks of his early studies in mathematics. He cannot regret, he says, that he ceased to pursue them before the habit of rigid demonstration had impaired the delicacy of his feeling for the finer shades of moral evidence. Whether such a result was necessary, we need not pause to consider. I refer to his remark because it indicates in that great scholar a consciousness that the scientific habit of mind is not, taken by itself, an adequate equipment for dealing with such problems as meet the scholar and historian. In our generation, and more especially in this country, that noble old conception of classical studies which is implied in the term "humanities" has rather fallen into the background—partly from the causes which I have indicated, partly also because we have had so many English translations, and because the practice of Greek and Latin composition (especially verse) has not of late years held quite so prominent a place in school studies as it formerly did. Already, however, one may perceive signs of a reaction in this respect—so far, at least, as prose composition is concerned. And I believe that this reaction will be further strengthened as the

study of *modern* languages is gradually established among us on a sound and thorough basis. That expectation may seem paradoxical, and yet I think it is reasonable. For, when people have fully realised that intellectual grasp of a modern language can be more surely tested by the power of composing in it than by the power of using it colloquially, then they will be less disposed to disparage the value of the same test in Greek and Latin. Then, too, perhaps we shall no longer hear that Nature cries aloud to us to teach the classical languages chiefly by an oral use of Dr Ollendorff's method. There is indeed one essential difference, as regards composition, between modern languages and the classics, which should be well noted here. It depends on the difference between *idiomatic* writing, and writing which is merely correct in point of grammar. In a modern language, when the learner knows only that he is grammatical, but doubts whether he is idiomatic, he can easily decide the point by an appeal to living authority. But in Greek and Latin, the only gauge of idiomatic truth is that which is furnished by the literature; and while it is comparatively easy to ascertain the rules of grammar, it requires very careful study—study which tasks not only intellect, but feeling and taste—to seize that subtle reflection of a living personality which in language appears as idiom, and which can still be apprehended, though sometimes but dimly, and with an inevitable element of uncertainty, in the literary records of the ancient world.

In conclusion, I would venture to say that I believe the time to be auspicious for the establishment of this new Section in the Philosophical Society of Glasgow. There are abundant proofs in this great city, as elsewhere, that the studies which this Section embraces were never being pursued with more earnestness, or with more varied energy, or with better hope, than now.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE GREEK MIND ON MODERN LIFE[1].

The Faculties of the Greek Race.

The very name of this noble Hall, in which your Lordship's courtesy permits us to meet to-day, recalls a part of that prehistoric background against which the Greek genius first shone forth. The immemorial civilisation on the banks of the Nile had gradually passed under the bondage of stereotyped formulas, as despotism of another kind overshadowed the lands of the Tigris and the Euphrates, when the Greek spirit, in the first glow of a youth which has proved immortal, was beginning to clear the path of mankind to political liberty, to the recognition of natural beauty, and to the fearless pursuit of knowledge. If, again, we look back from a modern standing-point on the various parts played in human progress by various members of the Indo-European family, how singular do the faculties of the Greek race appear, alike in compass and in harmony! This might be illustrated from the history of modern art, when some felicity of invention or achievement

[1] Address to the Students of the London Branch of the University Extension Movement, delivered in the Egyptian Hall at the Mansion House, by permission and under the presidency of the Lord Mayor: March, 1893.

is explained by the fact that several strains of lineage, several branches of the Indo-European stock, have contributed to a result which no one of them could have produced alone. Thus, the most signal achievement of the French genius in art has been the creation of Gothic architecture; and, as the President of the Royal Academy reminded its Students some years ago, the cradle of that architecture was the Royal Domain of central France, a region in which the Celtic blood of the Cymri was mingled with the Latin element derived from the Romans, and with the Teutonic element furnished by the Franks; giving birth to that Gothic style which blends freedom with self-restraint, audacity with prudence, and science with emotion. No similar analysis can be applied to the masterpieces of the Greek architect and the Greek sculptor. Imperfect though our knowledge is, does it not warrant the belief that no people has yet appeared upon the earth whose faculty for art, in the largest sense of the term, was at once so fine and so comprehensive?

But it is through the classical literature of Greece that the mind of the race is most fully known to us. There is a passage in one of Macaulay's earliest writings—a review of Mitford in *Knight's Quarterly Magazine*—from which I will quote a few sentences, because they put the claim of Greek Literature in the boldest form; one which many readers, probably, would deem extravagant, or even paradoxical. "If we consider," he says, "the subtlety of disquisition, the force of imagination, the perfect energy and

elegance of expression, which characterise the great works of Athenian genius, we must pronounce them intrinsically most valuable; but what shall we say when we reflect that from hence have sprung, directly or indirectly, all the noblest creations of the human intellect; that from hence were the vast accomplishments and the brilliant fancy of Cicero; the withering fire of Juvenal; the plastic imagination of Dante; the humour of Cervantes; the comprehension of Bacon; the wit of Butler; the supreme and universal excellence of Shakespeare?" The claim which Macaulay here makes for Greek literature would be extravagant indeed if it meant that Cicero was brilliant because he had profited by Demosthenes, that Juvenal's satire was inspired by Aristophanes, that Dante was vivid and sublime because Virgil had given him glimpses of Homer, that the humour of Cervantes and the wit of Butler flowed from an Attic source, that Bacon's grasp was due to study of Aristotle, or that Shakespeare, who had small Latin and less Greek, was the prince of dramatists by grace of the Dionysiac Theatre. In what sense, then, if in any, is the claim a just one? In this—that the Greeks were the people with whom the very conception of artistic literature began; that, in all the principal branches of poetry and of prose, the Greek mind achieved work so abounding with intellectual life, and so excellent in form, as to remain for after-ages an inspiration and a standard.

The Transmitted Greek Influence.

The vital power of the Greek spirit was indeed not fully disclosed until, after suffering a partial eclipse in the Macedonian age, it emerged in a new quality, as a source of illumination to the Italian masters of the world. Under the plastic touch of conquered Greece, the Latin language was gradually moulded into an apter instrument of literature, while the Roman intellect itself acquired, in some measure, a flexibility not native to it. Through Rome, the Greek influence was transmitted to mediæval Europe in a form which obscured much of its charm, yet also served to extend its empire. In the earlier period of the Renaissance, the scholars of Italy, where the revival had its chief seat, were engrossed with Latin literature; they regarded it as their Italian heritage, restored to them after long deprivation. Greek studies, though ardently pursued by a few, remained, on the whole, in the background. And it may be said that the general spirit of the classical revival continued to be Latin rather than Greek down to the latter part of the last century. Even where the Greek language was most cultivated there was comparatively little sense of what is characteristic and distinctive in the best Greek literature. This sense was developed, in the second half of the 18th century, chiefly through two agencies. One was the study of Greek art, as advanced by such men as Winckelmann and Lessing, —bringing with it the perception that those qualities

which characterise the best Greek art are also present in the best Greek literature. The other agency was a reaction against that conventional classicism, wearing a Latin garb, which had so long been dominant. Minds insurgent against that tyranny turned with joyous relief to the elastic freedom of the Greek intellect, to the living charm of Greek poetry and art. Goethe and Schiller are representatives of the new impulse. The great gain of the movement which thus began was that, for the first time since the Revival of Letters, the Greek originals stood out distinct from the Latin copies. Men acquired a truer sense of the Hellenic genius, and the current of Hellenic influence upon modern life began to flow in a clear channel of its own, no longer confused with the somewhat turbid stream of Renaissance classicism.

Meanwhile, however, modern literature and art had experienced the influence of other forces, acting in very different ways: and with these forces the Hellenic influence had to reckon. One of these was the product of mediæval Catholicism, which had given art a new genius. A new world of beauty had arisen, even more different from the pagan world than the Empire of the twelfth century was different from that of the first. Greek art had sprung from a free, cheerful life, open to all the bright impressions of external nature, a life warmed by frank human sympathies, and lit up with fancy controlled by reason. The lawgivers of mediæval art were men withdrawn from communion with the outward

world by the rapture of a devotion at once half mystic and intensely real; instead of flexible intelligence they had religious passion; instead of the Greek's clear outlook upon the facts of humanity they had a faith which transfigured the actual world. The Greek artist, even in portraying passion, was mindful of balance, and placed certain limits upon the expression of individual character. The mediæval artist strove before all things to express the intensity of the individual soul. In poetry Dante is the great exponent of this spirit. And mediæval Catholicism deeply coloured the sentiment of all the literature known by the general name of Romantic. In Goethe's younger days the conflict between the Classical and the Romantic schools raged fiercely. The interlude of *Helena*, which forms the third act in the second part of *Faust*, was the work of his old age. Faust's nature is to be elevated and purified by developing in him the sense of beauty; Helena represents the classical, but especially the Greek, element in art and literature; and when Faust at last wins her, their union typifies the reconciliation of the Romantic with the Classical. Goethe himself dated a new life, a mental regeneration, from the time when he first seized the true spirit of the ancient masters. These are his own words, speaking of Greek art and literature:—"Clearness of vision, cheerfulness of acceptance, easy grace of expression, are the qualities which delight us; and now, when we affirm that we find all these in the genuine Grecian works, achieved in the noblest material, the

best-proportioned form, with certainty and completeness of execution, we shall be understood if we always refer to them as a basis and a standard. Let each one be a Grecian in his own way, but let him be one." In that allegorical strain which pervades the *Helena*, Goethe has not failed to mark that, while the Hellenic idea of beauty is supreme, the Romantic element has also enriched modern life. The gifts are not all from one side. The symmetry, the clear outlines, the cheerful repose of Classical art, are wedded to the sentiment, passion, and variety of the Romantic. The great German poet felt, and has expressed with wonderful subtlety, the truth that no modern can absolutely dissociate the Hellenic influence from the others which have contributed to shape our modern life; no one can now be a pure Hellene, nor, if he could, would it be desirable; but everyone should recognise the special elements with which the Hellenic ideal can ennoble and chasten the modern spirit, and these he should by all means cultivate. To do so successfully, is to educate one's sense of beauty; and to do that aright, is so far to improve one's whole nature. This lesson, taught half-mystically in the second part of *Faust*, has sometimes been obscured by what Mr Matthew Arnold called the Hebraising tendency. We remember his definition, in *Culture and Anarchy*, of Hebraism as contrasted with Hellenism. The governing idea of Hellenism is spontaneity of consciousness; that of Hebraism is strictness of conscience; both seek, in the Hebrew Apostle's words, to make us partakers

of the divine nature; but Hellenism seeks to do this through the reason, by making us see things as they are; Hebraism insists rather upon conduct and obedience. In our own country, the intellectual influence of the Renaissance was crossed, and for a time checked, by the Hebraising tendency. But, though there is a profound difference, there is no necessary antagonism, between the ideal broadly described as Hebraic, and the permanent, the essential parts of Hellenism. The Greek influence has acted upon modern life and literature even more widely as a pervading and quickening spirit than as an exemplar of form; and it has shown itself capable of co-operating, in this subtle manner, with various alien forces, so as neither to lose its own distinction, nor to infringe upon theirs. Milton illustrates this. By temperament no less than creed he is a Puritan of the higher type. Steeped though he was in classical literature, the pervading spirit of his work is at any rate not Greek; it is more akin to the Hebraic, or, when not that, to the Roman. The *Lycidas*, for instance, is a pastoral elegy on an Alexandrian Greek model; but how strangely the temper of the Hellenic original is changed when the English poet's wrath blazes forth against the corruptions of the time. He shows his own consciousness of this in reverting to his theme:

> "Return, Alpheus, the dread voice is past
> That shrunk thy streams; return, Sicilian Muse!"

The *Samson Agonistes* has the form of a Greek

drama; but its inspiration, like its subject, is far more Hebraic than Hellenic. Yet no one acquainted with the best Greek poetry can read Milton without feeling what its influence has contributed to his genius; it has helped to give him his lofty self-restraint and his serenity.

But the deepest and largest influence of Greece is not to be sought in the modern literature which treats Greek subjects or imitates Greek form; that influence works more characteristically when, having been received into the modern mind, it acts by suggestion and inspiration, breathing a grace and a power of its own into material and form of a different origin. This influence has been all-pervading in the modern world. Yet those who most appreciate the true value of Hellenism will never claim for it that, by itself, it can suffice for the needs of humanity. In the intellectual province its value is not only permanent but unique. It has furnished models of excellence which can never be superseded; by its spirit, it supplies a medicine for diseases of the modern mind, a corrective for aberrations of modern taste, a discipline, no less than a delight, for the modern imagination; since that obedience to reason which it exacts is also a return to the most gracious activities of life and nature. Of such a power, we may truly say—

> "it will never
> Pass into nothingness, but still will keep
> A bower of quiet for us, and a sleep
> Full of sweet dreams, and health, and quiet breathing."

But in the province of religion and morals Hellenism alone is not sufficient. Greek polytheism, even as ennobled by the great poets, was incapable of generating religious conceptions which could satisfy the mind and heart, or of furnishing an adequate rule for the conduct of life. These must be sought from another source. Yet there is no inherent conflict between true Hellenism and spiritualised Hebraism, such as is contained in Christianity. The distinctive quality of the best Greek literature and art, that by which it has lived and will live, is the faculty of rising from the earth into a clearer air. "The divine," says Plato in the *Phaedrus*, "is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like; by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace; but when fed upon evil, it wastes and falls away." The Greek spirit, in its noblest form, is indeed, to borrow Plato's beautiful phrase, "the power of the wing" for the human soul. The visions to which it can soar are such as that described in the *Phaedrus*, where Beauty is beheld dwelling with Modesty, in a holy place. The best Greek work in every kind is essentially pure; to conceive it as necessarily entangled with the baser elements of paganism is to confound the accidents with the essence; the accidents have passed away; the essence is imperishable.

A further claim which may be made for the best Greek work is that it is capable of acting as an intellectual tonic, and of bracing us for the battle of

life. "To pass from the study of Homer to the business of the world," says Mr Gladstone, "is to step out of a palace of enchantment into the cold grey light of a polar day. But the spells in which this enchanter deals have no affinity with that drug from Egypt which drowns the spirit in effeminate indifference; rather they are like the *φάρμακον ἐσθλόν*, the remedial specific, which, freshening the understanding by contact with the truth and strength of nature, should both improve its vigilance against deceit and danger, and increase its vigour and resolution for the discharge of duty." The tribute here rendered to Homer might be paid, with not less justice, to the classical Greek poetry as a whole. True to Aristotle's principle for art, this poetry deals with the universal,—with those elements of human character and life which are not transient or abnormal, but of interest for every age and every land.

On the high places, the *templa serena*, of Greek literature and art, those who are worn with the troubles or disturbed by the mental maladies of modern civilisation can breathe an atmosphere which, like that of Greece itself, has the freshness of the mountains and the sea. But the loneliness of Oeta or Cithaeron is not there; we have around us, on those summits, also the cheerful sympathies of human life, the pleasant greetings of the kindly human voice. The great thinkers and artists of ancient Hellas recall the words in which Aeschylus

described those kinsmen of Niobe who worshipped their ancestral deity on the mountain-heights of Mysia—

> "the seed of gods,
> Men near to Zeus; for whom on Ida burns,
> High in clear air, the altar of their sire,
> Nor hath their race yet lost the blood divine."

Humanity cannot afford to lose out of its inheritance any part of the best work which has been done for it in the past. All that is most beautiful and most instructive in Greek achievement is our permanent possession; one which can be enjoyed without detriment to those other studies which modern life demands; one which no lapse of time can make obsolete, and which no multiplication of interests can make superfluous. Each successive generation must learn from ancient Greece that which can be taught by her alone.

Through what channels, in what modes, has her teaching been most largely operative upon the world? History shows how, from the Roman age to our own, Greece has everywhere helped to educate gifted minds, from which her light has radiated in ever widening circles. It has been her privilege to elicit a sense of kinship in the finer spirits of every race, and to enter as a vitalising essence into the most varied forms of modern thought, bringing to every such alliance some distinction which no other element could have conferred. But the peculiar characteristic of this influence among us in recent years is the vast increase in the number of those

who receive it, not indirectly merely, but directly, through their own study of Greek literature and art. As regards the literature, this has been largely due to the appearance of really good translations. Through these a reader may learn to appreciate some qualities, at least, of the best Greek writers. In regard to art again, anyone whose eye has been trained to recognise the distinction of the best Greek work has learned much.

The Greek Language.

But the qualities of the Greek language are such that the difference made by a knowledge of it to one's appreciation of the literature is greater than in the case, for instance, of Latin, or German, or even of French. In these languages, of course, as in all others, very much is lost by translation; yet not so much as in Greek. The comprehension of Greek art, again, is distinctly aided by a knowledge of the Greek language, as the best archæologists would, I think, agree; and these facts follow from that general character of Greek which I must now attempt, however briefly, to describe. Compare classical Greek with its elder sister, the literary language of ancient India, and the difference is striking. Sanskrit has been the more faithful guardian of old Indo-European sounds and forms: the transparency of its structure gives it an unequalled value for students in relation to that whole family of languages. Greek attracts by a different charm.

The thought which it suggests is rather,—how wonderfully this language has achieved the purposes inherent in its own particular genius! It is an instrument which responds with happy elasticity to every demand of the Greek intellect. The forms which it has retained are light, graceful, flexible. It can express the most delicate shades of meaning with an elegant simplicity. This power is due, not only to its organic structure, but also to the tact with which words expressing the same general idea have been discriminated in its rich vocabulary. The Greek language is the earliest work of art created by the spontaneous working of the Greek mind, and it is the greatest work of Greek art which has survived. If those fragments of Greek architecture and sculpture which we so prize had come down to us without any credentials of their origin, simply as relics of an otherwise unknown race, it would not have been fantastic to conjecture that, of all the peoples recorded in history, the only one presumably capable of producing such monuments in marble was the same people whose thoughts had moulded, and whose spirit had chastened, the most perfect among the forms of human speech. The characteristic qualities of the Greek language are nowhere seen to greater advantage than in the Homeric poems, although the Homeric language has not yet fully developed certain special traits which the Attic dialect shows in perfection. We perceive in Homer how vividly this language bears the stamp of the imagination which has shaped it. The Greek saw the object of his

thought directly and clearly. His first aim in speaking was to make the expression fit the thought. When an imagination of this kind, unclouded by any haze of literary reminiscence, and free from conscious striving after effect, soars into the region of the marvellous or the ideal, it still commands the obedience of the language which it has disciplined in the field of natural observation. Consider, for instance, the preternatural elements in the *Odyssey*. The oriental art which embodied an abstract conception or a mystic dogma in some hybrid or monstrous animal shape, was merely making an effort of symbolism. The spectator may comprehend the meaning or accept the doctrine, but he does not believe in the monster. The reader of the *Odyssey*, on the other hand, who feels the persons to be real, is not robbed of his illusion when Circe changes the hero's companions into swine; or when the flesh of the Sun-god's oxen bellows on the spits; or when Poseidon petrifies the Phaeacian ship. The human verisimilitude of the whole disguises the impossibility of the details; we scarcely feel at the moment that they are impossible. But how has this effect been attained? By an imagination which, through habitual contact with what is living and real, has learned to animate fiction also with the breath of life; and which is served here also by a language so faithfully and finely moulded upon nature that, when it clothes a narrative of the miraculous, the very outlines of the garment disarm suspicion as to the form which they invest. Such is the general character of the Greek language

—a perfect organ of expression, showing essentially the same qualities which appear in the best Greek art.

A Popular Study of Greek.

We ought all to rejoice, then, in the remarkable success of a new experiment in teaching that language, which has arisen out of the work of this Society. Classes have lately been formed for the study of Greek, and students who had enjoyed no previous advantages of instruction in the language, but whose interest in it had been quickened by lectures on the literature, have shown a zeal and made a progress of which their teachers have reason to be proud. I would venture to commend this new enterprise to the sympathies of all who are interested in classical studies, or indeed in literary studies of any kind. To my thinking, it is a movement of great importance, which is very likely to mark the beginning of a time when a first-hand knowledge of Greek shall be more widely diffused. It would be a notable and fruitful result if, as these new classes seem to promise, the interest felt in the Greek language should grow into anything that could fairly be described as a popular interest,—so that considerable numbers of students, outside of our great schools and Universities, should set themselves to acquire the power of reading the Greek literature in the original. I do not think that such a hope is chimerical, in view of what has already been accom-

plished by the enthusiasm of teachers and students. Of course one cannot expect that the time should soon come when the students at these classes, in any large numbers at least, will be able to read the more difficult parts of Greek literature; though I have no doubt that some students, when once started, will advance rapidly. But we may expect, I think, that such a knowledge of Greek as enables one to read Xenophon's *Anabasis*, for instance, will be found such a pleasant and profitable acquisition that, even if the student should not see his way to going much further, he will think that his time has been well spent, and that his labour has been well rewarded. I rest this belief on the peculiar charm of the Greek language, and on the peculiar way in which this charm affects learners, almost from the beginning—as I know from my own experience. A simple illustration may help to make this plainer. There are many children to whom no toy is more delightful than a printing-press, and its fascination consists chiefly in the leaden types. The letter A, for instance, so clear-cut, so faultless, as it stands forth from its neat stem,—what a contrast it is to the same letter as scrawled by pen or pencil; it is a little work of art in itself, which appeals to the fancy of an intelligent child. And such as types are to him, such are the words of the Greek language to a sympathetic learner. The Greek words are, in themselves, so clear-cut, so beautifully moulded, that they begin to please one's artistic sense even before one has made much progress with the language. This pleasure

becomes keen so soon as one proceeds to put Greek words together—even three or four at a time—in the simplest sentences; it is like the child's pleasure in type-setting, only more varied. Therefore, for the beginner in Greek, we may always prescribe a little easy composition, it does not matter how little or how easy, if only it calls this feeling into play. For this feeling is not an illusion, which will fade in the presence of better knowledge. It is the germ of that delight in Greek which ripens with study, when the pleasure given at first by shapely words is enhanced by a perception of that symmetry and harmony, that unfailing adequacy to the lucid utterance of thought, which distinguishes the language as wielded by all its great masters, alike in verse and in prose.

I have firm faith, then, in the power of Greek to retain the interest which it has once awakened, not only for the sake of the treasures which it unlocks, but for its own sake also. And I believe that anything which tends to make the study of this language popular will be valuable in a further way. High specialisation has long ago become inevitable in every branch of knowledge. Classical philology is no exception to the rule. If a student is to know the best that has been done in even a small part of the field, he must concentrate himself thereon. But in the case of classical studies such completeness at a particular point may be purchased too dearly. These studies used to be called the "Humanities." This name expressed what is, after all, the greatest and best gift which they have to bestow. Their

highest office is to influence the character, to chasten the judgment, to illumine the understanding, and, in a word, to render their disciples more truly humane. But, in order that they should produce these effects, it is necessary that they should be approached in a spirit more comprehensive than that of the specialist who confines himself to one small part of them, and comparatively ignores the rest. It is better—for most minds at any rate—to renounce the hope of an exhaustive acquaintance with any one corner of the field, than to miss the largest benefits which the entire discipline can confer. This is what, under the conditions of modern scholarship, we are perhaps too apt to forget. But, if the study of the Greek language were to be spread over a wider area, and if a more popular interest in the classics were to spring from it, the academic tendency towards excessive specialising would be gradually tempered by more popular instincts; the classics would be, so far, recalled to their paramount function as "Humanities"; in this sense, and to this extent, the intellectual pleasures tasted by the scholars of the Renaissance would be enjoyed anew by large numbers among us, to whom the charm of Greek literature, inseparable as it is from that of the Greek language, would come with all the joy of a discovery.

But even this is not the largest issue involved. That eager acceptance of stimulating lectures on the classics which has been manifested at several great centres of population is only one symptom, though a most remarkable one, of a growing desire to know

the best literature at first hand. There is an eagerness abroad in the land to participate in those highest benefits of civilisation which are within the common rights of all mankind,—those gifts of education which may enable everyone to live a worthier life, a life of higher activities and higher enjoyments, a life in which the duties of loyal citizenship can be discharged with greater efficiency and intelligence. The strength of the University Extension movement resides in the fact that it has responded to this desire —indeed, has done much to evoke it where it was latent, and to define it where it was vague. The Universities, as representing the higher education of the country, have gone out to the people, clearly seeing that the popular desire is not for the second-best, but for the best,—only presented in forms which can be understood. All thinking persons will perceive the immense importance of such a movement to the public welfare, not merely in an educational sense, but in regard to social stability and national security. Nothing could contribute more powerfully to preserve the best things which we have inherited from our ancestors, or to warrant a confidence that the new generation will be qualified to deal in a wise and enlightened manner with the conditions and problems of their time. University Extension has created a new profession, which demands special gifts and a special training. The distinguished men in its ranks have much hard work to do, sometimes much drudgery; and they have often to encounter difficulties which only perseverance can

surmount. But they will be encouraged by the thought that they are rendering their country a great service—that they are helping to maintain the continuity of its best traditions, and to ensure that a people whose self-respect has its root in centuries of ordered freedom shall be knitted together by ties even stronger and nobler than those which united their fathers.

In conclusion, allow me to thank you for the kind patience with which you have listened to these remarks. I earnestly hope, and fully believe, that this great Society, which has already accomplished so much, will go on prospering more and more. In the field at which we have been looking to-day, it is doing a great work by enlarging the basis of those studies which are of primary importance for all literature and history. This is really to work in the Athenian spirit; and it will bring fresh honour to London—in words which a living poet applies to Athens,—

> "While this city's name on earth shall be for earth
> her mightiest name."

THE WORK OF THE UNIVERSITIES FOR THE NATION, PAST AND PRESENT[1].

THIS meeting, to which the University welcomes her visitors, not as strangers or aliens, but as members of a body united to her by common studies and sympathies, is a visible expression of that change which, during the last thirty years, has been passing over the relations between the ancient Universities of England and the country. They are no longer content to be only, in the strict sense of the phrase, seats of learning; they now desire to be also mother-cities of intellectual colonies, and to spread the influence of their teaching throughout the land. It is indeed instructive to contrast this impulse with that feeling with which we meet in earlier ages, that any addition to the number of centres at which a higher education could be obtained was a menace to academic monopoly. In mediaeval times, when a body of Cambridge students withdrew to Northampton, Henry III., who had at first regarded the movement as likely to benefit the town to which they went, was presently induced to condemn it, as an infringement of privilege else-

[1] Cambridge University Local Lectures; Fourth Summer Meeting: The Inaugural Lecture delivered at the Guildhall, Cambridge, July 29, 1893.

where; and when Oxford students migrated to Stamford, they were peremptorily recalled by Edward III. In the days of the Commonwealth, the Master of Caius College, William Dell, proposed that the studies of Oxford and Cambridge should be established also in the large towns of the west and north: the scheme was rejected, however, for a reason which, though valid at the time, was precisely opposite to that which in our own day has recommended University Extension; it was held that such a measure would tend to diminish the influence of the Universities. The modern developments of railway travelling were necessary to render Extension, as we understand it, even possible; but, before the opportunity could be used, something more vital was required,—the rise of a new spirit.

And this suggests that it may be not uninteresting to consider how far, and in what sense, that spirit is new; what, in the past, has been the attitude of the Universities towards the nation; and how far, at different periods, they have performed a national work. This is the subject with which I shall attempt, however slightly and imperfectly, to deal. It is scarcely necessary to observe that the sketch must be confined to salient points.

Rise of Universities in Europe.

The Universities of Europe sprang from a spontaneous and enthusiastic desire for knowledge. During the dark ages, from the fall of the Western Empire to the eleventh century, such education as existed was given in the schools attached to monasteries and cathedrals. Though some outlines of

pagan literature were preserved, the subjects taught were mainly such as formed a direct preparation for the calling of the priest or the monk. Towards the end of this period, new studies began to press for recognition, partly through the stimulus given to Europe by contact with the more civilised East, a result to which the Crusades contributed. The practical studies of Medicine and of Law became more extended. The rudiments of physical science, and some branches of Mathematics, came more clearly into view. At the beginning of the twelfth century, the study of Dialectic, based on parts of the Aristotelian Logic, received a notable impulse. Its claim rested not only on its intrinsic value as a mental discipline, but upon its assumed relation to Theology. A belief was diffused, which some famous controversies of the time had strengthened, that spiritual truth could not be rightly apprehended except through certain forms of reasoning. This conception was the basis of what was afterwards known as the scholastic philosophy. Scholasticism began by dealing with certain problems of the Aristotelian Logic (or what passed for such), and then applied its processes to Theology. The task which it ultimately undertook was that of reconciling the doctrines of the Church with human reason. This explains why, in the middle age, Dialectic was regarded as the paramount science, the highest which could engage man's intellect; since it was not only the handmaid of Theology, but in a certain sense the key to it.

The scholastic philosophy.

The question now was, where could these new subjects be adequately studied? The ordinary range of instruction in the monastic and cathedral schools was too narrow to admit them. A few religious houses there were, doubtless, in which churchmen of exceptional gifts and attainments responded in some measure to the new desire; but these were inadequate to satisfy the wants of the age. Associations began to be formed, specially devoted to purposes of study. Such an association was commonly designated by one of two names; *Studium Generale*, meaning a place of study not merely local, but open to all comers; or *Universitas*, a corporation or guild, implying that teachers and learners formed a definitely incorporated body. The term *Universitas* being a general one, this special sense of it was defined by some addition; we find such phrases as *Universitas Magistrorum et scholarium*, a corporation of masters and scholars; or *Universitas literaria*. It was not probably till the close of the fourteenth century that the word *Universitas* came to be commonly used alone, in the sense of "University."

Studium Generale and *Universitas.*

The earliest example of such a body dates from a time antecedent to the general awakening of the European mind, and is associated with the most indispensable of the practical sciences. The school of Medicine at Salerno in Southern Italy can be traced to the ninth century. But the twelfth century is that in which the first great Universities of Europe take their rise. Two of these are respectively typical

of different tendencies in the higher teaching of the age. The University of Paris became the great school of Dialectic and Theology: it represents especially the desire for a general mental training, with a speculative bent. The University of Bologna, famous for the study of the civil and canon law, gave the foremost place to the idea of a professional training, with a definite practical aim.

Paris.

Bologna.

Paris was the model upon which the English Universities were founded. Before the end of the twelfth century, Giraldus Cambrensis could describe Oxford as the place "where the clergy in England chiefly flourished, and excelled in clerkly lore." The earliest history of our own University is more obscure; but it, too, probably had its origin in the twelfth century, in connection with teaching carried on by the canons of the Church of St Giles; and in 1209 we hear of some students migrating from Oxford to Cambridge. But it is not until we come to the era of the earliest Cambridge Colleges that there is any full or clear light. Throughout the middle age, Oxford was the representative University of England; and not only that, but at one time the rival, and in some respects the superior, of Paris. There are, however, indications enough to show that the development of mediaeval Cambridge was following the same general course.

The English Universities.

The first period which we may take in the history of the English Universities starts from the time when they begin to have a distinct influence on the national life,—viz., from the early part of the

First period: from about 1216 to 1350 A.D.

thirteenth century,—and goes down to about the middle of the fourteenth. It answers roughly to the reigns of Henry III. and the first two Edwards, with the first half or so of Edward III.'s. This was the golden age of the scholastic philosophy. At this period Oxford produced a series of famous schoolmen, among whom Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam are only some of the most prominent,—doctors celebrated throughout Christendom. Nor were the studies confined to scholasticism, though that was in the foreground; all other knowledge that the age possessed was pursued with ardour. Never since, perhaps, has any seat of learning given proofs of a more eager or varied activity than is attested by this long succession of brilliant Oxonians, many of whom were Franciscans. At this time the English Universities represented the best intellect and the highest knowledge that existed in the country. All men who cared for mental cultivation at all looked to them as the centres of education. Their attractive power was the more widely felt because the Church then offered the most varied avenues to advancement in life; indeed, there was no other road to it, except a military career. Many of us, perhaps, when we look back upon the mediaeval University, might be apt to think that after all it had little but the name in common with the University of to-day. In one sense, of course, this is true. An impassable gulf divides them in respect to material surroundings, to aims and methods of study, to the whole fabric of

Oxford.

The Universities really national.

government and society. But, if we revert to the idea in which Universities had their origin, we find that the English University of the thirteenth century fulfilled the essence of it; it possessed the highest culture of the age; and it was recognised by the nation as the exponent of that culture.

This position rested primarily on the dominance of the scholastic philosophy, which, in turn, presupposed the unity of Christendom. It is no paradox to say that, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it was necessary for a University to be international before it could be worthily national. Its rank depended on the eminence of its teachers in studies which were acknowledged as paramount throughout Europe, and which were pursued in the common language of learning, the Latin. At Paris this cosmopolitan character appears in the four "nations" of that University, the French, the Norman, the Picard, and the English. At Oxford and Cambridge there were only two nations representing respectively the North and the South of England; but we hear of students from Paris migrating to both our Universities; and the number of foreign students, especially at Oxford, must at one time have been considerable.

From 1350 to 1500 A.D.

With the second half of the fourteenth century, however, we enter upon a new period of our academic annals, in the course of which the attitude of the Universities towards the nation was gradually but profoundly changed. This stage may be roughly defined as extending from about 1350 to 1500.

Decay of Scholasticism.

The first great fact which meets us here is the incipient decay of the scholastic philosophy. It declined, not because any formidable rival had appeared in the field of intellectual interests, but because the age was slowly coming to perceive that scholasticism had failed in the sublime task which had inspired the dreams of its youthful ambition. It had not succeeded in reconciling the doctrines of the Church with human reason. The extraordinary enthusiasm and devotion which it had so long commanded sprang from the belief that, in the domain of knowledge, this philosophy was a sort of counterpart to the Holy Roman Empire in the sphere of government, and that, as the Emperor was in the old phrase the "advocate" of the Church, so the cultivation of the intellect reached its climax in those studies where the Dialectic bequeathed by Greece became the secular arm of Theology. But theologians from one point of view, and logicians from another, came to see that the alliance had broken down; semi-mysticism on the one part, inchoate scepticism on the other, became the refuge of disappointment. And, when the scholastic philosophy was once separated from its loftiest purpose, what was it? An armoury of slowly rusting weapons, which could no more do service in the greatest of the causes for which they had been elaborated. The weary guardians of the armoury might shift the places of those weapons on the dusty walls, and make some show of keeping them decently keen and bright; but they could not feel the joyous

energy of the soldier who had sharpened and burnished them for battle. Long afterwards, Erasmus expressed what the fourteenth century had already begun to feel, when, asking how Christendom was to set about converting Turks, he said—"Shall we put into their hands an Occam, a Durandus, a Scotus, a Gabriel, or an Alvarus? What will they think of us, when they hear of our perplexed subtleties about Instants, Formalities, Quiddities, and Relations?" Considered merely as an instrument of mental discipline, the scholastic philosophy had done good work for the age in which it arose; it has left, indeed, an abiding mark on the language and the thought of Europe; but it was now passing into a system of lifeless formulas and mechanical exercises. Thus the Universities were losing—slowly but surely—that which had once been their sovereign attraction. And at the same time they were denied an outlet for new activities. Wyclif's gallant struggle at Oxford was defeated. His death in 1384 marks a turning-point. Religious freedom was suppressed, but at the cost of intellectual life. The crusade against Lollardism introduced an age of torpor and sterility at the Universities. Indeed, the Latin philosophy was gradually silencing itself. And a decided divorce between the Universities and the nation was now setting in. The laity felt less interest in the paralysed studies of the academic schools, which were tending to become little more than clerical seminaries. The numbers of the students were dwindling. Already the study of Medicine was

withdrawing to the large towns; the study of Law was dropping off to the Inns of Court. It is also a significant circumstance that the second half of the fourteenth century coincides with an advance in the literary use of the English language, as represented by Chaucer and Gower, and by Wyclif himself. This fact does not in itself imply any antagonism to the Universities, but it reminds us that a national literature was now growing which was independent of their influence.

Rise of the Colleges.

Thus far we have contemplated what may be called the negative side of the period from 1350 to 1500. The Universities were beginning to lose their hold upon the nation; their old mental life was failing. But there is another side to this period, and one which gives it a strong claim upon our interest. This was the era at which the power of the Colleges was slowly rising. Of our seventeen Cambridge Colleges, only one was founded before 1300, and only three were founded after 1550. At Oxford, three Colleges arose before 1300; and though a larger number of foundations than here came after 1550, still we may say that, at both Universities, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries form the period during which the power of the Colleges was chiefly consolidated. The general intention of the earliest Colleges was that they should be boarding-houses, with a discipline so organised that the inmates should lead a studious and decorous life,—special provision being made for those who required pecuniary aid. Many Colleges

were designed more especially for the secular clergy, as the monastic and mendicant orders were already so amply endowed. We must remember that the multitude of students at a mediaeval University was a fluctuating and often turbulent mass. The great value of the Collegiate system, when it first came in, lay not so much in the pecuniary assistance which it gave, as in the security which it afforded for discipline and good order. It was an element of permanence and cohesion for the whole academic body. The teaching function, it may be added, did not belong to the original idea of a College, except in so far as the older residents might be expected to aid or guide the studies of the younger; a College teaching-staff was a later development, due to the altered status of the University schools.

The new classical learning:

While the Universities, as such, long continued to be identified with the moribund scholasticism, the Colleges, from the fifteenth century onwards, were more especially identified with the new learning,—with the classical revival. At the time of Wyclif's death, that revival was passing, in Italy, through its earliest phase, under the immediate followers of Petrarch, who felt the new delight of discovery. In the first half of the fifteenth century, the groups gathered around Cosmo de' Medici at Florence, or Nicholas V. at Rome, were busied in arranging the discovered materials; and before 1500 criticism had been carried further, chiefly by Italian societies and academies. In due time this new humanism spread to England. But we observe a striking difference

its advent, compared with that of scholasticism.

between the conditions under which this movement reached us, and those which had surrounded the advent of its great predecessor, the scholastic philosophy, in the twelfth century. That philosophy had hardly begun its course when, owing to the intervention of the Dominicans and Franciscans, it was enabled to advance under the banners of the Church. No equivalent patronage protected or encouraged the first endeavours of our English humanists. It was not until the middle of Henry VIII.'s reign that the humanities began to enjoy the doubtful advantage of official favour; and then the classical muse might already have responded—if only she had dared—in the tone of Dr Johnson's reply to the tardy civilities of Lord Chesterfield. The restored classical learning was planted in England by the enterprise and zeal of a few individuals, such as that series of Hellenists whom Oxford can show at the close of the fifteenth century,—Selling, Lilly, Grocyn, Latimer, Linacre; such as Cambridge, again, produced in the immediately subsequent period,—Richard Croke, Thomas Smith, and that able scholar, whom Ascham and Milton commemorate, Sir John Cheke. The Colleges sheltered most of those who brought the new learning into England. These foundations afforded opportunities for private study,—and it must be recollected that the new learning, Greek especially, carried the suspicion of heresy;—they also facilitated foreign travel, which was then almost indispensable for the purpose. But the classics,

Oxford and Cambridge Hellenists.

though the circle of those interested in them became continually larger, could not exercise such a widespread or popular influence as once belonged to the old mediaeval studies. The strongholds of humanism, again, the Colleges,—as their permanent character, their wealth, and the ability of their administrators gradually made them predominant,—represented an aristocratic or at least oligarchic agency, engrafted upon the once democratic existence of the mediaeval University. Thus, in the second half of the fifteenth century, internal causes were tending to detach the Universities from the general life of the nation, while at the same time the number of other interests and careers was expanding.

The Colleges.

The early years of the sixteenth century are made memorable for Cambridge by the residence here of Erasmus, from the end of 1510 to the end of 1513. In his earlier stay at Oxford, he had enjoyed most congenial and instructive friendships; but here, at least, he did some of his ripest and hardest work,—kindling the minds of disciples, too, who carried on the tradition. It was in the old tower of Queens' College that he completed a collation of the Greek text of the New Testament; and four years later his edition—the first ever published—appeared at Basle. It was in this University, and in the years just after the visit of Erasmus, that the Reformation had its English birth. It was a time, too, when Cambridge men were zealously continuing those classical studies in which the Hellenists of Oxford had been pioneers. It is

Erasmus.

The Reformation.

Cambridge in 1520 A.D.

interesting to recall what Erasmus wrote in 1520 to Everard, the Stadtholder of Holland: "Theology is flourishing at Paris and at Cambridge as nowhere else; and why? Because they are adapting themselves to the tendencies of the age; because the new studies, which are ready, if need be, to storm an entrance, are not repelled by them as foes, but received as welcome guests." John Skelton was even moved to satirise the zeal for Greek which prevailed at Cambridge in 1521.

But this fair promise was too soon overclouded. A time of unrest and anxiety was at hand. Poverty and discontent, legacies from the past century, were wide-spread in the land; the Church was wealthy,

Danger of the Universities.

and powerless to defend its wealth; the Universities were identified, in the public eye, with the Church, and, like it, were in danger of spoliation. Oxford and Cambridge were glad to have Wolsey's protection; and after his fall, it was of vital moment to them to win the favour of the king. The king did indeed stand their friend: when courtiers urged that the Universities should be plundered, he declared that he judged no land in England better bestowed than that which was devoted to the uses of learning. But in return he exacted submission to his will. The visitation of the Universities by Thomas

Royal Injunctions of 1535.

Cromwell's Commissioners took place in 1535, when the Royal Injunctions were issued. They imposed the acceptance of the royal supremacy, abolishing the lectures and degrees in the canon law. They prescribed the study of Latin and

Greek, and of the Old and New Testaments, to the exclusion of the old scholastic text-books. These Injunctions may indeed be regarded as formally marking the fall of scholasticism. They constitute an official boundary-line between the mediaeval learning and the new.

The years 1535—1559.

But the reform failed to bear good fruit. During the years from 1535 to Mary's death in 1559 the Universities were at a low ebb. At first, no doubt, the level of their work seemed to be rising. But Henry had narrowly circumscribed their intellectual freedom; they were suffering from poverty; and they were distracted by all the fierce controversies of the time. A mischief of a new kind had also crept in. After the expulsion of the religious orders, youths of the richer classes began once more to frequent the Universities, as their parents had no longer to fear the influence of monk or friar. Thus in 1549 Latimer said, referring to Cambridge, "There be none now but great men's sons in College, and their fathers look not to have them preachers." Academic corruption followed. Roger Ascham says, "Talent, learning, poverty and discretion all went for nothing..., when interest, favour, and letters from the great exerted their pressure from without." Perhaps the Universities were never less truly national than in those years.

Elizabethan age (1559—1603).

Elizabeth's reign opened a new era. Not that it was a brilliant period in academic studies. With the partial exception of Theology, no branch of learning was really flourishing at the ancient seats. However,

a decided change came about in the general position of the Universities. For two centuries, they had been more or less isolated; and the internal forces which shaped them had been mainly ecclesiastical. These conditions were now sensibly modified. Elizabeth, whose gifts and attainments disposed her to appear as a patroness of letters, showed much favour to the Universities. In the year of Shakespeare's birth (1564) she made a visit of five days to Cambridge, and not long afterwards bestowed a like honour upon Oxford. By these and similar acts she increased the social prestige of the Universities. Now, too, they came into closer contact with the life of the capital. In London there was a world of letters which, though it received many recruits from Oxford and Cambridge, was by no means academic in character. A stream of popular literature now began to flow from London to the Universities. Frequent intercourse sprang up between University students and the town wits, and was promoted by the fact that University men were continually passing into the ranks of the Inns of Court. It may be conjectured that the results were not altogether good for academic discipline; but there was some real gain in the literary impulse given to the Universities. It was also better that they should be drawn more into the currents of a wider and fuller life, even though those currents were sometimes turbid, than they should remain in isolation. Elizabeth's reign was a time in which the Universities were tending to acquire a certain

character of exclusiveness,—not, indeed, in any very narrow sense, but relatively to the nation at large. On the other hand it was certainly a time when they resumed something of their old relations with a world larger and more varied than their own.

The 17th century.

At the opening of the seventeenth century we find the Universities enjoying, under James I., a continuance of royal favour. But they were not prospering as seats of learning. Much as James relished theological disputations and College plays, his first object in regard to Oxford and Cambridge was that they should uphold the royal supremacy in matters of religious belief. Under all the Stuart monarchs the case was the same; the first thing asked of Oxford and Cambridge was that they should inculcate sound doctrines in Church and State: their condition in respect of learning was a secondary matter. In the Great Rebellion both the Universities were royalist; and the Barebones Parliament once discussed the propriety of suppressing them altogether. Milder counsels prevailed, and under the Protectorate it was resolved that "the Universities and schools shall be so countenanced and reformed as that they may become the nurseries of piety and learning." Shortly afterwards, however, a more rigorous plan was mooted,—viz., that the number of Colleges in each University should be cut down to three, answering respectively to the faculties of Divinity, Law, and Physic. The Restoration quickly averted that peril; and the Revolution, in its turn, delivered the Universities

from those strained exercises of royal prerogative in which the last two Stuart kings occasionally indulged. Certainly the seventeenth century was not one in which it could be expected that the average level of academic life should be a high one. And yet, throughout that century, the two old seats of learning were producing a long series of men whose intellectual achievements in various fields are among the chief glories of England. It may be hard to say what exact share of credit is due, in any of these cases, to the *Alma Mater*; but it is reasonable to believe that in no instance can her influence have been wholly sterile. Cambridge can point to such names as those of Bacon, William Harvey, Milton, Barrow, Newton, Bentley; then there are the Oxford and Cambridge divines who bore part in the Authorised Version of the Bible, or helped to build up the standard Anglican theology; the Oxford group who founded the Royal Society; the Cambridge Platonists, who sought, in a spirit very different from that of the schoolmen, to reconcile religion with philosophy and science, to soften the strife of sects, and to bring out the essential things of Christianity. When one looks back on that century as a whole,—on the turmoils and contrasts of its outer life, and on the results of its mental activity,—one is inclined to apply the old Greek saying to our academic commonwealths; "It is not the walls that make the city, but the men."

The 18th century.

The age which came next has usually been regarded as that in which the English Universities

were least alive to their national duties and responsibilities. I shall not attempt to offer a defence for the academic shortcomings of the eighteenth century. But, if the censure is not to be too sweeping, it is well to observe certain points. First—we should remember that those studies which Universities seek to foster cannot really thrive unless they are animated by at least some touch of ardour, some spark of a generous enthusiasm. They are sensitive to the atmosphere about them, and are apt to be chilled by a surrounding apathy. The eighteenth century, correct, judicious, observant of measure and obedient to common sense, gave little encouragement to large aspirations or lofty ideals. These, however, are the breath of life to young students, and most of all to the best. Never, perhaps, did scholars work with greater intensity than the great schoolmen of the thirteenth century;—Duns Scotus, for instance, dying, it is said, at thirty-four, left the equivalent of thirteen printed folios;—and they could do so, because the ideal before them was so grand. The eighteenth century was in this respect at the opposite pole from the thirteenth. There was little in it to feed the sacred fire. If the Universities were torpid, their fault was at least so far the less, that they were breathing an unfavourable air. In the next place, it should be noted that the torpor was not unbroken or universal. Like the heroes in the battles of the Iliad, the two Universities have their respective moments of pre-eminence; and in regard to the

eighteenth century, an impartial inquirer will conclude, I think, that Cambridge, though very far from blameless, held some advantage. There were two principal reasons for this. First, that century opened here with a period during which Bentley and Newton were giving a powerful impulse to studies old and new. Chairs of Astronomy, Anatomy, Geology, and Botany were founded between 1702 and 1727. Secondly, there was at least one study, that of Mathematics, which was pursued here with real industry and success during at least the second half of the century; when a great improvement was also effected in the tests of mathematical attainment. Yet it is not to be denied that, on the whole, both Universities then fell far short of any standard which could be deemed worthy of their position; nor is it a sufficient plea that, during the eighteenth century, they can claim so many sons distinguished in letters, science, or active careers.

Early part of this century.

Institutions are seldom at their worst when the outcry against them is loudest. Before public opinion reaches the point which threatens interference from without, conscience and prudence usually make themselves heard within. During the first third of this century, steps were taken at both the Universities to improve the quality and enlarge the scope of their work; and if these steps did not go very far, at least they were laudable in their way. Meanwhile the voice of censure, which had been almost silent in the eighteenth century, became more importunate. Its tone was such as we find in these words of

Dugald Stewart, which were pointed especially at the English Universities :—"The academical establishments of some parts of Europe," he said, "are not without their use to the historian of the human mind. Immovably moored to the same station by the strength of their cables and the weight of their anchors, they enable him to measure the rapidity of the current by which the rest of mankind is borne along." The time of the first Reform Bill is that at which the unpopularity of Oxford and Cambridge began to be general. In a series of articles contributed to the "Edinburgh Review," Sir William Hamilton framed an indictment against them which attracted much attention. Within the Universities themselves, the more active minds were fully alive to the necessity for further improvement. Foremost among these was Adam Sedgwick, whose "Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge" appeared in 1833. A Cambridge graduate who published in 1836 a letter[1] on the "Condition, Abuses, and Capabilities of the National Universities," remarks that, if he ventures to point out defects, he will be asked "whether he wishes that our youth should be better educated than Bacon, Locke, and Newton"; but he makes it clear that his own opinions were shared by many Cambridge residents. To foreign observers the peril of our academic situation was equally manifest. Huber, a Professor at Marburg, published his History of the

The demand for reform.

[1] It will be found in a volume of "Tracts" in the University Library, Bb. 26, 33.

English Universities in 1839. He was a lenient judge; sometimes even too lenient. But he recognises the existence of a hostile feeling against Oxford and Cambridge, which is proclaimed, he says, "in every variety of tone and manner, and from the most different quarters."

The two chief defects.

Let us note the causes of this feeling. First, there had been, since the seventeenth century, a great expansion in science and literature, with which the Universities had not kept pace. They no longer adequately represented the knowledge of the age, or the best intellect of the nation. Secondly, the instruction which they did give—and in some subjects it was better than it had ever been before—was virtually limited to certain classes of society, defined partly by wealth, and partly by religious opinion. That moment was the earliest at which it had become apparent to the country at large that, in both these senses, the Universities failed to be national. And the perception was quickened by the new democratic tendencies.

A German criticism:

It is curious to observe what Huber—a friendly critic—regarded as the one tenable ground of defence. He says, in effect: "The end for which the English Universities have long existed has not been to form learned men, or able professional men, or State Officials, as our German Universities do; it has been to produce that first and most distinctive flower of English national life, an English gentleman; a product to which we on the Continent have nothing really similar; the nearest approach to it

is a Castilian *caballero*." No doubt there were many people in England—men inspired with a lofty idea of what a University ought to be—who, when they read those words of the German historian, felt in them a severe, though unconscious irony. And yet, if we wish to be quite just to the work which the Universities did for the nation from 1600 to 1850, we are bound to recognise the element of truth which Huber's remark contains. Seats of education, which for centuries have existed in the midst of a vigorous people, can never be colourless embodiments of a desire for knowledge; they are necessarily influenced, in different ways at different periods, by the national genius of that people. And it belongs to the genius of the English people—in modern days at any rate—to value character more than intellect, and ability more than learning. Hence there have long been currents of influence, bearing on the Universities from outside, which have tended to a sort of compromise between the function proper to a University and that function of social education which can also be performed by a good regiment, or by any other society in which young men act and react upon each other under the two-fold sway of a public opinion controlled by themselves and a discipline above them. When allowance has been made for all shortcomings, it must be granted that the English Universities have not only rendered great services to learning and science, but have

how far true.

Bent of the English genius.

also done good work for the nation by forming characters in which at least some measure of liberal education has been combined with manliness.

Reforms since 1850.

That, however, is no longer the only ground upon which they can claim to be national. The successive reforms which have been accomplished since 1850 have been directed to remedying or mitigating the two principal defects, narrowness of study, and narrowness of social operation. The range of studies has been immensely enlarged; and though much remains to be done, it may be said of both Universities that at no previous time have they been the seats of intellectual work at once so highly organised and so varied. Within the last twenty-five years, too, their doors have been opened to whole classes of the community against which they were once closed.

Attitude towards national education.

But the historian of the future will see something still more distinctive of our time in the spirit which has moved the Universities to take up a new position in regard to national education beyond their own precincts. In the course of the thirty-five years

Local Examinations.

since the Local Examinations were established, the Universities have done much towards elevating and organising secondary education in the schools concerned, and have thus contributed something, at least, towards supplying what is still the chief need in our educational system. Larger and more fruitful

The Extension movement.

still has been the working of that later but essentially kindred movement which, twenty years ago, this

University, moved by Mr James Stuart, had the honour of initiating, and which both the old Universities, in alliance with younger but vigorous agencies, are now prosecuting in generous emulation. To an audience such as this, comprising many of those whose untiring energy and distinguished ability have made University Extension what it is—comprising, as it also does, a yet larger number of those who have tasted the benefits of the movement—it is superfluous to speak in detail of conditions, methods, and results with which none are so intimately acquainted as themselves. Looking at the movement in its broad aspects, we see that the missionary enterprise of the Universities is imparting a new stimulus to the country, and is labouring to satisfy the demand which has been recognised or created. No task can be more patriotic than that of knitting the whole community together by common mental associations and enjoyments. "Surely as Nature createth brotherhood in families," said Bacon, "so in like manner there cannot but be fraternity in learning and illuminations." But the benefits are not all upon one side. If the Universities give, they also receive. Many of their ablest men, the leaders and workers in this movement, testify that they have learned lessons which could have been acquired in no other way. The Universities themselves, as we venture to hope, are gradually winning a place in the affections of the country which must needs be the best of incentives to good work.

The present need.

The great object now is to place University Extension on a more permanent and systematic basis. The difficulty is simply want of funds. The Universities, as such, are far from rich, relatively to the claims upon them; and if farther financial aid is to come from an academic source, it is to be looked for rather in the following of that admirable example which has been set by more than one College. The case for aid from the State is a strong one, and has been stated more than once with a force to which nothing can be added. It has been pointed out that the State spends three millions a year on Elementary Education, and that a small grant—say £5000 a year—to University Extension,—a grant which might in the first instance be temporary and tentative,—would greatly increase the value of the return which the country obtains for the larger expenditure. Elementary instruction, unless crowned by something higher, is not only barren, but may even be dangerous. It is not well to teach our democracy to read, unless we also teach it to think. The County Councils' grants go at present to one side of the movement only,—the technical and scientific; and, far from weakening the argument for some further State aid, they really strengthen it. Such thoughts naturally occur to the mind at such a gathering as this; but no uncertainty which may hang over the future can diminish the feelings of gratification at past success, and of good augury for further development, which such an occasion is fitted to inspire.

In conclusion, I would only venture to express the earnest hope that this summer meeting may prove no unworthy successor, in every benefit and enjoyment which such an experience can afford, to the meetings which have preceded it; and that our visitors, whom the University so warmly welcomes, may find here, in the temporary home of their studies, something of that mysterious influence which nowhere does its spiriting more gently than in a venerable seat of learning,—the genius of the place. True it is that in these ancient courts and halls, in the cloisters and the gardens, the charm which one feels is inseparably blended with a certain strain of melancholy. How often, in the long course of the centuries, have these haunts been associated, not only with the efforts which triumphed and the labours which bore lasting fruit, but also with the lost causes and the impossible loyalties, with the theories which were overthrown, with the visions which faded, with the brave and patient endeavours which ended in failure and defeat! Nevertheless, this place speaks to us of a corporate intellectual life which has been continuous; not always, indeed, free from the incubus of superstition or the heavy hand of external despotism; not always exempt from a depressing lethargy within; yet always preserving some secret spring of recuperative vigour, and thus linking the present with the past by a tradition which has in a great measure run parallel with the fortunes of England. And now, when these scenes, so dear to those whose life is passed among them,

are animated by the presence of visitors who have already experienced the influences which Cambridge fosters, there is no one here who will not feel that the familiar features of our old academic home have a light upon them which our fathers never saw,—the light kindled by this new and living sympathy between the Universities and the nation.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE MASON COLLEGE[1].

When the Council of this College did me the honour of inviting me to give the Inaugural Address to-day, I understood that, as on similar occasions in recent years attention has been directed to those studies in Science which justly hold so great a place here, in the present instance it might be considered appropriate to touch upon the literary side of educational work, and in particular on the study of the classics. It is, indeed, only on such a view that I could have any claim to the indulgence of this distinguished audience, and it affords an opportunity which is all the more welcome, because I am well aware how sound and excellent is the teaching enjoyed by the students of that subject at Mason College.

I propose to consider how classical studies have been affected by the general tendencies of the nineteenth century in literature and art; and what is their present position.

Change in the position of classical studies since 1800.

[1] At the Annual Meeting for the Distribution of Prizes, Oct. 9, 1893.

At the beginning of the century those studies, as pursued in our Schools and Universities, rested on a tradition, dating from the sixteenth century, which had never been effectively challenged, even by those whom it failed to satisfy. And yet the humanities, salutary as their influence had been in the higher education, powerful as they had been in helping to shape individual minds and characters, did not then possess much hold on the literary and intellectual life of the country at large. Even among those who had profited most by them, there were perhaps few who, if they had been called upon to defend the humanistic tradition, could have done so in a manner which we should now regard as adequate. At the present day, on the other hand, the classics share the domain of liberal culture with a large number of other subjects whose importance is universally recognised; controversies have raged around them; but at any rate, wherever classical studies are carried to an advanced point, the students can now give good reasons for their faith. That spirit which the classics embody now animates the higher literature of the country to a greater extent than at any previous time in the history of English letters. Moreover, an intelligent interest in the great masterpieces of ancient literature and art is far more widely diffused than it ever was before in England.

Tendencies of this century in literature.

It is worth while to trace, however briefly, the process by which this change has been effected. The latter part of the eighteenth century was the

time at which the distinctive qualities of the old Greek genius began to be truly appreciated by moderns: this was due chiefly to such men as Lessing and Winckelmann in the province of art, to Goethe and Schiller in literature. Meanwhile the Romantic school had arisen, seeking an ideal, but recoiling from the Latin classicism hitherto prevalent, and seeking refuge in the middle ages. The Romanticists had little sympathy with the Greek desire for light and clearness; they were more inclined to be mystical; mediaeval art as inspired by Catholicism, and national legend with its chivalrous or magical lore, gave them their favourite material. With us in England, at the beginning of the century, the Romantic school was dominant. Walter Scott's mighty genius showed from the first its native affinity with romance: when he was a youth at the University of Edinburgh, he could not be induced to learn Greek; but he learned Italian, and maintained that Ariosto was better than Homer. Towards the end of his life, when he went to Italy, he showed no interest in the classical antiquities; but delighted in Malta as associated with the Knights of St John. Scott remains the most signal embodiment in our literature of the romantic, as contrasted with the classical, tendency. Then came Byron, a force too individual and too volcanic to be described under the name of a school, but making, on the whole, for romanticism; identified, in his last years, with Greece, and masterly in his description of its natural beauties,

but not in harmony with the mind of its ancient people:

> "He taught us little; but our soul
> Had *felt* him like the thunder's roll."

The most gifted Englishmen of that period who were really in sympathy with the old Greek genius had no influence in England. Shelley, as might have been expected, was keenly alive to the beauty of Greek literature; he translated Plato's *Symposium*, and a blending of Plato with Dante may be felt in his *Epipsychidion*; though, when he followed the outlines of Greek form, as in the *Prometheus Unbound* and the *Adonais*, he wholly transmuted the spirit of his models. Keats, again, was in much a Greek by instinct, though his style was usually less classical than romantic. Walter Savage Landor, born seventeen years before Shelley and twenty before Keats, continued to be active long after those short lives were closed; in his exquisite prose he is a conscious artist, working in the spirit of the classical masters. But these men, and such as these, appealed in their own day only to a few. In the earlier part of this century there arose no new popular force in English literature tending to diffuse a recognition of those merits and charms which belong to the classical ideal. Take, for instance, two great writers who present a sufficiently strong contrast to each other, Carlyle and Macaulay; Carlyle, both in cast of thought and in form, is anti-classical; while Macaulay, with his intimate knowledge of the classics, his ardent love of them,

Shelley.

Landor.

Carlyle.

Macaulay.

and his mastery of a brilliant style, does not exhibit those particular qualities and charms which are distinctive of the best classical prose. John Henry Newman, whose scholarship, in Greek at least, was not equal to Macaulay's, exhibits them in an eminent degree; reminding us that for their happy manifestation a certain spiritual element is requisite, a certain tone of the whole mind and character.

A more living interest in classical antiquity.

A new current set in soon after the middle of the century, when a more living interest in classical antiquity began to be felt, outside of scholastic and academic circles, by the cultivated portion of the English public generally. It was in the province of history, I think, rather than of literature, that this new current first became perceptible. Dr Arnold, in his teaching at Rugby, had already prepared it among a select few; but if one were to specify any single book as marking the commencement of its wider influence, one might perhaps name Grote's History of Greece. Grote had the advantage, not a small one for this purpose, of being not only a scholar, but a man of affairs; the British public was the better inclined to him on that account; and one of his achievements, due especially to his treatment of Athens, was to invest ancient Greece with a modern interest. That good work was carried on by the lamented Mr Freeman, ever insisting, as he did, on the unity of history, and emphasising the fact that the story begun by Herodotus and Thucydides should be followed up in Polybius and Finlay.

Grote.

Freeman.

Purely literary forces.

Meanwhile purely literary forces were tending to create a more appreciative sympathy with classical literature. Among these the foremost place must be given to the influence of Tennyson; not only when it is direct, in the series of his poems on classical themes, but as it operates generally by his artistic perfection of form, which is always, in spirit, classical. In this large sense he has been, for our age, the most powerful poetical mediator between the antique masters and the English-speaking world. And there is another poet, one whom those who love him will not fear to call great, whose effectiveness in this way can be deemed second only to the late Laureate's,—I mean Matthew Arnold. His influence, inevitably less popular, quickened the perceptions of a comparatively limited public, yet one which included not a few of those by whom literary opinion is gradually moulded. This is not the time to estimate all that Matthew Arnold did for Hellenism; but, as we know, he wrought in two ways; by example, in his own exquisite poetry; and by precept, as in his lectures on translating Homer, and generally in his critical essays. Robert Browning had less of native sympathy with the classical spirit than is shown by his gifted wife; his normal style is far from classical; but his marvellous wealth of poetical thought is seen in "Balaustion's Adventure," the new garb in which he has clothed the "Alcestis" of Euripides; and in that "Apology," so instinct with modern subtlety, which he puts into the mouth of

Tennyson.

Matthew Arnold.

Robert Browning.

Aristophanes. Nor should it be overlooked that all Browning's work has one element of kinship, unconscious but important, with the Greek; pervaded, as it is, by an intense vitality, it is always a voice of life; it has more affinity with the spoken word than with the written. There are living poets and prose-writers who have also contributed, by various gifts, to the comprehension of ancient thought and beauty; but I am compelled to be brief; and the names of some of them will at once occur to you. I need only add that, within the last thirty or forty years, we have seen the growth of a literature tending to popularise, without vulgarising, the classics; addressed, that is, not only to scholars, but to cultivated readers generally; such books, for instance, as those of the late Mr J. A. Symonds, and the late Professor Sellar. We have had, too, a number of good English translations; in the forefront of which stands that beautiful work, a memorial of one whom so many pupils and friends are mourning, through which Professor Jowett has made Plato an English classic.

Symonds.

Sellar.

Jowett.

Growth of a feeling for ancient art.

Thus the literary development of the century has been such as to draw Greek and Latin studies more and more out of scholastic isolation, and to bring them more and more into the general current of intellectual interests. A change, not less significant, has meanwhile been passing over the English appreciation of classical art. This has been, in its larger aspect, merely one branch of a movement dating from about the middle of the century, and tending to raise the

level of English education in regard to art of every kind. But special causes have favoured the diffusion of an interest in ancient art, and more particularly in that of Greece. Everywhere in the Hellenic lands the soil has been giving up its buried treasures, and revealing monuments hitherto unknown, or known only through books. Athens, Olympia, Mycenae, Delos, the Troad, Ephesus, Halicarnassus are only a few of the sites where pregnant discoveries have rewarded the spade. Increased facilities of travel have enabled thousands to become familiar with the scenes of Greek and Roman history, and so to follow with a keener interest the progress of such explorations. England, which had sent forth many of the earlier explorers, among whom Colonel Leake will always hold a place of honour, had for some time fallen behind other nations in such enterprise. Within the first half of this century, both France and Germany had established at Athens permanent centres for the promotion of research. It was not till 1883 that a British School of Archaeology was established there; but already it has done a considerable amount of good work; as, for instance, in its most recent undertaking, the excavations at Megalopolis in Arcadia. Again, the means of studying ancient art in this country have been enormously increased. The British Museum, which acquired the Elgin marbles in 1816, has throughout the century been receiving a series of invaluable additions, and was never before either so attractive or so highly organised as a place for the study of

classical antiquities. Then at several centres in different parts of the country there now exist good collections of casts from the antique, permitting a systematic survey of Greek and Roman sculpture. We see, then, how in art, as in literature, the course of the century has tended to enrich and to enlarge classical studies. Let us now look a little more closely at those studies themselves, and observe how far their scope and method have been altered during the same period. But, in order to understand this, we must throw our glance further back.

Development of classical studies.

For a long time after the revival of ancient literature men were occupied chiefly with the beauty of its form ; this is the period to which Erasmus belongs, though he himself was much more than a stylist. Next, study was attracted by the wealth of the subject-matter contained in the classics, and we have the labours of such men as Casaubon. The third stage is that of textual criticism, in which Bentley was a vigorous pioneer. So far, the general characteristic had been the predominance of individual genius. A strong personality arose, a man like one of those just named, and made an epoch. His work was emphatically his own ; and he was bound by no rules except such as he might lay down for his own guidance. But, as generations went on, and the literature of these studies grew in volume, students began to feel the need of more agreement on general principles. In the present century the scientific spirit has added the domain of these old studies to its conquests. Within the last fifty

years the comparative method has created a science of language. The study of manuscripts, as such, has become the science of palaeography; textual criticism is, within certain limits, a science; so is archaeology; or rather it is a group of kindred sciences. All this is excellent; though there are certain tendencies, incidental to this progress, which it is desirable to keep within due bounds. There is some danger, perhaps, lest, under the influence of high specialising, the various departments or sub-departments of classical study should become too much isolated from each other, and the larger view of the humanities should be lost. The other danger is lest the zeal for scientific precision should obscure the nature of the material with which all scholarship has to deal, viz., the creations of the human mind, in language, in literature, or in art. No study, concerned with such material, can attain its highest aim, unless the purely intellectual spirit of science is controlled by the literary and artistic sense, which is partly moral. To hold the balance between them must always be difficult, and is peculiarly difficult in an age like our own. But the rising generation of scholars, the future guardians of the classical tradition, will perhaps do well to heed these things.

Meanwhile, it is a matter for unqualified rejoicing that the study of antiquity has become wider and more real, and is now capable of satisfying a greater diversity of intellectual appetites. The gain here might be illustrated by a typical case,—that of

Thackeray, who in his charming "Notes of a Journey from Cornhill to Grand Cairo," records his first visit to Athens. He imagines the Greek Muse coming to him in a dream, and asking him if he is not charmed to be there; and he replies to her, "Madam, your company in youth was made so laboriously disagreeable to me that I can't at present reconcile myself to you in age." After an admirable description of the view from the Acropolis, he adds:—"Musing over this wonderful scene, perhaps I get some feeble glimpse or idea of that ancient Greek spirit which peopled it with sublime races of heroes and gods; and which I never could get out of a Greek book." Yet Thackeray had been at the famous school which, a little earlier, sent forth Thirlwall and Grote. Under the present methods, there is less danger that a boy of such gifts should have a like experience. Not only are the Greek books made more attractive, but there is an easier access to glimpses of Greek art. It may fairly be said that classical studies are now, on the whole, more efficient in this country than they ever were; they are at many points deeper; they are more comprehensive; and they are more in touch with the literary and artistic interests of the day.

The place of the classics in education.

I believe, too, that the classics will keep their place in our system of liberal education. This belief rests on the fact that their true claims are now more generally understood. Critical studies in history, in law, in language and in various branches of archaeology, have brought out the number and

complexity of the threads by which modern civilisation is interwoven with the ancient civilisations of Greece and Rome. The Greek mind stands out clearly as the great originating mind of Europe; it has given us not only standards of literature, not only models of art, but ideas which have been fruitful in every field of human thought and life. As Renan says, "Progress will eternally consist in developing what Greece conceived." The positive results of antiquity in special branches of knowledge, such as medicine or natural science, have indeed been absorbed into modern books. But if we desire to study antiquity itself, to see how ideas have been evolved, to understand, in short, the earlier chapters of our own history, then we must needs go to the mental records of our European ancestors. This constitutes the historical claim of the classics. On literary grounds their claim is two-fold; first, their intrinsic beauty, and their unexhausted wealth of suggestive thought. As to the latter, let us remember what is so well said by John Stuart Mill: "The discoveries of the ancients in science have been greatly surpassed, and as much of them as is still valuable loses nothing by being incorporated in modern treatises; but what does not so well admit of being transferred bodily, and has been very imperfectly carried off even piecemeal, is the treasure which they accumulated of what may be called the wisdom of life; the rich store of experience of human nature and conduct which the acute and observing minds of those ages, aided in their

observations by the greater simplicity of manners and life, consigned to their writings, and most of which retains all its value." Secondly, there is the fact that, either directly or indirectly, they have moulded, or at least helped to inspire, almost all the best writing of the modern world. Modern literature can be appreciated and enjoyed without their help. But the light which they can give adds zest to the enjoyment, and depth to the appreciation; and they alone can explain the process of development. On the third claim of the classics, the linguistic, it must suffice barely to touch. It is not necessary to dwell on the cardinal importance of Greek and Latin for the study of Comparative Philology and of general grammar. As instruments of mental training, again, they have the advantage of a structure organically distinct from the modern. The very freedom with which the order of words can be varied in a Greek or Latin sentence—a freedom unparalleled in any modern language—increases the value of the exercise in analysis. And when the classical languages are rhetorically, though not quite accurately, described as "dead," that very epithet suggests one of their chief recommendations. In a modern language, living authority can decide questions of usage or idiom; Greek and Latin, in which there is no such resource, make a more exacting demand on the learner's nicety of judgment. And this consideration applies not only in the province of language, but in the whole domain of classical study. It is good to have in our literary education at least one

large subject rich in problems which excite curiosity but do not admit of any certain solution. "Probability," as Bishop Butler says, "is the very guide of life"; and for probable reasoning, as distinguished from demonstrative, it would be hard to find a more varied field than is afforded by the classics.

Nearly three centuries ago Bacon spoke of those who "call upon men to sell their books and buy furnaces, forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan." He further expresses his opinion that the progress of knowledge has been retarded by a tendency to neglect the general training of the mind—"philosophy and universality," as he terms it—in favour of professional studies. It is no new thing, the question how far, and how best, we can combine *education*, the bringing out of the faculties, with *instruction*, the imparting of valuable knowledge. Modern life, so complex, so restless, and so competitive, naturally tends to insist first upon instruction; but, as no progress of science can enable men to think faster, a sound economy of educational time depends on the same principles as ever. Classical studies serve to inform the mind, in the proper sense of that word; they serve to mould and to train it: but they also instruct; and the uses of the knowledge which they can give are manifold. They cannot, indeed, create the literary faculty, though they seldom fail to improve it where it exists; nor can they humanise characters that resist their charm, though, where that power finds entrance, they vindicate their

title to be called the humanities. In any reasonable scheme of liberal education, studies such as these deserve to retain their place. As Mr Freeman, one of their staunchest defenders, once said, let them be "the objects of a reasonable homage," not "of an exclusive superstition." Nothing, I believe, would tend more to confirm the position of classical studies in this country than a deeper and more systematic study of modern languages and literatures. Every addition to the clearness with which we see the continuity of literary tradition in Europe must add force to the words which Dante addresses to the shade of Virgil, *Tu se' lo mio maestro e 'l mio autore;* for the relation of modern to ancient literature is that of a disciple who renounces no part of his originality or his independence when he acknowledges his debt to a master and a guide.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND NATIONAL LIFE[1].

Every country has educational problems of its own, intimately dependent on its social and economic conditions. The progressive study of education tends, indeed, towards a certain amount of general agreement on principles. But the crucial difficulties in framing and administering educational measures are very largely difficulties of detail; since an educational system, if it is to be workable, must be more or less accurately adjusted to all the complex circumstances of a given community. As one of those who are now visiting South Africa for the first time, I feel that what I bring with me from England is an interest in education, and some acquaintance with certain phases of it in the United Kingdom; but with regard to the inner nature of the educational questions which are now before this country, I am here to learn from those who can speak with knowledge. In this respect the British Association is doing for me very much what a famous bequest does for those young men whom it sends to Oxford; I am, in fact, a sort of Rhodes

[1] Meeting of the British Association in South Africa, 1905. The author's Address as President of the Section for Educational Science.

scholar from the other end,—not subject, happily, to an age-limit,—who will find here a delightful and instructive opportunity of enlarging his outlook on the world, and more particularly on the field of education.

As usage prescribes that the work of this Section, as of others, should be opened by an address from the Chair, I have ventured to take a subject suggested by one of the most striking phenomena of our time,—the growing importance of that part which Universities seem destined to play in the life of nations.

Among the developments of British intellectual life which marked the Victorian age, none was more remarkable, and none is more important to-day, than the rapid extension of a demand for University education, and the great increase in the number of institutions which supply it. In the year 1832 Oxford and Cambridge were the only Universities south of the Tweed, and their position was then far from satisfactory. Their range of studies was too narrow; their social operation was too limited. Then, by successive reforms, the quality of their teaching was improved, and its scope greatly enlarged; their doors were opened to classes of the community against which they had formerly been closed. But meanwhile the growing desire for higher education,—a result of the gradual improvement in elementary and secondary training,—was creating new institutions of various kinds. The earliest of these arose while access to Oxford and Cambridge

was still restricted. The University of Durham was established in 1833. In 1836 the University of London, as an examining and degree-giving body, received its first charter. A series of important Colleges, giving education of a University type, arose in the greater towns of England and Wales. The next step was the formation of federal Universities. The Victoria University, in which the Colleges of Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds were associated, received its charter in 1880. The Colleges of Aberystwyth, Bangor, and Cardiff were federated in the University of Wales, which dates from 1893. The latest development has been the institution of the great urban Universities. The foundation of the University of Birmingham hastened an event which other causes had already prepared. The federal Victoria University has been replaced by three independent Universities, those of Manchester, Liverpool, and Leeds. Lastly, a charter has recently been granted to the University of Sheffield. Then the University of London has been reconstituted; it is no longer only an Examining Board; it is also a teaching University, comprising a number of recognised schools in and around London. Thus in England and Wales there are now no fewer than ten teaching Universities. Among the newer institutions, there are some varieties of type. But, so far as the new Universities in great cities are concerned, it may be said that they are predominantly scientific, and also that they devote special attention to the needs of practical life, professional, industrial and

commercial; while at the same time they desire to maintain a high standard of general education. It may be observed that in some points these Universities have taken hints from the four ancient Universities of Scotland,—which themselves have lately undergone a process of temperate reform. The Scottish Universities are accessible to every class of the community; and the success with which they have helped to mould the intellectual life of a people traditionally zealous for education, renders their example instructive for the younger institutions. With reference to the provision made by the newer Universities for studies bearing on practical life, it should be remarked that much has been done in the same direction by the two older Universities also. At Cambridge, for example, degrees can be taken in Economics and associated branches of Political Science; in Mechanism and Applied Mechanics; and in Agricultural Sciences. It certainly cannot now be said that the old Universities neglect studies which are of direct utility, though they rightly insist that the basis and method of such studies shall be liberal.

In looking back on the general course of this whole movement in England, we find that it has been steady, smooth, and fairly rapid. It has not been due to any spasmodic impulse or artificial propaganda, but has been the result of natural forces, operating throughout the nation. Universities, and the training which they give, have come to count for more in our national life as a whole.

It should be noted in passing that the missionary movement known as University Extension did not arise in the first instance from spontaneous academic action, but was a response to public appeals from without. It had its origin in memorials addressed to the University of Cambridge, in 1872, by various public bodies ; and it was in compliance with those memorials that, in the winter of 1873, the first courses of Extension lectures were organised in the Midlands. Another fact of vital significance in the movement is that it has included ample provision for the higher education of women.

With reference to the present position and prospects of the higher education in South Africa, I tried, before leaving England, to acquaint myself with at least the outlines of the general situation; but it is only with great diffidence that I shall offer a few observations bearing on some of the broader aspects of the question. I trust to be heard with indulgence by those from whom I shall hope to learn more. At any rate I can truly say that the question seems to me one of the deepest interest and of the gravest importance. Indeed it does not require much insight or imagination to apprehend the greatness of the issues that are involved.

In the first place, it would be correct, if I am not mistaken, to say that in South Africa at large there is a genuine and a keen desire for efficient education of the highest type. A sound liberal education is desired for all who can profit by it, whatever their future callings are to be. But the practical and

immediate need for the organizing of the highest teaching is felt, I believe, more particularly in regard to three great professions;—the profession of Engineering, in all its branches; the profession of Agriculture (including Forestry); and the profession of Education itself, on which the intellectual future of South Africa must so largely and directly depend. That the interest in the higher instruction is so real, must be regarded as the best tribute to the efforts of those able and devoted men who, in various parts of this land, have laboured with dauntless perseverance for the improvement of Primary and Secondary Education. Unstinted gratitude is due also to the University of the Cape of Good Hope. It is acknowledged on all hands that the University, as the chief guardian of learning in South Africa, has done admirable work in maintaining a high standard of general education. Certainly it cannot be regarded as any disparagement of that work, if, as seems to be the case, a wide-spread desire exists that South Africa should possess an institution, or institutions, of University rank, which, besides examining, should also teach. That is a natural progress, which is illustrated by the recent reconstitution of the London University itself. I am not qualified, nor should I desire, to discuss the various difficulties of detail which surround the question of a teaching University. That question is, for South Africa, an eminently practical one; and doubtless it will be solved, possibly at no distant time, by those who

are most competent to deal with it. I will only venture to say a few words on some of the more general aspects of the matter.

The primary needs of daily life in a new country make demands for certain forms of higher training, —demands which may be unable to wait for the development of anything so complex and costly as a teaching University. It is necessary to provide a training for men who shall be able to supervise the building of houses, the making of roads, bridges, and railways, and to direct skilled labour in various useful arts and handicrafts. The first step in such a provision is to establish technical schools and institutes. Germany is, I suppose, the country where the educational possibilities of the technical school are realised in the amplest measure. In Germany the results of the highest education are systematically brought to bear on all the greater industries. But this highest education is not given only in completely equipped Universities which confer degrees. It is largely given in the institutions known as Technical High Schools. In these schools, teaching of a University standard is given by Professors of University rank in subjects such as Architecture, various branches of Engineering, Chemistry, and General Technical Science. There are, I think, some ten or eleven of these Technical High Schools in Germany. In these institutions, the teaching of the special art or science, on its theoretical side, is carried, I believe, to a point as high as could be attained in a University;

while on the practical side it is carried beyond the point which in a University would usually be possible. In England we have nothing, I believe, which properly corresponds to the German Technical High School; but we may expect to see some of the functions of such a school included among the functions of the new Universities in our great industrial and commercial towns.

Now Technical Schools or Institutes, which do not reach the level of a German Technical High School, may nevertheless be so planned as to be capable of being further developed as parts of a great teaching University. And the point which I now wish to note is this,—that the higher education given in a Technical Institute, which is only such, will not be quite the same as that given in the corresponding department of a teaching University. University education, as such, when it is efficient, has certain characteristics which differentiate it from the training of a specialist, however high the level of the teaching in the special subject may be. Here, however, I pause for a moment to guard against a possible misconception. I am not suggesting that the specialist training given in a technical institute, though limited, is not an excellent thing in itself; or that, in certain conditions and circumstances, it is not desirable to have such a training, attested by a diploma or certificate, instead of aiming at a University standard and a University degree. Universities themselves recognise this fact. They reserve their degrees for those who have had a

University training; but they also grant diplomas for proficiency in certain special branches of knowledge. Cambridge, for instance, gives a diploma in the Science and Practice of Agriculture; and the examinations for the diploma are open to persons who are not members of the University.

But the University training, whatever its subject, ought to give something which the purely specialist training does not give. What do we understand by a University education? What are its distinctive characteristics? The word *Universitas*, as you know, is merely a general term for a corporation, specially applied in the middle ages to a body of persons associated for purposes of study, who, by becoming a corporation, acquired certain immunities and privileges. Though a particular University might be strongest in a particular faculty, as Bologna was in Law and Paris in Theology, yet it is a traditional attribute of such a body that several different branches of higher study shall be represented in it. It is among the distinctive advantages of a University, that it brings together in one place students—by whom I mean teachers as well as learners—of various subjects. By doing this, the University tends to produce a general breadth of intellectual interests and sympathies; it enables the specialist to acquire some sense of the relations between his own pursuit and other pursuits; he is helped to perceive the largeness of knowledge. But, besides bringing together students of various subjects, it is the business of a University to see that each

subject shall be studied in such a manner as to afford some general discipline of the mental faculties. In his book on *The Idea of a University*, Newman says :—

"This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education ; and though there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is conceivable, or whose intellect would be a pattern of what intellects should be made, yet there is scarcely any one but may gain an idea of what real training is, and at least look towards it, and make its true scope and result, not something else, his standard of excellence ; and numbers there are who may submit themselves to it, and secure it to themselves in good measure. And to set forth the right standard, and to train according to it, and to help forward all students towards it according to their various capacities, this I conceive to be the business of a University."

It may be granted that the function of a University, as Newman here describes it, is not always realised ; Universities, like other human institutions, have their failures. But his words truly express the aim and tendency of the best University teaching. It belongs to the spirit of such teaching that it should nourish and sustain ideals ; and a University can do nothing better

for its sons than that; a vision of the ideal can guard monotony of work from becoming monotony of life. But there is yet another element of University training which must not be left out of account; it is, indeed, among the most vital of all. I mean that informal education which young men give to each other. Many of us, probably, in looking back on our undergraduate days, could say that the society of our contemporaries was not the least powerful of the educational influences which we experienced. The social life of the Colleges at Oxford and Cambridge is a most essential part of the training received there. In considering the questions of the higher education in South Africa, it is well to remember that the social intercourse of young students, under conditions such as a great residential University might provide, is an instrument of education which nothing else can replace. And it might be added that such social intercourse is also an excellent thing for the teachers.

The highest education, when it bears its proper fruit, gives not knowledge only, but mental culture. A man may be learned, and yet deficient in culture; that fact is implied by the word pedantry. "Culture," said Huxley, "certainly means something quite different from learning or technical skill. It implies the possession of an ideal, and the habit of critically estimating the value of things by a theoretic standard." "It is the love of knowledge," says Henry Sidgwick, "the ardour of scientific curiosity, driving us continually to absorb new facts and ideas,

to make them our own, and fit them into the living and growing system of our thought; and the trained faculty of doing this, the alert and supple intelligence exercised and continually developed in doing this—it is in these that culture essentially lies." And if this is what culture really means, evidently it cannot be regarded as something superfine,—as an intellectual luxury suited only for people who can lead lives of elegant leisure. Education consists in organising the resources of the human being; it seeks to give him powers which shall fit him for his social and physical world. One mark of an uneducated person is that he is embarrassed by any situation to which he is not accustomed. The educated person is able to deal with circumstances in which he has never been placed before; he is so, because he has acquired general conceptions; his imagination, his judgment, his powers of intelligent sympathy have been developed. The mental culture which includes such attributes is of inestimable value in the practical work of life, and especially in work of a pioneer kind. It is precisely in a country which presents new problems, where novel difficulties of all sorts have to be faced, where social and political questions assume complex forms for which experience furnishes no exact parallels,—it is precisely there that the largest and best gifts which the higher education can confer are most urgently demanded.

But how is culture, as distinct from mere knowledge, to be attained? The question arises

as soon as we turn from the machinery of the higher education to consider its essence, and the general aims which it has in view. Culture cannot be secured by planning courses of study, nor can it be adequately tested by the most ingenious system of examinations. But it would be generally allowed that a University training, if it is really successful, ought to result in giving culture, over and above such knowledge as the student may acquire in his particular branch or branches of study. We all know what Matthew Arnold did, a generation ago, to interpret and diffuse in England his conception of culture. The charm, the humour, and also the earnestness of the essays in which he pleaded that cause render them permanently attractive in themselves, while at the same time they have the historical interest of marking a phase in the progress of English thought and feeling about education. For, indeed, whatever may be the criticisms to which Arnold's treatment of the subject is open in detail, he truly indicated a great national defect; and by leading a multitude of educated persons to realise it, he helped to prepare the way for better things. Dealing with England as it was in the sixties, he complained that the bulk of the well-to-do classes were devoid of mental culture,—crude in their perceptions, insensible to beauty, and complacently impenetrable to ideas. If, during the last 30 or 40 years, there has been a marked improvement, the popular influence of Matthew Arnold's writings may fairly be numbered among the con-

tributory causes, though other and much more potent causes have also been at work. When we examine Arnold's own conception of culture, as expressed in successive essays, we find that it goes through a process of evolution. At first he means by culture a knowledge and love of the best literature, ancient and modern, and the influence on mind and manners which flows thence. Then his conception of culture becomes enlarged; it is now no longer solely or mainly aesthetic, but also intellectual; it includes receptivity of new ideas; it is even the passion for "seeing things as they really are." But there is yet a further development. True culture, in his final view, is not only aesthetic and intellectual; it is also moral and spiritual: its aim is, in his phrase, "the harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature." But, whether the scope which Arnold, at a particular moment, assigned to culture was narrower or wider, the instrument of culture with which he was chiefly concerned was always literature. Culture requires us, he said, to know ourselves and the world; and, as a means to this end, we must "know the best that has been thought and said in the world." By literature, then—as he once said in reply to Huxley—he did not mean merely *belles lettres*; he included the books which record the great results of science. But he insisted mainly on the best poetry and the highest eloquence. In comparing science and literature as general instruments of education,

Arnold observed that the power of intellect and knowledge is not the only one that goes to the building up of human life; there is also the power of conduct and the power of beauty. Literature, he said, serves to bring knowledge into relation with our sense for conduct and our sense for beauty. The greater and more fruitful is the progress of science, the greater is the need for humane letters, to establish and maintain a harmony between the new knowledge and those profound, unchanging instincts of our nature.

It is not surprising that, in the last third of the nineteenth century, Arnold's fascinating advocacy of literature, as the paramount agency of culture, should have incurred some criticism from the standpoint of science and of philosophy. The general drift of this criticism was that the claim which he made for literature, though just in many respects, was carried too far; and also that his conception of intellectual culture was inadequate. As a representative of such criticism, I would take the eminent philosopher whose own definition of culture has already been cited, Henry Sidgwick: for no one, I think, could put more incisively the particular point with which we are here concerned. "Matthew Arnold's method of seeking truth," says Sidgwick, "is a survival from a pre-scientific age. He is a man of letters pure and simple; and often seems quite serenely unconscious of the intellectual limitations of his type." The critic proceeds to enumerate some things which, as he affirms, are "quite alien to

the habitual thought of a mere man of letters." They are such as these ;—" How the crude matter of common experience is reduced to the order and system which constitutes it an object of scientific knowledge ; how the precisest possible conceptions are applied in the exact apprehension and analysis of facts, and how by facts thus established and analysed the conceptions in their turn are gradually rectified ; how the laws of nature are ascertained by the combined processes of induction and deduction, provisional assumption and careful verification ; how a general hypothesis is used to guide inquiry, and after due comparison with ascertained particulars, becomes an accepted theory ; and how a theory, receiving further confirmation, takes its place finally as an organic part of a vast, living, ever-growing system of knowledge." Sidgwick's conclusion is as follows :—" Intellectual culture, at the end of the nineteenth century, must include as its most essential element a scientific habit of mind ; and a scientific habit of mind can only be acquired by the methodical study of some part at least of what the human race has come scientifically to know."

There is nothing in that statement to which exception need be taken by the firmest believer in the value of literary education. The more serious and methodical studies of literature demand, in some measure, a scientific habit of mind, in the largest sense of that expression ; such a habit is necessary, for instance, in the study of history, in the scientific

study of language, and in the higher criticism. Nor, again, does any one question that the studies of the natural sciences are instruments of intellectual culture of the highest order. The powers of observation and of reasoning are thereby disciplined in manifold ways; and the scientific habit of mind so formed is in itself an education. To define and describe the modes in which that discipline operates on the mind, is a task for the man of science; it could not, of course, be attempted by any one whose own training has been wholly literary. But there is one fact which may be noted by any intelligent observer. Many of our most eminent teachers of science, and more especially of science in its technical applications, insist on a demand which, in the province of science, is analogous to a demand made in the province of literary study by those who wish such study to be a true instrument of culture. As the latter desire that literature should be a means of educating the student's intelligence and sympathies, so the teachers of science, whether pure or applied, insist on the necessity of cultivating the scientific imagination, of developing a power of initiative in the learner, and of drawing out his inventive faculties. They urge that, in the interests of the technical industries themselves, the great need is for a training which shall be more than technical,—which shall be thoroughly scientific. Wherever scientific and technical education attains its highest forms in institutions of University rank, the aim is not merely to form skilled craftsmen, but to produce

men who can contribute to the advance of their respective sciences and arts, men who can originate and invent. There is a vast world-competition in scientific progress, on which industrial and commercial progress must ultimately depend; and it is of national importance for every country that it should have men who are not merely expert in things already known, but who can take their places in the forefront of the onward march.

But meanwhile the claims of literary culture, as part of the general higher education, must not be neglected or undervalued. It may be that, in the pre-scientific age, those claims were occasionally stated in a somewhat exaggerated or one-sided manner. But it remains as true as ever that literary studies form an indispensable element of a really liberal education. And the educational value of good literature is all the greater in our day, because the progress of knowledge more and more enforces early specialisation. Good literature tends to preserve the breadth and variety of intellectual interests. It also tends to cultivate the sympathies; it exerts a humanizing influence by the clear and beautiful expression of noble thoughts and sentiments; by the contemplation of great actions and great characters; by following the varied development of human life, not only as an evolution governed by certain laws, but also as a drama full of interests which intimately concern us. Moreover, as has well been said, if literature be viewed as one of the fine arts, it is found to be the most altruistic of them all,

since it can educate a sensibility for other forms of beauty besides its own. The genius of a Ruskin can quicken our feeling for masterpieces of architecture, sculpture, and painting. Even a very limited study of literature, if it be only of the right quality, may provide permanent springs of refreshment for those whose principal studies and occupations are other than literary. We may recall here some weighty words written by one of the very greatest of modern men of science. "If I had to live my life again," said Charles Darwin, "I would have made it a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least once every week....The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature." The same lesson is enforced by John Stuart Mill, in that remarkable passage of his Autobiography where he describes how, while still a youth, he became aware of a serious defect, a great lacuna, in that severe intellectual training which, for him, had commenced in childhood. It was a training from which the influences of imaginative literature had been rigidly excluded. He turned to that literature for mental relief, and found what he wanted in the poetry of Wordsworth. "I had now learned by experience" —this is his comment—"that the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and required to be nourished and enriched as well as guided." Nor is it merely to the happi-

ness and mental well-being of the individual that literature can minister. By rendering his intelligence more flexible, by deepening his humanity, by increasing his power of comprehending others, by fostering worthy ideals, it will add something to his capacity for co-operating with his fellows in every station of life, and in every phase of action; it will make him a better citizen, and not only a more sympathetic but also a more efficient member of society.

One of the urgent problems of the higher education in our day is how to secure an adequate measure of literary culture to those students whose primary concern is with scientific and technical pursuits. Some of the younger English Universities, which give degrees in Science, contribute to this purpose by providing certain options in the Science curriculum; that is, a given number of scientific subjects being prescribed for study with a view to the degree of B.Sc., the candidate is allowed to substitute for one of these a subject taken from the Arts curriculum, such, for instance, as the Theory and Practice of Education. This is the case in the University of Wales and in the University of Birmingham; and there are indications, I believe, that this example will be followed elsewhere. Considering how hard and sustained is the work exacted from students of science, pure or applied, it seems important that the subjects from which they are to derive their literary culture should be presented to them, not in a dryasdust fashion,

not chiefly as subjects of examination, but rather as sources of recreation and changes of mental activity. From this point of view, for British students of science the best literature of the English language offers unequalled advantages. It may be mentioned that the Board of Education in London is giving particular attention to the place which English literature should hold in the examination of students at the Training Colleges, and has under consideration carefully planned courses of study, in which portions of the best English writers of prose and of verse are prescribed to be read in connexion with corresponding periods of English history; it being understood that the study of the literature shall be directed, not to philological or grammatical detail, but to the substance and meaning of the books, and to the leading characteristics of each writer's style. If, on the other hand, the student is to derive his literary culture, wholly or in part, from a foreign literature, ancient or modern, then it will be most desirable that, before leaving school, he should have surmounted the initial difficulties of grammar, and should have learned to read the foreign language with tolerable ease.

When we look at this problem,—how to combine the scientific and the literary elements of culture,—in the light of existing or prospective conditions in South Africa, it appears natural to suppose that, in a teaching University, the Faculty of Education would be that with which literary studies would be more particularly connected. And if students of

practical sciences, such as Engineering and Agriculture, were brought together at the same centre where the Faculty of Education had its seat, then it should not be difficult, without unduly trenching on the time demanded by scientific or technical studies, to provide such students with facilities for some measure of good literary training.

A further subject is necessarily suggested by that with which we have been dealing,—I mean the relation of University to Secondary Education; but on that I can only touch very briefly. Before University Education can be widely efficient, it is indispensable that Secondary Education should be fairly well developed and organised. Secondary Education should be intelligent,—liberal in spirit,—not too much trammelled by the somewhat mechanical uniformity apt to result from working for external examinations, but sufficiently elastic to allow for different aptitudes in the pupils, and to afford scope for the free initiative of able teachers. It is a gain for the continuity of education when a school-leaving examination can be accepted as giving admission to the University. Such an examination must be conducted under the authority of the University; but there is much to be said in favour of the view that, under proper safeguards, the school-teachers should have a part in the examination; always provided that the ultimate control, and the decision in all cases of doubt, shall rest with the University. A system of school-leaving examinations for this country was earnestly advocated, I believe, by Mr P. A. Barnett, who has achieved

such excellent work for the cause of education in Natal. To discuss the advantages or difficulties of such a proposal, as they at present affect South Africa, would demand knowledge which I do not possess; and I must content myself with the expression of a hope that in days to come,—perhaps in a not distant future,—it may be found practicable to form such a link between the highest education and the grade next below it.

But the limit of time proper for a Chairman's address has now almost been reached. I thank you sincerely for the kindness and patience with which you have heard me. In conclusion, I would only say how entirely I share a conviction which has been expressed by one to whose ability, to whose generous enthusiasm and unflagging efforts the cause of education in this country owes an incalculable debt,—I refer to Mr E. B. Sargant. Like him, I believe that the progress of education in all its grades, from the lowest to the highest, is the agency which, more surely than any other, will conduce to the prosperity and the unity of South Africa. For all workers in that great cause it must be an inspiring thought that they are engaged in promoting the most fundamental and the most far-reaching of national interests. They are endeavouring to secure that the men and women to whom the future of this country belongs shall be equal to their responsibilities and worthy of their inheritance. In that endeavour the sympathies which they carry with them are world-wide. As we come to see, more and more clearly, that the

highest education is not only a national but an Imperial concern, there is a growing desire for interchange of counsels and for active co-operation between the educational institutions of the Colonies and those of the Mother Country. The development of education in South Africa will command keen attention, and will be followed by earnest good wishes, not only in England but throughout the British dominions. One of the ideas which are bound up with the history and the traditions of our English public schools and Universities is the idea of efficient work for the State. Those institutions have been largely moulded, from generation to generation, by the aim of ensuring a supply of men qualified to bear a worthy part, either in the government of the nation, or in professional activities which are indispensable to the national welfare. In our own time, and more especially within the last thirty years, one particular aspect of that idea is illustrated by the closer connexions which have been formed between the Universities and the higher branches of the Civil Service. The conception of work for the commonweal is in its turn inseparable from loyalty to those ideals of character and conduct by which English life and public policy have been built up. It is by the long and gradual training which such ideals have given that our race has been fitted to grapple with responsibilities which have inevitably grown, both in extent and in complexity, far beyond anything of which our forefathers could have dreamed. That training tends also to national self-knowledge; it makes for

a sober estimate of our national qualities and defects; it quickens a national sense of duty to our neighbour. The munificence of a far-sighted statesman has provided that selected youths, whose homes are in this land, and whose life-work may be here, shall go for a while to England, shall breathe the intellectual and social atmosphere of a great English University, and shall learn to judge for themselves of the sources from which the best English traditions have flowed. That is excellent. But it is also most desirable that those traditions should pass as living forces into the higher teaching of South Africa itself, and that their spirit should animate educational institutions whose special forms have been moulded by local requirements. That, indeed, has been, and is, the fervent wish of men whose labours for South African education have already borne abundant fruit, and are destined to bear yet larger fruit in the future. May those labours prosper, and may that wish be fulfilled! The sooner will come the day when the inhabitants of this country, this country of vast and still indefinite possibilities, will be able to feel, in a sense higher and deeper than citizens of the Roman Empire could conceive, "*Cuncti gens una sumus*," "We are all one people." If the work which lies before us, in this Section of the British Association, should result in contributing anything towards the promotion of those great objects, by helping to elucidate the conditions of further progress, our deliberations will not have been held in vain.

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